CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/02/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03023216
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 12, 1959

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12 February 1959
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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kidTOt SECIM
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12 FEBRUARY 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet representatives threaten Iran
with "dangerous repercussions" at
breakoff of nonaggression-pact talks.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Yemen concludes aid agreement with
USSR for wheat.
Afghanistan to rece
ommunist China.
In
Cairo subsidizing Sudanese politicians
and publishers.
Laos denounces 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments.
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1
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III. THE WEST
French Atomic Energy Commission
sets up radio links in the Sahara: first
Aniclearlest ma come in 1959
Venezuelan Government' takes pre-
cautions to ensure inauvration, but
atmosphere remains tense.
Haiti - Disaffection grows among
President's supporters; government
disintegration an imminent possi-
bility.
LATE ITE1Vi
Iraq - New cabinet minister resigns
in protest against Qasim's siding with
Communists.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
fri
12 February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Iran-USSR:ollowing the breakoff in Soviet-Iranian
negotiations on 10 February, Iranian Prime Minister Eqbal ex-
pressed great concern over the threat of dangerous reper-
cussions which he claimed the Russians said would "become
manifest shortly." According to Eqbal, the last session of th
negotiations was very heated. The Soviet representatives be-
came "abusive, insulting, and very threatening," and left with
the foreign minister p lengthy document of "accusations, in-
sults, and threats .fri (Page 1)
Watch Committee conclusions�Middle East: Situations
sus eptible of direct exploitation by Sino- Soviet hostile action
which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East,
particularly in Iran and Iraq.
Iran: With the breakdown of Iranian-Soviet negotiations
and the anticipated signing of an Iranian-US bilateral agree-
ment, the USSR will certainly retaliate with violent propaganda,
strong economic and diplomatic pressure and probably with
subversive and other measures short of direct military action.
Middle East: Elsewhere in the Middle East, although the
situation remains precarious, a deliberate initiation of large-
scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.-3
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Yemen-USSR: Yemen, under the influence of pro-Soviet
Crown Prince Badr, now has concluded an aid agreement with
the USSR for 10,000 tons of wheat. The first Soviet wheat ship-
ment is scheduled to arrive at the Yemeni port of Hodeida about
20 February. The first American aid wheat is to arrive at Mocha
ahnuf 19 ViShruary
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Afghanistan - Communist China: The Chinese Commu-
nist Government to, g Afghanistan 20,000 tons of wheat.
In mid-January the Soviet gift to Afghanistan of 40,000 tons
was announced. Initial deliveries of Soviet wheat have already
been widely publicized in the Afghan press. The American
grant of 50,000 tons has also been announced.
(Page 3)
UAR-Sudan: The UAR has resumed clandestine payment
of subsidies to selected Sudanese politicians and is continuing
those to newspaper publishers. Cairo remains dissatis
with the general orientation of the Abboud government.
(Page 4)
Laos: he Laotian Government announced on 11 February
that it Tin o longer bound by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. This
action will probably provoke strong adverse reactions not only
from France but from the Sino-Soviet bloc and India as well. It
will end exclusive French control of Laotian military training.
(Page 5)
III. THE WEST
France - Nuclear test:rEstablishment of French Atomic
Energy Commission radio links in the Sahara increases the
probability that the first French nuclear test may occur in 1959
rather than 1960 as official Frpncl, Qnlirces have recently indi-
cated (Page 7) (Map)
Venezuela: The government is taking extensive precautions
to prevent further mob violence in Caracas and to ensure ac-
complishment of Romulo Betancourt's inauguration on 13 Feb-
ruary. There are, however, rumors of a coup attempt by dissi-
dent junior officers, and the atmosphere remains tense.
(Page 8)
12 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF
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Haiti: The deteriorating economic and financial situa-
tion continues to undermine the precarious political position
of the Duvalier regime. Disaffection is growing even among
the President's stronger supporters, and the disintegration of
the government, with accompanying serious disorders, has
become an imminent possibility.
(Page 9)
LATE ITEM
*Iraq: Husayn Jamil, propaganda minister in the new cab-
inet:MI-Emitted his resignation to Prime Minister Qasim on
10 February after Qasim, at Communist request, ordered the
reopening nf A rOMMUlliSt newsnaner which had been suspended
by Jamil, Jamil
declared the issue is now drawn between the Communists and
"all other" parties, including his own National Democratic Party
(NDP). He said that the party would not cooperate with the Com-
munists, and he expects the five other NDP members in the 14-man
cabinet to resign shortly. The reaction of the army to this, the
second cabinet crisis in a week, is unknown.
