CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03031338
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 11, 1960

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11 August 1960
Copy No. C 71
CENTRAL
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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11 AUGUST 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Plans being made for another meeting of
all Communist parties in effort to re-
solve Moscow-Peiping differences.
Comment on Khrushchev's hint he may
participate in UN disarmament debate.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Pakistan agrees to discuss Moscow's of-
fer of oil exploration assistance.
UAR stepping up drive to expand its con-
tacts and influence throughout Africa.
LATE ITEMS
Comment on Congo situation.
Comment on situation in Laos.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
International Communism: Plans reportedly are being
made to hold another meeting of representatives of all Com-
munist parties in a continuing attempt to resolve Moscow's
and Peiping's conflicting views. The failure of the recent
Bucharest meeting to provide a real resolution of the con-
flict apparently resulted in the formation of an international
Communist commission to plan for such a meeting. It will
probably be held in Moscow in conjunction with the USSR's
October Revolution celebration. In addition to its serious con-
cern with the unfavorable effects of the dispute on the image of
bloc strength and unity, Moscow is probably increasingly wor-
ried by the strain it imposes on national Communist parties
whose traditional left-right disagreements are being exacer-
bated by the Moscow-Peiping rift.
(Page 1)
USSR-UN: Khrushchev's hint that he may participate in
the UN General Assembly's disarmament debate suggests that
he sees a repeat performance at the UN as a means of refur-
bishing the peaceful image he attempted to create last Septem-
ber, when he unveiled his complete and general disarmament
scheme before the General Assembly. An appearance at the
UN, in conjunction with possible visits to Cuba or Mexico,
would also provide an opportunity for some "dramatic" new
gesture such as calling for a world disarmament conference.
Khrushchey's hint probably was timed to strengthen the efforts
of the Soviet UN delegation to prevent a meeting of the UN Dis-
armament Commission as requested by the US.
(Page 3)
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Pakistan-USSR: Pakistan's announcement that it welcomes
a Soviet proposal to discuss details of oil exploration assistance /..,
Is symptomatic of Pakistan's desire to enhance its aid from a- rr
road by introducing competition between the US and the bloc.
e Soviet proposal, originally made in 1958, was renewed in I
response to a Pakistani initiative last Ma( President Ayub i() 3
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probably does not intend to jeopardize Pakistan's alliance with
the US, but he presumably hopes to arouse apprehension that
Pakistan is moving toward a more "independent" policy.
(Page 4)
UAR-Africa: The UAR is stepping up its drive to expand its
contacts with and support for African nationalist leaders, and
to increase its relations with the newly independent states. Ma-
terial and moral support is being given to nationalist and Islamic
elements in Angola, Senegal, French Somaliland, the Rhodesias,
Kenya, Congo, Uganda, South and Southwest Africa, and Nigeria.
Headquarters for African nationalists has been set up in Cairo;
Radio Cairo continues its inflammatory Swahili broadcasts to
East Africa, aimed especially at the British protectorate of Zan-
zibar.
Apparently hoping to play an influential role in the Congo,
the UAR is maintaining direct contacts with Lumumba and is to
hold military discussions with Ghanaian officials concerning
"steps which should be taken in the Congo crisis."
(Page 5) (Map)
LATE ITEMS
i a
*Republic of the Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold is
expected to arrive in the Congo on 11 August and to proceed on
Friday to Elisabethville where Katanga Premier Tshornbe has
stated he is prepared to begin negotiations for entry of UN troops-4?0,th
11 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF
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into Katanga. Congo Premier Lumumba on 10 August
threatened an "invasion" of Katanga, and hinted he may
attempt to arrest Tshombe as a traitor. Despite his ef-
forts to reconstitute the Force Publique, Lumumba prob-
ably has no more than a few hundred troops loyal to him-
self, however, and no Congolese aircraft with which to
airlift them to Katanga.
