CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/08/27

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03029879
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RIPPUB
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U
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16
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February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
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Publication Date: 
August 27, 1959
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'9'"Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 / TOP SECRET 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 27 August 1959 Copy No, C CENTRAL 6:: INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. MO CHANGE IN CLASS. ' DECLASSIFIED CUSS. CHANGED TO: NEXT REVIEW DATE: REVIEWER: TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Pis � nnOr � ginir neir � 11 in � -TOP-SEGRET- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 I WI I 27 AUGUST 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Chinese Communist party lead- ers readjust economic targets downward, but maintain "leap forward" pressure. Soviet Navy concludes large-scale combined air/surface/submarine exercise in Norwegian Sea. USSR concludes $35,000,000 aid agreement with Guinea. II. ASIA-AFRICA Laos�Guerrilla action now largely limited to northern provinces, but Communists possibly preparing for country-wide operations. India will not interfere with any ap- peal, by Dalai Lama for UN action on Tibet. Name TOP SECRET III. THE WEST Prominent West Germans press Adenauer to make gesture aimed at easing way for ultimate resump- tion of relations with Poland. De Gaulle reportedly seeking Alge- rian solution involving membership In French Community. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 VA 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3029879 I v.( _7L.a I 16.1.4 I 'kw> CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 27 August 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China: A communique issued by the Chinese Communist party central committee on 26 August discloses Peiping's decision to "readjust" significantly downward China's four main production targets for 1959�coal, steel, grain, and cotton. The Chinese admit gross "over-assessment" of agri- cultural production in 1958�grain and cotton output claims are reduced drastically. The readjustment of targets represents a setback for the prestige of Mao Tse-tung and those of his lieutenants, including Liu Shao-chi, who had encouraged the most extravagant expectations of rapid economic development. The call by the leadership for further intensive effort on the economic front indicates that there is to be no relaxation of "leap forward" pressures on the masses. (Page 1) (Chart) USSR: Soviet naval forces have concluded the large-scale combined air/surface/submarine exercise in the Norwegian Sea which began 11-12 August. Four cruiser-destroyer groups and a large number of submarines�probably over forty--participated in one of the largest Soviet out-of-area exercises yet noted. Nu- merous, BADGER jet medium bomber aircraft also took part, with a high of 13 sorties scheduled during one 24-hour period. Most of the participating units were from the Northern Fleet, but one group of surface ships and two submarines from the Baltic Fleet were involved. Exercises of this typed defense of the seaward approaches to the Murman coast, are usually con- ducted twice a year. The I purred in Sentemhpr 1958 vUSSR-blimea: The Soviet Union and Guinea concluded in ,\L Moscow on 24 August an economic and technical cooperation V 11/ 2� II Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Jo.f I 4.1.1 b...71.41/40.iih..LI agreement providing for the extension of a $35,000,000 long- term Soviet credit. The official communique stated the credit will be used to purchase Soviet equipment for developing in- dustry and agriculture and for building roads. Moscow can also be expected to attempt to exploit Guinea's need for tech- nicians and specialists. Guinea has recently announced that it presently is drafting a national plan for economic develop- ment which, while emphasizing agriculture, also calls for an expansion of industry. Until the conclusion of this agreement, bloc economic activity in Guinea, with the exception of a Czech arms gift, had been limited to the development of closer trade relations. Page 3) IL ASIA-AFRICA Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sib-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The initiation of significant hos- tilities is unlikely in this area in the immediate future. Watch Committee conclusion--Laos: Laotian Government forces have redeployed combat units in northern Laos in an at- tempt to meet the threat posed by insurgent