QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATING TO VIETNAM - 1967/12/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03024594
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Questions and Answers Relating to Vietnam
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ARCHIVAL :RECORD
PLEASE 1I111ORN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES
8 December 1967
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATING TO VIETNAM
8 December 1967
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1. Is there evidence that the North Viet-
namese are limited by manpower from sending addi-
tional troops to the south?
The weight of the evidence indicates that
North Vietnam is not limited by manpower considera-
tions (in terms of available bodies) from sending
additional troops into South Vietnam. Of a popula-
tion of about 18.5 million, about 2 million males
between the ages of 15 and 49 are physically fit
for military service. So far, only about a fourth
of the physically fit males are in the armed serv-
ices. The bombing program has resulted in the di-
version of about 500,000 civilian men and women of
all ages into war-related activities--about 5 per-
cent of the total labor force.
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P. How large a force in South Vietnam, of both
Viet Gong and North Vietnamese, can North Vietnam
support--given its potential, our bombing, and other
pertinent factors?
Although we do not know with certainty
what the present VC recruitment rate is, we believe
the VC are recruiting the maximum number of replace-
ments possible under present circumstances. We esti-
mate that North Vietnam has infiltrated personnel at
an average monthly rate of about 6,000 (72,000 annual
rate) over the last year or so. North Vietnam has
the capability to train 75,000-100,000 men a year for
infiltration. By shortening current training cycles
or increasing the number of units involved in the
training of new recruits, this number could be sub-
stantially increased, although quality would be re-
duced. We estimate that North Vietnam could prob-
ably double its present infiltration rate for a year
or so without seriously weakening its forces in North
Vietnam. We also believe the present logistical
system could support the increased infiltration and
expanded force structure in the South with some aug-
mentation of personnel and transport equipment. It
would thus appear that, from purely a manpower stand-
point, the Vietnamese Communists could, at least over
the short term, substantially increase the strength
of thei-r main forces in South Vietnam.
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3. How much of the Viet Cong main force
strength is now composed of North Vietnamese?
The regular forces (VC main and local
forces and North Vietnamese Army troops) in South
Vietnam number about 118,000. Of these, about
54,000 are in NVA units and about 64,000 are in
VC main and local force units. However, there are
at least 10,000 other North Vietnamese, and perhaps
more, serving in historic VC units. Some VC units
in the northernmost provinces were also originally
formed almost entirely of northern draftees who
never served in the regular North Vietnamese Army
except for basic training.
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4. How much of Viet Cong guerrilla strength
is now composed of North Vietnamese troops?
There is no evidence that North Vietnam-
ese troops are being used to reinforce Viet Cong
village and hamlet guerrillas. Some northerners
may possibly be serving in some village organiza-
tions as military or political advisers, and some
guerrilla units may contain former Viet Minh re-
grouped to the North and reinfiltrated. We are,
however, beginning to see more and more evidence
that North Vietnamese are going into some Viet Cong
local force units, at least in I and II Corps.
These units are the lowest elements on the enemy's
regular forces ladder and are formed of full-time
personnel who usually serve in their own province
or district areas.
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5. Is the bombing reducing the infiltration
of men? By what degree? What is the evidence to
support this?
Based on an analysis of interrogation
reports and captured documents, we estimate that
air attacks killed not more than 2 percent of the
North Vietnamese Army troops infiltrating into
South Vietnam during 1966. Indirectly, however,
the bombing contributes to an increase in the
number of desertions among infiltrators and to the
number of men who die from sickness en route to
South Vietnam. Losses from the latter causes may
run as high as 20 percent in some infiltrating
groups.
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6. Is the bombing reducing the infiltra-
tion of materiel? Bg what degree? What is the
evidence to support this?
The bombing has not reduced the infiltra-
tion of materiel. Truck traffic from North Viet-
nam into the Laotian Panhandle has increased each
year, making available a greater volume of supplies
for use in Laos and South Vietnam. Extension of
the road network in Laos during the past three years
now permits truck traffic to move all the way from
North Vietnam into South Vietnam throughout the
year. _If the interdiction program had not been under-
taken, however, even larger volumes of supplies prob-
ably would have been infiltrated to South Vietnam.
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7. is there evidence that the bombing has
weakened the will of the leaders of Hanoi?
There is no evidence of this, but it is
unlikely we would obtain such evidence. US inter-
vention certainly must have sobered many North Viet-
namese cadre who, in 1964, were banking on an early
and relatively inexpensive victory in the South.
It probably is a safe assumption that the shatter-
ing of these hopes and the destruction in the North
have created doubts in the minds of some of the
leaders in Hanoi. There is some evidence of such
doubt at lower levels and among the population as
a whole, but we see nothing to suggest this has or
is likely to persuade the leadership that its strat-
egy is incorrect.
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8. Is there evidence that the bombing has
strengthened the will of the leaders of Hanoi?
Again, there is no evidence of this. There
are many observers, however, including some in Hanoi
who are convinced that the bombings have inflamed
nationalist sentiment and have thus strengthened the
will to resist. This argument is bolstered by our
assumption that the successful North Vietnamese ef-
fort to overcome the effects of the bombings has
increased the confidence of the regime that it can
cope with the awesome power of the US. We are in-
clined to take at face value Hanoi's assertions that
it considers the bombings an inconclusive factor
in determining the outcome of the war.
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9. What is the order of battle of ground
forces in North Vietnam?
It is estimated that the North Vietnamese
Army now numbers approximately 443,000 men. In-
country forces number approximately 374,000 men
broken down into 10 infantry divisions, an artil-
lery division, an antiaircraft artillery division,
two infantry brigades, slightly over 100 independent
antiaircraft artillery regiments, some 30 to 35 SAM
battalions and other service and support units.
Out-of-country forces include at least 54,000 person-
nel in South Vietnam and 18,000 in Laos.
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10. How are those forces being utilised in
North Vietnam today--howcmany repair lines of com-
munication, how many man air defenses and coastal
defenses, how many are in training capacities?
The bulk of North Vietnam's Army--aside
from those involved in full-time air defense and
antiaircraft artillery roles (some 93,000 person-
nel)--is engaged in activities common to any army.
At least seven of the 12 or so major infantry
units, roughly 80,000 troops out of a total of
about 171,000 infantry troops, are believed to
have a training role; that is, training new re-
cruits and forming new units for infiltration to
South Vietnam or to replace regular units that are
sent south. An estimated 111,000 personnel are
believed to be engaged in such other activities as
armor, artillery, logistics, engineers, transpor-
tation and high command or administrative tasks.