In Leopoldville, there have been anti-Lumumba dis-
turbances for the second consecutive day. Possibly in re-
action to rumors of a coup attempt, Congolese police on
10 August raided the office of the Abako party, which on
8 August passed a motion of no confidence against Lumumba.
Several Abako adherents were reportedly wounded when
firing broke out, but reports that Lumumba himself was in-
jured in street demonstrations have been denied by an aide.
The premier has warned that large numbers of Europeans
would shortly be arrested for "plotting against the Congo,"
a threat which may lead to a new exodus by Belgians, in-
cluding those in Katanga.
Brussels continues critical of the US for supporting the
UN resolution calling for the "immediate" withdrawal of
Belgian troops from Katanga and for activity allegedly pre-
judicial to Belgian interests. -Although Foreign Minister
Wigny has indicated that all Belgian troops could be evacuated
from the Congo by 21 August, Brussels still may hope to a-
void a commitment concerning a date for the evacuation of
its Congo bases. - /Public criticism of Prime Minister Eyskens'
government hag' sparked new rumors he may soon relsian
area controlled by the rebellious second
parachute battalion and other small units allied witil it
still is apparently restricted to the Vientiane avian
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nme provisional executive committee-
announced in in Vientiane by the revolutionary high command SiLLA__
contains diverse elements unified mainly by their dislike of the
11 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iii
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Somsanith regime. Armed forces Commander General
Ouane flew from Luang Prabang to Vientiane on 10 August,
apparently to ascertain the rebels' terms. The possibility
exists, however, that he might join them. Any compromise
between the two contending regimes would in all likelihood
lead to some loosening of Laos' ties with the United States
and to an effort to reach a settlement with the Communist
Pathet Lao. (Page 6)
III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the im-
mediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US
allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate
future.
C. The following developments are susceptible of direct ex-
ploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could
jeopardize the US in the immediate future:
While the origin and objectives of the 9 August
coup in Laos are still unclear, there are indi-
cations that anti-US neutralist factions may be
directing it. The internal developments create
a situation favoring Communist exploitation,
particularly Pathet Lao. There are no indications
of any Chinese Communist or North Vietnamese
intention to intervene overtly. The danger of
such overt intervention would be greater if Thai-
land or South Vietnam were to intervene militarily.
*The Director of Naval Intelligence and the
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army, feel that the situation
11 Aug 60
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best described simply as one which presents
opportunities for Communist exploitation with-
out regard to the many possibilities for which
11
there are as yet no indications.
11 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF
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Lrobable Future High-Level Communist Meeting
Plans are being made to hold another meeting of represent-
atives of all Communist parties in an attempt to resolve the
conflict of views which continues to divide the Soviet Union
and Communist China
Most parties, either through
conviction or as a result of Soviet pressure, supported the So-
viet Union at Bucharest. However, even after a 24 June meet-
ing of representatives of the bloc countries had agreed on an
innocuous resolution stressing unity, the Chinese delegate
carried his country's opposing views to larger meetings of
representatives of all Communist parties on 25 and 26 June.
Apparently on the suggestion of the Rumanian delegate,
who was chairing the meetings, an international commission--
comprising both bloc and nonbloc delegates--was established
to prepare for another conference. This will probably be held
in Moscow in conjunction with the USSR's October. Revolution cele-
bration. In November 1957 a similar meeting attended by Mao
Tse-tung worked out a declaration which was instrumental in
maintaining a facade of unity for some time thereafter.
In addition to its serious concern with the unfavorable ef-
fects of the dispute on the image of bloc strength and unity,
Moscow is probably increasingly worried over the strain it
imposes within national Communist parties whose traditional
left-right disagreements are being exacerbated by the existence
of two opposing views at the apex of the Communist movement.
Although the more disciplined and closely controlled bloc
parties have swung behind the Soviet Union in the dispute,
especially since the Bucharest meeting, there were indications
earlier that support existed within certain of these parties for
some of the Chinese views.
