CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/02/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03024588
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 3, 1959

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3 February 1959
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CENTRAL
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN-
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3 FEBRUARY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Evaluation of report on Soviet nuclear-
powerbd submarines.
Soviet party congress may be extended;
rPntrql onnimittPP Phn ges possible.
Chinese Communist light bombers
probably en route to Ind
Dart of 1958 arms deal.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iranian-Soviet negotiations having
serious impact; Baghdad Pact allies
urge Shah to reconsider.
Cambodia - South Vietnamese fear
Thais cooling toward anti-Sihanouk
plot.
Algerian rebels warn against Amer-
ican participation in Saharan oil ex-
ploitation.
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TOP SECRET
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0 King Saud apparently seeks rapproche-
ment with Nasir.
0 Kuwait probably to join Arab League
In near future.
0 Libya - Soviet delegation arrives to
negotiate gift of hospitals.
III. THE WEST
Portugal - Internal tension and army
dissatisfaction foster rumors of mili-
tary coup against Salazar.
Spain - Student demonstrations against
regime expected in February; police
reportedly reluctant to interfere.
Ngw British-Icelandic ,incident may
hinder solution of fishery problem.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
ESoviet nuclear-powered submarines: A report has been
received from a that a senior
Soviet naval officer has stated that the USSR has in operatio
12 atomic submarines equipped with torpedoes and missiles
with atomic warheads, and that the construction of such ves
sels is being given much attention in the Soviet Navy. The
reported number of submarines would appear to be more
credible if it represented a Soviet program for constructing
12 atomic submarines, with the first few now in operation.
Although it is not now possible to confirm the existence of any
nuclear submarines, this report indicates that the USSR may
have a more advanc7d niirlpar k ih ma ri ne nrngram than pre-
viously estimatedD
(Page 1)
CUSSR: There are some indications that the Soviet party
congress will be in session longer than originally planned and
that, contrary to the congress' agenda, changes in the party
central committee may be acted on at one of the closing ses-
sion9 (Page 3)
Communist bloc - Indonesia: Four Chinese Communist
twin-engine TU-2 light bombers apparently are being trans-
ferred to Indonesia as part of the 1958 bloc-Indonesian arms
deals. The piston bombers, accompanied by an IL-14 trans-
port, arrived at Rangoon, Burma, on 2 February. The bloc
also is providing Indonesia with 20 to 30 IL-28 twin-jet light
bombers, 55 MIG-17 jet fighter s,:and substantial quantities of
other types of aircraft under arms arrangements totaling
$170,000,000. (Page 4)
--T-GP�SEeRET-E7TJER-
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Glran-USSR: The Shah's interest in concluding a nonag-
gression treaty with the Soviet Union is causing grave con-
cern and reassessment among Iran's Baghdad Pact allies.
Turkey and Pakistan view the proposed treaty as a direct
threat to the pact and are making major efforts to induce
the Shah to reconsider. London is also trying to persuade
the Shah to change his decision and, if this fails, is prepared
to exert maximum efforts to get him to proceed cautiously.
The Irania4 foreign minister indicated to Ambassador
Wailes on 1 February that Soviet-Iranian negotiations were
stalled over Iranian membership in the Baghdad Pact and
have a "very good chance" of breaking down. It has been
considered unlikely that the USSR would insist on terms which
rwould_ablruct conclusion of these negotiationsZ1
(Page 5)
(Cambodia: South Vietnamese intelligence agents are con-
cerned that Thai authorities may be withdrawing their support
of anti-Sihanouk activities. The Thais may in fact have adopted
a more cautious attitude toward the various groups plotting �
against the Cambodian regime, owing to Western pressures
and the presence of a UN mediator in the area. There still
remains doubt, however, whether all levels of Thai contacts
with rii 5akidPtit 1 PrnPritc 111 reflect Bangkok's caution.5
(Page 7)
Algeria: CSeveral ministers of the Algerian rebel provi-
sional government have informed the American Embassy in
Tunis of their firm intention to prevent exploitation by France
of Saharan oil resources. The rebels plan to "warn off Amer-
Jeans from Saharan districts" and discourage American oil
companies from participation in French oil development proj-
ects. They fear American casualties might affect the US sup-
port they seek.j (Page 8)
3 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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iSaudi Arabia - UAR: King Saud, showing renewed self-
confidence, is trying to create the impression that he now
seeks Nabir's friendship.
