CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/02/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03023212
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 17, 1959

- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023212
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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
17 February 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCLIMENT NO.
CI.
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17 FEBRUARY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Marshal Malinovsky says USSR in-
tends to maintain conventional forces
while improving nuclear capabilities.
Peiping cool to Klshi's offer to re-
sume Sino-Japanese trade.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran moves to counter Soviet prop-
aganda pressure; blames Moe
for breakdown in recent talks.
0
0 _
India and Pakistan adopting more con-
ciliatory attitude; high-level talks sched-
uled.
Cambodia - Sihanouk increasingly aware
of domestic coup plots; till
in contact with plotters.
Australia announces it would not op-
pose an agreement for transfer of Dutch
New Guinea to Indonesia.
-
\\\
0 Ethiopia's relations with UK deteriorat-
ing over British plan for a Greater
Somalia.
III. THE WEST
0 Italy - No change in foreign policy
likely, but new cabinet probably un-
able to obtain important domestic
legislation.
� Cuba - Castro becomes prime minister;
likely to press land reform and to con-
tinue plotting against other Latin Amer-
ican regimes.
LATE ITEM
0 Probable ICBM launching on Tyura
Tam Range on 16 February 1959.
--T-60P-SEeltrr
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR:
soviet marsnai mannovsicy sam tnat tne Ubbit in-
tends to retain a modern conventional armed force while
simultaneously improving its nuclear capability. Malinovsky
said he believed NATO was in error for having favored nuclear
capability at the expense of conventional forces. He admitted
the possibility of limited warfare. a departure from Moscow's
usual propaganda positioig (Page 1)
Communist China - Japan: A Chinese Communist spokes--
man on 15 February stated that Prime Minister Kishi's offer to
restore trade was an effort to solve his domestic "political
crisis" and that restoration would depend on a change in Kishies
"hostile" attitude.
agreed to hold "concrete discussions" on breaking
the trade impasse with a Socialist party delegation scheduled to
visit Peiping in March lust prior to Japan's local and upper-house
election9 (Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran-USSR: In response to strong Soviet propaganda pres-
sure, Iran is making a concentrated effort diplomatically and
through propaganda to place full blame on the USSR for the col-
lapse of recent Soviet-Iranian negotiations in Tehran. Tehran
asserts that it makes its decisions without external influence
and that Iran will never surrender to threats and intimidation.
(Page 3)
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India-Pakistan: New Delhi and Karachi apparently are
adopting more conciliatory attitudes toward each other. High-
level Pakistani and Indian officials will meet in Karachi on
23 February to attempt to settle some minor territorial dis-
putes. a3oth capitals have expressed cautious optimism over
prospects for agreement on the division of irrigation water
derived from the major rivers which flow through both India
and Pakistan At present, Pakistan is pressing less hard
than before for consideration of the Kashmir issue.
(Page 4)
Cambodia- Thailand:LThe developing estrangement of Pre-
mier Sihanouk and General Dap Chhuon probably reflects the
premier's growing knowledge of Chhuon's coup plans and his
liaison with other plotters. Thailand, meanwhile, has not
broken comnletely with anti-Sihanouk elementsT\
(Page 5)
Australia-Indonesia: The joint communiqu4 issued on
15 February by Australian External Affairs Minister Casey
and visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio indicates
an alteration of Australia's previous position that it would not
tolerate any transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch of West New
Guinea to Indonesia. Although Australia would prefer the
status quo, the announcement states that it would not oppose
any Dutch-Indonesian agreement for a transfer. The Dutch
Government is not likely for the foreseeable future to agree
to transfer sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia,
but it is possible that after the 12 March elections the Dutch
may be more willing than efore to consider some other dis-
7osition of the territory. I
Ethiopia -UK: Ethiopia's relations with the UK appear to
have deteriorated sharply over London's recently expressed
nonopposition to an eventual association between Somalia and
the British Somaliland Protectorate. Radio Moscow, echoing
Ethiopia's controlled press, accuses London of plotting--with
American support--to establish a Commonwealth-affiliated
17 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF
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Greater Somalia, unifying ethnic Somalis now distributed among
Somalia, British and French Somaliland northern Kenya, and
southeastern Ethiopia. (Page 6) (Map)
III. THE WEST
Italy: Premier Antonio Segni's all-Christian Democratic
cabinet, which will probably meet its first parliamentary test
in a few days, includes a number of prominent rightists and is
expected to be invested with the vote of the Liberals, Monarch-
ists, and.neo-Fascists. No change in Italy's pro-NATO foreign
policy is anticipated. In view of the differences between left
and right in the cabinet and in parliament, little important domes-
tic legislation is likely to be passed. This cabinet will be little
more than a holding operation foi the Christian Democrats. Un-
less they can reach an agreement on the future political course
of the 'arty at their Anril eon.crrecs national elertions mav he
called.
