CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03029888
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 23, 1959

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23 October 1959
Copy No. C 65
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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23 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet disapproval of communes causing
dissension in Chinese party.
Chinese leaders tell Indian Communist
chief they want "proper atmosphere" be-
fore beginning border talks with Nehru. 0
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Soviet diplomat visiting Jordan; USSR of-
fer of aid "with no strings" reported.
Nasir makes new effort to speed up po-
litical and economic reform in Syria.
Terrorist activity in Cameroun may in-
clude attacks on US and British consular
Installations,
Pakistan President Ayub has invited
Afghan prime minister to visit Karachi
and discuss settlement of differences.
LATE ITEM
Ballistic vehicle launched at Tyura Tam,
Tfl-SCI?
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - USSR: Recently available articles from
Communist China's provincial press contain the most explicit
admissions to date that Soviet disapproval of the communes con-
tributed to dissension among the rank and file in the Chinese
Communist party. The articles attack as "right opportunists"
party members who cite Soviet abandonment of communes in the
1920s and who say, "If other socialist countries do not have com-
munes, we should not establish them." lihrushchev's failure to
endorse even the limited concept that communes are good "for
China" probably has added to difficulties the Chinese leaders are
having with unconvinced party members. (Page 1)
Communist China - India: LMao Tse-tung on 6 October sought
to provide Indian Communist party leader Ajoy Ghosh with a dis-
play of Peiping's "reasonableness" which Ghosh could use in off-
setting Indian Communist party factional disputes arising out of
the Sino-Indian border dispute.
Mao admitted Peiping had "made some mistakes" by
continuing to publicize its extensive border claims, but he assured
Ghosh the Chinese would not press the full claims in any negotia-
tions over border outposts. Both Mao and Liu Shao-chi told Ghosh
negotiations on the border could begin as soon as the "proper at-
mosphere" developed--suggesting the Chinese expect the Indian
Government to adopt a more friendly tone in public:1 Nehru said
on 21 October that he had received no reply to hfflatest letter to
Chou En-lai and commented that the C11inPQP did nnt h nw thp same
"eagerness for peace" as Khrushchev.
(Page 2)
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IL ASIA-AFR1CA
Jordan-Bloc: he British ambassador in Amman is con-
cerned about the cordial treatment King Husayn and Prime
Minister Majalli are according the visiting Soviet ambassador
to Lebanon, S. P. Kiktev, the first ranking Soviet diplomat
ever to visit Jordan. Husayn has stated the Soviet ambassa-
dor offered possible military and other aid "with no strings
attached." The primary Soviet objective is said to be the
establishment of diplomatic relations. A Jordanian Foreign
II
'77
Ministry spokesman said on 18 October that the Czech ambas-
K//'
sador in Beirut is expected to visit Jordan "next week
(Page 3)
4,77A
'
UAR: Nasir's 21 October decree giving Vice President
Marshal Amir broad executive powers in Syria apparently is
a move to speed up economic and political reforms. Nasir
will now almost certainly try to push ahead with activation of
the representative "National Union"--the UAR's sole official
political party--and toward completion of a shake-up in the
Syrian Army. Cairo nevertheless still faces a prolonged peri-
od of parrying popular discontent until some real progress
is made nartirtillnly in stabilizing Syria's dislocated economy.
(Page 4)
Cameroun: bere are isolated acts of violence against
Europeans in French-administered Cameroun, and the atmos-
phere is becoming more tense there and in the British Cameroons.
Attacks by extremist members of the Union of the Cameroons Pop-
ulation (UPC) on British and American consular installations in
Douala and Youandd�originally slated for 15 and 19 October--
are now scheduled for 1 November,
The extremists presumably plan these attacks as a prelude
to a new campaign of violence aimed at ousting the moderate
Ahidjo government before Cameroun becomes independent on
1 Januarirj, (Page 5)
23 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Afghanistan-Pakistan: Pakistani President Ayub has in-
vited Afghan Prime Minister Daud to visit Pakistan to "dis-
cuss a settlement of their differences,"
Daud has indicated
willingness to make the trip if Ayub assures him he will dis-
cuss the Pushtoonistan dispute. A meeting of the two leaders
might check the deterioration in relations resulting from recent
heated propaganda exchanges, but it is doubtful that either side
Is ready to make the concessions necei. Jary for a settlement of
the difficult Pushtoonistan problem.
(Page 6)
III. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Outlooal and South Africa. NIE 76-59,
20 Oct 59.
Singapore�Problems and Prospects. ME 69-59, 20 Oct 59.
