CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/03/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03023195
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 12, 1959

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12 March 1959
Copy No. C 6 3
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMINT NO
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12 MARCH 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Gomulka's speech to Polish party
congress backs Moscow on Germany
and Berlin; indicates no change in
internal policies.
Chinese Nationalists delaying re-
duction of offshore garrisons.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR - Nasir's renewed attack on
Communists may bring sharp re-
action from Moscow.
Kurdish tribal le tiers in Iran see
arms from Iran.
UAR-Iraq rivalry may focus on
Kuwait.
Sudan - Danger of clash between
army and tribesmen recedes; fur-
ther government changes likely.
\
0
i
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II. THE WEST
0 Cyprus - Communists decide to co-
operate with Makarios in return for
assured seats in new legislature.
0 Portugal - Salazar's position may be
weakened.
0 Bolivia - More anti-American riot-
ing may break out.
LATE ITEMS
Khrushchev tells 011enhauer he pre-
fers "what we have now" to a reun-
ified Germany.
Khrushchev invites East Germans to
send delegation to Moscow in May.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 March 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Watch Committee conclusion: No Sino-Soviet bloc country
intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US
forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the
immediate future.
Khrushchev continues to reiterate his intention to conclude
a peace treaty with East Germany and to turn over Berlin access
controls to the East Germans. Although the Soviets are making
preparations necessary to the turnover, which could be done with
little or no warning, available evidence does not indicate that they
intend to do so in the immediate future. The eventual possibility
of armed conflict between Western forces and Soviet-East Ger-
man forces is inherent in the Berlin problem because of miscal-
culations which could arise....IXOP-SECref)
Poland: In his seven-hour speech opening the Third Polish
party congress Gomulka backed Soviet policy on Germany and Ber-
lin and accused the Western powers of endangering the peace by
their refusal to agree to Soviet proposals. He expressed the hope
implicitly that the Yugoslav party might return "to our movement."
His remarks on internal affairs indicated his intention to continue
his relatively moderate policies on such matters as the church, in-
tellectual freedom, and agricultural collectivization
TIAL) (Page 1)
Taiwan Strait: EI:he Chinese Nationalists appear reluctant to
reduce the size of their armed forces on the Chinmen Islands in
accord with an agreement reached between Chinese and America
military officials last November and, despite prodding, have failed
to produce any plan for the reduction. The agreement calls for the
removal of 15,000 men from a total of approximately 86,000 by the
end of June, but official figures disclose a reduction to date of only
530 men. Some American military officials believe that this figure
is suspect and that the size of the garrison has actually increased)
j.SgeltrT (Page 2)
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Watch Committee conclusion�Middle East: Situations
susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc hostile
action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle
East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situations in the area
remain precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale
hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.
Iraq: The apparent failure of the revolt in Mosul further
removes checks to the drift of Iraq toward Communist control.