A portion of most army units--the exact extent un-
known--is probably engaged in bomb repair and re-
lated tasks.
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11. Now dependent is the NLF on infiltration
of men and supplies from the North? What evidence
is there that the NLF is controlled by North Vietnam?
The steady flow of personnel infiltration in
1967 is the best evidence of the necessary contri-
bution Hanoi is making to keep the Communists'
main forces intact. North Vietnamese troops are
being used as fillers in many Viet Cong regular
units, primarily because of Viet Cong recruitment
difficulties in South Vietnam. Enemy main force
units are now almost fully equipped with the Soviet
family of small arms weapons, for which ammunition
can only come from the Communist countries through
North Vietnamese hands. The same is true of such
heavier weapons as artillery, rockets and large
caliber mortars.
NVA and VC regular and administrative support
forces in South Vietnam currently require about 55
tons of supplies per day--about 25 percent of their
supply requirements--from external sources. Ex-
ternal sources provide about 22 percent of the food
supply requirement, 30 percent of their weapons and
equipment supply requirement, and 85 percent of the
ammunition supply requirement.
Documents, prisoners, and a body of other evi-
dence provide substantial proof that the VC--and
the NLF, its political facade--are controlled by
North Vietnam through the Communist party, even though
NLF leaders are southerners and include some non-
Communists.
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12. How is the NLF organised? What is its
strength Is it predominantly South Vietnamese?
Is there any evidence that the NLF is controlled
by Peking?
The NLF is organized according to the
typical Communist pyramidal structure. In theory,
the top body is an elected Congress, but real
power rests in the Central Committee Presidium with
a Secretariat. This body, which is studded with
members of the Communist Party, directs the ac-
tivities of Front committees extending down through
the Province, District, Village and Hamlet levels.
In addition to this structure, the Front also has
allied with it numerous organizations such as women,
youth, student groups and so forth. At all levels
of the Front, representatives of the Peoples' Rev-
olutionary (Communist) Party (PRP) enjoy key posi-
tions and can exercise effective control over Front
activities.
The PRP, in turn, takes its direction
from the North Vietnamese Party. Current estimates
indicate that there are approximately 750,000 men
and women enrolled in one or another Front organiza-
tion. Probably over 80 percent of these are re-
siding in Viet Cong - controlled areas and are almost
wholly South Vietnamese.
There is no evidence that the Front is
controlled by Peking.
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13. Row much popular support does the NLF en-
joy from nonmembers in South Vietnam?
One of the primary failures of the NLF has
been its inability to bring to its banner any po-
litically significant individual or group in South
Vietnam. In the past it called on antigovernment
elements, such as the Buddhists, to join with it
but has received little response. Recently, however,
the Front has begun an intensive campaign based on
its new program to portray itself as a viable al-
ternative to the Saigon government. There is no sign
that the new approach has expanded popular support
for the Front so far, but the Communists apparently
intend to push in this direction, probably in the
belief that any eventual political settlement may
develop in the form of an agreement on a Communist-
dominated coalition in South Vietnam.
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14. How many civilians have been killed or
wounded in (1) South Vietnam and (2) North Vietnam
from all causes?
(1) The number of civilian dead and
wounded as a result of the war in South Vietnam
is extremely difficult to estimate because of im-
precise records and shifting reporting criteria.
Available data from 1958 through November 1967 in-
dicates that approximately 14,800 civilians were
killed as a result of Communist terrorism alone;
the estimated number of civilians wounded in ter-
rorist attacks is even less firm, but is most
probably around 25,000-30,000. Since July 1965,
close to 6,500 have been killed, including almost
1,500 civil officials. In 1967, civilian casual-
ties of Communist terror number 3,166 killed and
6,587 wounded through 25 November.
(2) In North Vietnam, the estimated
number of civilian casualties from 1965 through
mid-1967 is 43,000 killed and wounded. Thirty to
40 percent of the total are estimated to have been
killed. A large share of the civilian casualties
were undoubtedly sustained by civilians engaged in
war-related activities such as repair of bomb dam-
age, civil defense, and logistics activities.
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15. How do you explain the motivation of the
Viet Cong?
The key to the motivation of the Viet
Cong movement is its hard-core leadership, or cadre
structure. The unusually strong motivation of the
cadres themselves contains varying degrees of Com-
munism and nationalism, but is primarily rooted in
the revolutionary tradition in Vietnam and is.sus-
tained by memories of the triumph secured at the end qf
the earlier Indochina conflict. Some of these sane
factors, of course, influence the rank and file
Viet Cong, but their continuing support of the VC
depends primarily upon more limited and personal con-
siderations such as antagonism over GVN actions
against them or their families. Such feelings are
exploited by the hard-core cadres.
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16. How do you expain the motivation of the
North Vietnamese?
Hanoi's motives are a complex mixture of
nationalism, anti-Americanism, Communist militancy,
and historical experience. None of these is neces-
sarily predominant and at various times one factor
may carry more weight than others. At present,
their experience with the French plays a role in
explaining the leadership's persistence in the mili-
tary struggle and their suspicions of negotiations.
As for the rank and file North Vietnamese soldiers
in the South, most studies indicate that the regime
has been successful in indoctrinating them with a
militant nationalism and anti-Americanism.
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17. What percentage of the material being in-
filtrated into South Vietnam comes via Sihanoukville
rather than via the Ho Chi Minh trail or across the
DMZ?
There is no reliable intelligence indicat-
ing that arms or supplies are delivered to any Cam-
bodian ports for shipment to Communist forces in
South Vietnam, or that the Cambodian Army is making
any systematic diversion of arms to those forces.
Some Cambodian arms probably reach Communist forces
through small-scale, illegal transactions, however.
Probably less than one-fifth of the total rice re-
quirements of VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam comes
from Cambodia and nearly all of the remainder is ob-
tained within South Vietnam. Other items such as
batteries, cloth, and paper produced or imported
by Cambodia supplement the larger Viet Cong procure-
ment of these supplies within South Vietnam.
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18. Please describe the escalation in the
type of equipment infiltrated over the past 12
months as compared to prior times -- has there not
been a step-up of rockets, artillery and other
larger pieces?
