LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

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• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
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• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: October 5, 1978

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Latin America
Review
5 October 1978
Top
RP LAR 78-0091
5 October 1978
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
5 October 1978
CONTENTS
Nicaragua: External Support for the FSLN and for
Somoza
Both sides in the current conflict rely on
varying degrees of cooperation or assistance
from foreign sources--Somoza primarily in
the form of arms purchases, and the guer-
rillas for a wide variety of material and
moral support.
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Nicaragua: External Support for the FSLN and for
Somoza
Support for the Sandinistas falls into four prin-
cipal categories:
Longstanding Cuban support.
Marginal but growing help from leftist
and Communist groups in the region
with the active encouragement of
Havana.
Recent Venezuelan and Panamanian aid.
Passive--but important--involvement
of Costa Rica.
The Cuban Role: Background
Since their formation in the early 1960s, the San-
dinistas have looked to Cuba for ideological inspiration,
strategic guidance, tactical training, material support,
and sanctuary.
Some aspects of Cuba's support role are well docu-
mented. Throughout the FSLN's existence, Cuba has been
3." a training site; two years ago 60 Sandinistas were there
in various stages of training. Cuba is also both a safe-
haven and propaganda base; one of the guerrillas flown
to Cuba after the December 1974 operation remained in
Havana until earlier this year to act as FSLN liaison
with the Cuban Government, to direct Sandinista propa-
7 ganda over Radio Havana, and to contact representatives
of other radical organizations. Sandinistas in Cuba may
also be in contact with support groups in the United
States and other third countries.
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In the last few years, however, Cuba appeared to
decline repeated Sandinista appeals for money, arms, and
increased training outside Cuba. Havana apparently con-
centrated its material support on training in Cuba and
related expenses, including transportation and documen-
tation. The Cubans became cautious in their dealings
with the FSLN because they were skeptical about the
group's capabilities and sensitive to international opin-
ion. Havana insisted that the FSLN first purge itself
of factionalism, establish a unified leadership base,
and prove itself under fire.
Cuban Promotion of Unification
Until the Sandinista surge of recent months, insur-
gent unification movements within the Central American
countries were primarily generated internally. Earlier
this year, however, Cuba stepped up its efforts to en-
courage unification of Central American guerrilla groups.
Cuban officials tried several times this year to set up
meetings in Costa Rica and Panama to help the Sandinistas'
Terciario (T), Popular Prolonged War (GPP), and Prole-
tarian Tendency (TP) factions iron out their differences.
During the World Youth Festival in Havana (28 July-5
August), the Cubans announced that the unification of
the three factions had been achieved.
More recently, new differences seem to have strained
the union. These highlight the divergent tactical ap-
proaches taken by each of the factions when they entered
the union. Given the growing domestic and foreign support
for the FSLN military campaign, the factions will probably
be able to maintain a working relationship.
Cross-Border Central American Guerrilla Cooperation
Until this year, cooperation among guerrilla groups
in Central America seemed limited. El Salvador's Fari-
bundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), Guatemala's
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), and Nicaragua's FSLN
evidently maintained some contact, but reports of co-
operation were ley:
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In May 1977, EGP guerrillas kidnaped
the Salvadoran Ambassador to Guate-
mala on behalf of Salvador's FPL.
In late 1977, four Salvadoran guerrilla
instructors were reportedly in Guate-
mala to train some Communist Party
members.
By the end of 1977, however, the Nicaraguan, Sal-
vadoran, and Guatemalan groups were developing stronger
ties. The closest relationship still appeared to be
between the Salvadoran FPL and the Guatemalan EGP, al-
though much of their current activity is prompted by
feelings of solidarity with the Nicaraguan insurgents,
whom they credit with launching the revolution that
could "liberate" all of Central America. In mid-Septem-
ber, the FPL--with the support of other Salvadoran
groups--and the EGP were planning a series of coordinated
and mutually assisted attacks against their respective
governments' officials, US representatives, and business-
men. The Salvadoran guerrillas earlier fired on the US
Embassy and were planning to target the US Ambassador,
while the EGP was to attempt the same in Guatemala.
These actions were intended to demonstrate solidarity
with the FSLN, to keep the Salvadoran and Guatemalan
Governments too occupied to go to the aid of Somoza, and
to focus attention on the US, which the guerrillas be-
lieve is supporting the Nicaraguan Government.