elements, but as yet no significant military actions have taken place. Dissident activity with probable North Vietnamese support and guidance continues in the northern and, to a lesser extent, in the central and north-central provinces. The North Vietnamese, by provid- ing guidance and logistic assistance to the dissident elements in Laos, have the capability of intensifying operations through these elements, which, if they see government resistance weakening, may extend the scope of their military operations to include the greater portion, if not all, of the country. Laos: The American Embassy states that while guerrilla �\) combat action is still limited basically to three provinces in r� the north, there are continuing reports from other provinces 27 Aug 59 DAILY BRIEF ii / 1 . A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3029879 I'kJ kJ J-I411.1-4 tA 10" �11;1 VA that small bands have infiltrated to propagandize and organize potential guerrilla forces. These activities may be in prepara- tion for country-wide expansion of guerrilla o er wet se son en's in about la Government on 22 August informed the Da ai Lama that it would not stand in the way of any appeal by him for UN consideration of the Tibetan question. New Delhi continues to feel that such a move can serve no useful purpos ut apparently intends to do nothing either to support or to in- erfere in any UN action on Tibet. Nehru took a similar line ith the American charg�n 20 August. Indian officials also gave clearance for a trip by the Dalai Lama's top adviser on 28 August to Manila, where he may explore possible Philippine sponsorship of UN discussion of Tibet3 (Page 4) III. THE WE ST West Germany - Poland: E, _Vest Germany's leading news- paper publisher, supported by Foreign Minister Brentano and several top government and Christian Democratic officials, is urging Chancellor Adenauer to make a "dramatic declaration" of friendship toward Warsaw on 1 September, the twentieth an- niversary of the German invasion. Their aim is to ease the way a.../ for ultimate resumption of diplomatic relations. While Adenauer U is reported to have agreed to deal with the Polish question in a speech, he and significant elements of the party oppose any move toward formal relations prior to the 1961 elections, because of strong onnogition from the politically influential refugee groups-.) (Page 5) France-Algeria: [be Gaulle plans to propose soon that Algeria become a member of the French Community, accord- ing to remarks attributed to Deputy President Jacques Sous- During his visit to Algeria from 27 to 30 August, De 0 r Gaulle reportedly will try to convince the army that it should accept this solution. De Gaulle had originally spoken of a "choice place" for Algeria within the Community. However"! 27 Aug 59 DAILY BRIEF iii 'U �TOP�SEC-RET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Ver, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 1 ur Nino' in view of army insistence on continued close ties between geria and France, the rebel goal of eventual independence, and disagreements among African members of the Commu- nity over the extent of association with France, it is doubtful that a "Community solution" for Algeria satisfactory to all elements could be achieved no (Page 6) 27 Aug 59 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET � iv /////007Z7100://A7/274M7,7,17.0707,7767.77717,771 A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 UNCLASSIFIED COMMUNIST CHINA'S "READJUSTMENT OF "THE FOUR MAJOR TARGETS" ( PRODUCTION IN MILLION TONS) CLAIMED FOR 1958 VERIFIED 1958 OUTPUT 1959 PLAN ( PROMULGATED FEBRUARY 1959) ADJUSTED TARGET FOR 1959 STEEL 11 11* 18** 12*** COAL 270 270 380 335 GRAIN 375 250 525 275 COTTON 3.35 2.1 5 2.3 * 3 "Primitive" and 8 "Modern" ** Both "Primitive" and "Modern" *** All "Modern" Qn827 27 AUGUST 1959 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 LAilN1 ILL! 1 IPtLo L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China Cuts Back 1959 Targets The communique issued on 26 August by the Chinese Com- munist party, following its eighth plenary session at Lushan during the first two weeks in August, discloses Peiping's deci- sion to "readjust" significantly downward China's four main production targets for 1959--coal, steel, grain, and cotton. The new grain and cotton targets are only half the original goals, and those for steel and coal are significantly reduced. The Chinese admit to gross "over-assessment" of their agricultural production in 1958. Exaggerated reports from statistical units, together with hasty harvesting and storage due to inadequate labor, resulted in verification of only 250,000,000 tons of grain (375,000,000 tons had been claimed) and 2,100,000 tons of cotton (3,350,000 tons had been claimed). The back-yard steel program was in