CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/01/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03031262
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: January 15, 1960

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DATE* 8...../11)&192011VIEWENI
15 January 1960
Copy No. C 67
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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15 JANUARY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's program for Soviet military,
if implemented, would mean sweeping
shake-up of armed forces on scale simi-
lar to previous programs for industry and
agriculture. 0
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Recent developments show continued
progress by Pakistan and India toward
solving some of their most bothersome
problems.
III. THE WEST
�British and Greek Cypriots still far
apart on size of Cyprus bases to be re-
tained by Britain; however, representa-
tives to London conference starting 16
January appear determined to reach
agreement so that Cyprus independence
date of 19 February will be met.
()Question of exchanging diplomatic mis-
sions with USSR again arises in Bolivia;
although President Siles and foreign min-
ister apparently oppose such an exchange,
congressional and public support for it is
strong.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 January 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: &preliminary analysis of Khrushchev's major dis-
armament statement to the Supreme Soviet session on 14 Jan-
uary indicates it is a major move in East-West relations. The
main points of his program for the Soviet military, if imple-
mented, would mean a sweeping shake-up of the Soviet armed
forces on a scale similar to his previous programs for industry
and agricultur!_t] (Page 1)
Erhe representative of the Department of State believes that
the Soviet moves if implementeds would be principally motivatec
by technological and manpower considerations. He further be-
lieves that the timing of the Soviet announcement is designed to
be of maximum benefit to the Soviet position prior to impending
East-West negotiations
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Pakistan-India: Recent developments indicate continued
progress by Pakistan and India toward solving some of their
most bothersome problems. Recently representatives of both
countries announced that all border delineation disputes were
resolved except in one area on the southern West Pakistan -
Indian border. (The Kashmir dispute remains essentially un-
touched.) Earlier the Ayub government had reported it had
nearly settled the complex internal problem of claims by Mos-
lem refugees from India on Hindu evacuee properties in Pak-
istan. In early January a meeting of representatives of both
countries announced substantial progress toward final settle-
ment of the financial disputes which arose out of the 1947 par-
tition of British India. (Page 3)
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Cyprus: @reek Cypriot and British positions on the
size of the military bases to be retained by Britain on
Cyprus are still far apart as the London conference opens
on 16 January., The British want a total of 113 square miles
the Greek Cypriots want them limited to 42 square miles.
British, Greek, Turkish,and Cypriot representatives to the
conference however, appear determined to reach an agree-
ment so that Cyprus will attain independence as scheduled
on 19 February_D (Page 4)
Bolivia: The question of exchanging diplomatic missions
with the USSR has arisen again in Bolivia in the midst of a
struggle over the governing party's nominations for the pres-
idential elections later this year. President &Iles and his
foreign minister apparently oppose an exchange of missions.
Funds for a Moscow embassy have been allocated in the pres-
ent budget, however, and congressional and public support
for active diplomatic relations is strong.
(Page 5)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964.
NIE 11-4-59. 5 Jan 1960.
Outlook in Libya. NIE 36.5-60. 12 Jan 1960.
15 Jan 60 DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet Statement
A preliminary analysis of Khrushchev's major disarma-
ment statement to the Supreme Soviet session on 14 January
indicates it is a major move in East-West relations. The
main points of his program for the Soviet military, if imple-
mented, would mean a sweeping shake-up of the Soviet armed
forces on a scale similar to his previous programs for in-
dustry and agriculture. The main points were as follows:
A. The armed forces are to be reduced (unilater-
ally) by 1,200,000 men (from 3,600,000 to 2,-
400,000) over the next one to two years.
B. The air force has "lost its previous importance."
"Almost the entire military air force is being
replaced by rocket machinery. We have by now
cut down sharply and it seems will continue to cut
down and even discontinue the manufacture of
bombers and other obsolete machinery."
C. The submarine fleet "assumes great importance";
surface ships are no longer as useful as "in the
past."
D. A saving of 16 to 17 billion rubles will result, it
is claimed, from the reduction in armed forces.
Khrushchev warned, however, that "our defense
budget can stand an increase in military expendi-
tures" if "defense of the motherland" requires it.
Khrushchev stated, "We have consulted our military and
come to the conclusion that our defenses will not be jeopard-
ized." Numerical strength of forces is not as important as it
was "three years ago," he said. "The defenses of a country
are determined not by the number of soldiers, but by economic
factors--and the power of weapons and the means of their de-
livery." Khrushchev reassured the Soviet people that the pro-
posed measures would not reduce military power since "our
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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ftos, 1110
army has such arms as have heretofore been unknown to men."
He added, "We possess formidable weapons," but those which
are being designed and contemplated are "incredible."
