CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/02/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03023221
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 6, 1959

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
6 February 1959
uopy .NO. L, 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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6 FEBRUARY 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet submarines continu
il 4-4rma n1I+cid4. ,,..,,q areas,
USSR reportedly favors summit
meeting this spring.
Soviets may plan formal invitations
to US leaders to visit USSR.
USSR - Party central committee
may meet; possibly to take action
on charges against "antiparty"
group.
Peiping publicly accepts Khrushchev
views on road to Communism.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
�Iraq - Four cabinet ministers resign
in protest against favored treatment
of Communists.
�USSR proposes to develop Iraqi off-
shore oil on 90-10 basis.
0 French determined to continue exclu-
sive role in Laotian military training.
III. THE WEST
Cuban regime facing mounting inter-
nal problems; Castro speech may be
prelude to pressure on US naval base.
Paraguayan exiles may be planning
armed revolutionary action this month.
Mexico - Leftist demonstrations pos-
sible during President Eisenhower's
visit; police alerted and ready.
@Venezuela - Disturbances being planned
for Betancourt inaugural.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
6 February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet submarine operations: Two detachments of
Soviet Northern Fleet submarines continue operations
well beyond local operating areas. One detachment has
apparently rounded Cape Horn and entered the Pacific
and is probably en route to the Pacific Fleet. The second
detachment, including a "Z"-class submarine possibly
configured to carry and launch ballistic missiles contin-
ues operations in the srthern Norwegian Sea and/or
Northeastern Atlantic. (Page 1)
the USSR favors a four-power heads-of-gov-
ernment meeting this spring. Moscow would
agree to a foreign minister' conference instead, but
only on the basis of parity, with Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia participating on the Soviet side.
"nothing will change" after the USSR wunaraws Irom
East Berlin, and implied that East German controls over
Allied access would not be far-reaching. This approach
probably was intended to probe for any change in French
views on East-West negotiations since President de Gaulle
expressed preference last summer for a summit meeting
confined to the great powers.")
(Page 2)
USSR: Khrushchev's invitation to President Eisen-
hower to visit the USSR, issued the day Prime Minister
Macmillan announced that he would go to Moscow on 21
February, is a further move to demonstrate the USSR's
desire for talks with Western leaders. Khrushchev mis-
represented the President's press conference remarks of
28 January concerning a Khrushchev visit to the US in or-
der to support the charge that American leaders want to
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reverse the "thaw" in Soviet-American relations which re-
sulted from Mikoyan's visit. The Soviet leaders may plan
to follow up Mikoyan's informal invitation to Vice Pres-
ident Nixon and Ktirushchev's speech with formal overtures.
USSR: A meeting of the Soviet central committee may
follo-TiFe�party congress which has now ended. The cen-
tral committee would take measures to carry out the direc-
tives of the congress on the Seven-Year Plan and might deal
with the demand made at the congress for removal of Bul-
ganin Pervulthin. and Saburov from the committee.
Communist China - USSR: Peiping's first editorial
comment on-the Soviet 21st party congress, carried in
� People's Daily on 5 February, indicated the Chinese have
dropped implications that the communes are a special road
to socialism and Communism. The editorial praised the
� Soviet "road" and Khrushchev's "creative conclusion that
the socialist countries will more or less simultaneously pass
to Communism," following the "brilliant example" of the
Soviet Union.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
� Iraq: Four Iraqi cabinet ministers, including Foreign
Minister Jumard, submitted their resignations to Prime
Minister Qasim on 3 February in protast_against_his
con-
tinued favoring of the Communists,
All four have been absent
from their offices since that time. Qasim has frustrated
previous attempts by dissatisfied ministers to resign, and
some ministers who oppose Qasim have feared that resigna-
tion would merely resut t in increased Communist influence.
(Page �)
6 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF
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The Soviet economic delegation /recently in Bagh-
dad made a proposal to the Iraqi Goverment for an offshore
oil concession on a 90-10 percent profit-sharine basis
The pro-Communist minister of economy is said
to be pushing the proposal despite the resistance of other
members of the cabinet:
Laos-France: (jL-TS plans to assume a direct role in train-
ing Laotian armed forces are being jeopardized by strong
opposition from the French.Government. French Ambassador
Gassouin in Vientiane has been notified that Paris has de-
cided to reject these plans and is firmly determined to con-
tinue its exclusive role in military training. Gassouin in-
terprets this attitude as an intent by Paris to use Laos as a
"pilot experiment" in building "a new French Community."
