CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/02/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03023214
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 14, 1959

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14 February 1959
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CENTRAL
63
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
DOCUMENT NO.
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TOP SECRET
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14 FEBRUARY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR apparently believes that British
views on Berlin and Germany can be
exploited to weaken Western unity.
Macmillan may be governed by
domestic political considerations
in proposals to USSR.
MIG49s noted in East China.
Chinese Communist ambassador in
Cambodia privately expresses confi-
dence in Sihanouk.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq - Last two members of NDP
in cabinet s,,bmit resignations.
Nasir intends to halt his campaign
against Communist influence in
Iraq.
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Algerian rebel government's rela-
tions with Nasir have deteriorated;
it may turn to Iraq for More weap-
ons.
Cameroun terrorists will reportedly
engage in violence prior to UN con-
sideration of Cameroun independence
on 20 February.
Burma - Ne Win resigns as pre-
mier; apparently forcing showdown
to return him for indefinite ten-
ure.
South Korea - Rhee taking counter-
measures in effort to block Japan's
decision to repatriate Koreans to
North Korea.
LATE ITEM
0 Cuba - Fidel Castro takes over as
prime minister.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: CA Soviet official in Bonn recently gave the impres-
sion to an American correspondent that the USSR considers Brit-
ain to be the "weakest link" in the Western front and may hope to
use Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to drive a "hard bargain:'
Soviet Embassy officer in Paris has expressed doubt that Britain
would participate in any Western military action to keep land ac-
cess to Berlin open3 (SECRET NOFORM (Page 1)
*UK-USSR! CThe American Embassy in London reports indi-
cations that Prime Minister Macmillan has "election fever" and
may be tempted to make proposals to the USSR primarily moti-
vated by domestic political considerations. A large number of
top-level officials will accompany the prime niinister,(and more
than 100 newsmen are seeking visas: (Page 3)
Communist China: (FARMER (MIG-19) jet fighters
in at least one ig
reference over East China. Some of these planes were noted
in China in late October 1958 when aircraft from the Soviet Union
landed in Manchuria. The presence of these supersonic fighters
in East China will improve Chinese Communist air defense capa-
bilities in the Taiwan Strait area3
(Page 5) (Map)
Communist China Cambodia!'
Ambassador
Wang Yu-ping recently expressed confidence to his staff that Siha-
nouk's position would become more stable in 1959 and that Sino
Cambodian relations would continue to improve to Peiping's ad-
vantage. Ambassador Wang was one of the first to tip off Siha-
nouk regarding the plot aainst his regime supported by South
Vietnam and Thailand (Page 6)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: The last two members of the National Democratic
party (NDP) in the Iraqi cabinet have submitted their resigna-
tions, Prime Minis-
ter Qasim now will be left to rely only on the support of his
personal following among the military and on the Communists.
he leader of the NDP, }mil Chadirchi,
has been Qasim's principal political a5iviser. He was reported
recently to be hoping to make the NDP more potent than the
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UAR: (Nasir intends to enci at least for the time being,
his campaign against Communist influence in Iraq, according
to an emissary from Nasir to Ambassador Hare. The emissary
said this action is to be taken because Nasir believes he can-
not continue to attack the Communists while the British and
French governments remain hostile to him. Nasir may hope
that the US will bring some pressure to bear on London and
Paris in order to create a unified backing for him in the event
of a further worsening of his relations with Moscow. A more
important consideration for Null., however, probably is that
his tactics toward Iraq have not succeeded.
(Page 7)
Algeria: Relations between the Algerian rebel govern-
ment and President Nasir's regime seem to have deteriorated
seriously and the Algerians now may turn to Iraq as the prin-
cipal source of weapons to continue the rebellion.
the removal of the rebel government from Cairo to
Tunis and offers arguments to refute the anti-UAR charges
which Cairo expects the Algerian rebel premier will make
during his forthcoming tour of the Middle East and Asia.