Prior to the Bucharest meeting the Chinese also lobbied
for their point of view in such international front organizations
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Las the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade
Unions. This led to furious discussion in these bodies, there-
by confusing the Communists who make up their membership
and reducing the effectiveness of their appeal.
Within Communist parties of the free world the debate
between the Soviet Union and China has been mirrored in de-
bates between leftist, internationalist factions, who borrow
from Chinese declarations for support, and rightist, nation-
alist groups, who rely on Soviet arguments. In India, for
example, the Communist monthly journal has been reprinting
Chinese speeches and the inflammatory Red Flag articles,
while the weekly publication reprints Soviet speeches and state-
ments. A similar situation apparently exists within the Iraqi
Communist party, and, among others, within some Latin Ameri-
can parties.
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IILL 1,1.01-4.111 I 1 Pt lad
Khrushchev Hints He May Again Address UN General Assembly
On Disarmament
Khrushchev's hint in a 9 August Pravda interview that he would
participate in the UN General Assembly disarmament debate this
fall suggests that he sees a repeat performance at the UN as a means
of refurbishing the image of himself as peacemaker which he at-
tempted to create last September, when he unveiled his scheme for
� general and complete disarmament before the General Assembly.
Khrushchev repeated his defense of the Soviet walkout from the ten
nation disarmament talks in Geneva last June and renewed his at-
tacks on the Western disarmament policy, which he again called
"control without disarmament." The interview was probably timed
to bolster the Soviet delegation's efforts to prevent the meeting of
the UN Disarmament Commission, scheduled on 16 August, which
the USSR probably feels would lessen the impact of an appearance�
by Khrushchev before the General Assembly in September.
Khrushchev may seek to use the UN once again as a forum for
announcing a dramatic new disarmament proposal, such as urging
a world disarmament conference. On 11 July the Communist-front
World Peace Council called for a disarmament conference to be at-
tended by all states, whether or not they are members of the UN,
and announced it would undertake a major agitation campaign on
the model of the 1950 Stockholm Appeal. Both the council's pres-
ident and the Soviet delegate to it claimed that the omission of
Communist China had given disarmament conferences of the past
ten years an "air of unreality." In anticipation of Western propos-
als to bring about an early resumption of disarmament talks, Ithru-
shchev may call for a world disarmament conference or the inclu-
sion of Communist China and neutral countries as a means of avoid-
ing serious negotiations on this subject until a new US administra-
tion takes office. In his letters to the Western powers in late July,
Khrushchev asserted that the question of inviting other states to
join the talks would arise during the UN session.
Khrushchev may be contemplating an appearance before the
General Assembly in conjunction with possible visits to Cuba and
Mexico. Raul Castro recently stated that Khrushchev had set a
definite date for a trip to Havana, but Mexican officials continue
to deny that he has been invited to attend Mexico's independence
celebrations.
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Proposed Soviet Oil Exploration Assistance to Pakistan
Pakistan's announcement that it welcomes a Soviet proposal
to send a delegation to discuss details of assisting in the ex-
ploration of mineral�especially oil--resources shows Rawal-
pindi's desire to increase its aid from abroad by introducing
competition between the US and the bloc. President Ayub pre-
sumably hopes to arouse apprehension that Pakistan is moving
toward a more independent policy, but he probably does not
intend to Jeopardize Pakistan's alliance with the United States.
Many Pakistanis have argued for some time that India has
secured larger amounts of foreign aid because it accepts help
from both free-world and Communist countries. Recent So-
viet successes in discovering oil deposits in India and Afghan-
istan probably have also been factors in Rawalpindi's decision
to seek Soviet help in this field.
The Soviet proposal was originally made in ima and was
renewed in response to a Pakistani inquiry last May. In their
public announcements each country, however, now is trying
to make it appear that it is responding to the initiative of the
other.
The Pakistani military regime may hope that its show of
"independence" will strengthen its support among the people,
many of whom entertain strong' thoiwI usually latent, neutral-
ist sentiments.