Cuba: Fidel Castro's assumption of the prime minister-
ship on 16 February will eliminate the duality of power which
has delayed government decisions and actions. His move, how-
ever, does not as yet indicate he will forego his speech-making
trips and wholeheartedly assume the responsibilities of govern-
ing. Certain of his pet projects, such as land reform, will prob-
ably receive increased attention. Cuban plotting against the re-
gimes in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Haiti
will probably continue. (Page 7)
17 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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LATE ITEM
*Probable ICBM launching on Tyura Tam Range: A valid
launching operation began on the Tyura Tam Missile Test
Range at 1100 hours EST on 16 February 1959 and culminated
In the successful launching of an ICBM test vehicle at about
2045 hours EST. COMINT and ELINT reports indicate the
ICBM covered the full 3500 nautical mile range.
This is the first full-range ICBM flight test detected since
24 May 1958. The ICBMs launched on 18 July and 24 Decem-
ber 1958 failed to reach the intended impact area. To date,
the detected ICBM test program on the Tyura Tam Range has
included seven successfu1 flight tests two in-fliaht failures,
and one failure to launch.
17 Feb 59
,
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Malinovsky Comments on soviet Strategy
CSoviet Marshal Malinovsky told a visiting military
delegation that the USSR intends to retain a mod-
ern conventional capability while building up its nuclear strength.
The defense minister implied that some military leaders had
favored preparing a nuclear capability at the expense of conven-
tional forces, but that the government Presidium had decided
in favor of simultaneous development, which he personally ap-
proved. NATO, Malinovsky noted, had adopted the other course,
and he considered this an error:1
CSignificant improvement of the ground forces in the past
several years bears out Malinovsky's statement. Probably re-
lated to this decision is Malinovsky's comment that limited wars,
including a limited nuclear war, were quite possible and would
require a large army trained with nuclear weapons. Soviet prop-
aganda, however, consistently has played down the possibility of
limited warfare, while Soviet military literature has indicated
that the USSR sees future warfare in the form of large-scale cam-
paigns on land extending over a long period, accompanied by
powerful nuclear air and missile strikes". j
ClVIalinovsky told the delegation that all agreed that nuclear
weapons would be decisive in a general war but that other arms
and weapons would continue to play a major role--a line both he
and former Defense Minister Zhukov have expounded,
(The delegation apparently learned nothing about the
present state of the Soviet ICBM program, except that ICBMs
were referred to in the present tense. It was stated that inter-
mediate-range ballistic missiles now cover Western bases in
Eur ope
EA tactical exercise observed by the Swedes was in line with
known Soviet tactical nuclear warfare, including the assienme7t
of nuclear weapons to ground division commander.
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17 Feb 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Peiping Denounces Kishi's Continued "Hostility"
Peiping has rejected Japanese Prime Minister Kishi's offers
to resume tradetind hold ambassadorial talks.. It apparently con-
siders these moves political maneuvers by Kishi to strengthen his
position, and hopes that by rejecting them it will weaken the Lib-
eral-Democratic party's chances in Japan's forthcoming upper-
house elections.
An official of Peiping's bureau for the promotion of interna-
tional trade told a Japanese visitor on 15 February that restora-
tion of trade would depend on a change in Kishi's "hostile" attitude,
which he characterized as a betrayal of the aspirations and inter-
ests of the Japanese people. He ridiculed the "deliberate impres-
sion" created by Kishi that China must have trade with Japan,
saying China's "leap forward" continued unabated in the absence
of trade with Japan. He attacked Kishi's persistence in continuing
to recognize Taiwan.
