CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/11/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03031312
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: November 2, 1959

Approved
TOP SECRET,
DOCUMENT NO.
De (MANDE IN CLASS. ;���
n DECLASSIpED
CIRVAE; PI: TS S C
Dth:XT rikVIL.W tO
1,2
DWI:5 JUN 1980
F;EviErigni
2 November 1959
Copy No. C 6
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)i
f
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
-T- 01) - E C- R E -T-
r/Z4/7", Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C030313121/7/ eZZZA
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
-Nod
Nov
" CO CT
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
'44�10,
2 NOVEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev, in speech on 31 October,
puts disarmament at top of agenda for
summit meeting.
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
a �ia�a Awe a a�, 1
Reports continue of differing opinions
between East Germans and Moscow over
China.
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Laotian Government again postpones
trial of pro-Communist leaders.
Afghan overflights of Pakistan could
lead to breakdown of efforts to ease re-
lations between the two countries.
Belgian Congo--Arrest of nationalist
leader may bring further disorders.
"Clarification" announced in Algeria of
De Gaulle's proposals seen as step away
from liberal solution.
,
III. THE WEST
France--De Gaulle's reluctance to re-
open question of storing American
atomic warheads believed linked to
his forthcoming talks with Khrushchevo
0 Bolivia--Situation tense as civilian
militia groups are mobilized in sup-
port of contenders for presidency.
LATE ITEM
0 Vehicle launched from 'rvitra Ta m �
test ICBM.
--11PA-P�re
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 November 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Khrushchev in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on
31 October reaffirmed his preference for a summit conference
as early as possible. In proposing an agenda, he assigned top
priority to disarmament and also listed a German peace treaty,
Berlin, and other questions. The speech reflected an effort to
meet reservations apparently expressed by other bloc leaders
regarding the effects of present Soviet policy. In a passage prob-
ably addressed primarily to Chinese Communist leaders he re-
peated earlier doctrine that "one must not confuse mutual conces-
sions in the interest of peaceful coexistence" with ideological
concessions. He also warned against "adventurism in politics."
(Page 1)
East German - USS Differences of opinion continue to be
reported between East German leaders and Khrushchev over
China. Both Ulbricht and Premier Grotewohl look favorably on
Chinese hard-line practices, some fetttures of which have been
applied in East Germany.
Ulbricht has made his views known to
Khrushchev and will soon go to Moscow for discussions."1 (SE-
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos; The Laotian Government has again postponed the trial
of Prince Souphannouvong and 13 other pro-Communist leaders,
from 2 November until after 13 November. Inadequate security
arrangements was given as the reason for this second postpone-
-6\Lment. The Communists may claim credit for the delay. During
the past week Peiping and Moscow have charged that the trial
would block a settlement through "peaceful negotiation" and ag-
gravate tension in the area.
�TOP-SEeRET
TWiia-Ti620702/21 C03031312'
VA
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
%1100
Afghanistan-Pakistan: High Pakistani Air Force officers
have stated that on several occasions in recent weeks forma-
tions of Afghan IL-28 bombers have flown over Pakistani terri-
tory. Such overflights, the first indication of regular operations
by Afghanistan's Soviet-equipped bomber force, seem almost
ertain to provoke eventual Pakistani reaction if they are con-
tinued. An Afghan-Pakistani clash would upset present efforts
to ease the Ion ense state of relations between the two coun-
so (Page 3)
Belgian Congo: Serious nationalist disorders on 30 and 31
October spread for the first time beyond the coastal area when
a violent clash took place between Belgian troops and native
Africans at Stanleyville. The violence, which reportedly did
extensive damage and claimed at least 24 lives, occurred after
government forces attempted to disperse an unauthorized meet-
ing of the Congo Nationalist Movement (MNC) independence group.
The MNC recently rejected Belgian plans for gradual Congolese
independence. Although order had been restored in Stanleyville
by 1 November, the arrest of the MNC leader on that date may
be expected to lead to further trouble
k ranee-Algeria: The announcement by Delegate General
Delouvrier in Algeria on 30 October that a two-stage referendum
will be required when Algerians exercise self-determination, as
promised by De Gaulle, is viewed as a step backwards by propo-
nents of a liberal Algerian solution. Delouvrier's "clarification"
of De Gaulle's proposals, presumably made on orders from Paris,
was probably intended to meet reported army dissatisfaction with
III. THE WEST
France De Gaulle appears reluctant to reopen the question
of storing American atomic warheads in France for NATO use
until after he has talked with Khrushchev. De Gaulle may hope
that by having demonstrated French "independence" of the Unite
lAb States he can ask that Khrushchev meet his public demands for a
show of good will on a world-wide basis as a precondition for a
summit meeting. Finance Minister Pinay has complained that
De Gaulle did not bother to consult the rahinet hefrne inviting Khru-
shchev. (Page 4)
2 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET
4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312' A
VA
z
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
Bolivia: The situation in Bolivia is tense and likely to remain
so in the period before the presidential nominating convention of
the government party which is scheduled to open on 10 December.
