CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03029889
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 24, 1959

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24 October 1959
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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24 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Recent Vast German statements may
have increased strain with Moscow on
some bloc policy issues.
Mikoyan warns Finland against member-
ship in European free-trade area.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq alerts military units in north; UAR
reports Iraqi reinforcements on Syrian
border; UAR, fearing Israeli action,
alerts units in Sinai.
New Indian - Chinese Communist border
incident will delay any plans to negotiate
dispute.
III. THE WEST
Italian President Gronchi likely to ac-
cept Soviet invitation to visit Moscow.
Cuba--Castro intensifies attacks on
United States in effort to muster pop-
ular support.
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TOP REI.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR - East Germany: at veral recent East German ac-
tions may put some strain on relations with the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev is annoyed with Ulbricht, especially because of a
telegram the East German leader sent to Mao Tse-tung in
answer to the latter's greeting on the occasion of East Germany's
tenth anniversary,
East German politburo mem-
ber Hermann Matern, at the Chinese Communist tenth anniver-
sary celebrations, commented favorably on the communes. In
September, Premier Grotewohl publicly backed the Chinese
Communist rather than the Soviet position on the Chinese-Indian
border dispute. (Page 1)
USSR-Finland: Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan, in Helsinki
for the signing of a new Soviet-Finnish five-year trade agree-
ment and the opening of the Soviet Industrial Fair, said at a press
1/ conference on 22 October that the USSR regards West European
economic groupings as "remnants of the cold-war era." Mikoyan's
statements following earlier unofficial warnings from Moscow
will almost certainly preclude formal Finnish membership in the
projected little4ree-trade area, the "Outer Seven," but apparently
would not rule out informal arrangements between Finland and
member countries. (Page 2)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Iraq-Israelt The Iraqi regime, apparently fearful of
possible UAR intervention in Iraq, alerted the 2nd Division
located in northern Iraq on 22 October.
the Iraqis had reinforced their troops in the
northern sector of the Syrian-Iraqi border. The UAR in turn,
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apprehensiveNtlat (developments in Iraq might reqd to some
Israeli action, on 21 October alerted units and outposts of the
2nd Motorized Battalion in northeastern Sinai. There is no
indication, however. o unusual Israeli military preparations.
(Page 3)
India - Communist China: New Delhi issued a statement
on 23 October "strongly" protesting a border clash on 21 Octo-
ber, in which 17 Indians were reported killed, as an incursion well
inside Indian territory. The incident occurred in an area of
Ladakh in eastern Kashmir claimed by both governments. The
Indian spokesman said New Delhi had rejected a Chinese protest
claiming the Indians had entered Chinese territory and opened
fire on a Chinese patrol. This incident--the first on the border
since 26 August�probably was not intended as a provocation, in
view of the fact that both governments have been trying to prepare
the way for negotiations on the border dispute. The clash is
likely to have the effect of deferring any immediate moves in
this direction.
*Peiping on 23 October published its version of the incident,
claiming in a relatively mild statement that Chinese frontier guards
had been "compelled" to fire in self-defense. In its protest to
New Delhi on 22 October, Peiping asked that measures be taken
at once to prevent the recurrence of any "violation of Chinese
frontiers.' (Page 4) (Map)
III. THE WEST
Italy-USSR: President Gronchi will probably accept a Soviet
invitation to make an official trip to Moscow in the near future.
In sounding out the Italians, the USSR has tried to ensure that
Khrushchev will be invited to visit Italy. Premier Segni and other
cabinet members want to leave the question open. They fear that
such a visit would have a bad effect on local elections scheduled
for next spring. (Page 6)
� Cuba: Reacting with characteristic demagoguery and violence
to new evidence of opposition to his regime, Fidel Castro has
again sought to enhance his mass support by strong attacks on
the United States. In a TV speech on 22-23 October, he accused
the US Government of permitting anti-Castro activities and referred
scathingly to the presence of the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay.
Castro% treatment of Major Huber Matos is causing "deep shock" in
the revolutionary stronghold of Santiago de Cuba, according to the
American Consulate there. (Page 7)
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ulbricht-Ithrushchev Relations Reportedly Strained
East German attitudes favoring Communist China appear
to be straining relations between Khrushchev and East Gprman
nnoyeci witfl ulDrlcflt,
especially because of a telegram--the contents of which are
not known--he sent to Mao Tse-tung in answer to the latter's
greeting on the occasion of East Germany's tenth anniversary}
COther East German actions may have contributed to Khru-
shchev's misgivings. For example, East German politburo
member Hermann Matern, at Peiping's tenth anniversary cele-
brations, ' commented favorably on the communes, and Premier
Grotewohl in late September publicly backed the position taken
by Peiping rather than taking the neutral Soviet view on the Chi-
nese-Indian border disputei
IUhrushchev may also have been irritated by the raising of
the new East German flag over elevated rail stations in West
Berlin, which was a unilateral
East German action,
a low-level functionary had ordered the flag-raising and that the
strong reaction to this incident made repetition unlikely:1
Ciflbricht is also reported to believe, despite assurances
from Khrushchev, that the Soviet leader may have been too con-
ciliatory during his meeting with President Eisenhower. Ul-
bricht fears that more than just tactical concessions were made
at the expense of his position and of East German prestige. He
plans to go to Moscow soon for talks with Khrushchev.
