CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/01/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03031261
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: January 14, 1960

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14 January 1960
Copy No. C G7
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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14 JANUARY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Kirichenko downgraded and assigned to
provincial post; may have lost out in
struggle for place of preference behind
Soviet leader.
Sibir-class ships approaching designated
Central Pacific impact area for Soviet
"ballistic rocket" tests.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Afghan foreign minister's talks with Pak-
istani President may have helped clear
way for further efforts to improve rela-
tions but early solution of Pushtoonistan
dispute remains unlikely.
Nasir's suppression of Syrian Baathists
may make them susceptible to Commu-
nist advances for cooperation against
Cairo.
III. THE WEST
0 Pinay's departure from French cabinet
may indicate De Gaulle decision to allow
greater government intervention in econ-
omy, diverting more resources to pro-
grams considered necessary for France's
"great power" aspirations.
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14 January 1960
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\ DAILY BRIEF
Odj6 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Aleksey Kirichenko, who until recently ranked
with Mikoyan and Kozlov as one of Khrushchev's chief lieu-
\ tenants in the party presidium, has been downgraded and
-
0/4 assigned to a provincial post. Kirichenko, a natural target
in the struggle for precedence behind Khrushchev, may have
6 laid himself open to demotion by differing with Khrushchev
�j
, either over party operations or over general policy consid-
erations. His reassignment was apparently approved at last
,04,-'64 taken by the Supreme Scviet
onth's secret session of the party central committee: which
also approved decisions to be
meeting beginning 14 January.
.'i Page 1)
N
N�
USSR: Three Soviet Sibir-class missile range instrumen-
tation ships are approaching the zone of the Central Pacific
designated by Moscow as an impact area for "ballistic rocket"
tests between 15 January and 15 February. The present posi-
tions and movement of these ships indicat t robably will
be in the impact area by 15 January,
On 13 January
a probable range-wide practice exercise was conducted on the
Tyura Tam Missile Test Range during which, as has been done
previously, information was nasspd fn thP Rihir-olacc ehinal
111. ASIA-Ai, RICA
Afghanistan-Pakistan: Afghan Foreign Minister Naim's
conversations with Pakistani President Ayub this week appar-
ently were primarily exploratory in nature, although, judging
from Nairn's public statements following the talks, they may
Or\ have helped to clear the way for further efforts to improve re-
lations. Nevertheless, an early resolution of the major irritant
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between the two countries, the Pushtoonistan dispute, is un-
likely, since this would rPritiirr, mainr adjustments in policy
and popular attitudes. ) (Page 2)
UAR: An Iraqi Communist delegation recently arrived
in Beirut to seek a Communist-Baathist alliance to work
against the UAR regime in Syria,
a meeting of Akram Hawrani, Syrian Baathist leader
who recently resigned as UAR vice president, with Commu-
nist and Baathist leaders in Syria. Although Hawrani is
said to have rejected the idea of joint efforts against Cairo
at this time, there were instances of Baathist-Communist
cooperation prior to 1958, and Nasir's continued suppression
of the Syrian Baathists may make them susceptible to Com-
munist advances. (TOP SECRET DAUNT) (Page 3)
Watch Committee Conclusions: EI:tie following develop-
ments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Com-
munist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of
the US in the immediate futurei]
'ffiyithin and without Iraq, political groups continue to
maneuver for power, and an attempt to assassinate Qasim
could occur at any tim...23
Laos, formation of the new government on 7 January
temporarily should ease political unrest and reduces the like-
lihood of internal measures, such as an early trial of NLHZ
leaders, which would stimulate strong reaction on the part of
Lao Communists and their supporters abroad. However, the
dissidents probably will continue their propaganda and local-
ized guerrilla activities in an effort to disrupt government
measures to establish effective control over outlying areas-4
III. THE WEST
France: Finance Minister Pinay's departure from the cab-
inet on 13 January may indicate a decision by De Gaulle to allow
greater government intervention in the economy for the purpose
14 Jan 60
DAILY 8RIEF
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of diverting more resources to programs considered neces-
sary for France's "great power" aspirations and to make
concessions to labor and agriculture designed to allay their
growing opposition to the regime. The appointment of an
able and respected "technician," Bank of France Governor
Wilfrid Baumgartner, as Pinay's successors while reducing
the political importance of the Finance Ministry portfolios
may lessen the risk of a loss of investor confidence in the
French economy. Two of the other three members of Pinay's
Independent party still in the cabinet--the minister of Agri-
culture and the secretary of state for foreign econo
--are reportedly also planning to resign.
(Page 4)
14 Jan 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
KhrushcheV Demotes Top Party Aide
� Aleksey Kirichenko, who until a few months ago was
functioning as Khrushchev's second-in-command in the party
secretariat, has been demoted to the job of party chief in
Rostov Oblast, according to a Soviet press announcement
of 13 January. The assignment represents a serious rever-
sal in his political fortunes. Kirichenko's status as a full
member of the party presidium, a post he has held since
July 1955, was not mentioned. While Kirichenko has not
been reported involved in policy disputes, in recent months
he no longer seemed to enjoy Khrushchev's full confidence.