LATE ITEM
*USSR: A ballistic vehicle was launched on the Tyura Tam
missile test range at about 1333 EDT on 22 October. Location
of the impact area is not clear, because of conflicting evidence:
28 minutes after launch, Soviet and American elements reported
visually sighting the vehicle near the Kamchatka Peninsula,
on the other hand, a de-
scending vapor trail was sighted iour minutes later by an Amer-
ican observer about 1,100 miles further down range, near three
heavily instrumented Soviet ships which were addressees for the
Tvura Tam countdown.
nor to permit
assessment of the mission as an ICBM test or capsule-recovery
event.
23 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
vi
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Deny Applicability of Soviet Experience With Communes
The most explicit admissions to date that Soviet disapproval
of the communes contributed to dissension among the rank and file
in the Chinese Communist party are contained in two recently avail-
able articles in the Chinese provincial press. A Yunnan Daily ed-
itorial on 1 September stated that some Chinese still point out
that the USSR abandoned communes after a brief trial in the 1920s.
Accusing these Chinese of calling for the study of Soviet experi-
ence as a pretext for criticil-iing the communes, the article warned
that Soviet experiments must not be studied in a doctrinaire man-
ner. The editorial argued that while it was "completely correct"
for the USSR to disband its communes and "establish collective
farms universally," conditions in China were different from the
situation in the USSR when communes were tried there.
An article in the Szechwan Daily of 22 September quoted "right
opportunist" critics in the Chinese party as stating flatly that "if
other socialist countries do not have communes, we should not es-
tablish them." Deliberately avoiding any reference to Khrushchev's
opposition to the communes, the article revived Stalin's statement
that communes were a higher form of agricultural organization.
The resolution adopted by the Chinese central committee plenum
last August, strongly reaffirming the "superiority" of the communes
over the former cooperatives, is an implicit rebuke to Moscow as
well as a slap at Chinese opponents of the commune program. Khru-
shchev's and Suslov's recent failure to endorse even the limited con-
cept that communes are good "for China" probably has heightened
Peiping's irritation and added to the difficulty the Chinese leaders
are having in overcoming doubts among certain party members.
CONFI1 IAL
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Mao Seeks to Reassure Indian Communist Leader
tilao Tse-tung on 6 October sought to provide Indian Commu-
nist party leader Ajoy Ghosh with arguments to offset criticism
of Communist China, which has split the Indian Communist party
on the border dispute. Admitting that Peiping had "made some
mistakes" in publicizing its border claims, Mao assured Ghosh
the Chinese had no intention of pressing these full claims in ne-
gotiating with the Indians to settle disputes over the location of
individual border outposts along the McMahon line4
(-Mao did not abandon Communist China's claims, however,
and stated it would be necessary to develop the "proper atmos-
phere" before any negotiations could be held. This suggestion
that the Indian Government adopt a more friendly tone in public
probably was intended to reach Nehru and, along with the other
comments on the border, apparently was conveyed by one of the
Indian Communists to the Indian ambassador in Peipingg
14ao praised the Indian party for efforts to "overcome nation-
alist feelings" and conceded that, "under certain circumstances,"
public endorsement of Peiping was not feasible. Seconding earlier
instructions from Moscow, Mao told Ghosh the Indian party should
try to "save Nehru from the rightists" and side with him for the
time being. Mao's alleged assurances should provide Ghosh with
powerful ammunition in subduing "nationalist" and "international-
ist" extremists and restoring party disciplinIV
&e.hru told the press on 21 October that he had received no
reply to the letter he sent Chou En-lai three weeks ago, in which
he said no negotiations could be held until China evacuates out-
posts it holds on the Indian side of the "traditional" frontier. His
comment that the Chinese did not show the same "eagerness for
peace" as Khrushchev apparently was designed to bolster his the-
ory that Peiping and Moscow are at odds over relations with India]
jyx-RE
23 Oct 59
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Jordanians Give CordihyReception to Sqyiet Diplomat
Ctoviet Ambassador to Lebanon S. P. Kiktev has proposed to
King Husayn that Jordan consider accepting possible military and
economic aid from the USSR "with no strings attached,"
The King reportedly said Kiktev
seemed principally interested in the establishment of Soviet-Jor-
danian relations, andhad suggested that Husayn follow the example
of Afghanistan, which continues as a monarchy and receives as-
sistance from both the West and the USSR, including Soviet mil-
itary aid]
British Ambassador Johnston in Amman is concerned over
the cordial treatment being accorded Kiktev by the Jordanian Gov-
ernment. Neither Husayn nor Prime Minister Majalli has given
any information directly to the British or American ambassador
about the discussions with Kiktev-.7
Eflusayn/ who is said to be discouraged and perplexed by West-
ern hesitance regarding future aid commitments to Jordan, prob-
ably would like to explore the Soviet offer, although he also pre-
sumably is wary of offending Great Britain and the United States
by accepting it. He and Majalli may fear that a Western-Soviet
rapprochement might result in reductions in Western aid to Jor-
dan which at some future time could, if necessary, be replaced
by Soviet assistancej
U_Jordanian Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 18 October
that the Czech ambassador in Beirut is expected to visit Jordan
',next week.1
23 Oct 59
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UAR Vice President Given Full Powers in Syria
UAR Vice President Amir has been made virtual viceroy
of the Syrian Region of the UAR in an apparent effort by Nasir
to speed up urgently needed economic and political reforms.