(Page 8)
Cameroun: Leftist terrorists have reportedly been in-
structed by their Cairo-based headquarters to engage in vio-
lence to embarrass the moderate pro-French native govern-
ment shortly before the UN General Assembly meets on 20
14 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF
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February to consider Camerounian independence. If settle-
ment of the issue is postponed, the pro-Western government
may be unable to combat growing disorders and may fall
from power. (Page 9) (Map)
*Burma: Coeneral Ne Win, through his statements ex-
plaining his resignation 5.s prime minister on 13 February,
is apparently forcing a showdown in Parliament on the ques-
tion of whether to make the constitutional changes necessary
to permit his return to the premiership indefinitely or to
call for elections in April. Ne Win may expect significant
opposition to his request for such a constitutional amend-
ment, particularly from former Prime Minister U Nu. How-
ever, he is probably counting on the threat of extra-legal ac-
tion by the army to influence Parliament to return him to of-
fjqe on his terms-0-)
japan - boutn .h.orea: In an enort to mock implementa-
tion of Japan's decision to repatriate Koreans wishing to go
to North Korea, the Rhee government has suspended further
talks with Japan and begun demonstrations. It apparently in-
tends also to cut off trade and step up seizures of Japanese
fishing vessels. Despite an alert of South Korean armed
forces, no military action is likely except for possible clashes
between South Korean Coast Guard vessels and Japanese patrol
craft. (Page 11)
LATE ITEM
*Cuba: The resignation of Prime Minister Miro Cardona
and his cabinet on 13 February and the assumption of the top
cabinet post by Fidel Castro on 16 February will probably
sharpen the latent conflict between Castro's "26 of July -move-
ment" and other groups that opposed former dictator Batista.
This is possibly Castro's first move toward the presidency;
he was made eligible for the post by a recent constitutional
revision lowering the age requirement. Another revision, con-
ferring citizenship rights on foreigners who fought with the
14 Feb 59 DAILY BRIEF
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rebels, also makes the controversial leftist Argentine, "Che"
Guevara, eligible for any high government post.
Castro's former position as chief of the armed forces now
will probably fall to his younger brother, Raul, whose past
actions have demonstrated his irresponsibility.
14 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BUIL.,
Soviet Views of Macmillan's Visit to Moscow
The Soviet leaders apparently believe that British views
on Berlin and Germany and the likelihood of British elections
this year can be exploited to weaken Western unity. The first
secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn implied to an Ameri-
can correspondent on 11 February that the USSR considers Brit-
ain the "weakest link" in the Western front and may drive a
"hard bargain" during Prime Minister Macmillan's visit. He
hinted that the USSR might suggest withdrawing its Berlin de-
mands in exchange for cancellation of plans for West German
nuclear rearmament
r
(Moscow probably feels that Macmillan's desire for a "peace-
maker" role, together with the pressure of British public opinion
for a lessening of East-West tensions, makes him particularly
vulnerable on the German issue. The counselor of the Soviet
Embassy in Paris has expressed doubts that Britain would par-
ticipate in any Western military action to maintain land access
to Berlin:3
The Soviet leaders, reminded of the benefits former Prime
Minister Eden derived in his 1955 election campaign from having
advocated a summit meeting, may seek to obtain at least a tacit
endorsement from Macmillan of the desirability of another heads-
of -government conference and favorable reference to European
security measures such as a nonaggression pact or a reduction
of foreign forces in Germany. Soviet propaganda is stressing
the British people's concern over trends in West Germany and
their desire for a policy "independent of that imposed by the "
Adenauer -Dulles partner ship
fin discussing the Berlin problem with Macmillan, Khru-
shchev probably will repeat the line Ite'took with the Norwegian
ambassador on 9 February, when he warned that Soviet troops
would immediately react to any violation of the East German
frontier by Western forces. He remarked on the significance
of Secretary Dulles reference to the formula that the East Ger-
mans might act as "agents" of the USSR and said this formula-
tion, while unfortunate, was a move in the right direction. Khru-
shchev again denied that his Berlin proposal was intended asi
14 Feb 59
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Noe
Gn ultimatum, but said the turnover of Soviet functions to the
East Germans could occur sooner or later than 27 May;)
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14. Feb 59
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Nue
Macmillan's Visit to the Soviet Union
[The British Foreign Office is preparing a list of questions
to be used as "guideposts" for Prime Minister Macmillan's dis-
cussions during his week- to ten-day visit to Moscow beginning
on 21 February. According to a Foreign Office official) London
hopes to ascertain how confident Khrushchev is that the USSR is
sufficiently strong to prevent any modification of the European
situation. Britain would also like to determine whether the USSR
is so apprehensive of a "German-US alliance in NATO" as to con-
sider war to prevent its further development. The importance
London attaches to the forthcoming trip is indicated by the large
number of top-level officials who will accompany Macmillan:\
(The US Embassy feels thatMacmillan,now has entered the period
of "election fever" and may have to be held back "by the coattails"
from pushing proposals aimed at impressing the British electorate.