Both the EGP's plans to assassinate the US Ambassador
in Guatemala and the EGP's shooting of Nicaragua's Am-
bassador to Guatemala on 16 September appear to have
been made at the specific request of the FSLN. The EGP
is continuing actions in support of its Nicaraguan col-
leagues. On 27 September, the Nicaraguan airline (Lanica)
office in Guatemala City was bombed; and on 28 September,
the Office of the Permanent Commission of the Central
American Defense Council (COPECODECA) was machinegunned.
In addition, several Sandinistas are stationed
regularly in Guatemala and one EGP guerrilla and five
Guatemalan "Red Berets"--a new group about which little
is known--recently went to Nicaragua and reportedly
fought alongside Sandinistas in an action near the Costa
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Rican border. An undetermined number of Sandinistas were
reportedly in Guatemala in late September for strategy
sessions, as well as to arrange for false documentation.
Current Cuban Role in Central America
To some extent, the increased cooperation among
Central American guerrilla organizations seems to be a
result of Cuban efforts. Cuban officials pushed the idea
of cooperative Central American insurgency and support
for the FSLN at the World Youth Festival in Havana. They
also sponsored a meeting of representatives from 15 Latin
American insurgent organizations and urged them to stage
dramatic operations in their respective countries to dem-
onstrate their solidarity with the Sandinistas and to
"distract" the US.
Guatemala's EGP and El Salvador's FPL have already
undertaken the kinds of actions recommended by Cuba and
are planning more. Ecuador's Socialist Revolutionary
Party (PSRE) has reportedly planned an attack on the
Nicaraguan Embassy in Quito, to be carried out with sup-
port from the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR). The MIR also reportedly has a support apparatus
in Costa Rica that helps train Nicaraguan guerrillas.
Radical groups in Peru and Colombia are reportedly con-
sidering sending volunteers to Nicaragua to fight with
the FSLN guerrillas. All the Central American guerrilla
groups probably provide the Sandinistas with safesites,
documents, and assistance in travel and border crossing.
In addition to lobbying the Latin American insurgent
groups, Cuba made similar pitches during the World Youth
Festival to Latin American Communist Pprty representatives.
the Cubans said
they were convinced the Sandinistas had the necessary
ideological commitment and popular support to take on the
Somoza government. Cuba asked the Communist Party dele-
gates to give "financial, propaganda, and perhaps physical
support" to the FSLN.
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The Honduran Communist Party's (PCH) contact with
the FSLN has grown since mid-1978 as a direct result of
Cuban encouragement. the Cubans (b)(1)
"ordered" the PCH to provide the FSLN with blank (b)(1)
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Honduran passports; whatever arms, radios, and recorders
J? could be collected; assistance in border crossings; and
,�1----*afesites for Sandinistas who would be
Y" arriving in Honduras, presumably from Cuba.
The generally soft-line Communist Party of El
Salvador (PCES) has also reportedly initiated efforts to
provide money, food, clothing, equipment, and arms to the
FSLN. Committees of Solidarity with the Nicaraguan
People--generally FSLN front groups--are collecting funds
and propagandizing for the Sandinistas in Mexico, Vene-
zuela, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, and other Latin
American countries.
The Cubans reportedly promoted the consultative
working conference of the Communist parties of Central
America and Mexico and other leftist and anti-Somoza
groups that met in Panama City from 29 September to 1 Octo-
ber. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Nic-
araguan situation, and Havana was expected to continue
urging active support for the Sandinista guerrillas.
Given Cuba's enthusiasm for the FSLN cause, the tide of
international public opinion against the Somoza regime,
and the capacity of the Sandinistas to avert a definitive
military defeat by escaping to Honduran and Costa Rican
sanctuaries, it seems likely that the trend toward in-
creased cooperation among the Central American guerrilla
groups and support for the Sandinistas will continue.
Reports of a Cuban presence in Nicaragua are sus-
pect,* but there is evidence that Havana has assumed a
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direct support role. The leader of the recent Sandinista
assault on the National Palace in Managua appears to be
one of some four dozen FSLN members who were supplied
with Cuban passports in alias by the Cuban Embassy in
Panama. And last year a Cuban Prensa Latina official in
Venezuela was reportedly trying to help collect money
for the FSLN.