(Page 9)
j7. ef et'
Kuwait:(Kuwait appears almost certain to join the Arab
League in the near future, according to the American consul
there. The British cabinet is reported to have approved the
A
;
idea as an alternative to allowing consuls from the other
Arab states to establish themselves in Kuwait. The Ruler
of Kuwait, however, may wish to accredit Arab consuls as
well as join the league and contribute heavily to the Arab
development fund project in an effort to ensure himself against
adical Arab nationalist agitatiori.j(
Libya: A Soviet delegation has arrived in Libya to com-
plete negotiations for constructing and equipping two hospitals
as gifts from the USSR. The Libyan Government is still
"studying" other long-standing Soviet aid proposals�espe-
cially in the form of machinery and technical aid for develop-
ment projects. At the same time, Libya is attempting to
obtain increased American aid.
III. THE WEST
Portugal: Persistent rumors in northern Portugal that
the military are about to bring off a coup and force Prime
Minister Salazar into retirement are symptomatic of the cur-
rent political tension. A considerable number of army officers,
mostly of junior grade, seem to be dissatisfied with the regime
and to sympathize strongly with General Humberto Delgado,
who campaigned for the presidency last spring and who, since
12 January, has been in asylum in the Brazilian Embassy in
Lisbon. (Page 11)
3 Feb 59 DAILY BRIEF
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Spain:C_Spanish police are reported reluctant to undertake
repressive tactics against student demonstrations expected in
Barcelona during February, because they are unwilling to
identify themselves with the strong-arm methods of the re-
gime Increasingly open expressions of discontent in Spain
seem likely, even if the government takes strong action
against the Union Espanola--the formation of which was an-
nounced by rightist critics of Franco after a dinner in Madrid
on 29 January. (Page 12)
*Iceland-UK: Cihe fishery dispute between Iceland and the
UK flared up again on 1 February when British warships in-
tervened after an Icelandic patrol vessel had apprehended a
British trawler operating within the four-mile limit off Ice-
land's east coast. This is the first serious incident since ml
November, although Icelanders have claimed repeated viola-
tions of their unilaterally proclaimed 12-mile limit. The
incident will inflame Icelandic opinion and hinder any solution
of the disagreement
3 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
TOP SECRETy
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Nuclear-Powered Submarines
s been received
a senior Soviet naval officer has stated that
as in operation 12 atomic submarines equipped
with torpedoes and missiles with atomic warheads, and that
the construction of such vessels is being given much attention
in the Soviet Navy. The atomic submarines are built on the
Northern Sea (i. e,, the Arctic Ocean), on the industrial base
of Leningrad." Although it is not naw possible to confirm the
existence of any nuclear submarines, this report indicates that
the USSR may have a more advanced nuclear submarine program
than previously estimated:\
In reviewing this report, JAEIC noted: "There is a high
probability that the USSR would use pressurized water reactors
in its first nuclear submarines. Atomic energy intelligence in-
dicates the level of Soviet reactor technology would have permit-
ted the design and construction of the first pressurized water re-
actor for submarines by 1958, but seemingly inilitates against
the existence of 12 nuclear-propelled submarines in operation
before the end of 1958.'1)
COMIC has commented that submarines now could be armed
with short-range surface-to-surface missiles requiring sur-
face launching. It believes, however, that nuclear submarines
would be equipped with a more sophisticated missile system
than has been estimated to be available at this time-.-1
The reported area of construction is consistent with previous
intelligence, and it has been believed for some time that the /first
Soviet nuclear submarine would be built at Severodvinsk (formerly
Molotovsk) on the White Sea, with major heavy equipment furnished
by Leningrad plants. The USSR is considered to have the capability
of arming submarines with torpedoes and missiles, both with nuclear
warheads.1
3 Feb 59
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CThe reported number of submarines would appear to be more
credible if it represented a Soviet program for constructing 12
atomic submarines, with the first few now in operation. During
the past year there has been a marked increase in the number
of reports that Soviet nuclear-propelled submarines are in opera-
tion, but the actual existence of such a submarine has not been
confirmed.