Over a year ago 120-mm. mortars and 70-
mm. and 75-mm. howitzers began to be used in South
Vietnam. Other weapons that have been employed
since early 1967 include Chinese Communist 102-mm.
rockets, Soviet 122-mm. and 140-mm. rockets, and
RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers. Rockets have
been employed in I, II, and III Corps, and VC/NVA
forces have made extensive use of mortars in all
Corps areas, particularly 81/82-mm. mortars in II
and III Corps. The firing of conventional artil-
lery has only been confirmed in the DMZ area. The
enemy employed 85-mm., 100-mm., 105-mm., 130-mm.,
and possibly 152-mm. artillery in attacks on Gio
Linh, Con Thien, Camp Carroll, and Dong Ha.
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19. How many Soviet military advisers are
there in North Vietnam and what are they doing?
We believe there are about 2,000 Soviet
military technicians in North Vietnam at present.
Since mid-1965, Soviet military technicians have
had an essentially advisory role. In addition to
working with the SAM system and jet fighter units,
Soviet technicians have been engaged in communica-
tions, maintenance, and logistic support activities.
Soviet technicians in North Vietnam have provided
much of the transitional training on advance MIG-21
jet fighters.
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20. How many Chinese military personnel are
there in North Vietnam and what are they doing?
An estimated 30,000 to 50,000 Chinese
troops are working on the construction, repair, and
defense of transportation facilities in North Viet-
nam, especially on the important Hanoi - Lao Cai
and Hanoi - Dong Dang railroad lines. These forces
include an estimated four antiaircraft artillery
divisions, a railway engineer division, and four
special engineer divisions. By maintaining the rail
connections to China, Chinese support troops have
facilitated the movement of both Chinese and Soviet
war material and have released North Vietnamese
manpower for keeping open the supply and infiltra-
tion routes to South Vietnam and Laos. Some Chinese
military personnel also are employed in the train-
ing of North Vietnamese troops.
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21. Please assess the degree of damage to
civilian structures and neighborhoods in North Viet-
nam attributable to our bombing?
Damage by accidental bombing to residen-
tial housing has been relatively light in view of
the large number of sorties flown. We estimate
On the basis of aerial photography that only 2 per-
cent of civilian structures in the urban area of
Hanoi has been damaged or destroyed through October
1967. In Haiphong during the same period, about
10 percent of the total residential area in the ur-
ban complex has been damaged or destroyed. Heavier
damage has been suffered in some outlying areas.
In the small town of Phu Ly (population 5,000) about
80 percent of the residential area had been de-
stroyed or damaged by mid-1967. Where significant
damage to residential areas has occurred, military
or economic targets have been nearby. In some cases
air defense installations are located in residential
areas.
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22. To what degree is Cambodia being used
as a sanctuary and a base of operations aside from
its use as an infiltration trail?
Some of the VC/NVA forces in South Viet-
nam operate along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese
border, taking advantage of the remote, thinly popu-
lated areas and the venality of local Cambodian of-
ficials to establish facilities such as hospitals and
supply caches. Enemy prisoners and defectors report
the location within Cambodia of stations providing
transients with food, shelter, and medical treatment.
VC/NVA forces also frequently seek sanctuary in
Cambodia when pressed by allied operations.
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23. How often does the average VC/NVA maneuver
unit fight? How is it measured? Is the low combat
rate a matter of choice or necessity -- what is the
limiting factor? Has the rate changed over the
last year?
In 1966, it was estimated that the aver-
age enemy battalion engaged in combat once every
35 days; during 1967 enemy engagements have in-
creased -- currently the level of combat is esti-
mated to be 1 in 30 days. In 1966 VC/NVA forces in-
itiated 44 battalion-size attacks; through Septem-
ber of this year, despite a step-up in allied ground
operations, and a small reduction in enemy forces,
VC/NVA battalion-size attacks have numbered 36.
The number of small-scale VC initiated attacks have
increased from 540 during the last 6 months of 1966
to 978 during the first six months of 1967. This
increase in small-scale attacks may reflect an in-
ability on the part of the Communist logistical sys-
tem within South Vietnam to expand its support of
battalion-size combat operations or it may simply
reflect a basic change in VC strategy -- a step-up
in small-scale operations which, in some instances,
are difficult for friendly forces to cope with and
also tend to cut chances for inflicting crippling
losses on the enemy.
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24. How much of South Vietnam is "pacified" to-
day. How do you measure what is "pacified" and what
is not?
Pacification is generally measured by the ex-
tent of security given to the population. The land
area under government control contains the bulk of the
population. The new Hamlet Evaluation System places
about 67 percent of the population in areas offered
varying degrees of protection by allied military
forces and technically administered on a continuing
basis by the GVN. About 16 percent of the population
lives in contested areas, and about 17 percent under
Viet Cong control. This is a marked improvement over
the situation three years ago when about 40 percent
of the population lived under government control;
however, only slight gains have been made this year.
Moreover, much of the population gain under the gov-
ernment wing consists of refugees. The roughly
11,378,000 persons constituting the 67 percent figure
include about 3.5 million in urban areas. The GVN
rates about 4,700 of the country's 12,000 hamlets
as "secure."
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25. What evidence do we have to indicate that
a pacified area will stay pacified? Does the enemy
have the resources to reverse pacification procedure?
Has he done so? In what areas of the country? To
what degree?
Security remains the primary factor for
maintaing the status of a pacified area, although in
the strict sense it also requires a reasonably ef-
fective and responsive government administration.
An area is likely to remain pacified if the enemy's
main and local forces are prevented from encroach-
ing on the area, if the Communist infrastructure
is rooted out, if guerrilla forces cannot operate
nearby, and if the government of Vietnam is capable
of providing reasonably effective local government.
The Viet Cong still have the potential to re-
verse pacification gains in most areas of the coun-
try, either through force or through political sub-
version. The enemy has done so, at least to some
extent. It has happened in I Corps because of the
presence of large main force elements. Similar
reverses have been accomplished in parts of Phu Yen
Province and elsewhere on the central coast and in
a number of delta provinces, such as Vinh Binh by
enemy small unit actions against the pacification
areas, in combination with large unit threats, else-
where to draw off the protective forces.
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� 26. Is it necessary to win the allegiance
of the pacified population or is it enough merely
to bring them under government control? How do
we know what their allegiance is?