Cuba has been trying to playdown its involvement
with the FSLN. for example, Fidel Castro
said that the Sandinistas know how to obtain arms and
money and do not need Cuba's help. But Cuba's strong
propaganda support for the Sandinistas demonstrates its
interest in the possibility of a revolutionary renaissance
in Central America. A solidarity rally was held in Havana
in September and a recent feature article in Granma states
that Central America now has all the conditions for a true
revolutionary situation. The US Interests Section has
commented that while Cuba makes abundantly clear its hope
for a Sandinista success, it apparently wishes to keep
its assistance hidden in order to discourage antiguer-
rilla intervention.
A member of the Group of 23--which serves as the
FSLN's political arm--reportedly visited Havana recently
to request that Castro provide arms, money, and even
direct military support. We believe that the Cubans
may well increase their material support to the Nicaraguan
guerrillas in the weeks ahead, but, unless there is a
dramatic turn in the situation in Nicaragua, will stop
short of sending Cuban personnel into Nicaragua.
Anti-Somoza Efforts of Venezuela and Panama
Venezuelan President Perez and Panamanian strongman
/ Torrijos are both deeply�and at times emotionally--
committed to efforts to help topple President Somoza.
Following the Venezuelan and Panamanian decisions
the week of 10 September to send aircraft to Costa Rica
as a warning to President Somoza, President Perez and
General Torrijos moved toward more active intervention.
By 21 September, Venezuela had moved two C-130 trans-
ports and four Canberra bombers to Panama City and sent
four T-2 light jet aircraft to David, in western Panama
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near the Costa Rican border. Panama's Air Force, normally
located in the capital, had also moved almost entirely
to David. Perez claims to have a pact with Cuba whereby
Castro has agreed not to interfere but to leave it to
Torrijos and Perez to bring down Somoza. Perez and
Torrijos, in turn, have decided that if the FSLN can
seize and hold territory in Nicaragua, both would recog-
nize a provisional government established by the guerrillas.
Perez has met openly with members of the FSLN and
the Group of 12.
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recently claimed
that Perez turned over a large sum of money to Torrijos
for passage to the Sandinistas.
There are a convincing number of reports pointing
to Torrijos' direct involvement with the guerrillas. In
September,
Torrijos promised to provide guerrilla training to
the FSLN unit that went to Panama following the National
Palace operation, but that the Sandinistas departed be-
fore any training took place. The Panamanian military
also reportedly discovered a 30-man FSLN cadre training
in Panama's western Chiriqui Province in August, but did
not interfere with the group's return to Nicaragua.
Direct arms support by the Panamanians, or with the Pana-
manians acting as middleman for Perez, also seems likely.
Earlier this month, a chief Nicaraguan guerrilla com-
mander was seen in Chiriqui Province loading what appeared
to be munitions onto an airplane flown by a Panamanian
Air Force pilot, the plane
was being diverted from normal use for nightly flights
into Costa Rica. have
reported surreptitious shipments of small arms and am-
munition for the Sandinistas.
reports that Panama has
covertly introduced troops into Costa Rica to help the
Sandinistas regroup were confirmed on 23 September by
Torrijos' admission to a US official that a Panamanian
infantry company was in Costa Rica. Torrijos may also
be helping to equip civilian volunteers recruited in
Panama to fight in Nicaragua. Torrijos'--and Perez'--
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growing belief that support for the Sandinistas was the
only way to avoid a worse bloodbath and a Castro-backed
takeover, that Guatemala and El Salvador had already
reinforced Somoza with men and materiel, and that the
US diplomatic initiative was dead in the water led to
Torrijos' unilateral warning to the US of an imminent
attack on Nicaragua by Venezuelan and Panamanian forces.
Torrijos believes a hard prod is necessary to move
the US to action. Added to this was his frustration as
a military man, his probably
high personal regard for Commandante Pastora (the opera-
tional commander of the FSLN who had iust met with him)
Torrijos also
saw in the Nicaraguan situation an opportunity, along
with Perez, to weigh in on the side of the angels against
Somoza. Torrijos was, and probably still is, prepared
to recognize a provisional FSLN government if the Sandi-
nistas take and hold a piece of Nicaraguan territory for
any length of time.
Costa Rica's Role
Costa Rica continues to be the FSLN's principal,
and critically important, staging area. FSLN raids from
across the border have been a continuing thorn in the
( side of Somoza's counterinsurgency effort and a very
important asset to the guerrillas and will probably remain
so.