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gore
Mikoyan in Finland
Moscow is using Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's cur-
rent visit to Finland to condemn European economic integra-
tion and to warn Finland officially against participation in the
projected seven-nation little-free-trade area (LFTA). Mikoyan�
in Helsinki for the signing of a new Soviet-Finnish five-year
trade agreement and the opening of the Soviet Industrial Fair,
said at a press conference on 22 October that the USSR regards
the Western European economic groupings as "remnants of the
cold-war era." He expressed confidence that Finland�the
USSR's "most important West European trade partner"--would
reach an "advantageous decision" concerning its links with the
LFTA.
Previous unofficial warnings from the USSR caused the Finns
to adopt a cautious wait-and-see attitude toward the projected
LFTA. Mikoyan's explicit warning will definitely preclude any
direct Finnish membership. Nevertheless, the Finns, concerned
over the competitive position of their exports in Western Euro-
pean markets, may seek to preserve their position by making
informal arrangements with the member countries.
The new Finnish-Soviet long-term trade agreement for
1961-65, signed by Mikoyan on 22 October, calls for Finnish
exports valued at $789,000,000--one third of which will be in
ships--and imports at $756,000,000. This represents a 2.5-
percent annual increase in trade between the two countries but
is less than the over-all increase in Finland's foreign trade.
The exact amount of Finland's petroleum imports under the
agreement is not known. The Finns, however, rejected a So-
viet demand to supply all of their crude oil requirements and
instead proposed that two thirds come from the USSR.
Mikoyan's visit will last a week or ten days, according to
Finnish officials, and will include a tour of the country and the
launching of an icebreaker built by Finland for the USSR. A
private dinner and informal conversations with Finnish Pres-
ident Kekkonen are also scheduled.
NFIDEN11AI-
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Military Alerts in Iraq and the UAR
Both Iraq and the UAR have taken steps apparently designed
to meet any military eventuality arising from the unstable situa-
tion in Iraq. The UAR may fear that Israel is about to take some
action to forestall Cairo's becoming involved in any new move
against Qasim. UAR units in northern Sinai were ordered on
21 October to be alert to the possibility of such Israeli action.
Cairo, however, on 19 October refused to give assurances
of military assistance to anti-Qasim plotters in Baghdad. One of
the reasons given for the refusal was concern that UAR military
involvement in Iraq would bring counteraction from Israel. There
is no indication of unusual Israeli military preparations as yet.
Israel is capable of mobilizing on very short notice.
Iraq in turn seems wary of UAR designs and on 22 October
ordered units of the 2nd Division into the highest state of alert
in the northern Syrian-Iraqi border area. Baghdad radio on 23
October renewed charges that the UAR was massing troops on
the border. A UAR Desert Guard company in that area informed
Damascus on the same date that "approximately a regiment" of
the Iraqi Army had bivouacked near the border. The Iraqi alert,
however, may also be related to current rumors that dissident
elements in the Syrian Army are on the verge of revolt against
the Cairo regime.
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Indian and Chinese Communist Border Forces Clash in Ladakh
Ill feeling between India and Communist China over their bor-
der dispute is likely to hit a new peak as a result of another seri-
ous clash in the Ladakh area of Kashmir. The latest incident
occurred on 21 October about 45 miles inside the generally recog-
nized border between western Tibet and Ladakh, about at the
point where the boundary claimed by Peiping slices off the north-
eastern corner of Ladakh.
New Delhi on 23 October issued an official statement "strongly"
protesting the incident as an intrusion into Indian territory. The
communique stated that 17 Indian border guards were killed and
three seriously injured when their unit suddenly came under
heavy fire--including mortars and grenades--from Chinese troops
in a mountain position. The Indian spokesman said New Delhi
had rejected a Chinese protest claiming the Indians had,entered
Chinese territory. Peiping also published its version of the in-
cident on 23 October, claiming in a relatively mild statement that
Chinese frontier guards had been "compelled" to fire in self-
defense. In its official protest on 22 October, Peiping asked
that measures be taken at once to prevent the recurrence of any
"violation of Chinese frontiers."
