CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/01/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03031264
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: January 18, 1960

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18 January 1960
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CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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18 JANUARY 1960
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chou En-lai again invites Burmese prime
minister to Peiping, but in effect turns
down Bum,..0.0 nvonnonba fir horrior set-
tlement.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Turks being pressed by Moscow for ex-
change of high-level visits.
Laotian Government devising electoral
procedures to assure conservative victory
this spring; Hanoi cautions against any
departure from neutral foreign policy.
III. THE WEST
()Dominican Republic�Trujillo trying to
counter growing unrest.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
18 January 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - Burma: Premier Chou En-lai on
?enewed his invitation to Burmese Prime Minis-
ter Ne Win to visit Peiping for talks, which he said would be
"very useful" in promoting an agreement on the Sino-Burmese
border issue. Chou again side-stepped acknowledgment of
Ne Win's precondition for such a visit�China's acceptance of
Burma's June 1959 proposals--and called on Burma to "con-
tinue negotiations" on the "relatively small difference" re-
maining between the two sides. It now is probably clear to
Ne Win that the Chinese will not give him a border settlement
on his terms. (Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Turkey-USSR: Lmrkish Prime Minister Menderes has in-
formed Ambassador Warren of his concern over problems posed
for his government by the atmosphere of East-West detente and
recent exchanges of high-level visits. Soviet representatives in
Turkey are actively urging similar visits between Turkey and the
"1
USSR. According to Menderes, Turkey does not oppose an East-
West detente, but it faces the dilemma of determining how to
keep in step with its Western allies without unnerving its Middle
Eastern friends. On balance, however, it appears that Ankara
will probably accede to Soviet pressure for increased official ex-
change visit_sil (Page 2)
Laos: he new Laotian Government is devising electoral
procedures which it hopes will ensure a conservative victory
over the Communists in elections for a new National Assembly
p still tentatively scheduled for April or May. The government
has also taken pains to make clear to foreign nations that it in-
tends to continue its officially neutral foreign policy. Nort_19
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viao
EVietnam has greeted the new government with comparative
moderation but has indicated that Hanoi might call for in-
creased Communist activity if Vierttiane departs from a
neutral course),
(Page 3)
III. THE WEST
Dominican Republic: Dictator Trujillo, fearful that grow-
ing internal unrest may reach insurrectionary proportions,
has taken a series of measures in an effort to counter it. In
addition to economic concessions such as reduced rents for
- low-income city dwellers and small farmers, he has removed
another source of public irritation by relieving his unpopular
son "Ramfis" as chief of the Combined General StaffL,
18 Jan 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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1110 Voisi
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping Repeats Invitation to Burmese Premier
Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai on 12 January
renewed his,invitation of 22 December to Burmese Premier
Ne Win to visit Peiping for a discussion of the Sino-Burmese
border dispute. Ne Win on 3 January rejected the earlier in-
vitation, stating that the work of preparing for the forthcoming
elections in Burma ruled out a trip at this time unless he could
be assured beforehand that the Chinese would sign a settlement
based on Burma's June proposals, its maximum offer.
As in his earlier letter, Chou ignored Ne Win's condition
that the Chinese must first accede to the Burmese proposals
and suggested further "negotiations." Chou said he felt it
would be "very useful" toward promoting a settlement if he
were given the chance to explain the Chinese Government's
position and to discuss "matters of principle" for eliminating
the remaining differences. Although Chou tried to minimize
the points of disagreement between the two sides--he said these
were "relatively small"--his letter implies Burma's proposals
are unacceptable.
The Communists--in maintaining a posture of readiness
to negotiate but avoiding agreement to Burmese conditions--
are following the same tactics they are using in the border dis-
pute with India. Peiping is unwilling to give a border settle-
ment to the strongly anti-Communist Ne Win, particularly with
the prospect of a more sympathetic Burmese Government after
the 29 February election. These stalling tactics have probably
made it lear to Ne Win that he will not get a settlement on his
terms.