Jordan: The absence of King Husa,yn from Jordan and the
scheduled departure of Prime Minister Rifai on 17 March pro-
vide opportunity for political competition among members of
the government remaining in Amman and for coups by opposi-
tion elements. (--8P-SECIZEI)
UAR-USSR: Nasir's Damascus speech on 11 March, in re-
action to events in Iraq, contained the strongest charges to date
against Arab Communists. He termed them "agents" who "work
for the foreigners" and expressed determination to continue his
anti-Communist posture "regardless of the harm which may be-
fall us." His renewal of attacks on the Communists may bring
a sharp reaction from Moscow. (CLINSIDETWRA-LIIPage 3)
Iran -Iraq: Kurdish tribal leaders in Iraq, claiming to rep-
resent more than 4,000 families,
requested arms and ammunition from Iran
for a rebellion against the Qasim government. This approach
was apparently unrelated to the coup effort by Iraqi Colonel
Shawwaf. The Kurds also requested assurance of Iranian asy-
lum if their venture failed. Such an attempt, by itself, offers
no real threat to Qasim and would be suppressed. Some ele-
ments in the Iranian Government might be tempted to support
the proposal, but Iran has not acted favorably on such requests
in the past. (Page 4)
Kuwait: [Rivalry between the UAR and Iraq may focus in-
creasingly r on Xuwait, largest oil producer in the Middle East
12 Mar 59
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revolt has been especially concerned with its effect on Kuwait
and the relative influences of Nasir and Iraq there. Recent
UAR interest in Kuwait has been shown by a visit of high-rank-
ing UAR officers in mid-January
(Page 5)
Sudan: he immediate danger of a clash between Ansar
tribesmen and Sudanese Army units has been reduced. On
the morning of 10 March,
the leader of the Ansar sect told the 1,000 tribesmen who nad
gathered in Khartoum to go home. The new Abboud govern-
ment remains divided on several scores. Pressures from
army, political, and religious factions make further changes
almost inevitable. These changes might include the retire-
ment of Abboud himsele (�E.CRE-T-Ne (Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Cyprus: Communist spokesmen on Cyprus, representing
a small but well-organized party with proved vote-getting
ability and controlling the island's largest labor organization,
have decided to cooperate with Archbishop Makarios for the
present. In return, Makarios reportedly has agreed to the
election of a given number of Communist-backed candidates in
Cyprus' first legislature, possibly as many as a quarter of the
Greek seats. Communist leaders, however, have recently fol-
lowed Mosco line by denouncing the Cyprus settlement.
(C NTIAL) (Page 7)
Portugal: kremier Salazar's close associates have stated
that he has recovered from his attack of pneumonia six weeks
ago and is carrying a normal work load. However, he has n
left his home, made any public statement, or seen any for
for nearly two months. Many observers believe tha
he will not regain the public confidence he formerly enjoyed
and that, in view of the continuing discontent, his prolonged
absence from official functions could encourage a move to oust
him.] (..9_91g.EIDENTIAL (Page 8)
12 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF
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Bolivia: (Rew tension is being created in La Paz by the
Bolivian (.4 overnment's efforts to impose wage terms on strik-
ing tin miners and gradually unfreeze commissary prices in
order to satisfy a requirement of the International Monetary
Fund for granting further aid. This tension could erupt in re
newed anti-American rioting stimulated by an article in the
16 March issue of Time which states that a US official "in
rueful jest" suggested Eolivia's partition3 (SF,GRE'r
(Page 9)
LATE ITEMS
USSR: & his talk on 9 March with West German Social
Democratic Chairman 011enhauer, Khrushchev stated that if
there is no progress in a foreign ministers' or summit confer-
ence, the USSR will conclude a separate peace treaty and then
transfer Berlin access controls to the East Germans. He as-
serted that the United States, Britain France, and "most West
Germans" do not want reunification and said the USSR also pre-
fers to keep "what we have now" because the future actions of
a reunified Germany would be uncertain. Khrushchev endorsed
011enhauer's suggestion that a military relaxation in Europe
must precede any progress toward German reunification:7
(SE5..26
USSR - East Germany: Khrushchev has invited the as
Germans to send a government and party delegation to Moscow
in May, according to the communique issued at the end of his
visit to East Berlin. The announcement now of this visit, which
carries with it the implication that a separate peace treaty will
then be signed2 may be intended to exert further pressure on
the West to accept Soviet tex.ms for a meeting on a German treaty
and Berlin. (CO IAL)
12 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Gomulka Covers Full Range of Polish Problems in Congress
Speech
Speaking at the opening session of the third Polish party
congress, First Secretary Gomulka covered the full range of
Polish foreign and domestic affairs. He charged the West
with rejecting peaceful means of settling differences, break-
ing the Potsdam agreement, and dividing Germany. Backing
Soviet policy on Germany and Berlin, Gomulka stressed that
a separate peace treaty will be signed with the East German
regime if the Federal Republic and the Western powers per-
sist in their refusal to participate in an all-German agree-
ment. Poland will insist on participating in all conferences
on the German problem.
Poland's western border was settled at Potsdam, Gomulka
declared, and the inclusion of the border question in a peace
treaty would be only a formality. He characterized all efforts
to woo Poland away from the USSR as attempts to undermine
this settlement.