Kirichenko, now 52, was a Khrushchev protege and as-
sociate for many years. Khrushchev was apparently respon-
s1blefo0Cirichenko's rapid rise in top party circles since
1953. aa June 1959, however, Khrushchev told Governor
Harriman that Kozlov had been picked as his successor and
derided the suggestion that Kirichenko might be in the run-
ning. Since then Kirichenko has not engaged in the kind of
substantive party activity which had previously marked him
as one of the four top Soviet leader!:.]
Factional infighting in the highest circles of the party
Is nioSt'often observed in the areas of personnel appointment
and policy decisions. There has been a rash of personnel
changes recently: upheavals in the leadership of several re-
publics, extensive changes in the secret police (KGB), shifts
in the central party apparatus, and more recently, the return
of Presidium member Nikolay Ignatov to full-time work in the
party secretariat after several months in disfavor. Some of
these changes probably reflected maneuvering involving
Kirichenko.
The decision to reassign Kirichenko was probably made
last month at a special secret session of the party central
committee which was held immediately following an open
meeting devoted to agricultural problems. A Soviet news-
paperman stated that the secret session considered impor-
tant domestic matters which would be formally approved by
tho SiinrPmP Soviet meeting beginning 14 January.
14 Jan 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Afghan-Pakistani Conversation Produces Cautious Optimism
Afghan Foreign Minister Naim's 10-12 January conversa-
tions with Pakistani President Ayub will probably lead to fur-
ther efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan to improve their
relations. The talks, which were exploratory and informal
in nature, appear to have been more useful than either side
expected. It was agreed that contacts should continue in an�
effort to solve "political differences." The government-
monitored Pakistani press has welcomed the talks as im-
proving the prospects for better relations.
Naim's public comments on the talks suggest he now be-
lieves it may be possible to make progress in negotiations.
Kabul's earlier assessment that it would be impossible to do
business with Ayults military government had been largely
responsible for the deterioration in relations.
Despite Ayubys recent public dismissals of the Pushtoon-
istan dispute as a "phony" issue, he has apparently convinced
Naim that he is willing to consider the problem and try to reach
an accommodation. Although the hostile propaganda exchanges
between the two countries may be moderated, a resolution of
the Pushtoonistan dispute, the major irritant in Afghan-Pak-
istani relations, is unlikely in the near future since such a
development woulq recmire major adiitstments in policy and
popular attitudes.
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NINO'
Iraqi Communists Seek Cooperation of Baathists in Syria
The UAR Embassy in Beirut informed Cairo on 11 Jan-
uary that Iraqi Communists had arrived in Eeirut on 9 Jan-
uary and contacted members of the l3aath party to work out
a plan of cooperation against the Nasir regime in Syria.
the Communists planned to
ask the Baathists to join them in a, coup attempt or at least
to support "any movement or coup which occurs in Syria." In
return for cooperation, the Communists were prepared to
promise release of Baathists imprisoned in Iraq and permis-
sion for Baath party activity there.
a Syrian Communist offer
of cooperation had already been rejected by Alcram Hawrani,
Syrian Baathist leader who recently resigned as UAR vice
president. Hawrani reportedly stated he preferred to wait
for further developments in Syria. It is not clear whether the
approach to Hawrani was the same one
The Baathists had cooperated with Communists
to gain mutual objectives prior to the formation of the UAR
in 1958, however, and Nasir's continued conflict with the
Baathists in Syria might make them amenable to later Com-
munist offers.
Meanwhile, the UAR internal security apparatus in Syria
appears to be increasing its surveillance over Iraqi political
refugees and Communists.
the Syrians have seized two Iraqi Communists sent
by Iraqi military intelligence to organize Svri
sidents,
an provincial governors in Syria to undertake a detailed
StUTd�f the identification and political inclinations of Iraqi
refugees.
14 Jan 60
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III. THE WEST
Implications of Pinay's Removal from Debrd Cabinet
The removal on 13 January of Finance Minister Pinay, the
most influential leader of the previous regime remaining in the
cabinet, indicates that De Gaulle may have decided to subordi-
nate Pinay's "hard money" policy to other considerations. Ap-
pointment of Bank of France Governor Wilfrid Baumgartner,
an able and respected technician, to replace Pinay may lessen
the risk of a loss of investor confidence in the French economy
and will also reduce the political importance of the Finance
Ministry portfolio.
Premier Debre has been subject to growing pressures to
loosen Pinay's restrictions on consumption and economic expan-
sion and to push programs stressing social benefits. He and
other ministers drawn from the "Gaullist" Union for the New
Republic (UNR) favor selective rises in wages and farm prices,
and have been working on plans to create a new national bank to
aid in the reconversion of depressed areas and industries, to
organize a government-controlled company for marketing Saharan
oil, and to implement decrees embodying De Gaulle's earlier
proposals to give labor a voice in corporate management.
The political implications of the crisis may be more far
reaching. Pinay represents a threat to the UNR's attempt to
build a new political base for the present regime. He still has
considerable influence in the Independent party, which has been
showing signs of serious disagreement with De Gaulle's "liberal"
offer of self-determination to Algeria, his highhanded treatment
of parliament, and his apparent downgrading of NATO and the
Western alliance.
Pinay's withdrawal may widen the rift between the Independ-
ents and the UNR. The situation will be further strained if other
Independents in the cabinet, notably Minister of Agriculture
Henri Rochereau and Secretary of State for Foreign Economic
Affairs Max Flechet, also leave, especially if they are replaced
by "technicians," as opposed to political figures.
14 Jan 60
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14.0
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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