{Liao Ching-chih, Peiping's Foreign Ministry expert on Japan,
the Communists had
"no interest" in ambassadorial talks as long as Kishi persists in
making "unfriendly remarks." He questioned Kishi's motives in
suggesting that the talks be held in a third capital rather than in
Peiping or Tokyos.-')
[However, Liao expressed a willingness to hold "concrete dis-
cussions" on breaking the trade impasse with a Japanese Socialist ,
party delegation scheduled to visit Peiping in March. The Chinese;
Communists will permit newsmen to accompany the delegation in
what will probably be a pre-election attempt to boost the Socialists'
prestige;)
1'7 Feb 59
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New, '4,0F
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran Makes Firm Rebuttal to Soviet Propaganda Attacks
Iran, after waiting to see what line the Soviet Union would
take in explaining its unsuccessful attempt to obtain a new non-
aggression treaty, now is making an intense diplomatic and prop-
aganda effort to place full responsibility on the USSR for the col-
lapse of negotiations on 10 February.
the government of Iran was
completely "frank and honest" during the talks, the Soviet dele-
gates produced nothing but a series of "arguments," mostly of a
propaganda nature against the Baghdad Pact and against the pend-
ing bilateral defense agreement with the United States. Further-
more, Tehran claims that the Soviet Union backed down from its
original terms and, by so doing, caused the collapse of the negotia-
tions.
Foreign Minister Hekmat, at a session of the Iranian Senate
on 14 February, expressed the government's determination not to
be intimidated despite the fact that Iran's physical strength is
like that of "a sparrow facing an eagle." The Shah,
has ordered his embassy in Washington
to inform The New York Times that Iran's rejection of the USSR's
proposals was not caused by any external influence, but was re-
required by Iran's interests alone.
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India and Pakistan Adopt Conciliatory Attitudes
Since the assumption of power by Pakistani President Ayub
last October, both his government and the government of India
apparently have made efforts to improve relations between the
two countries. Ayub and his foreign minister have both expressed
a desire for better relations, and Ayub broke recent custom by
attending the independence day celebration at the Indian High Com-
mission in Karachi last January. Nehru has several times pub-
licly stated the need for moderation and understanding between
India and Pakistan.
Top-level Indian and Pakistani officials will meet in Karachi
on 23 February to continue the effort begun last year to settle
minor territorial disputes along the Punjab and Bengal borders.
A similar meeting in 1958 on East Pakistan frontier problems led
to a conference in September between Nehru and Firoz Khan Noon,
head of the Pakistani Government at that time. While the agree-
ment they reached has been criticized in India and has not entirely
ended recurrent border shooting incidents, it apparently is re-
garded by both governments as final.
Directives to cease inflammatory propaganda, recently is-
sued by New Delhi and Karachi to radio stations in border areas,
indicate a willingness to settle border problems. Pakistan is send-
ing a trade delegation to New Delhi, which should also facilitate
such an agreement.
While great obstacles still stand in the way of an over-all Indo-
Pakistani settlement, the deliberate friendly gestures being made
suggest that both countries now hope agreement on minor questions
will pave the way for eventual negotiations on such major problems
as Kashmir. Official quarters in both capitals have expressed
cautious optimism over the possibility of agreement on the canal
waters issue as a result of current mediation by the World Bank-.)
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Cambodian Situation Becoming Tense
t The sharp deterioration in relations between Cambodian
Premier Sihanouk and General Dap Chhuon, governor of Siem
Reap Province, implies that the premier is aware of Chhuon's
coup designs and his liaison with other anti-Sihanouk plotter87
[_
Officials visiting Siem Reap risk falling under government
suspicion unless they carry Sihanouk's special authorization.
