THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03027800
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 11, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
,:j c(.4)
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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11 December 1967
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lop-Secret vie
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
lop-Seerer
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TOPS"r6.'R ET
Information as of 1600
11 December 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
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The Soviets have issued an official statement
of concern over the possibility of an extension
of the war into Cambodia and Laos.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
An estimated full Viet Cong battalion attacked
three US positions in the delta on 10 December
(Paras. 1-3). Captured enemy documents have re-
vealed Viet Cong leaders' concern about the deteri-
orating situation in Phu Yen Province last summer
and perhaps explain'the apparent high priority
given to enemy operations:' in the province this fall
(Paras, 4-7).
the use of North Viet-
namese cadre in the South (Paras. 8-10).
IL Political Developments in South Vietnar
/ Reports are circulating in Long An Province
that Viet Cong cadre there are telling their sub-
ordinates that there will be a military standdown
after Tet, to be followed by the establishment of
a coalition government (Paras. 3-7).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: The
Soviets have officially protested any possible ex-
tension of the war into CaMbodia and Laos (Paras. 1-2).
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68932 12-67 CIA
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I. MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A Viet Cong force estimated to be a full bat-
talion assaulted positions of a US 9th Infantry Division
company in Long An Province in the Mekong Delta just
before claim on 10 December. Simultaneously, two other
9th Division installations in nearby villages were hit
by rifle, grenade, and machine gun fire. The attacks
left 7 Americans and 15 Viet Cong dead and 46 US sol-
diers wounded.
2. In the main ground attack, part of the enemy
force succeeded in penetrating the perimeter of the US
company, but was driven back after approximately two
hours of close-in fighting. Reaction forces from the
9th Division were deployed along possible enemy with-
drawal routes, but no contact was' made with the Viet
Cong force.
3. Fighting elsewhere in the country was gener-
ally light on 10-11 December. One US Marine was killed
and 23 were wounded by enemy artillery barrages just
below the Demilitarized Zone during the afternoon of
10 December. Airborne US observers directing air
strikes north of Con Thien on 9 December reported 16
North Vietnamese were killed in a strike.
Developments in Phu Yen Province
4. Captured enemy documents
reveal that Viet Cong leaders felt their control
was eteriorating seriously in central Phu Yen Province
last summer.
stated that the allied military take-over in Phu Yen
had "generally broken up" the Viet Cong revolutionary
structure. government pacifi-
cation program and indicated that it had succeeded in
winning over many Viet Conq symoat4izers and guerrillas.
At a result compliance with the
1967 campaign would be difficult.
11 December 1967
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5. Another document, a political report of
the southern subregion of Viet Cong Military Region
5, provides further evidence that the enemy was
discouraged by the situation in Phu Yen last summer.
The report indicates that enemy forces in the
province were short of food and other supplies
and had procured them forcibly. This further
alienated the people.
6. These reports may explain the apparent
high priority which the Communists have given to
their operations in Phu Yen this fall. Security
conditions in the province took a decided turn
for the worse in late August when Viet Cong forces
launched a number of coordinated attacks on small
government outposts and an element of the North
Vietnamese 95th Regiment attacked a government
Revolutionary Development complex less than six
miles from Tuy Hoa, the provincial capital. In
a series of sharp clashes near Tuy Hoa just prior
to and following the national elections on 3
September, 21 hamlets were overrun. US officials
estimated that the Revolutionary Development
program was set back three months. Enemy activity
continued at a relatively high level in October
and November.
7. Prisoners and captured documents indicate
that both the North Vietnamese 95th Regiment and
Viet Cong units in Phu Yen have received large
numbers of North Vietnamese replacements this
year, as have other enemy units deployed in the
heavily populated coastal plain which extends
along the length of South Vietnam, The Communists
have attempted to maintain a high tempo of
activity in these areas and in the Mekong Delta
in conjunction with large-scale battles along
the country's isolated, interior borders.
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Evidence of VC Leadership Problems in South Vietnam
8.
/the use of North Vietnamese cadre in
the South.
\assigned to various provincial units
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in the four coastal provinces of cluang Nam, Quang
Ngai, Binh Dinh, and Phu Yen. . the 3 � 33. 3(h)(2)
.� ,
Viet Cong had requested that these officers be sent
from North Vietnam because of a shortage of quali-
fied cadre.
9.
all of
the officers except one in the Binh Dinh headquarters
were regroupees.
10. The assignment of North Vietnamese personnel
to local force units, provincial staffs, and other
elements of the Communist infrastructure in South
Vietnam makes it difficult to locate replacements
once they arrive in South Vietnam. The assignment
of 30 North Vietnamese officers to provincial
duties also illustrates that although the North
Vietnamese are having difficulty in training ade-
quate leadership personnel for their forces, the
Viet Cong are in even worse shape in this depart-
ment and in many cases must rely on the North Viet-
namese.
11 December 1967
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Viet Cong in Long An Reportedly Predicting Early
Peace
3. Viet Cong cadre and unit commanders in Long
An Province have reportedly beentelling their sub-
ordinates and the elders of Communist-controlled
villages since early November that all Communist
offensive operations in Long An will be stopped
after the Tet holidays in late January. Such a
standdown allegedly would then be followed by the
establishment of a coalition government with the full
:participation of the National Liberation Front.)
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4. as a result of
Communist assurances to their troops and other
subordinates that they will receive positions of
responsibility in the new government, the Chieu
Hoi program in the province has been "almost nulli-
fied." Rallier figures from the province show a
return of 59 in October and only 39 in November.
a failure by the Com-
munists to follow through on these promises will
result in "chaos" among Viet Cong soldiers and
supporters and mass defections among other than
hard-core elements.
5. Although the establishment of a coalition
government has been treated in a number of recently
captured documents and has received new emphasis
since the revised Liberation Front program was
issued in September, in no case has there been any
specific target date or any indication that such
a government is anticipated in the near future.
There is considerable documentary and other evidence,
in fact, that the Communists are preparing to con-
tinue fighting throughout 1968.
6. It is possible that, in receiving in-
doctrination on both the Communist "winter-spking
campaign" and on the coalition theme, Viet Cong
cadre in Long An have misinterpreted what are
actually longer range Communist plans. One
training document captured last month and believed
to have been used by a local force unit in Long An
alleged that the "revolution" in the South would
be concluded in 1967-1968. Local cadre may also
have distorted the plans themselves in an effort
to boost their subordinates' morale. The differing
Versions of the coalition theme within Long An
itself--reported by some informants to refer to
a countrywide coalition and by others as scheduled
to be put in effect only in III and IV Corps--
strongly suggest that Viet Cong cadre are adding
their own interpolations as they think necessary.
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7. It is also possible that
'information reflects
local South Vietnamese efforts to rationalize the
drop in Chieu Hoi figures. Chieu Hoi returns through-
out the country have been declining for several months,
and the decline predates the reported Viet Cong predic-
tions in Long An of an early coalition government.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Soviet Union on 10 December issued an
official statement expressing concern over possible
expansion of the Vietnam war into Laos and Cambodia.
A statement issued by TASS condemned alleged "plans"
being made in the US to extend military operations
into the two countries and asserted that any US at-
tempts to aggravate the situation in Southeast Asia
would be "strongly rebuffed by peace-loving nations
of the world."
2. The TASS pronouncement records at a more
authoritative level the foreboding note sounded in
Soviet media over the past several weeks, apparently
evoked by extensive speculation in the US press that
the US might be contemplating such action. It is also
certainly designed to trade on the anxieties of Cam-
bodia's Prince Sihanouk.
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