Gomulka stressed the equality and independence of all
Communist parties, claiming that each party adapts its ac-
tivity to the specific conditions in its country and is fully
responsible for setting its own policies. He said that while
the Soviet Union is the mainstay of all socialist countries and
the nerve center of the world socialist system, it guides rather
than directs; it does not impose its will on other parties.
The Yugoslav party was accused of adopting a revision-
ist program, which if followed by other parties would disrupt
the unity of the socialist camp and aid the imperialists.
Gomulka said the Yugoslays will soon have to choose between
returning to the Communist fold and all ing themselves with
the Western Socialists. (C IA L)
12 Mar 59
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Chinese Nationalists gow in Reducing eiffshore Islands Garrison
[title Chinese Nationalists appear reluctant to reduce the
size of their armed forces on the Chinmen Islands in accord
with an agreement reached last November between General
Wang Shu-ming, the chief of the Nationalist general staff,
and the head of the US military advisory mission to Taiwan.
According to the terms of the agreement, the Nationalist
forces of at least 86,000 men are to be reduced by 15,000
by the end of June. In return the United States is to improve
Nationalist capabilities on the islands by supplying additional
equipment, including new 10-inch howitzers and more 155-mm.
guns. Thus far, the Nationalists have reported that the gar-
rison has been reduced by 530 men, and some American ob-
servers believe that personnel strength has in fact been in-
crease 414
Nationalist spokesmen have violated the spirit of the
joint communique issued on 23 October by President Chiang
Kai-shek and Secretary Dulles. This communique specified
that political rather than military measures were the prime
means of recovery of the China mainland. In a speech on 12
November, Vice President Chen Cheng resumed use of the
phrase "counterattack" against the mainland, and the Nation-
alists have continued to insist that military action would come
when a "Hungarian-style" military revolt occurred. The Na-
tionalists also have attempted to convince US officials of their
alarm over the imminence of Communist attack on the islands;
their own internal intelligence reports, as receiveitthronali�
clandestine channels. reveal no siieh ennrarn
5Fx-RE'r
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir Renews Attack on Communists
Events in Iraq have led UAR President Nasir to attack the
activities of Communists in the Arab world, thus again bring-
ing into question the UAR's relations with the Communist bloc.
In a speech delivered in Damascus on 11 March, Nasir accused
Iraqi Premier Qasim of fostering division within Arab ranks
and denounced Communist "agents" in the strongest terms he
has yet used. He charged Communists with deriving their in-
spiration from outside their native lands and acting on behalf
of "the foreigner." He described his "mission" and that of the
UAR as a continuing struggle on behalf of unity among Arab
states to protect them from "those who covet us." He included
imperialists, Zionists, and the "agents" in this category. The
speech ended on a note of determination to continue on that
course, "regardless of the harm which may befall us."
The earlier threat of a split between Moscow and Cairo
was temporarily averted by Khrushchev's letter to Nasir on 20
February, which Nasir accepted as assurance that the USSR
considered his moves against UAR Communists an internal af-
fair. Nasir's sharply renewed attack on Arab Communists,
however, is likely to make it increasingly difficult for Moscow
to avoid new disagreements with Cairo, a possibility which
Nasir apparently noted in concluding his Damascus speech.
The speech suggests that hereafter the danger of Communism
may be used to an even greater extent as a major argument to
justify Cairo's efforts t.tain or extend its influence in the
Near East. ( TIAL)
CONF NT1AL
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Iraqi Kurds Seek Arms From Iran
Several Kurdish tribal leaders in Iraq recently requested
arms and ammunition from Iran for an uprising against the
vernment,
They intend to invite Sheik Latif, a prominent Iraqi
Kurdish nationalist leader, to cooperate, but if he refuses they
will seize him and begin the action. This conspiracy seems to
be unrelated to the revolt by Iraqi Colonel Shawwaf. The leaders
include those of the Poshtdari, Jaf, and Oraman sub-tribes near
the Iranian border, as well as those in the town of Sulaimaniya.