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UAR Stepping Up Support for African Nationalists
The UAR is intensifying its drive to expand its contacts
with and support of individual African nationalist leaders as
well as tighten its ties with the newly independent states. Con-
vinced that Cairo's mission is to be the center of "anti-imperial-
ist" activities and the leader of the Moslem world, Nasir is at-
tempting to extend his leadership further into the African conti-
nent.
Funds have been given to or allotted for nationalist leaders
in Kenya, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, the Congo, Nyasa-
land, and Basutoland, and Islamic leaders in Nigeria and Sene-
gal. Money for an Arabic printing press in the Somali Republic
was made available in early July, and $11,200 was sent to London
on 21 July for the support of UAR activities among African nation-
als there. As early as last February Patrice Lumumba received a
$21,000 gift from Nasir.
'In late July contact was made with Angolan "revolutionary"
leaders and arrangements were made to bring them to Cairo. Ef-
forts were being made last May to transfer South African nation-
alist headquarters to Cairo. Similar efforts have been made with
respect to Southwest Africa. Ugandan and Eritrean nationalists
have been smuggled to Cairo.
Cairo radio meanwhile continues its anti-Western Swahili
language broadcasts to East Africa. These have taken on an in-
creasingly strident tone and many have been aimed at Zanzibar,
where there has been opposition to the establishment of US satel-
lite tracking installations.
In addition to the UAR's direct contacts with Congo Premier
Lumurnba, Nasir informed President Nkrumah of Ghana on 7 Au-
gust that he supported Ghanaian plans for "military aid to the
Congo outside the scope of the United Nations." Cairo radio an-
nounced on 10 August that a military mission will leave for Accra
to discuss "what steps should be taken in the Congo crisis."
-TOP SECRET
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Laotian Coup Developments:
The area controlled by the rebellious second parachute battalion
and other small units allied with it apparently still does not extend
beyond Vientiane and its immediate environs.
The provisional executive committee announced by the revolutionary
high command in Vientiane on 10 August is a diverse group united
mainly by hostility toward the Somsanith government. Its most
prominent member is Souvanna Phouma, a former premier who has
long advocated stricter neutrality for Laos and believes the Communist
Pathet Lao can be more easily handled if brought back into the national
community than if forced to continue in armed insurrection. Also on
the committee are two generals whose quarrel with the government
was based on personal considerations of advancement and opportunities
for graft rather than on ideological considerations. A number of
disgruntled politicians of varying degrees of leftist persuasion are also
included, among them Bong Souvannavong, a neutralist politician who
long served as an apologist for the Pathet Lao. Two of Bong's extreme
leftist sons appear to have played an important role in the coup.
The Somsanith government apparently will try to mount a counter-
offensive against the Vientiane group from Luang Prabang. There is
some indication that :Defense Minister General Phoumi is shuttling
between Thailand and southern Laos in an effort to organize loyalist
support in that area. The task of dislodging the rebels from Vientiane
by military means during the current rainy season may be sufficiently
difficult to dispore Somsanith toward some form of compromise with
the revolutionary group. Armed Forces Commander General Ouane's
arrival in Vientiane on 10 August apparently represented an effort to
find out the rebels' terms. There is some danger that Duane may be
won over to the rebel cause, however, and it seems hardly likely that
he will be permitted to leave the capital.
Any compromise between the two contending regimes would in all
likelihood lead to some loosening of Laos' ties with the United States,
TOP SECRET
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a friendlier policy toward the Sino-Soviet bloc, and an effort to
reach a negotiated settlement with the Pat,het Lao. According to one
report the rebels have told Ouane that their terms include the
designation of Souvanna Phouma as premier, "true neutrality, "
and a rapprochement with the Pathet Lao:j
Communist China so far has not reported the coup; North
Vietnam broadcasts indicate sympathy for the rebels. Although
Hanoi has not specifically endorsed the Kong Le clique, it has
rebroadcast rebel communiqu�and criticized the Somsanith
government.
--TOP-SEeRET
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-CONFIDENTIAL-
Vs,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
' Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
, The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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