The embassy also feels that if British elections were scheduled to
follow an East-West conference, the British Government would be
under pressure to produce results and "agreements.'il
EMacmillan may be considering a nonaggression pact with the
Soviet Union. In a possible trial balloon, Reuters on 11 February
said that London diplomatic quarters expect Khrushchev to pro-
pose a bilateral pact during Macmillan's visit. According to these
diplomats, Soviet leaders believe Macmillan's denial of an inten-
tion to negotiate would not rule this out_,
14 Feb 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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I+ Piston fighter
Jet fighter
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Jet light bomber
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Nue
MIG-19s Noti-d in East China
[Indications that FARMER (MIG-19) jet fighters are op-
erating in East China were received on 11 February when a
control tower at Chingyang warned another aircraft, "One
ivi1G-19 left Liencheng.
5. number of MIG-19s moved into Manchuria from the
Soviet Union in late October 1958, and there are indications
that a second flight may have taken place in January 1959.
These aircraft have not been observed
athough Chinese Communist,
radar in East China has recently tracked aircraft at altitudes
beyond the capabilities of 1VLEG-17s
he presence of these supersonic aircraft in the Taiwan
Strait area would improve Chinese Communist air intercept
capabilities, particularly during conditions of good visibility.
Some of them have been modified to give them limited all-
weather capability]
15 Feb 59
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Noir
Peiping Copiimistic About Policy Toward Cambodia
(An optimistic estimate of Peiping's efforts to bring Cam-
bodia into a closer relationship with Communist China was
made by Communist China's ambassador and his deputy in
Phnom Penh at party meetings on 30 January and 2 February
in the embassy.
the work of Peiping's economic mission was ap-
praised as having "yielded some results," and Ambassador
Wang Yu-ping stated that Sino- Cambodian relations would con-
tinue to improve to Peiping's "advantage." Wang expressed
confidence that the Cambodian political situation would become
more stable in 1959. He advised that Sino-Cambodian relations
be made a "model" of compliance with the five principles of
peaceful coexistence between "large and small countries." He
also advised embassy officials to learn to speak French or
Cambodian within a year or two in order to "expand activities"
at the grass-roots levels."\
Peiping's objectives in Cambodia are facilitated by Siha-
nouk's premise that the best way to maintain Cambodia's in-
dependence is to "remain friends with Chou En-lai," as well
as. by his constant feuding with anti-Communist South Vietnam
and Thailand. These attitudes and Cambodia's weak security
capabilities render largely ineffective Sihanouk's declared o
n o the s read of Communism within Cambodia:
14 Feb 59
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Nor
II. ASIA-AFRICA
NasirSays Ike Plans to Drop Campaign Against Iraqi Communists
(Nasir, through Cairo newspaperman Muhammad Hasanayn
Haykal, informed Ambassador Hare on 11 February that the UAR
campaign against the Iraqi Communists will be gradually abandoned
for "tactical reasons." Haykal added that suppression of Egyptian
and Syrian Communists would continue, however, as would the
UAR's "basic hostility" toward those in Iraq.')
CNasir's reason for dropping the campaign, according to
Haykal, is his feeling that he cannot continue while the French
and British still show no indication of changing their opposition
to the UAR. He complained specifically of press and clandestine
radio attacks against him and alleged British delay in completing
financial negotiations with the UAR p Haykal stated that Nasir's
complaint did not include the United States, whose position through-
out the Iraqi-UAR dispute was "unprecedented in its wisdom:"`,
CVarious considerations, besides that put forth by Haykal, prob-
ably-entered into the decision. Nasir has had virtually no success
in shaping events in Iraq according to his desire, and he has run
considerable risk of seriously damaging his relations with the
Communist bloc, which backs Iraqi Premier Qasim. Nasir is
unlikely to stop all clandestine opposition to Baghdad, however,
and would probably still attempt to aid any internal movement
In Iraq which appeared to him capable Of displacing.the present
regime. The approach to Ambassador Hare may have be
designed to elicit some assurance of American support.)
14 Feb 59
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Algerian Rebel Relations With Nasir Deteriorating
Relations between the Algerian rebel government and the
regime of UAR President Nasir seem to have deteriorated.