The Kurdish leaders offered to compensate Iran at the end
of the rebellion for the cost of any aid and suggested the use of
Kurdish property in Iran as collateral. They requested that, if
their uprising should fail, the more than 4,000 families involved
be granted asylum in Iran. The total Kurdish population in Iraq
is about 800,000.
Lieutenant General Kerim Varahram� commander of the
Third Army Corps in northwestern Iran who has long advocated
a policy of sponsoring Kurdish subversion in Iraq, can be ex-
pected to support this request. Nevertheless, Tehran probably
will reject the plan, since Iran desires neither to encourage na-
tionalism indirectly among its own 750,000 Kurds and 250,000
Arabs, nor to invite Iraqi-sponsored subversion in Iran. In ad-
dition, both the Iranian Government and the Kurdish leaders
probably feel that, with the suppression of the Shawwaf r7volt.
the opportunity for action has passed for the time being.
12 Mar 59
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Nasir-Qasim Struggle May Focus on Kuwait
4'
ahe growing hostility between the UAR and Iraq probably sharpen sharpen the struggle between them for influence
in Kuwait, the Middle East's largest oil producer:3
Eiyaqi governments have long coveted the oil revenues
of Kuwait, which in 1958 amounted to nearly $390,000,000.
Since the July 1958 revolution the new Baghdad regime has
taken an increased interest in the Persian Gulf states. The
ruling Subah family in Kuwait fears Iraqi expansion above
all else, particularly since the violent advent of the new re-
gime, and has relied for protection on treaties of defense
and friendship with Britain. Iraq has never agreed to de-
marcation of its boundary with Kuwait, and the land-reform
program of the Qasim government threatens extensive Subah
holdings in southern Iraq. Enhancement of the Communist
position in Iraq as a result of the failure of the Mosul revolt
will further increase the long-term threat to the Subah re-
gimej
acuwait's population, about half of whom are non-Kuwaiti
Arabs, has long hailed Nasir as its hero, and Nasir's brand
of Arab nationalism has been spread by teachers, oil work-
ers, and others who have found jobs in Kuwait. The Subahs
have been uncertain how to handle the nationalists, having
tried both appeasement and suppression�mostly the former.
Kuwait's ambitious deputy ruler has made a point of cultivat-
ing close relations with the UAR, and even the diffident Ruler
has inclined increasingly toward associating Kuwait with the
UAR-dominated Arab Leagu_O
EVith another failure of pro-UAR plotters in Iraq, Nasir
may increase efforts to expand his influence in Kuwait, ex-
ploiting the Subah dread of Iraq. A visit to Kuwait by high-
ranking UAR officers this winter constituted a warning
against Iraqi designs on Kuwait. The focus of Cairo's in-
terest in Kuwait seek-
ing immediately all available information on the Kuwaiti
Armn
Source: GCHQ FIELD FAX 6690, 7 Mar 59 (Secret Pivot).
12 Mar 59
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Sudanese Situation
C-The danger of a clash between the Ansar tribes and the
Sudanese Army has been reduced. One thousand tribesmen
had come to Khartoum to protest the ouster from the govern-
ment of Brigadier General Wahab, the strongest remaining
adherent of the Ansar sect and Umma party. On the morn-
ing of 10 March,
Ansar leader Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mandi told
these tribesmen to go home]
[the new government is handipapped by dissension, how-
ever, and additional changes appear almost inevitable. Pres-
sure continues within the army for a still further reduction of
Ansar and Umma party influence in the government. There is
also strong friction in the Supreme Council between some of
the senior members and the three commanders who forced
their way into membership. A Cairo newspaper on 11 March
carried a report from Khartoum that Prime Minister Abboud
will soon resign,j
Ethe attitude of the government will necessarily be influ-
enced by the leaders of the junior officers who are the real
foundation of its power. Pro-Nasir Arab nationalist senti-
ment is strong in this group, and several of its leaders were
involved in an Egyptian-supported abortive coup effort in May
1957D
Eihe situation is further complicated by the maneuvering of
both the Communist party and pro-Egyptian political elements
to remove government restrictions on their activities and to
prepare the way for their eventual inclusion in a new coalitio9
12 Mar Mar 59
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1110 THE WEST
Cyprus Communists Make Deal With Makarios
The Communists on Cyprus appear to have adopted a
policy of temporary collaboration with the conservative,
popular Archbishop Makarios but continue to be critical of
the recent Cyprus agreements, as are Communist press
organs in Greece and the USSR. Andreas Ziartides� able ,
Moscow-trained leader of the Communist-dominated Old
Trade Unions and a spokesman for the far left on Cyprus,
reportedly has assured Makarios that the Communists will
not genuinely contest the first elections in the new republic.
