USE OF HOMOSEXUALS BY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03104136
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 22, 2024
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2024
• Case Number: F-2020-01929
• Publication Date: July 5, 1950

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THIA DIRECTOR Or CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
IUBJECT: Use of Homosexuals by Intelligence lervices
1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 27 June addressed
to you by the Assistant General Counsel, subject generalaskilineire,
wherein background material and case examples _o_n_tkette-Subject were
revasted from this Office to be ueLe4A-te-fIlmony before the Investi-
gation Subcommittee of t4s-&eExpenditures Committee which is
presently investigating homosexuals in the Government
servi
2. In general, while there is considerable available information
and while there has been a great deal of general discussion of t4e-Use
of homosexials by foreign intelligence services read partierrarly of the
use of homosexuality as a control mechanism, 011,rttres et the present
time do not contain a large number of,docntented cases suitable for
citing. It can be accurately stata:, however, that the use of homo-
sexuals as s controLever" individuals recruited for espionage is a
penerelly aceeate'dtechnique which has been used at least on a limited
ieThr many years.
3, With reference to the o:eerational policies of this Office,
can be stated that homosexuals are considered as security risks-and
every effort is made to screen thoroughly all applicants'fOr positions
with OSO to this end.
_
4. With regard to the Subcommitteels_rgenest.fer-tp-acific case
examples that have come to theAttenttMi-of CIA abroad wherein foreign
�
governments have,madeet-Of homosexuals for intelligence or espionage
a.uj:Aecse&,- e ,c1lowing cases are submitted:
British Intelligence
(1) A number of staff officers who have been employed by
the British services are considered by.f�la.airmtbileagues as
homosexuals. The BrItAshr-h , appear to consider each
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-case individually.
(2) Daring World War II, a German Abwehr Agent
Olympic swimmer, was successful in, obtaining ffoebook of
the British Ambassador to Portugal, ebook was of such
importance that the British co red it vital to recover it.
Through their intelligen rvice they were t-7131e to discover
that the German a as a homosexual and through exploiting
this factor able to retrieve the notebook. (Yirther
deta .e to the exact approach made are unavailable.)
(3)
(4) Ihrring World Wax II three individualer-4-derie&-by
the Italian'Special Tribunal for_the-Derers-rof the State
charged with mi1itaxy4dvirilicel espionage on behalf of
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England. All three individuals were confirmed homosexu
as was their cut-out, an important Swiss official�a4yeftoned
in Rome. The principal agent was recruited,por'Intelligence
work by the Swiss, who was a friend of,lwrig standing. He,
in turn, entered into intimate relaAtans with the two other
individuals, one a German, an4-ione en Italian. Controlling
them emotionally, he was,el'cin able to obtain from them infor-
mation of espionage,vtfle. Although the subagents in their
testimony den19A-15ny knowledge that their information was
being tranarrilted to a foreign power, the principal agent
test 441'thst they were both aware of the purpose of their
onage sctivities.
b. German Intelligence
(1) Even prior to the war, the Nazis made exte aerlIse of
homosexual inclinations in order to elimin mestic opposi-
tion and strengthen the Party. In the -known case of
Colonel General Fritsch which is ented in detail in
Giseviusl book "To the Bitte d", an attempt was made to
eliminate him through s measures. ,FRITSCH, who was an
active anti-Nazi, r framed by the Nazis in a washroom
incident and &b.t to court martial. Fortunately the Nazis
were unab o secure a conviction. FRITSCH was in feet not
a hom. -xual and was able to nrove that he had been mistakenly
1. if led. with a homosexual of the same name despite the
ramed incident.
(2) During the War, an Ambassador of en allie&mrtn'n
stationed in Ankara was discovered byIjle-JGef5fams to be a
homosexual. They were succesirplanting as his butler
and handyman an AlbaSan-htgosexual who msnaged to gain the
Ambassadorls c5,fieltlice and affection. As a result of his
trusted po tren the butler was able to obtain a key to the
Amba orls safe on behalf of the Germans who then photo-
plied all documents placed in the safe.