3 Feb 59
1012-SECITET
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Possible Lengthening of Soviet Party Congress
dhe Soviet 21st party congress, now in its eighth day,
may be prolonged through 5 February, and there is a pos-
sibility that the meeting will depart from its formal acrpririn
in the later stages.
the meet-
ing was to last seven or eight days from that date. Since
most of the leading figures in the regime have already ad-
dressed the congress on the Seven-Year Plan, the remaining
time may have been set aside for other business.--c
E; S re Rer-E TER
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Chinese Communist Participation in Indonesian Arms Deals
Four Chinese Communist twin-engine TU-2 light bombers,
accompanied by an Indonesian IL-14 transport, arrived at
Rangoon from Kunming on 2 February, apparently en route
to Indonesia. The bombers, formerly subordinate to the Chi-
nese Communist 23rd Air Division, presumably are being
transferred to Indonesia under its 1958 arms agreement with
Czechoslovakia. Under similar arrangements with Peiping,
Czechoslovakia also is providing Indonesia with IL-10 ground-
attack bombers and possibly other aircraft from Communist
China as well.
Peiping also is participating in the Polish-Indonesian
$170,000,000 arms deal. This agreement calls for the deliv-
ery of naval vessels, including destroyers, submarines, and
subchasers. The first four of eight subchasers which were
supplied to Indonesia are believed to have been delivered from
a Chinese Communist port, presumably under arrangements
similar to those by which the Chinese Communist aircraft are
being supplied to Djakarta.
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
ran s Negotiations with USSR Worry Baghdad Pact Allies
[Turkey, Pakistan, and the United Kingcl9m, deeply con-
cerned over Iranian-Soviet negotiation of a nonaggression
treaty, are urging that every feasible step be taken to save
Iran and the Baghdad Pact. Turkey and Pakistan believe
conclusion of such a treaty would reduce the Baghdad Pact
to worthlessness. They emphasize that pact members would
no longer have any confidence in military planning with Iran.)
QTurkish officials argue that bilateral defense agreements
with the United States are important to Pakistan and Turkey
only if Iran also signs such an agreement. According to Turk-
ish Foreign Minister Zorlu, an Iranian agreement with the
USSR would be a dangerous example which might spread to
both SEATO and NATO.I
CThe British are already exerting maximum efforts to dis-
suade the Shah from finalizing the agreement and to encourage
him to proceed cautiously. They are willing to consider with
the US some new type of guarantee to Iran, but they have ad-
vised the US that there is little Britian can do to provide Iran
with additional financial assistance:1
(Moscow's awareness of the political impact of a. Soviet non-
aggression pact with a member of a free world defense organ-
ization is reflected in the arrival in Tehran of a high-level
negotiating mission on 29 January to support Ambassador
Pegov, himself an experienced diplomat. The Soviet Em-
bassy counselor in Tehran, apparently probing to discover
the status of US-Iranian negotiations, remarked to the US
military attache on 30 January that a pact with the USSR would
probably prevent Iran from concluding an agreement with the
United States. Soviet leaders, seeking a quick agreement which
in their view would deal a serious blow to the Baghdad Pact will
probably try to keep provisions of any Soviet-Iranian treaty as,
_SEC-REr-
3 Feb 59
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generalized as possible and avoid specific conditions unpalat-
able to the Shah. While the Iranian foreign minister indicated
to Ambassador Wailes on 1 February that Soviet-Iranian nego-
tiations were stalled over Iranian membership in the Baghdad
Pact and have a "very good chance" of breaking down, it is
considered unlikely the USSR would allow them to break down on
this issue. t
3 Feb 59
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South Vietnamese-Thai Cooperation Against Cambodia May
Have Struck Snag
Thai authorities may be withdrawing their clan-
destine support of the anti-Sihanouk dissident movement.
the Thais had decided
to give no more assistance to former Cambodian Royal Coun-
cilor Sam Sary, who is in Bangkok working with the Vietna-
mese to overthrow Sihanouk. Sam Sary re-
ceived urgent instructions from Saigon to seek an audience
with Marshal Sarit or General Prap* to find out "whether or
not they are going to stick with us."