Civilian militia groups are being mobilized in support of the con-
flicting presidential ambitions of both former. President Paz--whom
bmoderate President Siles is apparently now supporting--and right-
wing leader Walter Guevara. The police and the army are said to
have been alerted to quell disturbances, but they probably could
trol a widespread outbreak on the part of the militia.
(Page 5)
LATE ITEM
*USSR: launching occurred at Tyura Tam at about 1624 EST
on 1 November. It probably involved a test ICBM,
the missile reached the usual
ICBM impact area on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The countdown wao
marked by delays of over four hours, and was preceded by appar-
ently unsuccessful attempts to launch on 30 and 31 October.
The Soviet instrumentation ships on 31 October were apparently
en route to Petropovlovsk on Kamchatka and could have been in port
during this operation. There is no available information that the
ships participated in the event.
2 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
TOP SECRET
VA
iApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3031312, , A
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ithrushchev's Foreign Policy Speech
In his speech to the closing session of the Supreme Soviet on
31 October, Khrushchev summarized in a notably moderate tone
the principal themes of his "peaceful coexistence" policy which
he developed during and since his visit to the United States. He
indicated satisfaction with the "noticeable improvement in the
international situation" and said the prospects for strengthening
peace "have become more favorable."
Khrushchev's discussion of major East-West questions con-
tained no indication of any changes in the Soviet position. He re-
peated his favorable assessment of his US visit and talks with
President Eisenhower and attempted to convey the impression that
he had reached "mutual understanding" with both the President
and Prime Minister Macmillan on a summit conference. While
he avoided direct criticism of President de Gaulle's position on
the timing of a meeting, he rejected the view that the heads of
government should meet only after agreement has been reached
on major questions. He reaffirmed his preference for an early
meeting and proposed an agenda which gave top priority to disarma-
ment, followed by a German peace treaty, Berlin, and "other
international questions of general interest."
Khrushchev expressed Soviet appreciation of the statements
by De Gaulle and Premier Debre on the "inviolability" of the
Oder-Neisse frontier. He gave a cautious endorsement to De
Gaulle's recent statement on Algeria but, at the same time, re-
peated the standard expression of Soviet sympathy for peoples
who are "struggling for independence and national liberty."
In Moscow's first authoritative response to recent statements
by American officials holding the USSR at least partially responsi-
ble for Peiping's actions, Khrushchev denounced this as a "psy-
chological attack against the Soviet Union" and :accused- the United
States of distorting the character of Sino-Soviet relations and
CONFIDENTIAL
2 Nov 59 CENTRAI INTFI I inpwrr RI III P-rito Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
Awe ANS .11 S A 51-3
Name
casting doubt on Peiping's sovereignty. He repeated Moscow's
view that the Taiwan question is a "purely internal affair of
China" and expressed confidence that "Taiwan and the other
islands will be reunited with the rest of China." Although he
made no mention of the use of force, Khrushchev renewed
Soviet pledges to support Peiping "until it has achieved settle-
ment of this question."
The Soviet premier adhered to his neutral position on the
Sino-Indian border dispute, expressing hope for a peaceful set-
tlement satisfactory to both sides. The New China News Agency's
account of the speech omitted this passage.
The most important aspect of Khrushchey's speech was his
effort to define the limits of his peaceful coexistence polity�pre-
sumably in response to doubts and reservations which apparendy
have been voiced by other bloc leaders. After urging the need in
the present world situation for "mutual concessions and understand-
inOQ.in East-West relations, he emphasized that "one must not con-
fuse mutual concessions in the interest of peaceful coexistence"
with concessions on ideological principles, which he said are out
of the question.
Khrushchev defended his present course by pointing out that
Soviet history contains many examples of "Lenin's wise and flex-
ible foreign policy aimed at the solution of vital problems of peace."