(3) Although the list is not currently available_in_OS0,-
it has been reported that German Intelllgmale-hampiled an
extensive list, by co1int44,,trargervias holding important
governmental posi . This information allegedly wes in-
tended to.sed for blackmail and subversion purposes.
c. Russian Intelligence
(1) The following case, altasx.44--11VT51c, may be taken
as a classic example vulnerability of homosexuals
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holding strategic positions:
(a) In 1900, a young captrin in the Austrian
service named Raedl, after finishing the General Staff
Academy was assigned to the Counter-Intelligence Division
of the Austrian G-2. He wat intelligent, energetic, and
above all honest. At that time in Austria, it was the
custom that half the government money in the CI service
reached the pocket of the officers themselves, so the
service was very poor for lack of funds. Reed]. directed
all his funds against penetrating the Russians and during
his first two years inflicted great &image on Russian net-
works in Austria. Through numerous court trials, the
Russian Intelligence Service managed to identify "raefilL who
by that time had become chief of the Austrian CI service.
The Russians now made an all-out effort to learn the
details of Raedlls personal life. They soon were able to
observe that he was never seen in the compeny of women.
Through a young newspaper boy they were able to discover
that Raedl was a homosexual- and had made improper advances
to the boy.
This was the turning point of the case. Under Austrian
law no officer could be tolerated in the army with such
inclinations and if Raedl were denounced he would undoubted-
ly be dismissed. The Russians decided to get definite proof
and to this purpose were able to substitute another news-
paper boy in their employ. This boy was soon able to con-
firm Raedlls tendencies.
At first the Russians considered denouncing Raedl at
once, but then decided to attempt to make better use of the
knowledge they had gained. During the summer the boy, who
had become,very close to Raedl, suggested that they take a
vacation someplace other than Vienna. They travelled to a
hotel in the Tyrol where a Russian official also took a
room. Through the boy, a copy was made of the key to Raedlts
room and then, in accordance with a detailed plan arranged
with the boy, Raedl was caught in flagrante delictu. He
was immediately threatened with official exposure and,
through fear, agreed_ to furnish the Russians with valuable
intelligence which he had access to by virtue of his posi-
tion. A suitable cut-out was arranged, a woman, so that
Raedl would not learn too much concerning Rassian intelli-
gence officials in the event that he should change his mind.
As his first assignment Raedl furnished the Russians
with Austrian mobilization plans to be used in the event
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of a wax with Russia. He also doctored or destroyed,
over a period of years, information reports received
from AuStrian networks within Russia. The results of
his treachery were so extensive that at the outbreak of
war in 1914, the Austrian and German staffs were com-
pletely misinformed on the number of existing Russian
divisions.
At one point during Reedits activity, an Austrian
agent in Warsaw reported that there were indications
that Russia was in possession of Austria's mobilization
Plans. In order to save his own skin, Raedl decided to
place the blame on some other Austrian agent who was in
fact working for Russia. As Chief of the CI service he
knew which agents were suspected as doubles. He asked
permission from Russia for this step but before receiving
a reply he proceeded to turn over three suspects for
investigation. The men could not be convicted, however,
thron41 lack of definite proof. Russia ultimately de-
cided that Raedl was of more importance to them than the
three agents and furnished the necessary proof to Raedl
in the form of photostats of messages received from the
suspects. Raedl produced the document in court as a
result of which the men were found guilty and hanged. In
return for this service, however, the Russians demanded
from Raedl a complete list of Austrian agents in Russia.
Raedl also managed to report to the Russians the
name of a Russian Colonel who had offered to furnish the
Austrians with Russian mobilization plans. Consequently
the Austrians paid a large sum of money for a batch of
worthless papers and the Colonel in question was liquidated.
Raedl was finally exposed quite incidentally in 1913
through censorship measures which were then put into effect
by the Austrian Government. Because of the tenseness of
the international situation, most Russian nationals were
forced by Austria to leave the country, thus presenting
operational difficulties to the Russian intelligence
service. The Russians attempted to send money to Raedl
through a post office box not realizing that Austrian
censorship controls were in effect. Because of the size
of the sum, it attracted. Austrian attention; Awatch was
kept on the post office box and Raedl was identified after
picking up the money. He was put under house arrest and
shortly thereafter committed suicide.