EThai informants, meanwhile, report that as a result of
Western pressures., authorities in Bangkok have decided to
break off all contacts with anti-Sihanouk dissidents, including
Dap Chhuon, who recently appealed for backing for an internal
coup venture. Another factor that could account for Thai cir-
cumspection is the presence in the area of UN representative
Beck-Friis, who is seeking to restore diplomatic relations
between Thailand and Cambodiaa
view of the strong hostility toward Sihanouk on the part
of present Thai leaders, Bangkok's avowed hands-off policy may
be only a pose or a temporary expedient. President Diem of
South Vietnam can be expected to react strongly to any Thai at-
tempt to withdraw completely from the plotting. Just prior to
te
Thailand
had completed preparations o segin mi iary rain ng of Cam-
_b_o_dian_dissorces after Beck-Friis leavesZ)
--T-OP-SEeRET-EIDEIT
3 Feb 59
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ANN 0114
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Algerian Rebels to War on US Investors in Saharan Oil
embers of the Algerian rebels' provisional government
(FLN)--including the ministers of information, armed forces,
and cultural and North African affairs--informed the United
States Embassy in Tunis on 28 January that American lives
and property would be endangered if American companies par-
ticipate directly in the exploitation of Saharan oil. The rebels
said they have told several American companies, including
Standard Oil of New Jersey, which obtained a North Saharan
concession from France last month, that they have no objec-
tions to explorations for oil. The rebels will not, however,
permit France to exploit the Sahara's petroleum resources:i
{The Algerians said that while operations inside Tunisia
of the International Bechtel Corporation--an American firm
laying a pipeline from the Edjele field in eastern Algeria to
the Mediterranean in southern Tunisia--will not be bothered,
no rebel effort will be spared to stop work in Algeria. S
(The rebels deny that France has any right to the subsoil
wealth of either the Algerian or Saharan departments. The
FLN has repeatedly attempted to sabotage the heavily guarded
pipeline-rail route activated in January 1958 to link the Hassi
Messaoud field with the seacoast, scoring the first major
success two weeks ago by blowing up an oil train, destroying
11 of 18 tank cars,
(Other targets for rebel activity are the construction crews
which last fall began laying a 420-mile pipeline from Hassi
Messaoud to the port of Bougie. This route, scheduled for
completion this fall, will yield an estimated output of 31,500,-
000 barrels of crude petroleum in 1960--nearly 15 times the
1958 output of the temporary pipeline and rail system. France,
which is basing its economic development program for Algeria
on the exploitation of the petroleum and natural gas resources
of the Sahara, hopes by 1962 to obtain virtua s esti-
mated crude requirements from the Sahara7:1
-SECRET-
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King Saud Promoting Rapprochement With Nasir
Cling Saud, in his bid to regain prestige lost to Crown Prince
Faysal during last year's government crisis, is striving to create
the impression that he again seeks friendly relations with Nasir.
He has made an ostentatious display of attention to the new UAR
ambassador, who was invited to accompany the King to Medina
_aft_nres_entinelais in Riyadh.
the policies of Saudi Arabia and
Egypt will be coordinated more closely in the future. The UAR
has already apparently agreed to postpone renewal of full dip-
lomatic relations with Britain until London meets Saudi terms
for restoration of relations. Egyp-
tian-Saudi military cooperation has been quietly resumed, and
Saudi army officers and technicians are again being trained in
Egype3
Csaud nevertheless almost certainly continues to regard
Nasires revolutionary regime with deep suspicion and fear. While
Saud's move may bring him short-run advantages, normalization
of relations with Egypt and increased Egyptian influence in the
Saudi armed forces are likely to increase the ultimate danger of
subversion in Saudi Arabia.
CBy publicly promoting rapprochement with Cairo, Saud has
deprived Faysal of a major popular advantage at a time when
his brother's prestige has declined among reform-minded non-
royal Saudis as well as among members of the royal family.