In the strict sense of prosecuting the war,
it is probably not essential to win the "hearts and
minds" of the population, provided that sufficient
security can be maintained to deny the enemy access
to them and to obtain the necessary amount of popu-
lar resources for the government side. It appears
that an increasing number of persons are looking to
the government for protection although this cannot
be equated with positive support. In the longer
term, some form of active commitment by the popula-
tion to the government side is necessary to create
a viable non-Communist regime in the South. Al-
legiance is measurable to some extent by the amount
of voluntary participation in government programs,
willingness to volunteer in the armed forces, to
run for or serve in public office and administra-
tion, and to look to the government for the satis-
faction of economic and social needs.
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27. Is there any evidence that the enemy is
moving back toward a guerrilla operation? If the
enemy does this, can he sustain this effort in-
definitely? Could this keep South Vietnam in tur-
moil? Could the South Vietnamese handle a pro-
tracted guerrilla war themselves?
There is no evidence that the enemy is
moving back toward a guerrilla operation in the
sense that he is disbanding his main force structure
and operations. There is evidence that the Com-
munists are giving increased emphasis to guerrilla
forces and tactics, and some regular units operate
more often in dispersed, small unit actions.
If the enemy were to resort only to guer-
rilla warfare, he could sustain this effort for some
time, provided he could remain supplied. He could
probably reduce his loss rate, but, with roughly the
present number of allied forces, his guerrilla force
could probably be gradually reduced. Despite improve-
ments, South Vietnam's ability to handle a protracted
guerrilla situation, given anything like the present
size enemy force, is questionable, and continued
internal turmoil would seem inevitable.
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28. How much materiel support comes into North
Vietnam from the Soviet Union? From Red China?
What kind of support comes from each?
The USSR and Communist China have ex-
panded military aid to North Vietnam from an esti-
mated $270 million in 1965--almost double that of
the previous 11-year period--to an estimated $455
million in 1966 and $330 million in the first half
of 1967. The USSR supplied about four-fifths of
total military aid for these two and a half years
and Communist China provided the remainder. Vir-
tually all Soviet military deliveries have been
for North Vietnam's air defense system including
surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft guns, radar,
and fighter aircraft. Chinese military deliveries
primarily have been to build up North Vietnamese
ground forces and have included small arms and
miscellaneous ground forces equipment.
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2,9. What would happen to the North Vietnamese/
Viet Cong movement if Ho Chi Minh died or otherwise
left the scene? Who would take hie place?
We do not foresee any major change of pol-
icy because of Ho Chi Minh's death. To a great ex-
tent the North Vietnamese leadership has operated
as a "collective," more so than most Communist par-
ties. Of course, personal rivalries could come to
the surface and affect policy, once Ho's personal
authority in settling disputes is removed.
His most likely successors are Le.Duan,
now the party first secretary, or Pham Van Dong,
the premier. The former is closely associated with
the Viet Cong movement, and the latter has been
most recently the authoritative spokesmen on mat-
ters relating to negotiations. Ho holds both the
top party and the top government posts; these posi-
tions will probably be divided after his demise,
possibly between these two men. In the short run,
if the leadership continues its "collective" character,
which men succeed Ho officially may not be too sig-
nificant.
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30. Is thee any division within North
Vietnamese/Viet Cong leadership on the conduct
of the war or on the matter of negotiation which
could cause a disruptive split beneficial to us?
It is only prudent to allow for divi-
sions within the Vietnamese Communist movement;
it would, indeed, be surprising if there were none.
But there is no persuasive evidence that any such
differences in the leadership are over basic policy.
Therefore a serious split cannot be predicted.
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31. What is the role of the Nationalist Chi-
nese in our Vietnamese activities?
The Nationalist Chinese are providing
small-scale assistance to the South Vietnamese
military for psychological warfare training, as
well as assistance to agriculture, health, and
education. There are 26 Chinese in psychological
warfare teams, and on the civil side, an 80-man
agricultural team, a 16-man surgical team, and a
38-man electric power mission. In addition, the
Chinese Nationalists have furnished 26 aluminum
prefabricated warehouses, agricultural tools, seeds,
and fertilizer, some 500,000 textbooks, and an
electric power substation.
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32. If the Chinese entered the war overtly,
what would happen to Soviet material support for
the Vietnamese Communists?
We can't be very positive with this one.
If this became a Chinese war, the Soviets would
be faced with a whole new situation and would be
forced to do some thorough soul-searching. Should
they elect to continue supporting the Communist ef-
fort in Vietnam, we are inclined to believe the Chi-
nese would continue to cooperate in permitting So-
viet aid to flow through China for the VC/NVA.
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33. Are captured enemy documents we now use
to show his declining position valid or created
"documents" intended to mislead us?
Captured documents continue to provide
a valuable source of raw information, and, in
many instances, have been the basis for US intel-
ligence assessments of the declining VC/NVA posi-
tion. At present there is no indication that the
Viet Cong have attempted to create, falsify, or
plant documents on a scale large enough signifi-
cantly to mislead US intelligence, although in
isolated instances manufactured documents have
been detected. Misinformation in captured docu-
ments is not uncommon. This is, however, usually
the result of ignorance and is not falsification
designed to mislead allied units into whose hands
the documents tight fall.
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34. Is Viet Cong recruitment more difficult
today than it was a year ago? How many South Viet-
namese are recruited by the VC each month now? How
many a year ago? What does this mean?
There is increasing evidence -- from cap-
tured documents and interrogation reports -- that
the VC are experiencing greater difficulties in re-
cruiting. Recruitment has declined sharply in a
number of provinces where government control has in-
creased. Recruitment standards have been lowered for
guerrillas, and there is competition among the various
elements for recruits. The average monthly recruit-
ment a year ago may have been on the order of 7,000-
8,000 men and it may be 2,000-3,000 less today.
In the face of his recruiting difficulties,
the enemy is finding it more difficult to fully re-
place his losses from in-country manpower. He is
thus having to rely more on North Vietnamese in-
filtrees for his main force units in the three north-
ern corps zones. So far, the pace of North Vietnam-
ese infiltration has been roughly able to sustain the
gross manpower needs of the Viet Cong main forces.
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35. What evidence do we have, if any, that any kind
of cross-over point has been reached when the Viet Cong
and the North Vietnamese are losing more men than they
are infiltrating and recruiting?
36. If we have not reached that point, when do we
predict that it will be reached?