12 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Iranian-Sciviet Negotiations Broken Off After Heated Exchange
Iranian-Soviet negotiations on a nonaggression pact, which
hadl3een in progress for nearly two weeks, ended abruptly about
midnight on 10 February following a heated exchange, according
to Iranian Prime Minister Eqbal. The special Soviet delega-
tion headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov departed for
Moscow in anger, leaving with Foreign Minister Hekmat a 14-
page document of threats and accusations:1
E-Eqbal said the Soviet representatives became "abusive, in-
sulting, and very threatening" during the final session and gave
the impression that Moscow was almost at the point of severing
diplomatic relations with Iran. He said the Russians accused
the Iranian Government, the Shah, and himself of failure to rep-
resent the Iranian people, of being "abject lackeys" of the United
States, and of leading the country along the path to disaster:3
IThe Shah and Eqbal are greatly concerned over possible
"dangerous repercussions" from the Soviet Union which the
Russian representatives warned would "become manifest shortly."
The Shah, through Eqbal, even appealed urgently for an American
declaration "within the next 24 to 48 hours" to the effect that the
United States "will defend Iran in the same manner as American
territory .:3
CM. oscow can be expected to follow up with a propaganda cam-
paign aimed at discrediting the Shah's regime. The American
ambassador in Tehran believes that this could result in "serious
internal political damage" to the regime
rOther possible Soviet measures include military demonstra-
tions on the frontier and threats to exercise the right to advance
troops into Iran under the 1921 treaty. The Kremlin might als-ti'S
12 Feb 59
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encourage dissident groups and stimulate labor trouble or
sabotage by Arab workers in Iran's oil fields. Moscow fur-
thermore could cause some disruption of the Iranian econ-
omy by cutting off trade; in 1958 bloc countries received 11
percent of Iran's exports and provided 25 percent of its im-
ports:3
12 Feb 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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,StiCKE
vow/
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Chinese Communist Gift of Wheat to Afghanistan
The Chinese Communist C-Invernment is givina Afghan-
istan 20,000 tons of wheat,
Peiping's good-will gesture, which toitows
the Soviet gin of 40,000 tons, will probably lessen further
the impact of the American grant of 50,000 tons to meet an
emergency shortage. Both Peiping and Moscow have prob-
ably extended this aid in response to Afghan requests, wel-
coming the opportunity to counter the US assistance to
Afghanistan.
The Soviet and American gifts were announced simultane-
ously in the Kabul press on 14 January. Prompt initial deliv-
eries of Soviet wheat received widespread publicity in the
Afghan press during the last days of January. In addition,
Moscow has emphasized that it is delivering wheat to Afghan-
istan without any conditions and that Kabul will consequently
be able to use the proceeds from the sale of the wheat how-
ever it wishes. Soviet propaganda contrasts this with the terms
of the US grant, whereby the proceeds from the sale of American
wheat must be deposited in a special account and spent only with
American permission on agreed projects.
12 Feb 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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TOP SLCKL I
Now,
UAR Subsidies to Sudanese Politicians
Cairo has reinstituteda system of clandestine sub-
sidies to influential elements in the Sudan. Prior to the 17
November military coup in the Sudan, the UAR was engaged in a
broad program of such payments--to the Sudanese press, to
both the Nationalist Union party and the People's Democratic
party, and to certain selected politicians. Following the forma-
tion of the Abboud government and the proclaimed dissolution of
all Sudanese political parties, the UAR suspended its subsidies.
On 4 December, in response to the urging of its embassy in
Khartoum that a favorable press would be essential to influenc-
ing the Abboud government in the desired direction, Cairo ordered
payments to Sudanese newspapers resumed. It moved more slowly
on the question of reinstituting stipends for the politicians. In
early February, Cairo
directed the payment of individual subslaies to leaders o; the
former political parties. These included Sayid Al-Azhari, lead-
er of the National Union party, several second-ranking individ-
uals in that party, and Ali Abdul Rahman, leader of the People's
Democratic party.
The aim of the present program is to increase pro-Egyptian
internal pressure on the Abboud government, as well as to main-
tain a foundation for major influence in any succeeding Sudanese
government.