Khrushchev told his audience that while the US has decided
to catch up with the USSR in five years, it would be naive to
think that in the meantime "we will sit with folded arms." He
warned that modern war will begin "in the heart of countries�"
and all industrial and strategic centers will be attacked "during
the first minutes." Meanwhile, the USSR is creating an ICBM
system with "sufficient duplication and triplication" to ensure
retaliation should "our enemies suddenly attack."
15 Jan 60
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Noe
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Recent Progress Under Pakistani Military Government
The Ayub government is continuing to make progress to-,
ward solving some of its most bothersome problems. On 11
January it announced the resolution of all but one of the bor-
der disputes with India which in the past have resulted in bor-
der firing incidents. At the close of December the govern-
ment reported that it had nearly settled the complex problem
of claims by Moslem refugees from India on Hindu evacuee
properties in Pakistan. This will tend to enhance the regime's
reputation for efficiency and strengthen its prestige among
the politically important refugee element of the population,
whose problems have long been a political football. In early
January, negotiators from the two countries overcame the
most difficult obstacles to a final settlement of the financial
disputes which arose out of the 1947 partition of British India.
A further improvement in Indo-Pakistani economic relations
will probably follow.
Although considerable preparatory work for these achieve-
ments was done under previous regimes, Ayub's government
has attacked many of the country's long-standing problems
with vigor, and it will probably receive the lion's share of the
credit. The improvement in relations with Indth, has also
been encouraged by the common danger presented by Chinese
Communist pressures on the Himalayan border area.
The Pakistani military government, however, has yet to
make major progress on other basic problems. Little head-
way has been made in eliminating the food production deficit .
or in raising the standard of living. Although Ayub has given
the Kashmir dispute increased attention in his recent speeches,
no direct effort has ye 1^,:tc." r"^"Ii-'s 4-^te negotiations with
India on this problem.
15 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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1%me 140
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III. THE WEST
Cyprus Conference
ao. me British officiars, including Cyprus' Governor
Foot, have warned that the transfer of sovereignty, sched-
uled for 19 February, may have to be postponed if the
Cyprus conference, scheduled to begin in London on 16
January, cannot agree quickly on the major issues_j
/he main issue to be discussed concerns the two mil-
itary bases to be retained by Britain after independence.
British and Greek Cypriot positions may be difficult to
reconcile in the short time available for negotiation.t.1
C_The extent of the sovereign areas to be retained by
Britain and provisions for other facilities outside the bases,
such as training areas, for use by British military forces,
are still in dispute. The Cypriots are prepared to accept
British sovereignty over base areas of 42 square miles,
while London demands 113. In addition, the Cypriots want
assurances that the bases will be ceded to the Cypriot Re-
public if Britain finds them unnecessary, that no foreign
labor will be settled on the bases, that the administration
of the areas will be military rather than civilian, and that a
satisfactory status-of-forces agreement can be negotiated.
The Cypriots also insist on financial compensation for all
facilities provided the British outside their sovereign areas--
a demand that Britain has rejectel:g
EiLrchbishop Makarios will be under conflicting pressures
at London. The Greek Government is apparently urging con-
cessions to Britain, while, some of his Cypriot advisers will
oppose any further compromise. In addition, reports indicate
that last October's agreement between Makarios and General
Grivas pledged the Archbishop to try to limit the base area to
approximately 36 square miles. The adverse Cypriot reaction
which would follow even a temporary postponement of independ-
ence, however, will be a powerful factor inclining him to some
form of settlemelS
15 Jan 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Status of Bolivia's Relations With the USSR
The question of Bolivian relations with the USSR has
risen again in the midst of a struggle over the governing
party's nominations for the presidential elections in May
or June. The two countries did not exchange representa-
tives after relations were established in 1945, but Bolivia's
new Foreign Ministry budget, reflecting strong public and
congressional interest, provides funds for a Moscow mis-
sion. Part of this pressure derives from hope of Soviet
economic aid.
President Siles and Foreign Minister Walter Guevara--
the presidential aspirant favored by right-wing elements of
the government party--apparently oppose the exchange of
missions. @uevara on 12 January assured US Ambassador
Strom that as long as he is foreign minister no Moscow em
bassy will be establish4 Guevara's tenure, however, is
uncertain, as he may decide to resign soon to devote him-
self to campaignin
The probable victor at the party's nominating convention
of 15-21 February, with nomination tantamount to election,
is former President Victor Paz Estenssoro, who has not ex-
pressed himself on the exchange of missions, but is supported
by the ,party's left wing. Paz is friendly to the United States
but seems to favor a more independent line than incumbent
President Siles, and thus may be responsive to public pres-
sures for active relations with the USSR.
15 Jan 60
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INA ILL-41N I Iel La
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
� Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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