The former group had anticipated more substantial reforms
when Faysal assumed active direction of the Council of Minis-
ters last spring, while the royal family resented Faysal's at-
tempts to curtail their financial allotments;)
@he King's extensive travels about the country in recent
months apparently marked the beginning of a major drive to re-
assert primary leadership in Saudi Arabia. The King toured
among tribes in the north and east, where he remarked that he
was "hunting not gazelle but tribal leaders," and in the Hejaz;
TOP ET
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/ where he cultivated popular favor by temporarily lifting restric-
tions in force in the holy city of Mecca. During his tours Saud
made innumerable public appearances, dealt with local admin-
istrative problems, and dispensed generously of his own funds.
Saud's aim, according to one official: was to show that he:
unlike Faysal and other leading members of the family, was
spending his personal funds within the country instead of in-
vesting abroacti
-TOP-SEC-RE-T
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III. THE WEST
Army Coup Rumored in Portugal
Persistent rumors in northern Portugal that the military are
about to stage a coup and force Prime Minister Salazar into re-
tirement reflect continuing political tensions. These rumors,
reported by the American consul in Oporto, are reminiscent of
the situation last July when a number of military officers re-
portedly were planning a revolt against the regime for 8 August,
the day of President Americo Thomaz' inauguration. The move
was to take the form of a 'march from Oporto and Braga to Lis-
bon.
A considerable number of army officers, mostly of junior
grade, are said to be disgruntled over what they regard as
favoritism regarding promotions and over the regime's unnec-
essary, severity last May in repressing popular demonstrations
in favor of the oppositionist presidential candidate, General
Humberto Delgado. These officers are regarded, in the north
at least, as being strong supporters of Delgado, who obtained
asylum on 12 January at the Brazilian Embassy in Lisbon to
avoid arrest by the police. Opposition leaders in Oporto, who
have recently been appealing publicly to the army to oust
Salazar, maintain that the army will not permit rough treat-
ment of Delgado.
The likelihood of a coup attempt might be strengthened
if ex - Army Captain Henrique Galvao2 who escaped from a
Lisbon hospital on 15 January and is still at large, should suc:-
ceed in establishing direct contact with dissatisfied elements
of the military. Galva�, an outspoken critic of the regime,
probably still enjoys the respect of many army officers and
is popularly regarded as a martyr because of Salazar's unre-
mitting hostility to him. He is also a close friend of Delgado,
and if the two work together the general might be able to make
good the prediction he reportedly made to a confidant recently
that "Salazar has six months in which to leave the country or
else he will never leave it alive."
3 Feb 59
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Franco Regime Appears Uncertain in Face of Growing Difficulties
CThe Franco regime seems unsure of itself in dealing with var-
ious types of opposition activities.
the security authorities are worried about how to handle
demonstrations by Barcelona University students reportedly sched-
uled for early February. Failure to scotch them will encourage
their spread, but forceful action may worsen the situation. The
official adds that many of the police are trying to devise ways
of avoiding rough tactics, since they do not want to be identified
with the regime's strong-arm method
On 1 February rightist and liberal opposition groups in Ma-
drid announced the formation of the Union Espanola, in defiance
of the ban on all parties except the Falange. Three days earlier
Joaquin Satrustegui, a liberal monarchist and wealthy Basque in-
dustrialist and a member of the new party, had strongly criticized
the Franco regime at a dinner in Madrid attended by some 100
army generals, bankers, lawyers, and university professors.
The Union Espanola, in which the left-wing Christian Democrats,
Social Democrats, Socialists, and Anarchists are not participat-
ing, existed as a group at least a year ago without government
interference. The regime permitted Satrustegui, a representa-
tiverof the group, to attend a meeting of monarchist factions held
in Estoril on 6 January 1959.
Should the regime fail to crack down on the Union at this time,
in contrast to its severity in arresting 40 to 80 Socialists last No-
vember on charges of illegal political activity, its forbearance
would probably be due to hesitancy to alienate powerful sources
of financial aid and nuclei of support in the event that Franco
eventually announces the restoration of the monarchy. Whether
or not the regime takes strong action, public discontent is likely
to make itself heard to an increasing extent.
3 Feb 59
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--COPiHI/1W1. 1 A 1.4
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
_CONPDElb?Pt7M
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