12 Feb 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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Noe Nue
Laos Rep4diates 1954 Geneva Agreements
-'he Laotian Government, in a move apparently designed
to free itself from exclusive French control of military train-
ing, has announced that it no longer considers Laos bound by
the restrictive 1954 Geneva Agreements. The formal state-
ment recounts Laos' fulfillment of its obligations under the
1954 armistice and points out that as a fully independent and
sovereign nation, it cannot tolerate foreign intervention in its
affairs. An immediate consequence of this act is that it pro-
vides a legal basis for introducing American military training
into Laos. It also precludes reactivation of the International Con-
trol Commission in Laos, as sought by the Communist bloc and
CtLike France, which recently has Shown renewed determina-
tion o maintain its special position in Laos, the Communists are
expected to react sharply. The Sino-Soviet bloc, which maintains
that the Geneva Agreements are applicable to Laos and Cambodia
pending Vietnam's reunification, looks upon them as an effective
device to frustrate American efforts to increase the anti-Commu-
nist defenses of these countries. India, in its capacity as ICC
chairman and in an effort to preserve the status quo in Indochina,
previously has expressed strong fears that any unilateral abroga-
tion of the 1954 armistice machinery by the West might provoke
Communist military reaction:
.12 Feb 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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III. THE WEST
French Preparations for First Nuclear Test
Most such
reports have placed the probable test site at or near Reggane
Oasis in the Algerian Sahara area, and Agades and any point in
the Ahaggar range seem too remote from Reggane to indicate
observation or instrumentation sites appropriate for a nuclear
explosion. The reports, however, point to location of a test
site in the general area of the Ahaggar range--much farther re-
moved than Reggane from neighboring African nations which have
already expressed apprehension over the anticipated nuclear test.
A single report early in 1958 had indicated that the general test
area would be 100 to 200 kilometers north of Timbuktu in a re-
gion "where a fall-out danger would be negligible because of
absence of population.')
(France now is estimated to have enough plutonium to be able
to explode a nominal-yield (20-- to 40-kiloton) device. The stage
of preparations reinforces
the probability of a test this year rather than, as stated recently
by official French sources, in 196
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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verov
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Tension �-..,urrounds Venezuelan Presidential Inauguration
The explosive atmosphere surrounding the preparations for
inauguration of Romulo Betancourt as president of Venezuela
on 13 February is pointed up, by serious mob violence in Caracas
on 10 February and rumors of a cou,7-_, attempt by dissident junior
officers. The situation is complicated by the concentration of
disorderly opposition elements in the politically strategic Federal
District, where Betancourt has only limited support. Leaders
of Betancourt's Democratic Action party (AD) have for some weeks
feared disturbances, plots to block the inauguration, and even pos-
sible assassination attempts against the president-elect. There
have been several incidents of mass opposition to Betancourt in
Caracas since his electoral victory last December. The govern-
ment is taking extensive precautions to protect visiting foreign
delegations and to control any outbreaks of violence.
Sources close to Betancourt are particularly concerned over
the presence in Caracas of defeated presidential candidate Admiral
Larrazabal and doubt that his backers--who include the Communists--
have fully accepted his defeat. Larrazabal� the popular former junta
president, has kept himself in the political spotlight by appearances
at public ceremonies, especially during the recent visit of Fidel
Castro. There is some indication that he may postpone assuming
his ambassadorial assignment in Chile until after the inauguration.
His presence in Caracas on 13 February would be an embarrassment
to Betancourt and could possibly provoke disorders.
Betancourt apparently has made progress in alleviating the
traditional military hostility toward himself and his party. The
top military thus far have backed the election results and are not
known to be plotting against the inauguration of the new government.
The loyalty of the navy, however, which was solidly behind Larraza-
bal during his junta presidency and is still headed by his brother,
has been questioned.
12 Feb 59
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Haitian Situation Continues Critical
Mounting disaffection among Haitian officials now has
spread to some who were until recently among President
Duvalier's strongest supporters. The disintegration of the
government, with accompanying serious violence, has become
an imminent possibility. The administration's economic and
financial position has deteriorated to such an extent that
local banking circles estimates
that the government will be bankrupt within 40 days unless it
receives immediate outside assistance.
With the urban population becoming increasingly restive
and torn by bitter racial and class tensions and with the weak-
ened army already of doubtful loyalty, Duvalier can rely only
on his personal civilian militia for support. The militia, though
widely feared for its terroristic methods, could not defend the
regime against a popular explosion or a well-organized plot.
Duvalier's leading political opponent, former presidential
candidate Louis Dejoie, is in Cuba and confidently expects as-
sistance from Fidel Castro's 26 of July Movement in attemnting
a landing on Haiti's south coast, his political stronghold.
12 Feb 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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���� �
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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