(Page 6)
III THE WEST
Cuba: After a month in office, the Castro regime faces
rising unemployment, mounting labor unrest which if con-
tinued will affect the sugar harvest, and an increase in crime
because of its failure to organize an effective police force.
Rival political groups are awaiting an opportunity to strike
out against Fidel gastro's dominant 26 of July Movement,
His 3 February speech, in which he implied that the US naval
base at Guantanamo Bay is an infringement on Cuba's sov-
ereignty, probably presages a campaign to negotiate a higher
rental for the base or other economic concessions, or pos-
sibly US withdrawal. ,(Page' 7)
Paraguay: Revolutionary plans of the Liberal party ex-
iles seem to be taking firmer shape with a reported Cuban
promise of air delivery of small arms and a few officers as
well as heavy propaganda support. Exile leaders in Monte-
video hope operations can begin before Uruguay's administra-
tion changes on 1 March. More moderate Liberal elements
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In Asuncion may be weakening in their earlier rejection of
the use of force to oust President Stroessner.
(Page 8)
Mexico: Communist-influenced students and other
leftist groups in Mexico may try to organize demonstra-
tions against President Eisenhower during his 19-21 Feb-
ruary visit to Acapulco,
(/ Venezuela: A former key Communist in Venezuela who
was linked with the Caracas riots against Vice President
Nixon is apparently in charge of an effort to create disorders
against the inauguration of President-elect Betancourt on
13 February. Anti-Betancourt elements may seize upon the
arrival of the US delegation to the inauguration on 10 Febru-
ary--the last day of the t violent carnival season--
to create a disturbance. (Page 9)
6 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Nor
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Submarine Operations
Two detachments of Soviet Northern Fleet submarines
'continue to operate in areas well beyond local waters.
The detachment which left the Kola Gulf on 20 November
and remained in the vicinity of the down-range area of the
Canaveral missile range for several weeks is now believed
to have rounded Cape Horn and entered the Pacific Ocean.
At least one submarine of this detachmvnt, a "Z"-class unit,
has rendezvousedin the southern Pacific with the tanker
Pevek. The Pevek, expected in Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka,
about mid-March, probably is providing logistic support to
the submarines, which are believed to be en route' to the
Pacific Fleet area.
A second detachment of submarines which includes at
least a long-range "Z" class, possibly configured to carry
and launch ballistic missiles, left the Kola Gulf on 11 Jan-
uary, and has since been operating in the southern Norwegian
Sea and/or Northeast Atlantic.
A Pacific Fleet "Z"-class long-range submarine con-
tinues an extended patrol in the Pacific, begun in November.
Four Soviet "W"-class long-range submarines
In Vlona. Albani7, where they arrived last August.
6 Feb 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Soviet Diplomat Indicates Moscow's Preference
For Summit Talks
tin an apparent effort to sound out French views on East-
West negotiations, the counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris
the USSR favors a meeting of the heads of government of the
four powers this spring. he Soviet leaders would pre-
fer to have a "German peace treaty" listed as the subject of
such talks, but that they would probably agree to a general
heading such as the "German problem."'l
( Moscow probably would go along
with a conference at the foreign-minister level, but only if
the three Western powers agree to parity of representation,
with Poland and Czechoslovakia participating on the Soviet side.
This insistence on parity, which the West rejected last year,
may reflect Khrushch&v's strong preference for a summit meet-
ing which would enhance his personal stature as a world states-
man. It may also have been aimed at probing for any change
in French views since last summer, when President de Gaulle
Insisted that the summit meeting then being proposed on the
Middle East crisis be confined to the major powers immedi-
ately concerned and held under "conditions of objectivity and
serenity.'1
Khru-
shcheves Berlin proposals were not intended as an ultimatum.
while the USSR would carry out its announced in-
tention to withdraw from in "this does not mean that
anything will change." East German access controls
would not be far-reaching._
Soviet counselor, talking with an American of-
ficial in late January, contended the Western powers could
deal with East German border guards on a basis of expediency,
just as the US negotiates with the Chinese Communists at War-
saw. He also said the West could maintain troops in Berlin and k.