During the past year the enemy's manpower prob-
lems within South Vietnam have become more serious as his
loss rates have increased and his ability to recruit in
South Vietnam has diminished. Analysis of VC/NVA loss
and recruitment suggests that the enemy's military order
of battle (North Vietnamese Army, VC Main and Local Forces,
VC Guerrillas, and Administrative Service units)--which in-
creased substantially during 1965 and I966--has probably
tapered off or perhaps been reduced somewhat during 1967.
In addition, we estimate that the number of VC in the
fighting forces has decreased during 1967 and the num-
ber of NVA troops has increased.
It is difficult to assess with any real
confidence the extent to which over-all Communist
force strength in South Vietnam has declined over
the past year and any estimate of these losses
is subject to wide margins of error. We are fairly
certain_of our estimates on the regulars, but very
uncertain on the guerrillas and militia. We do not,
for example, know how many of the enemy's casualties
are suffered by guerrillas and militia. It may be
substantial, and this could greatly affect any
crossover point, even assuming our gross calcula-
tions on enemy losses are correct. Thus, for these
and other reasons, we are unable to conclude that
some kind of "crossover point" has been reached and
we are unable to predict when it might be reached
in the future.
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37. What are the statistics on the roads
open today versus those open a year ago? What
definition do you use of an "open road?"
The percentage of open roads in South
Vietnam has increased from 36 percent in June
1966 to almost 50 percent in September 1967.
"Open road" means relatively secure -- one along
which unarmed convoys could pass with some assur-
ance. No road is considered safe after 6 P.M.
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38. What are the figures on the number of
enemy being killed in 1967 versus 1966?
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
troops lost 55,524 killed during 1966, according
to MACV statistics. Enemy losses in the first 11
months of 1967 total nearly 80,000, indicating
that the Communists have been losing men at a much
higher rate this year than last. The weekly aver-
age of enemy killed in 1966 was 1,065. This year
the average is nearly 1,700.
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39. What are the figures on the number of de-
fectors coming from the Communist side to the govern-
ment in 1967 versus 1966?
The number of Communist defections during
the first three quarters of 1967 exceeded the number
of defections for all of 1966. During the first
three quarters of 1967, Communist defections numbered
about 23,600 compared to 20,200 for 1966. Thus, in
terms of absolute numbers, Communist defections have
increased in 1967. The rate of Communist defections
has, however, been declining since the first quarter
of 1967 -- averaging 10,600, 7,500, and 5,500 for the
first, second, and third quarters of 1967 respectively.
The sharp drop in the Chieu Hoi rate over recent
months appears primarily to result from a general de-
cline in security in areas which have previously had
high returnee rates and to the unsettled political
conditions during and following the GVN elections.
Other factors, such as increased hostile acts against
the returnees, a decline in the number of significant
allied search and clear operations, and problems en-
countered by the Hoi Chanh (ralliers) in finding em-
ployment have, no doubt, contributed to the declining
rate.
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40. What are the figures on the weapons being
captured in 1967 versus 1966?
In 1966 Communist forces in South Vietnam
lost 18,600 weapons. In the period January through
October 1967, enemy weapons losses were 26,200,
about 40 percent higher than in all of 1966.
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41. Please assess the success of the anticor-
ruption campaign of the South Vietnamese in facts,
figures, arrests and so forth. What has been done?
Corruption is reported to be extensive at
all levels of the administration. We have no firm
information on the number of arrests to date in the
Saigon government's anticorruption campaign, but
government officials in October indicated that more
than 100 officials in III and IV Corps had been
removed for corruption this year. The most recent
action has been taken against several officials in
Binh Dinh Province, including the former province
chief who is under a death sentence. There have
been other reports that up to 50 military officers,
including four lesser generals were marked for re-
moval, but we do not know how many have yet been
replaced.
Allegations of corruption have also been
levied against three or four generals now holding
high government posts, but there is little indica-
tion whether any action will be taken against most
of these men. The government has recently set up
a commission for the suppression of corruption, and
a special corruption court has been in existence
for two years, although active only sporadically.
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42. Is there a ceiling -- an upper range --
above which the Viet Cong and North Vietnam cannot
generate additional forces and cannot adequately
supply their forces in South Vietnam? What is it?
See question 2 for a discussion of the
problem. There clearly must be such a ceiling, but
we cannot say with any confidence what it is.
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43. What is the state of the North Vietnamese
economy? Crop yields? Industrial output? Exports?
Imports?
North Vietnam's normal economic activities
have been greatly disrupted as a result of the bomb-
ing. The country, however, is largely agrarian, and
the thousands of small shops and handicraft establish-
ments can supply the great bulk of the simple needs
of the people as long as economic and military aid
continue.
Rice output in 1966 amounted to about 4.2
million tons, or 300,000 tons below the average out-
put of recent years. Rice output in 1967 probably
will be somewhat below the output in 1966.
Industrial output before the bombing was
evenly divided between products of modern industrial
plants and those of the handicrafts sector. Handi-
craft output, which includes clothing, consumer goods
and canned products for export, has probably continued
with only slight reductions as a result of disturb-
ances of work routines and transport problems. The
output of the modern industrial sector has been
sharply curtailed by the bombing.
Exports have declined from about $100 million
in 1964 to about $82 million in 1966. Exports in 1967
probably will be below $70 million. Bulk exports by
sea of cement, coal, pig iron and apatite have de-
clined markedly since mid-1967. Exports of canned
foods and of handicraft products continue and rail
shipments of coal to China probably have continued.
Imports have increased sharply from about
$130 million in 1964 to $240 million in 1966. Imports
in 1967 will probably exceed the 1966 level. Imports
of food, metal products, and transport equipment have
increased measurably in 1967 above 1966.
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44. Under present conditions, what does the
future hold for the North Vietnamese economy?
North Vietnam is heavily dependent on
assistance from foreign countries merely to maintain
present levels of subsistence, to maintain air de-
fenses, and to continue the support to the war in
the South. Little effort has been made to repair
the presently damaged production facilities. Main-
tenance of yields in agriculture will depend on the
continued receipt of fertilizer from foreign suppliers
and on the maintenance of at least the present levels
of productivity by the peasants. Economic develop-
ment, although not abandoned, has been set aside in
favor of supplying essential consumer and military
goods. Assuming a continuation of present bombing
levels, there will be a further gradual deterioration
in the domestic economy and even more dependence on
foregn assistance. As long as foreign aid continues
and an average agricultural output is maintained there
will, however, be no general economic collapse.