Ziartides claims that his action is based solely on his
desire not to disturb the recently created Cypriot unity.
Communist party leaders issued a paper highly critical of
the Cyprus agreements but promising to work to implement
them for "the good of all the people." Makarios agreed to
grant Communist-backed candidates a certain number of seats
in the new legislature, possibly as many as 25 percent, but
will not give them a ministerial post,
The Communist Reform Party of the Working People
(AKEL) was proscribed in 1955 but is expected to be legal-
ized before the first Cypriot elections. In the most recent
municipal elections, held in 1953, the Communists received
about 42 percent of the vote in the towns and cities of Cyprus.
Mayors of three of the six largest towns on the island are
Communists or fellow travelers.
The Communists, aware that the first government of
Cyprus will probably be criticized for its failure to resolve
the many problems it will face, may have concluded that they
have more to gain at this time through a policy of watchful
waiting. They can be expected to concentrate on building up
their strength in preparation for the eventual conflict with
Makarios and other conservative leaders. (GONFIDENTIAT)
12 Mar 59
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Salazar Regime Seen in Weakened Position
[Ugh government officials and personal ilienub eunei
Salazar have assured the American Embassy that the premier
has recovered from pneumonia contracted on 27 January and is
working with his ministers. They made no mention, however, of
heart disease, which had been reported to have developed. The
embassy notes that Salazar has not left his house or made any
public statement or received foreigners in two months]
[The premier's supporters insist that once he is restored to
full health, he will reassume the leadership which has been tem-
porarily lacking. Most observers, however, believe that he will
never regain public confidence, and some think that prolonged ab-
sence from official functions could enable those groups desiring
a change of regime to combine and take action. The conviction
that Salazar has outlived his usefulness is widespread among
large sectors of the population and is held even among formerly
fervent supporters of the regime_.]
(he American Embassy has reported a growing current of
thought by responsible persons that Salazar should retire and
make possible an orderly transfer of power within the regime.
Otherwise, these persons fear conditions will so deteriorate as
to generate a popular movement, spearheaded by opposition groups,
which will force him out and jennarilize the accomplishments of
the regime.] (CO
12 Mar 59
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New Tension in Bolivia
11-New tension is being created inLa paz ay tne Bolivian Gov-
ernment's effort to impose wage terms on striking tin miners and
gradually unfreeze commissary prices. This action must be
taken to obtain further financial backing from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The tension could erupt in renewed anti-
American rioting, particularly since the 16 March issue of
Time states that a US official "in rueful jest" suggested Boliv-
Erg�partition. The foreign minister believes that a new US dis-
avowal of the statement might moderate popular reaction.
C*ewed inflation and a deterioration of the economic situa-
tion despite a sharp rise in the tin price apparently have caused
both the pro- and anti-government miners' factions to unite in
wage demands. Keeping to a minimum the cost of operating the
nationalized mines is important to the US- and IMF-backed eco-
nomic stabilization program; the mines--which are the backbone
of Bolivia's economy--operated at a loss in 1958. The govern-
ment probably does not have the military strength to impose a
decision on the armed minerg
the past several days the government has gone out of its
way to publicize the danger of a revolutionary conspiracy by the
perennially plotting rightist opposition party. This tactic, prob-
ably designed to rally dissident government party members be-
hind President Siles, haheenusedJrouent1v andma have lost
its efficacy3 LSEeftrf
12 Mar 59
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'VW
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
giNFIDErsrnar.,
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