In conclusion it may be said that the Russians, con-
trolling Raedl through fear of exposure of his homosexuality,
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almost completely neutralized the efforts of t ustrien
service in their direction over a period years. Not
only did they have the identities of Austrian agents
in Russia, but in gaining veins, Irmilitery intelligence
and feeding hank deception erial through Raeal they
put both Austria and. G .any at a definite disadvantage
at the opening of d War I. When the Germans learned of
Reedits case " Chief of the Austrian General Staff him-
self was �era_ to make an investigation with the result
that entire General Staff was changed. This also, of
c se, was a distinct disadvantage to a country entering
upon a war.
(2) During 1948, reports were received from a sourceAT
doubtful realibility indicating that an American lawycVWes
active as an agent for foreign Communist grottos and4rinecial-
ized in rapidly obtaining for foreign agents Unite4d States
Immigration visas through his excellent contacts within the
State Departhent. Source claimed that the,TaWyer was a homo-
sexual and maintained his strangely exc9itent contacts within
the Department through homosexual f4efids who assisted him
through their ability and inf1uen9X Source further claimed
that as a result, a complete hptWork of homosexuals em)loyed
in responsible positions wffrieing utilized by Soviet agents
and that Part of the ne wbirk penetrated deeply into the State
Department. The law
ship with the br
was made ava46
it originn
source
nort
WPS further said to be in law Partner-
er of a United States Senator. This report
le to an Embassy official in the country where
Because of the general unreliability of the
the sensational and serious allegations in his re-
it was not formally disseminated to the State Department
ashington pending clarification. A thorough investigation
ilea to substantiate or confirm source's claims.
(3)
(4) The use of homosexuality for purposes._q retraitment,
blackmail and control has been a freclikg4t-t-'661-inique of the
Soviet Intelligence Services, has been particularly true
of the organs of State�Seffeity. It is known that for many
years the MGT_axArt'ts predecessor organizations in Moscow have
directO,Antensive recruitment efforts against foreign diplomats
weve homosexual tendencies. Standard operating procedures
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in these cases has been for Soviet IntellIgerrde to confront
these individuals at the appropriate tiMe with photographic
and. other evidence of homoefaemet acts endeavoring to recruit
them in this way barabkriail. It is known that a number of
such a-oproa,9hoer-tO foreign diplomats in Moscow were successful
in pas4* litre. Unfortunately, the files of 050 do not contain
5Mantation for these cases.
5. A review of the above espionage and subversion, cases in which
homosexuality figures, reflects the following points of major interest
which should be considered in any investigation of the general security
of homosexuals:
a. Coercion and blackmail of homosexuals is particularly effec-
tive when: (1) homosexuality is universally condemned. and. actively
attacked by the society in which the subject lives as illustrated by the
Raedl case; (2) laws against homosexuality arc promulgated and. enforced.
The liazis in particular endeavored to coerce members of the German General
Staff, the church, or -any opponents of their system by the creation of
strict laws the enforcement of which provided a powerful pressure weapon.
Colonel General Fritsch is only one example of their attempts to remove
opposition throuda this device.
b. Under other conditions, a real security hazard lies in the
suscepti ility of homosexuals to inducement to cooperation in espionage
on the bass of the following factors:
An established homosexual relationship involving
emotions strong or stronger than a normal love-relationship.
(2) The f that homosexuality frequently is accompanied.
by other exploita131-� weaknesses, such as excessive use of
alcohol, use of narco cs, physical cowardice, susceptibility
to pressure and general stability thus making the individual
doubly vulnerable.
(3) The known psychologicaNusceptibility of the passive
homosexual particularly to dominatlan by aggressive personalities
in any number or in any situation, s may have been the moving
factor in the case of the Ambassador in are.
(4-.) The comparative ease with which pia� where homosexuals
congregate, i.e. bars, restaurants, ni6#t clubs, an be identi-
fied in any reasonably large community makes it pos �ble for a
recruit in agent to use hotosexuality as an excuse fo he
development of a clandestine relationship, which can lat he
directed to espionage Purposes with or without the knowled of
the subject. In this regard homosexuals have a definite
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similarity to other illegal groups such as crime, smugglers,
black marketeers, dope addicts, etc.
(5) The strong bonds and,laynities existing between homo-
sexuals which makes them s