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45. What has been the trend of North Vietnam
imports? Up, down, or constant? By sea? By j2a/H.,?
Since the beginning of 1965 North Vietnam-
ese imports have increased sharply. Imports in 1965,
valued at $195 million, were almost 50 percent above
1964; 1966 brought a further increase of almost 25
percent to a value of $240 million, and imports in 1967
will probably exceed the 1966 level. Imports by sea
have risen from about 700,000 tons in 1965 to over
900,000 tons in 1966. For the first ten months of
1967 seaborne imports have amounted to more than one
million tons. Imports by rail increased from an es-
timated 320,000 tons in 1965 to an estimated 460,000
tons in 1966. During the first half of 1967 rail
imports amounted to an estimated 210,000 tons.
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46. What are the principal items of imports
today and how have they changed over the past year?
In addition to military supplies, the
principal items of import today are bulk foods,
petroleum products, fertilizer, and miscellaneous
goods including machinery, metal products, textiles
and vehicles. About one third of seaborne imports
during 1967 were bulk foods--mostly flour from the
USSR and rice and maize from Communist China. The
377,000 tons of bulk foods imported during the
first ten months of 1967 was more than four times
the volume of bulk foods imported in all of 1966.
Imports of petroleum products during the first ten
months of 1967 amounted to almost 200,000 tons or
about equal to the amount imported during all of
1966. Miscellaneous and general cargo imports dur-
ing the first ten months of 1967 amounted to about
390,000 tons, slightly less than for all of 1966.
Fertilizer imports in 1967 will be substantially
below imports in 1966. Industrial raw material
imports, including coke, coking coal, and gypsum
have declined as a result of reduced industrial
capacity.
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47. How serious is the insurgency in Thailand?
The insurgency in Thailand now requires
a substantial drain of resources and if left un-
checked would represent a serious threat to the
3angkok government. Currently, armed insurgents
number only about 2,000-3,000 men loosely organized
in small bands, capable of only small-scale actions.
Important terrorist concentration has been limited
to the Northeast region and to those provinces
bordering the Malay peninsula. Although insurgent
strength has grown somewhat and insurgent activities
have spread to other regions in the face of Thai
counterinsurgency efforts, improvements in these
efforts have kept the over-all level of activity
in 1.967 from rising above the level established
in the second half of 1966.
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48. How feasible is it for Red China to launch
and maintain some kind of military intervention in
the war?
The Chinese could move 300,000 to 380,000
men against initial objectives in Thailand, Laos,
and South Vietnam, using light infantry forces in
the relatively dry months of November to January.
Against the DMZ in South Vietnam, the Chinese could
move 2 to 3 light divisions in November - January,
and with improving weather during February and
March, 7-8 light divisions (133,000 to 157,000 men).
These figures represent basic logistical capabilities,
do not take account of Peking's military strategy
or the US response to such moves, and probably could
not be sustained in bad weather.
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49. If we could cut the northeast rail line
and close the port of Haiphong, what effect would
this have on the NVN economy? Would NVN be able to
continue the war?
Even if all seaborne imports were halted
and all rail connections to China were cut it would
not halt the relatively small flow of military sup-
plies and essential economic goods needed by Hanoi
to continue the war. Essential supplies would still
come overland by truck, watercraft and primitive
transportation.
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50. What is the likelihood of Red China Or the
Soviet Union supplying NVN with new weapons -- weapons
that have not been used in this war so far? What
types of weapons would these be?
It is highly likely that the North Vietnam-
ese have sought more sophisticated weapons from the
USSR and perhaps China as well. New arms agreements
have been signed in recent months. We cannot be very
confident of just which weapons will appear in North
Vietnam or South Vietnam. Among the more likely
from the USSR are coastal defense missiles, improved
SAMs, heavier and more sophisticated AAA, and per-
haps advanced fighters for North Vietnam. Less
probable, but not to be excluded, would be the Frog,
(Free Rocket over Ground). We do not estimate, how-
ever, that the USSR would supply longer range stra-
tegic missiles.
We rate the chances at least even that the So-
viets -- given the current intensity of conflict --
will supply Hanoi during coming months with new or
qualitatively improved weapons that have so far not
been introduced. Listed in order of likelihood,
these might include improved antiaircraft artillery
(e.g., the ZU-23), heavier artillery and mortars,
better antitank weapons; coastal defense missiles,
and short range ground-support cruise missiles with
conventional warheads (the Samlet and the Salish,
respectively); and an improved surface-to-air mis-
sile system with a somewhat better capability against
low altitude attack. Under certain contingencies,
the Soviets might also supply Hanoi with a limited
range ground support rocket, the Frog.
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51. Is there any indication that any VC or
NVN units are beginning deliberately not to carry
out orders or beginning to rebel? Have there
been any mass surrenders?
We have seen scattered evidence in
documents during the past six months of individual
cadres and troops, and in some instances of a larger
part of a unit disobeying battlefield discipline,
but there is no evidence that this is occurring on
any wide scale. Documents frequently refer to re-
calcitrant or undisciplined individual soldiers
or cadres, suggesting that this problem is more
widespread than desirable, but there is little
indication that it is beyond controllable propor-
tions. There have been no mass defections or
battlefield surrenders of Communist main-force
or local force units. Moreover, documentary evi-
dence of poor battlefield discipline is not a
new phenomenon occasional enemy documents have
voiced concern over this problem for many years.
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52. Is it possible that the enemy will stop
fighting, go underground, and wait until the
Americans leave before starting up again?
The enemy has this option, but would
probably have to withdraw much of his North Viet-
namese force through exfiltration. Such a course
risks losing much of his present momentum and as-
sets. The enemy would most likely opt for this
course in an effort to preserve his remaining as-
sets if convinced he was being severely beaten.
He would consider that he faced a severe problem
of reviving his effort in the future, but might
well consider this preferable to complete capitula-
tion.
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53. Numerically, how effective were the
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese in keeping South Viet-
namese away from the polls in the recent election?
In the elections for the presidency and
upper house on 3 September, 4,868,266 persons--
or 83.1 percent of the country's 5,853,251 registered
voters went to the polls. In the lower house elec-
tion on 22 October, 4,271,794 persons--or 72.9 per-
cent of the registered voters--turned out. There is
no available evidence as to how many of the registered
voters not exercising their ballot were kept away
by Viet Cong threats or terror, and how many were
merely apathetic. The drop-off in turnout from 3 Sep-
tember to 22 October, however, suggests that apathy
played a significant role since Viet Cong propaganda
and terrorist efforts against the later elections
were on a significantly smaller scale. There is
probably no question that Viet Cong intimidation
prevented some registered voters in .outlying areas
from attempting to vote in either contest; addi-
tionally, perhaps one third of the country's voting
age population did not register because they live
in insecure areas or in Viet Cong - held areas.