In a passage apparently addressed primarily to the Chinese Com-
munists, he recalled Trotsky's opposition to Lenin's decision to
make peace with Germany in 1918 "to ensure for the young Soviet
state the possibility of peaceful construction of socialism," and
said Trotsky's "adventurist" policy had "played into the hands of
the German imperialists."
-CONFIDENTIAL-
2 Nov 59
CENTRAL INTFI I inFtsirF RIIIIFTIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
tvepro
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Afghan Air Force Bombers Overfly Pakistani Territory
The commander in chief of the Pakistani Air Force on 28
October stated that formations of Afghan twin-jet bombers,
presumably IL-28s, had recently appeared along the Afghan-
Pakistani border and that on one occasion three aircraft of a
flight of 12 had overflown the border. On the same day, a
senior Pakistani Air Force officer in Peshawar stated that 10
or 12 times during the past few weeks formations of Afghan
IL-28 jet bombers had overflown Pakistani tribal territory
south of the Khyber Pass. This officer said the Pakistani Air
Force was asking for antiaircraft artillery to be installed in
the area to deal with future intrusions.
Continued Afghan overflights of Pakistani territory seem
almost certain eventually to stimulate Pakistani military reac-
tion, either in the form of antiaircraft fire or fighter intercep-
tion. An Afghan-Pakistani clash would nullify elforts now being
made in diplomatic circles to bring about a rapprochement be-
tween Karachi and Kabul.
SECRET
2 Nov 59 � . V � M. ��� I � II ����� � .��� ��� ��� � � � � mg ��� � � � Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3031312
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
viwe'
III. THE WEST
CD.
Gaulle Reluctant to Reopen Nuclear Warhead Storage Issue
Until After Khrushchev Visit
French President de Gaulle is described as appearing reluc-
tant to reopen the long-deadlocked issue of storage of American
atomic warheads in France for NATO's use until after he has
talked with Soviet Premier Khrushchev0 who is scheduled to visit
France early next year.
De Gaulle may have been influ-
enced by a report that the Soviet Government was impressed by
his "independence" of the United States on the warhead question.
Pro-NATO Finance Minister Pinay has complained that De
Gaulle did not bother to consult the cabinet before inviting Khru-
shchev. Althougl De Gaulle showing "his
usual misunderstanding" of NATO, the chief of staff is now said
to be more optimistic concerning French-NATO relations. De
Gaulle can be expected to maintain his pressure for a greater
French role in NATO and for a French voice equal to that of the
United States and Britain in global Western policy decisions, but
there is no evidence suggesting he would encourage Khrushchev
in his apparent belief that France is the "weak link" in the West-
ern alliance.
On the nuclear warhead storage issue, he may hope that by
having demonstrated French "independence" of the United States,
he can in effect demand that Khrushchev reciprocate with evidence
of Soviet interest in a general detente. He might also point out
that France's actions have lessened the NATO "threat" to the
USSR. De Gaulle has already insisted on world-wide evidence--
particularly in Africa--of Soviet good will as a precoildition of
French participation in any East-West summit talks.
2 Nov 59 CPKITDAI IKITFI I irtmorr RI n arnsi
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
-*No'
Tension Increasing in Bolivia
Tension is likely to increase in Bolivia as a result of mobil-
ization of civilian militia in support of the conflicting presiden-
tial ambitions of former President Paz and right-wing leader
Walter Guevara, Moderate President Siles has apparently swung
his support from Guevara to Paz, and this is likely to give the
preponderance of militia support to Paz. The outcome of the
present conflict is likely to have decisive importance for the pres-
idential nominating convention of the government party sthedUled
to open 10 December. This nomination is tantamount to election
since the party has no major opposition in Bolivia.
In an apparent move to placate Guevara's right-wing support-
ers, Siles has demanded that leftist Jose Rojas, a principal lead-
er of the rural militia, resign from the cabinet by 4 November.
Rojas' dismissal may provoke additional militia violence, however,
since hp is now mobilizing his supporters while another key rural
militia leader is mobilizing opposing units.
The police and the army are said to have been placed on the
alert to quell disturbances, but they probably could not control a
widespread outbreak of militia violence.
SECRET
2 Nov 59 CFNTRAI IhITFI I InFkirp RI III PTIM
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
�4.00
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
ry)ArrYTIVATIT'l A I
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
r7 //// Z � fr/Z7//////////////////////////. if
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312
-TOP-SECRET
Z/ZApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03031312////////WWWW, j