6 Feb 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Cthat the East Germans would not necessarily participate in the
Soviet-proposed international commission to guarantee West
Berlin's status as a free city:-)
(The Soviet diplomat brushed off a suggestion that the USSR
seemed to be retreating from Khrushchev's initial stand on
Berlin by saying, "If we have succeeded in bringing you to the
table, that is enough of an accomplishmenel
6 Feb 59
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Peiping's First Comment on Soviet 21st Party Congress
Peiping's first comment on the Soviet 21st party congress,
carried in the People's Daily on 5 February, indicates the com-
munes will not be considered a special "road to socialism and
Communism." Such a "road" had been implied in Chinese state-
ments last summer. Selecting those of Khrushchev's comments
which seem most pertinent to the communes, the editorial re-
peatedly emphasized the correctness of the Soviet leader's views.
The editorial does not mention Chou En-lai's reaffirmation at
the congress that the communes are the "best form for China
to make the transition to socialism and Communism."
The editorial stated that Khrushchev's views apply not only
to the USSR "but to all countries passing from socialism to Com-
munism." It acknowledged his position on gradualness and
quoted from his congress speech that "what is immature can-
not be hurriedly and rashly carried out." 'While both Khru-
shchev and the editorial sa4I special conditions of a country
should be taken into account, the editorial stressed the Soviet
premier's remark that the transition to socialism and Commu-
nism is governed by laws of Marxism-Leniiiism "which cannot
be broken or skipped over." The deferential tone of the editorial
was emphasized by its agreement with one of Khrushchev's state-
ments which had implied China's future achievements will stem
largely from Soviet aid.
The Peiping press has also reported enthusiastic recep-
tion for Khrushchev's speech, with "copies sold out very quickly."
One indicative comment from a Tientsin scientist states, "The
21st congress is a beacon guiding all people along the happy road
of socialism and Communism."
CONFIDENTIAL
6 Feb 59
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
The Iraqi Situation
Four Iraqi cabinet ministers, including Foreign Minister
Jumard, handed Prime Minister Qasim their resignations on
3 February in protest against his continued favoring of the
Communists,
Jumard and the other three ministers--Baba All, min-
ister of communications; Hajj Mahmud, acting minister of
education; and Brig. NO. Talib, minister of social affairs--
have stopped going to their offices,
reported that Minister of Guidance Sadiq snan-
shal has also been absent from his office and avoiding contact
with Qasim. He was said to be conferring with Baathist Min-
ister of State Rikabi regarding the resignations. Until re-
cently Shanshal was urging his colleagues not to resign, fear-
ing that resignations would merely result in increased Com-
munist influence in the government. Qasim has frustrated
previous attempts by dissatisfied ministers to resign.
Although following an ostensibly more neutral policy since
his order restricting the Communist-dominated People's Re-
sistance Forces, Qasim has allowed a number of moves which
appear to have strengthened the Communist position in Iraq.
Tape recordings and scenes of the "treason" trial of former
Deputy Prime Minister Arif have been broadcast, and the re-
putedly Communist prosecutor, Col. Mandawi, has continued to
attack Nasir in the court, despite urgings from cabinet mem-
bers that the propaganda war against the UAR be toned down.
The latest Communist success is the replacement of the
strongly anti-Communist dean of the law college by a brother
of a Communist central committee member. This appoint-
ment appears to bear out other reports that the Communists
have gained control of the Ministry of Education as well as
broadcasting and the People's Court.
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American Plan to Train Laotian Army Opposed by France
(American plans to assume a direct role in training the
Laotian Army, a function now exclusively exercised by
France in accordance with the 1954 Geneva accord, are ap-
parently unacceptable to France. French Ambassador Gas-
souin in Vientiane, who personally has been sympathetic to
the US plan, has been notified that the French Government
is determined to maintain "ail links" with Laos, including
its training role. Paris further professes fear that the pres-
ence of US military advisers in Laos, in contravention of the
restrictive provisions of the Geneva agreement, would heighten
tensions in the Indochina arei:j
French failure to provide adequate training has resulted
in a serious reduction of the US-financed Laotian Army's
capabilities. The French training mission has been reduced
from its authorized strength of 1,500 to about 300. There is
dissatisfaction within the Laotian Government and Army over
inadequacies of the French mission and consideration of a
move to break the French monopoly on training. Vientiane
is actively considering denouncing the Geneva accord, thus
paving the way for the overt introduction of US military offi-
cers into Laos and a unilateral Laotian Government request
for a US training mission if France continues uncooperative
(Paris apparently believes it can preserve and perhaps
even increase the remaining French interests in the Indochi-
nese states. De Gaulle, who as President of France is also
President of the new French Community, hopes to retain
French ties with these states in some fashion, however ten-
uous, in order to enhance the "grandeur" of France and to
lend weight to its role in world affairs. De Gaulle probably
also believes that retention of French interest in the area
would ensure a French voice in Western policy decisions in
the Far East generally, andreinforce French demands for
tripartite global policy determination
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II L THE WEST
Cuban Government Indecisive in Face of Mounting Problems
After a month in office, Cuba's Provisional President Urrutia
has yet to show decisive leadership. Fidel Castro's penchant for
making uncoordinated police pronouncements continues to exas-
perate capable cabinet members. Castro himself still shows no
inclination to assume his responsibilities as armed forces chief.