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54. Are the VC still collecting significant
taxes from the people in contested areas of SVN?
Although available evidence suggests that
the VC are having considerable difficulty meeting
their tax collection goals in 1967, they still are
believed to collect a large, but unknown, amount of
taxes from contested areas. Increasing VC require-
ments, disruptions of normal food distribution chan-
nels, and the declining value of the SVN piaster
have caused the VC to increase tax rates in all
areas where they possess a collection capability.
In areas where the populace is resistant, such as
contested areas, the VC often resort to intimida-
tion and terror to extract taxes in both cash and
kind. A significant proportion of total VC tax
revenues is still collected from areas not under
VC control despite improved GVN security.
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55. Compare the ability and effectioeness of
the RVNAF today with that of l966, Z965, Z964, 1963?
The most encouraging development in the RVNAF
as a whole thus far in 1967 has been the striking de-
cline in its over-all desertion rates. The number of
RVNAF desertions during the first eight months of 1967
(54,000) was nearly half the number for the same period
last year. Assuming that this rate prevails for the
remainder of 1967, the annual desertion total (81,500)
will be considerably below the record-high levels of
116,000 and 113,000 recorded in 1966 and 1965, re-
spectively.
Although the decline in desertions is to
some extent the result of more vigorous enforcement
of legislation against desertion, it may also reflect
an improvement in the morale and confidence of the
South Vietnamese military establishment.
The number of RVNAF "missing-in-action"
(MIA) has also steadily declined from 15,000 during
1964 and 1965 to 3,300 in 1966 and 1,400 for the first
eight months of 1967. Many of the MIA were deliber-
ate deserters under combat who joined enemy ranks.
The trend of weapons lost has also been
significantly reversed.
Because of the RVNAF's present heavy commit-
ment to pacification, the total number of government
operations has declindd in 1967. The percentage of
enemy contacts to total operations, however, has in-
Creased significantly. In the first quarter of 1966,
there were 360 contacts in 820 large-unit operations,
btt in the first quarter of 1967, there were 380 con-
tacts in 760 operations.
Despite these signs of progress, major
problems continue to plague the RVNAF at all levels.
The most persistent an serious of these include
poor leadership, lack of motivation, and inadequate
training.
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56. Evaluate the combat capability of the
regular NVA forces.
In terms of weapons and equipment NVA
units are the strongest enemy elements allied
forces confront in South Vietnam. NVA units are
equipped with the most modern weapons--the new
family of Soviet-designed or Chinese copied 7.62-mm.
weapons including the AK-47 assault rifle, SKS
carbine, and RPD light machine gun.
North Vietnamese soldiers are also politically
well indoctrinated and serve under highly dedicated
and motivated professional cadre possessing excel-
lent leadership traits. Training, once a source
of strength in NVA units, is no longer of the caliber
given prior to the NVA buildup in 1965. Exhaustion,
hunger, disease, the lack of medical provisions,
as well as harassment by allied units through bomb-
ing attacks and ground operations have all contri-
buted to a drop in NVA morale. There has been, how-
ever, no noticeable lowering of combat effective-
ness judging from the courage and endurance demon-
strated by NVA troops in combat, as well as their
comparatively low desertion and defection rates.
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57. What is the reasoning behind the enemy's
recent series of very strong offensive actions,
Con Thien, Dak To, and so forth?
The primary reason for enemy offensives
in the area of Con Thien, Dak To, Loc Ninh - Song
Be, and so forth, apparently is to force the allies
to disperse their units over wide areas in battle
terrain favorable to the Communists. The enemy
hopes this will soak up uncommitted allied maneuver
battalions and prevent the concentration of allied
forces in any area where they might knock out and
conclusively destroy a significant portion of the
Communist forces.
The Communists also hope by these ac-
tions to demonstrate their continuing offensive
capabilities, regain additional combat initiative,
inflict heavy casualties on the allies, and show
that the GVN cannot provide adequate security. If
the Communists can retain and strengthen their
positions in these areas, they may try to move
out from them once again toward more populated re-
gions. The strategy is an important element of
the Communist belief that they can hold on and
deny the allies any conclusive victory in South
Vietnam beyond the point where continuation of
the war is politically feasible in the United States.
It does not appear that the vigor of
the winter-spring offensive of the Communists this
year represents any last gasp, big push before
negotiating.
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58. How much of the North Vietnamese manpower
base is committed to all areas of their war effort?
About one million North Vietnamese, or
about 10 percent of the labor force, are directly
involved in the war
effort.
500,000 North Vietnamese are
In addition, airstrikes have
Slightly less than
in the armed forces.
required the services
of about 500,000 civilian men and women of all
ages for the repair of lines of communication, re-
construction of buildings and bridges, and civil
defense. Of these civilian workers, about 300,000
work part-time.
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59. Does the declining military situation
of the VC/North Vietnamese increase the danger
of intervention by the Red Chinese? Can China
or Russia allow defeat of their Communist allies
in South Vietnam?
China has a substantial stake in the
outcome of the war in South Vietnam and will ex-
ert considerable pressure to sustain Hanoi's will
and ability to prolong the war. We do not, how-
ever, believe Peking is committed to a Communist
success in South Vietnam at any price. If faced
with a situation where only their own intervention
could save the situation, we believe the Chinese
fear of a US attack on the mainland would be the
commanding factor.
If the Communist position in South Viet-
nam continues to deteriorate and the Communist
forces there face certain defeat, the Soviets would
almost certainly accept a political resolution of
the conflict in the South and would urge Hanoi
to do the same. At the same time, the Soviets
would probably make it clear to Hanoi that the
USSR would not involve itself in an effort to re-
trieve a lost cause even if this should mean deny-
ing Soviet assistance to, or cooperation with, the
Chinese should they choose to intervene in the
South on behalf of Hanoi.
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60. How effective has our intelligence been
in anticipating enemy activities?