effect conceded to be un- successful. Output by local furnaces is no longer to be included in the national plan, and local efforts toward that end are to be subordinated to other economic activities. The communique confirms earlier indications that the slo- gans "great leap forward" and "leap forward" have been rede- fined in much more modest terms. The Second Five-Year Plan targets proposed in 1956, previously set aside as too conserva- tive, have been revived as realistic goals for 1959 which can be overfulfilled by sustained maximum effort. An accompanying resolution reaffirms that significant changes have taken place in the organization and operation of the communes during the months of "tidying up." It emphasizes, however, the superior qualities of the communes as an eco- nomic organization. Chinese Communist leaders have not all been committed to the same degree to the original concept of the "great leap for- ward." Those whose prestige has seemed most heavily committed 27 Aug 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 LAailtruinvi I 1P1LL. view' Nair are Mao Tse-tung; Liu Shao-chi, the second-ranking leader; Teng Hsiao-ping, the party's secretary general; and Tan Chen-lin, the secretariat's specialist in agriculture. These men played the leading roles in exhorting the "leap" and in threatening those opposed to a headlong course. Party lead- ers who had seemed to have reservations about the "leap" were senior administrators and economic specialists, pos- sibly including Premier Chou En-lai. Mao appears still to dominate the party; the communiqu� notes that the party plenum was held under Mao's "guidance," and it concludes by urging the party and people to unite under Mao's leadership. It is not yet clear whether Mao intends to fix any blame for the leap's shortfall on other party leaders rather than low-level cadres. 27 Aug 59 CONFIDENTIAL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 '41 1 i-t NOW Nair Soviet Economic Aid to Guinea Moscow, in a move designed to strengthen its relations with Conakry as well as to enhance the bloc's position in West Africa, concluded an economic aid agreement with Guinea on 24 August. According to TASS, the Soviet $35,000,000 long- term, low-interest credit is to cover the cost of economic and technical assistance to Guinea for constructing industrial enter- prises, developing agriculture, and building roads. Moscow, in keeping with its economic aid policy in the underdeveloped areas, presumably will accept partial, if not complete, repay- ment for its aid in the form of Guinean commodities. Guinea has recently announced that it is drafting a national plan for economic development which, while emphasizing agri- culture, evidently also will provide for the expansion of its nascent industry. The aid agreement will provide Moscow with an opportunity to exploit GUinda's need for qualified tech- nicians and specialists. The bloc, furthermore, may have of- fered to guide Conakry in efforts to develop the industrial sector. The Soviet aid program was agreed upon during the good-will visit to the USSR of a Guinean government delegation which left for home after a stay of about ten days. Since Guinea achieved its independence last year, bloc economic activity--with the ex- ception of a Czech arms gift this spring--has been essentially limited to attempts to develop trade relations. There are, how- ever, at least 30 bloc specialists, mostly Czechs, providing technical assistance on public works projects being carried out by the Guinean Ministry of Interior. In addition, there are re- portedly a few Czech officers working with the army. 27 Aug 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Qprin'T Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 II. ASIA-AFRICA Nigie India Adopts Hands-Off Policy on UN Consideration of Tibet C_Indian officials, in response to a request for guidarice from the Dalai Lama on an appeal to the UN, informed his advisers on 22 August that India would neither support nor interfere with any action on the Tibetan question in the UN. The Tibetans were told that New Delhi could not advise the Dalai Lama on the public appeal he plans to make soon, since it conflicts with India's recognition of Tibet as part of Communist China. The Indian officials also suggested that the Dalai Lama in future make his decisions independently and act in his own interest without seeking clearance from New Delhi. This position, which is in sharp contrast to the Indian Government's earlier desire to restrict the Dalai Lama's political activities, was explained as being necessary to protect Indian interests but was interpreted by the Tibet- ans as tacit encouragement of their resort to UN acticrinq Ll_5;rime Minister Nehru also indicated to the American charg�n 20 August that he planned no definite move to