Meanwhile, the absence of an effective police force is leading
to increased crime.
Mounting labor unrest, due in part to long-pent-up griev-
ances, if continued will affect the vital sugar harvest now un-
der way. By 3 February, 21 of Cuba's 161 sugar mills were
idled by strikes and several others were threatened. Construc-
tion workers at the American-owned Moa Bay nickel-processing
plant have also struck, and sporadic slowdowns and short work
stoppages have occurred in Havana and throughout the prov-
inces. The Communists are probably deeply involved. The
strikes, in defiance of a government decree temporarily sus-
pending the right to strike, suggest that the young pro-Castro
labor leaders may be incapable of controlling Cuba's politically
important labor organizations. Unemployment is mounting.
Political unrest is also evident just below the surface. Mem-
bers of the Revolutionary Directorate, a student group which
fought Batista, are still bitter over being denied participation
in the government. They may be partially responsible for the
chaotic conditions prevailing at the University in Havana, where
students have seized control of various schools. Ex-President
Prio and his party are outwardly supporting the government but
actually waiting for an opportunity to gain the upper hand.
Fidel Castro's 3 February speech, in which he implied that
the US nkvalbase at Guantanamo Bay is an infringement on
Cuba's sovereignty, may presage a campaign to negotiate for
either a higher rental for the base or withdrawal from it and,
incidentally, to divert Cuban attention from domestic problems.
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Paraguayan Exiles Promised Cuban Arms and Officers
Revolutionary plans of exiled Paraguayan Liberals seem
to be taking firmer shape with the reported Cuban promise of
arms and a few officers as well as heavy propaganda support.
the Cuban Government
has agreed to fly 500 or 600 machine pistols to Dr. Carlos
Pastore, leader of the Liberal exiles in Uruguay. Further
aid was discussed in Havana by a Uruguayan journalist and
one of Castro's officers, the Argentine Che Guevara, who is
a suspected Argentine Communist. Guevara suggested send-
ing a small group of his officers as well as arms and equip-
ment for 200 men.
Pastore wants to begin operations before the inaugura-
tion of the Herrerista government in Uruguay on 1 March,
probably because of Herrera's long-standing friendship with
Colorado governments in Paraguay. He apparently hopes to
emulate the Cuban rebels, who started under similarly ad-
verse odds, and reportedly has even rejected coordination
with other exile groups.
More moderate Liberal leaders in Asuncion may be
wavering in their earlier rejection of force to oust Pres-
ident Stroessner. Despite communiques to the contrary,
several leaders have privately admitted their belief that a
revolution launched from abroad "would perhaps be the only
solution." Pastore has a large personal following in the Lib-
eral party, which approximates the size of the ruling Colorado
party.
While Stroessner is taking strong security precautions
against exile plotting, he is giving equal emphasis to retain-
ing his vital military support, articularly in view of reports
of some disaffection.
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Demonstrations May Be Planned Against Venezuelan
President-elect Betancourt
A former Communist, prominent last May in staging the
Caracas riots against Vice President Nixon, is apparently in
charge of creating public demonstrations against the inaugu-
ration of Venezuelan President-elect Betancourt. Anti-
Betancourt elements may seek to embarrass the President-
elect by creating a disturbance on the arrival of the US del-
egation on 10 February--the last day of the traditionally vio-
lent carnival season.
The rumored objective of the disturbances is to prepare
groundwork for a coup by the Democratic Republican Union
party (URD), which cooperated with the Communists in last
December's election. In that election, the URD and the Com-
munists received a majority of the vote in the Federal Dis-
trict where the inauguration is to take place. Violence has
repeatedly broken out in Caracas during the past year.
if URD-Communist riots during the
inauguration period get out of control, the army may take over
the government.
The incumbent junta government on 5 February issued a
decree authorizing police to deal harshly with unauthorized
demonstrations and to keep groups suspected of planning dem-
onstrations out of the center of Caracas. The Venezuelan
police were disorganized and partly demobilized in early 1958,
but some progress has since been made in reconstituting the
force.
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Nue *40�04
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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