In the past two and a half years our in-
telligence has become increasingly effective in
anticipating enemy activities. During 1966 and
1967, a large number of allied search-and-destroy
operations were mounted against concentrations of
enemy forces on the basis of intelligence report-
ing. It is clear that in many instances these
operations thwarted offensive plans of the enemy,
disrupted his base areas and logistics, and seriously
eroded his infrastructure, hence his control of
the populace. The airborne direction finding pro-
gram to pinpoint major enemy units and headquarters
has been invaluable in spotting enemy concentrations.
The results of this program have figured heavily
in the effective use of air strikes and artillery.
Captured documents and prisoners and returnees have
provided a constant flow of timely information on
the enemy's forces at all levels. This intelligence
has enabled us to measure with considerably more
confidence the threat posed by enemy forces as well
as the enemy's problem areas and weaknesses. We
are now able to get a much earlier indication of
impending large-scale infiltration through communi-
cations intelligence breakthroughs and experience
with earlier infiltration.
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61. Do we have information about new Russian
or Chinese weapons to be introduced soon into the
VC/NVA military structure?
See question 8; as to current information,
there is nothing specific on new Communist weaponry
to be introduced.
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62. Will the enemy's great reserve strength
make our war of attrition an extremely long process,
if indeed practical?
The enemy's great reserve strength lies
partly in his own manpower reserves and partly in
the support coming from other Communist countries.
There seems to be no measurable limit to the latter.
North Vietnam's manpower reserves are large enough
to make a war of attrition an extremely long one.
Each year about 190,000 North Vietnamese males attain
the age of 17. Of these about 115,000 would prob-
ably be fit for military service. In addition, at
present only about one fourth of the physically fit
males of military age are in the armed forces.
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63. What is the definitive structure (order of
battle) of the North Vietnamese forces in the South?
North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam
are organized into seven divisions (six confirmed
and one possible). These seven divisions have 18
of the 26 NVA regiments in South Vietnam (25 con-
firmed and one possible) subordinate to them. The
other eight regiments usually operate independently,
although under the control of a military region or
"front" command. There are two major NVA "fronts"�
the DMZ and B-3 Fronts. Except for the three regi-
ments of the 7th NVA Division and one independent
artillery regiment, all North Vietnamese forces are
located in I and II Corps. At least two of the
divisions--the 324 and 325--are active in the DMZ
area and move into and out of South Vietnam. At
present, for example, two regiments of the 324th
4re in the South while two regiments of the 325th
are back in North Vietnam. North Vietnamese strength
in the above units, as well as a number of inde-
pendent battalions, now is believed to be about
54,000 men. In addition, there are a sizable
number of North Vietnamese troops in Viet Cong main
and lOcal force units.
There are reports of North Vietnamese units
not yet carried in the order of battle. These include
one or two new artillery regiments and several new
infantry regiments. It is quite probable that at least
some of these reported units will be accepted into
the order of battle in the coming months.
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64. What is the InfiZtration rate today?
months ago, a year, two years ago?
The notion that there is or hasP been
any real "rate of infiltration" probably is mislead-
ing. Prior to about mid-1966, the North Vietnamese
were sending to South Vietnam those forces in organ-
ized units that they believed were required. Through
mid-1965, these forces were intended to aid the Com-
munists in achieving a relatively quick victory over
an ineffective ARVN. After mid-1965, they seemed to
be bent on matching the US and Free World buildup--
not man for man, of course, but in terms of maneuver
battalion strength. If there is such a thing as a
rate of infiltration--that is, a required number of
men who must be sent south each month--then it is
likely that such a rate was first established in
middle to late 1966. This rate would have been the
number of men required each month to keep main and
local force units--in conjunction with recruiting in
South Vietnam--at or near their most effective strengths.
We estimate that such a rate was probably about 3,500
men a month toward the end of 1966, and that it has
gone up slightly to about 4,500 men a month in 1967.
The 1967 figure probably is higher, but additional in-
formation is required before we can be certain. If
Communist casualties continue to rise, and if recruit-
ing difficulties in South Vietnam continue to grow,
then the rate of infiltration will rise accordingly.
The average mcnthly infiltration could be called
a rate of infiltration. This would be as follows:
1965-- average monthly infiltration of 3,060 men
1966-- average monthly infiltration of 7,250 men
1967-- average monthly infiltration for first 10 months
of 4,700 men
Almost any average can be calculated by juggling
the months accepted infiltration or both accepted
and possible infiltration. MACV does this in its
monthly infiltration report. For example, the average
infiltration from 1 October 1965 through 31 May 1967
was 4,350 men a month in the accepted categories and
6,600 men a month in the accepted and possible cate-
gories.
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65. What is the Buddhist opposition's effect
today?
The influence of the militant Buddhists has
been greatly weakened by the suppression of their
1966 "struggle movement." Many of their followers
are reluctant to agitate openly today because of
government surveillance and its ability to take
countermeasures. The militants probably retain
considerable sympathy among the mass of Buddhists,
and they remain a major potential nuisance for
rallying the discontented. They are represented in
the lower house where they may prove a vocal, but
minor, opposition element. They provide a sounding
board for such sentiments as war weariness, con-
cern over US influence, fear of inflation, and
antimilitarism, but they are not likely to cause
serious disruption unless handed a popular issue
to attract now passive elements of the populace.
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66. Is there evidence of help of NVN by Com-
munist countries, besides China and Russia, other
than trade? What does NVN receive from these coun-
tries in trade? Are there arms and advisers from
these countries in NVN?
Direct military assistance to North Viet-
nam by Communist countries other than the USSR and
China has been negligible. The East European Com-
munist countries, however, provide a wide range of
economic aid goods which totaled about $95 million
from the beginning of 1965 to mid-1967. The main
items imported by North Vietnam from East European
countries have included petroleum products, general
purpose vehicles, construction supplies and equip-
ment, heavy industrial machinery, barges, and pontoon
sections.
There is no evidence of significant numbers
of military advisers or a significant quantity of
arms in North Vietnam from countries other than the
USSR and Communist China. A small contingent of
North Korean flight personnel are flying defensive
combat patrols for the North Vietnamese air force.
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67. If we could cut the northeast rail line
and close the port of Haiphong, how rapidly would
this degrade the air defenses in North Vietnam?
This program would not degrade the air
defenses in North Vietnam. Air defense materiel
arrives by rail and even if all rail connections
with China were cut there would still be sufficient
transport capacity available easily to move the
required volumes of AAA ammunition, SAM replacement
materiel and missiles, and replacement antiaircraft
artillery.
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