op- pose UN consideration of the Tibet issue, but he reiterated his view that UN discussion could not lead to any useful ac- tion on the matter. Nehru, apparently disillusioned with Peiping, implied that his government would maintain a cor- rect attitude toward the Chinese Communists at the interna- tional level, but would be less cooperative toward them than in the pasq ajespite Nehru's unwillingness to support the Tibetans in the UN, the Dalai Lama has been invited to make an official visit to New Delhi and has been given travel clearance for several Tibetan delegations to travel abroad for publicity purposes. From 28 to 31 August, the Dalai Lama's brother and chief adviser will visit Manila, where he probably will explore the possibility of Philippine sponsorship of a request for UN discussion of Tibet. Talks with officials of South Viet- nam, Nationalist China, and Australia are also planned. There is a possibility that some Latin American country may be will- ing to initiate such a request and to organize support among other UN members.] 27 Aug 59 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 OL:A...1�La NNW. NW' III. THE WEST Influential West Germans Urging Adenauer to Improve Relations With Warsaw &est Germany's leading publisher, Axel Springer, is urging Chancellor Adenauer to make some dramatic ges- ture of friendship toward Warsaw on 1 September, the 20th anniversary of the German invasion of Poland. Springer's idea is that a declaration of German-Polish friendship could ease the way toward establishment of diplomatic relations. Poland has recently been irritated by German plans to in- clude prominent refugee leaders in the German delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in WarsaW.J (Vice Chancellor Erhard, Bundestag President Gersten- maier, and Minister for All-German Affairs Lemmer are reported to support Springer's efforts. Foreign Minister Brentano and Press Chief von Echardt have also backed such a move in discussions with Adenauerj be chancellor reportedly has promised Springer to deal with Polish-German relations in a speech about 1 Sep- tember, but he will probably not go beyond a declaration of friendship and a promise not to use force in settling the boundary question. While Adenauer agrees some under- standing must be reached with the Poles, he does not intend to take steps toward formalizing relations until after the 1961 elections. Pe fears that establishment of diplomatic relations, implying renunciation of the German eastern territories as the Poles demand, would alienate 6,000,000 refugee and expellee voters. During the Geneva conference, refugee leaders in the Christian Democratic Union were in- strumental in killing Foreign Minister Brentano's proposal for a German-Polish nonaggression pactV -SEC-REF 27 Aug 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 ant..nc, %re Nume De Gaulle Reportedly to Propose Algeria Become Member Of French Community De Gaulle plans to propose soon that Algeria become a mem- ber of the French Community, according to remarks made by Deputy Premier Jacques Soustelle on 18 August to an Algerian who formerly served as secretary of state for Algerian affairs in the French cabinet. During his visit to Algeria, the French President is expected to sound out key French Army elements, whom he has previously felt it necessary to reassure as to his intentions, if the FLN has not ac- cepted De Gaulle's standing offer to negotiate a cease-fire be- fore the French Community executive council meets on 10 Sep- tember, De Gaulle will ask the council to propose that Algeria become a membei, Several previous suggestions that an Algerian solution be sou within the Community framework have been made by various French officials and other political leaders. De Gaulle, in his early public discussions concerning the Community, re-- served a "choice place" for Algeria. The conflicting demands of the key elements involved in the Algerian problem indicate, however, that a satisfactory "Community solution" will be dif- ficult to achieve without considerable "give" on all sidesV ake French Army and nationalists in France adamantly op- pose any form of Algerian independence. The European settlers in Algeria hope to maintain their privileges by total integration of Algeria with France. FLN leaders have recently indicated some opposition to Community membership and probably would not accept it without at least some recognition of their right to independence. A further complication stems from disagree- ments among the African members of the Community over the extent of their association with Fran.s.F) 27 Aug 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 IL/CAN I UAL, "'gene THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget off ice of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03029879