18 Jan 60
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*haw IL ASIA-A
Turkey Faces Dirdmma in Relation With USSR
.ikara appears ready to take steps to keep pace with what
it regards as a Western movement toward detente with the USSR,
but is concerned that any deviation from its basically austere
policy toward Moscow may cause apprehension among some of
Its Middle East neighbors, especially Iran. Prime Minister Men-
deres, in recently discussing with Ambassador Warren the ques-
tion of Soviet pressure for an exchange of high-level visits, noted
that contrary to,the impression gained by some of its Western
allies, Turkey is not fundamentally opposed to an East-West
detente but merely wants to view the situation realistical113
[-According to Menderes, Soviet representatives in Turkey
are actively contacting various ministries, newspapers, and in-
stitutions and expounding the theme "we now are friends with the
US, why can we not be friends with Turkey as well." Menderes
told Warren that the Russians has been insisting on official ex-
change visits for years, and now want to follow the recent visit
of the Turkish minister of health with other high-level visits as
a manifestation of improved relation
litlenderes' allegations of Soviet pressure
.7.oncerning
diplomatic contacts in whim soviet oinciais nave enaeavored to
exploit the friendly theme of the Camp David talks. On occasion,
Soviet representatives as well as the Soviet press have applied
the "stick" principle as well as the "carrot."/
Moscow's current campaign to expand contacts with Turkish
officials is part of its broader effort to exploit the current thaw
in East-West relations. The Soviet leaders probably regard
Turkey as a major obstacle to the attainment of their objectives
in the Middle East
4-n_aine with Mendered'expressed views that East-West ex-
changes are the "order of the day," there probably will be an in-
crease in exchange visits by Turkish and Soviet delegations during
the ensuing months. No basic change in Turkey's pro-Western for-
eign policy is anticipated, however, although such visits may have
a marked impact on Turkey's Middle East neighbord-.7
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Developts in Laos Following Formatibimod New Government
Elle new govkimment of Khou Arbhay in Laos is concentrating
on devising electoral procedures which it hopes will ensure a
conservative victory over the Communists in the National Assem-
bly elections tentatively scheduled for April or May. Among the
still unresolved questions in connection with preparations for
elections are whether to hold them in one or two stages and
whether to have candidates contest for seats on a province-wide
or district basis. These issues may well become serious sources
of new friction among Laos' anti-Communist elements and frus-
trate the efforts of moderate Premier Khou and his brother, Dep-
uty Premier Nhouy, to heal the deep divisions in conservative
ranks caused by the recent governmental criste
tPremier Khou, who is elderly, says he plans to exercise
over-all policy control, but he has delegated a great deal of
authority in day-to-day governmental affairs to his younger and
more energetic brother. Nhouy is a former interior minister
who was closely involved in past government efforts to devise
workable electoral procedurLsj
larmy leaders claim they can "completely" pacify the coun-
try before elections, but this is probably a vain hope. While the
Communists insurgents have been relatively quiet in recent weeks,
they are believed to retain control of significant areas of the
countryside. There have been indications, moreover, that rebel
ranks are being increased by young Laotians who have completed
courses at Communist training and indoctrination centers report-
edly located just across the frontier in North Vietnalr_q
The new government seems to contemplate with as much en-
thusiasm as the Phoui regime the prospect of substantially in-
creased UN technical assistance under Secretary General Hammar-
skjold's scheme to maintain a continuing UN presence in Laos.
The government, however, has taken pains to make it clear to
both friends and enemies of Laos that it intends to pursue a neu-
tral foreign policB
:ta.noi has greeted the new government with comparative
moderation but has indicated that it might call for increased
Communist activity if Vientiane departs from a neutral course:I
-SEGRE-T---
18 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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III. THE WEST
Dominican Dictator Makes Effort to Counter Unrest
Dominican dictator Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, fearful
that growing internal unrest may reach insurrectionary propor-
tions, has recently taken a number of actions which, in the
opinion of the American Embassy at Ciudad Trujillo, reflect
the first clear evidence of good judgment on his part since early
in 1958. Recovery of his political objectivity could enable
Trujillo to cope more effectively with the dissidents, espe-
cially since he has apparently ceased efforts to advance the po-
litical career of his unpopular son, General Rafael L. ("Ramfis")
Trujillo -
Early this month, the generalissimo removed Ramfis from
his post as chief of the Combined General Staff, where he ob-
structed relations with the United States, and sent him to Europe,
reportedly for a protracted stay. The dictator probably realized
that strained US-Dominican relations encouraged antiregime ele-
ments, many of whom believe that the United States helps Trujillo
stay in power.
During the past several weeks Trujillo has enacted several
measures designed to frustrate any immediate dissident plans.
Rents have been reduced for the low-income city dwellers and
small farmers who make up Trujillo's broad political support, an
earlier decision denying workers Christmas bonuses has been
reversed, scheduled salary decreases for government employees
have been canceled, and heavy arms purchases have apparently
been reduced or terminated. In addition, Trujillo has announced
a grant of $11,250,000 from the International Monetary Fund to
reinforce the Dominican economy.
While these measures may temporarily arrest dissident ac-
tivity, the apparent decision of the generalissimo to take over the
presidency from his brother Hector may indicate a desperate at-
tempt on the dictator's part to retain control.
CONFIDENTIAL
18 Jan 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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IVA A 1..."1-J111 A I A-11. 1.4
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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