The two principals, although in frequent consultation in the .._
past, now avoid each other's "capitals," apparently fearing ar-
rest or assassination. Sihanouk, despite his entrenched posi-
tion, is fearful of Chhuon, whose nickname of "Diamond Needle"
stems from his ruthlessness as the outstanding Cambodian re-
sistance leader opposing the return of French rule after World
War II. The Phnom Penh garrison has been strengthened, and
Sihanouk at the same time is maneuvering to undercut Chhuon's
position without recourse to a showdown.--s
EAs in the case of the South Vietnamese and Thai-supported
coup plotting by former royal councilor Sam Sary, the United
States is liable to be implicated by Sihanouk in this latest and
more direct threat to his rule:]
[Despite official denials, Thailand's continuing support for
anti-Sihanouk elements is revealed in recent Vietnamese inter-
cepts, although the present level of Thai participation does not
appear great. Thai authorities have supplied Sam Sary with
money and a house, have assured him their policy toward the
coup plotting has not changed, have tolerated the comings and
goings of Vietnamese agents, and have continued to allow the
development of Cambodian dissident bands in Thai territory.
With the imminent departure from the area of special UN rep-
resentative Beck-Friis, Thai involvement in these intrigues
may assume greater proportions:1
17 Feb 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
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The Horn of Africa
�Pt
Asmara.
ERITREA
\
,Addis Ababa
SOM
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
4147
Approximate area of proposed
Greater Somalia
YEMEN
et13-"'.4
Aden
L F
Djibouti
BRITISH
.Hargeise
SOMALILAND
OGADEN/
/ SOMALIA
Mogadiscio.
INDIAA
OCEAN
200
1212t2
UNCLASSIFIED
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Noe. `414109
Ethiopia's Relations With London Deteriorating
EEthiopian-British relations, long marked by suspicion and
mistrust on the Ethiopian side, have been subjected to serious
new strains as a result of London's recent policy statement in-
dicating that Britain would not oppose an eventual association
between the Italian trust territory of Somalia--scheduled to
become independent in December 1960--and Britain's Somali-
land protectorate. Ethiopian officials, sensing a threat to
Ethiopia's traditional desire for hegemony over the East African
Horn, reacted by accusing London of plotting--with American
support--to establish a Greater Somalia affiliated with the Brit-
ish Commonwealth, Actually, London's statement was intended to
undercut both Somali nationalism and UAR propaganda in the area
and did not constitute support for the full union of the 2,5001000
ethnic Somalis now distributed in Somalia, British and French
Somaliland, Kenya, and EthiopiLJ
CEthiopian Foreign Minister Deressa has emphasized his coun-
try's concern over the British position by indicating to the Amer-
ican ambassador in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia might abrogate its
1954 border agreement with the UK, close British consulates,
and seal Ethiopia's border with the protectorate. Although the
Ethiopians probably will not carry out these threats, they are ap-
parently searching for and may take some type of anti-British ac-
tiont.)
tin line with the Ethiopians' desire to appear as vigilant defend-
ers of African interests who are unafraid to oppose the will even
of great powers, the controlled press and radio of Addis Ababa has
given unusually great publicity to the issue, directing unprecedented
attacks against the United States as well as Britain. Its diatribes
are already being exploited in Moscow radiobroadcasth;
17 Feb 59
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I I I. THE WEST
Fidel Castro's Appointment as Cuban Prime Minister
Fidel Castro's acceptance of the office of prime minis-
ter in Cuba's provisional government will eliminate the duali-
ty of power which has hindered the functioning of the Urrutia
administration. Although Castro will undoubtedly continue to
dominate the government, his assumption of a high post does
not necessarily indicate he will wholeheartedly accept the re-
sponsibilities of office. His performance since the ouster of
Batista on 1 January suggests he is more interested in retain-
ing his own popularity than in attending to the affairs of govern-
ment. With emerging signs of discontent over the administra-
tion's failure to act decisively on economic and social problems,
Castro may be tempted to continue his speech-making trips at
home and possibly abroad. However, certain projects of particu-
lar interest to Castro, such as land and labor reform, will prob-
ably receive his attention.
There is no indication of a letup in the "campaign against
dictatorships," although activities against the Dominican Repub-
lic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay have apparently not yet
progressed much beyond the planning stage. Plotting will un-
doubtedly continue, and members of the Castro movement will
probably offer material aid to exile groups. The propaganda
campaign continues unabated. The Cdban representative to the
Organization of American States (OAS) announced on 16 February
that Cuba would withdraw from the OAS unless representatives of
"dictatorships" are expelled.
SECRET-
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%/N., AT". 1.e. A � A-�
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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