This incident is the first serious border clash since 26 Au-
gust. While the most publicized Himalayan frontier clashes have
occurred about a thousand miles east along the McMahon line in
Assam, Ladakh was the scene of several incidents during the sum-
mers of 1958 and 1959 which were protested by New Delhi, Prime
Minister Nehru, though demanding Chinese withdrawal from out-
posts on the Indian side of the "traditional" frontier as a condi-
tion for negotiations on the border dispute, has left the Indian po-
sition on northeastern Ladakh purposefully vague.
While Peiping's definition of the "traditional boundary" is
equally vague, the Chinese deny Indian claims as the legacy of
"British aggression" and insist New Delhi should respect the
"status quo," which would leave the Chinese occupying the dis-
puted corner of Ladakh.
The latest incident probably was not intended by either side
as a provocation, in view of the fact bh governments have been
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trying to ease tension and prepare the way for diplomatic discus-
sions. Nehru on 8 October said his government would undertake
no military operations "at this stage," while efforts to resolve the
dispute were under way on the political level. /Rao Tse-tung re-
cently assured Indian Communists that Communist China had no
intention of committing "aggression" against India and that the bor
der dispute "is going to be settled." However, the Ladakh incident
and new exchange of protests is likely to harden Indian public and
official attitudes, thus making it even more difficult to create the
"proper tmosohere" which Mao has said is necessary for nego-
tiations-4
SFCRET
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IIL THE WEST
Italian President Gronchi Likely to Visit the USSR
A Soviet official on. 14 October made preliminary inquiries
as to whether Italian President Gronchi would accept an invita-
tion from Khrushchev to pay an official visit to the USSR late in
November. The Italian cabinet wished to postpone a decision
on advice to Gronchi until next week after the conclusion of the
Christian Democratic party's national congress, but a leak of
the news by Moscow necessitated an advance, semiofficial an-
nouncetnent of the soundings on 21 October.
The Italian official said the cabinet is almost certain to
recommend acceptance by Gronchi, who presumably is eager
to go. However, Premier Segni, Finance Minister Taviani,
and former Premier and ex-Christian Democratic party sec-
retary Fanfani are said to be opposed for domestic political
reasons. The chief point for cabinet consideration appears to
be the terms of a return visit by Khrushchev, which the USSR
wants to make definite. Segni and Foreign Minister Pella wish
to leave this question open, fearing an adverse impact on next
spring's municipal and provincial elections.
The Soviet inquiry regarding Gronchi's visit was made to
Italian Foreign Trade Minister Del Bo, who is currently in
Moscow to discuss expansion of Italian-Soviet trade. The USSR
has requested additional lira credits, and the Italian Government
seems inclined to grant them. This year Moscow has ordered
about $60,000,000 worth of Italian chemical equipment, half of
which is to be supplied on government-guaranteed credits of at
least one year's duration. The USSR may press Gronchi, in the
course of his visit, to commit his government to expand the
amount of such guarantees and extend repayment periods to five
years.
_S11) LEIDEALT-1
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Cuba
Fidel Castro's latest tirade against his opponents--a televi-
sion speech on 22-23 October--indicates an increasingly emo-
tional attitude and tendency to appeal for mass demonstrations
of support from the lower classes. The Cuban premier said he
did not believe accusations made against Communist regimes
since they were the same charges leveled against the revolu-
tion he leads; he said he did not care if his movement was
labeled Communist.
His violent attacks on the US for allegedly permitting ac-
tivities directed against him, such as the leaflet-dropping flights
on 22 October over Havana, and his references to the great
strength of the US naval base at Guantanamo probably presage
intensified attempts to blame Cuba's troubles on Washington.
Castro called for a demonstration against such "air attacks" by
one million Cubans in Havana on 26 October.
In his attempts to malign Huber Matos, the respected for-
mer military governor of Camaguay Province who broke with
him over Communist influence in the regime, Castro said that
Matos' "self-sought" popularity and revolutionary ties made him
a desirable recruit of "big interests," a term now often equated in
Cuba with US business or the American press. The US Consulate
in Santiago de Cuba reports that Matos' denigration is causing
"deep shock and soul searching" in that revolutionary stronghold,�
where Matos was regarded as a loyal, anti-Communist officer
and a symbol of the best in the revolution.
Charging the US with attempts to keep Cuba defenseless
against its enemies by blocking purchases of military equipment
such as British jet aircraft, Castro said that the workers and
peasants now are Cuba's main force and that they must be armed.
Earlier this year Cuban Communists proposed that a people's
armed militia be organized, and extremist government officials
now controlling labor and agrarian reform may respond to Cas-
tro's declaration by creating such a militia with help from Raul
Castro.. the leftist minister nf revolutionary armed forces.
I 1AL
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
InJYrt ,e1a.11kT 11TP7,11 1
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