CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/02/10

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03023218
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 10, 1959
File: 
Body: 
-.err Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 �ativ 10 February 1959 Copy No. C bJ CENTRAL Nor' 3.5(c) INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN L-'0OUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. -7CLAF;S:FIED CHANGED TO: lte)(4 F;EVIEW DATE: RP-IPA/ER: -TOP-SECRET- 1 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 Approved f7r-ikereaS�e725-217/(1 C03023218 Anti -TOP-SEGRET- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 10 FEBRUARY 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC IL ASIA-AFRICA Tokyo moves toward trade talks with Peiping. Burma - General Ne Win to ask for six-month extension as prime minis- ter. III. THE WEST Honduran military official doubts Villeda regime can survive present crisis; civil war possibly near. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218- I -0M-1115-1- - 0 -SEeRET- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218,, VA VA CEN1AL INTELLIGENCE BULLITIN 10 February 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC IL ASIA-AFRICA Japan - Communist China: Foreign Minister Fujiyama an- nounced on 8 February that instructions had been issued to select a Japanese representative and a site for ambassadorial talks with Peiping over the resumption of trade., Prime Min- ister Kishi has apparently been forced to make this offer be- cause of internal political pressures. Peiping has thus far avoided comment. (Page 1) Burma: General Ne Win is expected to ask the Chamber of Deputies, during its session which convened on 9 February, to extend his term as prime minister for at least six months. This request is likely to be opposed by former Prime Minister U Nu. Ne Win probably controls a majority of the Chamber of Deputies, but an extension of his regime may, over a period of time, lead to popular discontent and broadening political oppo- sition. (Page 2) III. THE WEST *Honduras: [Armed forces chief Lopez expressed strong doubts to the American ambassador on 9 February that the government of President Villeda can survive the present crisis unless rebel leader Velasquez is immediately expelled from neighboring Nicaragua and his clandestine rebel radio forced to cease broadcasting. Tension has risen to the point where the country appears on the verge of civil war:3 (Page 3) VA SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218, NS I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material II. ASIA-AFRICA Japan Contemplating Ambassadorial Talks With Communist China An announcement by Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama on 8 February that his ministry has been directed to select a representative and a site for ambassadorial talks with Com- munist China is an overture on the part of the Kishi govern- ment, under growing internal political pressure, to determine Peiping's willingness to resume trade relations. Fujiyama said the ambassadorial talks, if they take place, would include the question of missing Japanese nationals in China, as well as possible postal, fishing, meteorological, and sea-rescue agreements. It is uncertain, however, whether Tokyo is thinking in terms of a government-to-government trade agreement. Prime Minister Kishi, no longer in firm control of the gov- ernment, has been forced to abandon his "wait-and-see" policy toward Peiping. Failure to respond to the growing domestic pressures for resumption of mainland trade could jeopardize his party's chances in the upper-house elections in June and en- danger his own retention of office. Kishi has emphasized, how- ever, that ambassadorial talks with Peiping may not solve the trade impasse and that diplomatic recognition of Communist China still is not contemplated. Peiping has thus far avoided comment. CONFIDENTIAL 10 Feb 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 Approved for ketease720-2TY/o/2-1 C03023218 'quire Prime Minister Ne Win Expected to Ask for Extension Of Tenure General Ne Win is expected to ask the Burmese Chamber of Deputies, which convened on 9 February, to extend his term as prime minister for at least six months. As a nonmember of Parliament, Ne Win is limited by the Constitution to a tenure of six months, and his term expires in April. He probably will argue that he needs more time to achieve his objective of restor- ing peace and security to permit the holding of elections free from violence and coercion. Ne Win now appears to command a majority in Parliament, and his request probably will be granted. Former Deputy Pre- mier Ba Swe has already assured the government of his party's support, as have smaller independent groups, and the vigorous reforms carried out during his tenure have added to Ne Win's national prestige. The prime minister also will present Parliament with a solution for the long-standing problem of the Shan States. The hereditary Shan princes have agreed to surrender their feudal privileges and their constitutional right of secession. Nevertheless, there is a strong probability that former Prime Minister U Nu, whose influence has declined under the present government, will oppose the extension as being uncon- stitutional. All political quarters, including those currently supporting Ne Win, look forward to ultimately resuming con- trol of the government and will become increasingly dissatis- fied as the army consolidates its rule while they are excluded from positions of national leadership. CONFIDENTIAL 10 Feb 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 - Nue III. THE WEST Honduras -Appears on verge of Civil War CThe situation in Honduras has become critical. Early on 9 February the Honduran Army sent troops to the departmental capital of Santa Barbara to suppress opposition elements which had apparently seized the city. Clashes between opposition groups and loyal civilians, as well as between the latter and isolated military outposts, have been reported in several parts of the country since early last week. Members of the administration Liberal party are threatening to take further independent action against the opposition unless President Villeda shows himself in command of the situation. Further deterioration of governmental control could result in widespread bloodshed and even civil war:-I (The weak opposition parties, with the help of a clandestine rebel radio in neighboring Nicaragua, have so exacerbated long-- standing frictions between members of President Villeda's ma- jority Liberal party and the armed forces that, in the resulting confusion, even armed forces chief Lopez admitted that he found it difficult to ascertain where his true loyalties lay. He is pub- licly committed to defend the government, however, and early on 9 February he expressed strong doubts to the American am- bassador that the government can survive unless rebel leader Velasquez is immediately expelled from Nicaragua and his radio forced to cease broadcasting. Lopez' control over his subordi- nates is in some doubt, and Managua has reported that since 4 February a considerable number of Honduran Army deserters have been crossing into Nicaragua:-} Con 9 February the clandestine rebel radio announced that the long-promised revolution had begun; this was probably a bluff designed to stimulate the military to defect and the various unco- ordinated opposition groups to take violent action against the gov- ernment. Despite the impression created by the broadcasts that the rebel movement is a coordinated force of overwhelming strength, the rebels probably number only a few hundred and are not known to have left their sanctuary in Nicaragua.1 10 Feb 59 �SECRET- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218, Noe THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218 I r 6/74. WI 1 /40414W177,,,, ZrZZZI WZ, //I I/ Apprcl C030A18 ///, 7 7 /1/ 0 V -TOP-SECRET- / Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023218