The Syrian executive council, which includes all cabinet mem-
bers for the northern region of the UAR, has been made di-
rectly responsible to Amir, and the first session under his
guidance has been called for 24 October.
Amir will probably lay before the council a blueprint
for carrying out Nasir's long-promised program for rescu-
ing the stagnating Syriar economy--dislocated by drought
and the consequences of union with Egypt last year. Amir
will probably also supervise the completion of purging the
First (Syrian) Army of its various dissident elements.
There has so far been no mention of personnel changes
in the Syrian ministries, except for giving Interior Minister
Abd al-Hamid Sarraj the additional post of minister of prop-
aganda Sand news, formerly held by the recently discharged
Baathist, Riyad al-Malki.
Amir will probably follow through quickly with Nasir's
plans for giving the Syrians at least a semblance of local
autonomy by formation of local and provincial committees
composed of individuals elected last July to the UAR's only
legal political party, the National Union. Such a move, par-
ticularly if followed soon by selection of Syrians to participate
in a UAR national assembly, should do much to forestall
clandestine political party activity and mollify Syrian public
discontent over Egyptian hegemony.
The regime, however, will continue to face popular
resentment of its restrictions on the once free Syrian econ-
omy. Cairo's grandiose plans for industrialization probably
will not yield significant benefits for several years, and
the prospects of a satisfactory agricultural comeback next
year are not bright.
CONFID L
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Terrorism in Cameroun
(Sporadic acts of violence b3r extremist members of the out-
lawed nationalist movement/ the Union of the Cameroons Popu-
lation (UPC), are reported to be increasing in frequency both in
the French-administered territory of Cameroun and in British
Cameroons. Four isolated attacks were made against lone Euro-
peans in Cameroun by UPC terrorists between 15 and 20 October.
During this period French forces are reported to have captured
10 Czech automatic pistols and 1,200 rounds of 7.62 ammunition.
These attacks on Europeans may have precipitated what appears
to have been a counter-terrorist raid on 19 October by a group
of 20 Africans and 14 Europeans against UPC supporters in Brit-
ish Cameroon_s_l
[Local British authorities� disturbed over these raids, are
reported to be reinforcing their border police with two Nigerian
infantry companies. In addition, two Nigerian gunboats are pa-
trolling the coastal waters of the border area to prevent a move-
ment of forces by se_g]..
attacks by UPC extremists on
British and American consular installations in Douala and Yaotand6--
originally slated for 15 and 19 October--are now scheduled for
1 November. The terrorists presumably plan these attacks,
which allegedly include assassinating the American consul gen-
eral in Yaoundd and the British vice consul in Douala, as aprel-
tide to a new campaign of violence aimed at ousting the moderate
government of Premier Ahidjo and forcing new elections in
Cameroun before it becomes independent on 1 January 19q9.3
Crhe UPC's capabilities probably are limited to increased
guerrilla-type activity/ unless it receives significant outside sup-
port. Ghana, Guinea, the UAR, and the Communist bloc have
provided the UPC with some limited support,
but the movement continues to suffer
from lack of good leadership, administration, and logistical sup-
port-.)
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Afghan and Pakistani Leaders May Meet to Discuss
Pushtoonistan Dispute
Pakistani President Ayub has invited Afghan Prime Minister
Daud to visit Pakistan to "discuss a settlement of differences."
Ayub's invitation, extended on 19 October, is his first concilia-
tory gesture to the Afghans. After he took power in October 1958,
Ayub generally ignored Kabul's Pushtoonistan propaganda, which
became increasingly violent. Since early September, however2
Pakistan has been retaliating with its own propaganda offensive.
Daud has said he is willing to go to Pakistan if assured that
the Pushtoonistan dispute will be the subject of discussion. He
has suggested, however, that his brother, Foreign Minister Naim,
might first talk with Ayub and learn whether conditions seem favor-
able to a solution of this problem. Daud probably does not want
to return home from a trip to Pakistan with nothing to show for
his trouble; if he should feel that Ayub had used a meeting for prop-
aganda purposes, his own Pushtoonistan propaganda would prob-
ably become still more violent.
The willingness of both leaders to meet suggests they may de-
sire to halt the deterioration in relations resulting from heated
propaganda exchanges. It is doubtful, however, that either side
is ready to make sufficient concessions to secure a lasting settle-
ment.
TOP RET
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence� The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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