Although resenting the controls which Egyptian authorities im-
posed on them, the rebels heretofore have counted on Cairo
for much of their external support.
_ confirms earlier reports that the Al-
gerian rebels were moving their provisional government to
Tunis. posts were being created in
Baghdad, Libya, and Morocco, while two ministers would
"formally" remain in Cairo.
CRebel ministers in Tunis implied that this shift is designed
to engender confidence in the West that they were moving away
from contacts with Nasir and Middle Eastern Arab radicals with
whom they have "little in common:nThis move suggests either
that Cairo is reducing its support or that the rebels are assured
of morergenerous support elsewhere. Iraqi Premier Qasimes
declaration to news correspondents on 11 February that Iraq--
already a major financial contributor to the Algerian rebellion--
will step up its arms shipments to the Algerians may indicate
that Iraq has supplanted the UAR as the principal source of weap-
ons for the rebellion.
The UAR expects Algerian rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas to
make anti-UAR charges during his current tour of the Middle
East and Asia. Cairo said-that Abbas would accuse "us of
shortcomings in aiding the Algerian revolUtion materially and
with arms, and making an agreement with France at the expense
of the cause, while alleging that we had ignored them (the rebels),
that the President had not met them since February 1958, and
fhhjLnnt1u]fil1pc1 ourjablizations on the Algerian budget."
14 Feb 59
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pm"
THE CAMEROONS AND NIGERIA
FRENCH WEST AFRICA
GHANA
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CAMEROON,
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v.�9
Violence May Erupt in Cameroun About 20 February
The Cairo headquarters of the Union of the Cameroon
Population (UPC)--an Egyptian-sponsored leftist-nationalist
group responsible for several years of guerrilla warfare in
western Cameroun--has urged the terrorists to use violence
shortly before 20 February to discredit the moderate, native
Cameroun Government. On 20 February, the UN General As-
sembly will discuss termination of the French trusteeship uver
Cameroun--promised independence by France on 1 January
1960--and the related problem of the British Cameroons.,
The UPC, which was favorably received at the recent All.
African Peoples' Conference at Accra, plans to send a strong
delegation to the UN meeting. Several nations apparently have
been influenced by UPC propaganda that the pro-French Ahidjo
government of Cameroun is unrepresentative and that new leg-
Alative elections should be held before independence.
(Opposition to Premier Ahidjo is indicated
which suggests that Accra should insist on new elections.
the African group generally supports that posi-
tion]
the UN General Assembly fails to give the necessary tw,.)-
thirds support to a resolution opposing new elections, the issue
will be postponed until the regular fall meeting of the General
Assembly and Cameroun probably cannot achieve independence
in January. In such event, the Ahidjo government would be under
sharp nationalist attack and might not be able to remain in office.
At present, there does not appear to be any other pro-West-
ern politician who could maintain the present fragile coalition
between a conservative Moslem north and the more evolved tribal
south. Furthermore, if new elections should be ordered by the
General Assembly, the UPC sympathizers and antigovernment
elements might increase their political influence sufficiently to
make stable government impossible in Cameroun.
14 Feb 59
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New,
Japanese - South Korean Crisis
South Korea has responded to Japan's decision to permit
the voluntary repatriation of Korean residents in Japan who de-
sire to go to North Korea by breaking off negotiations to normal-
ize relations with Japan, by commencing nationwide anti-
Japanese demonstrations, and by announcing an intention to step
up seizures of Japanese fishing boats and to cut off trade.
The South Korean Coast Guard and the Air Force alleged-
ly have been alerted to intercept "any ships" carrying repatri-
ates. These orders are unlikely to result in military action.
Actual sailing of repatriation vessels is several months away,
and the most serious incidents likely at the present time are
clashes between South Korean and Japanese patrol vessels.
The Japanese have intimated they might arm jtheir patrol
vessels, which heretofore have been defenseless,Cbut Tokyo is
planning to request International Red Cross or possibly North
Korean transportation for the repatriates:3
The Kishi Government's decision to act unilaterally on
from developing into a major domestic political problem. Other
the repatriation issue probably stems from a desire to keep it
factors such as the problem of internal security, the expense
of maintaining many destitute Koreans, pressure on the labor
market, and Japan's vulnerability to charges of violation of
"human rights" also entered into the decisionD In any event,
Japan sees little chance of normalizing relations with South
Korea.
14 Feb 59
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�4n Alla ail ILI
�Ntirti
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
�The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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