The FSLN attacks last October that began the offen-
sive against the Somoza government were staged by groups
that quickly fled into Costa Rica and Honduras before
Nicaraguan National Guard forces could react. In Novem-
ber there were some 70 well-equipped Sandinistas operating
from Costa Rica. A member of the FSLN high command has
publicly acknowledged that the group uses that country
as its principal training ground and safehaven. The
Group of 12, prior to returning to Managua earlier this
year, was based in San Jose.
The FSLN's continued reliance on its safehaven was
demonstrated by the raid launched from Costa Rica on 12
September and by the spectacular FSLN August raid on the
National Palace also planned and staged from Costa Rica.
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The Sandinistas receive material aid from the Costa
Rican Committee of Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People
and are provided safehavens and false documents by the
Costa Rican Communist Party. Sandinistas have occasional
contacts in Costa Rica witi Cuban officials and--
-with Soviet Embassy officials
as well.
The FSLN has been able to operate from Costa Rica
with virtual impunity. Although Costa Rica has announced
that it is closing its border with Nicaragua, the govern-
ment is militarily incapable of policing the border area.
There is also a certain lack of incentive because the
Somoza government is unpopular in Costa Rica. In addi-
tion, some government officials may fear retaliation
from the FSLN. When Sandinistas fall into government
hands, they are deported to Mexico, Venezuela, or Panama.
Costa Rican
President Carazo has decided to "stiffen" his policy on
FSLN activists apprehended in his country--by deporting
non - Costa Ricans and giving short jail sentences to
nationals. At best this would be only a slight shift
unlikely to have an appreciable effect on FSLN tactics.
So far there has been no evidence of a change. From
14-16 September, FSLN groups that encountered Costa Rican
security forces in the vicinity of the border were per-
mitted to proceed into Nicaragua to launch their attacks.
Other Support
FSLN support groups and "international brigades"
have been formed by leftists in several countries, most
recently in Panama and Mexico. In Mexico, the Coordinat-
ing Office for Solidarity with Nicaragua concentrates on
disseminating propaganda. In Panama, 1,500 volunteers
allegedly signed up to fight in Nicaragua (obviously an
inflated claim) and an effort is also being made to form
an international brigade in Venezuela. Panamanian left-
ists are sponsoring a late September meeting of these
brigades and other pro-FSLN groups, primarily for propa-
ganda and coordination purposes.
In Honduras, the Honduran Communist Party, a Com-
mittee of Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People, students
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and faculty members of the national university, and a
new leftist organization--the Popular Unity Movement--
reportedly give moral and material support to the FSLN.
The FSLN operates out of sanctuaries in Honduras,
but finds the atmosphere less hospitable than in Costa
Rica. As many as 60 guerrillas were staging regular
raids from Honduras into Nicaragua late last year, but
the Honduran Army swept the border region in May to sup-
press these activities. In response to the recent fight-
ing, the Honduran military again increased patrolling in
the border area and has taken about 80 Sandinistas into
custody. Like Costa Rica, Honduras deports captured
Sandinistas to third countries
There is also a Mexican FSLN Coordinating Committee
but its activities have been limited. It is not, for
example, willing to call publicly for volunteer brigades
because it does not want to arouse the ire of the Lopez
Portillo administration. The sparse information we have
on Mexican support includes the following:
In early 1978, Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro, of
the Group of 12, said that he had met with
Mexican President Lopez Portillo and Sec-
retary of Government Reyes. Cuadra said
the Mexican Government was providing im-
portant political and propaganda support
to the effort to remove Somoza from power.
Cuadra said the Mexicans had not yet pro-
vided any financial support, and he did
not indicate that support to date had
specifically included the FSLN.
Ernesto Castillo, also of the Group of
12, in early January 1978 "intimated"
that the FSLN had the sympathy of and
a good relationship with the Mexican
Government. He hoped that the Chamorro
assassination would generate concrete
assistance.
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-- The FSLN has members in Mexico, including
Carlos Gutierrez Sotelo, whose farm near
Cuernavaca is used for training and
recuperation by Sandinistas. Because of
Mexico's traditonally tolerant atmosphere,
many far-left Latin American groups have
chosen to set up exile operations there.
Foreign Support for Somoza
Nicaraguan President Somoza has several active and
tcrntii_scmreesaf_foreign military support.
and Argentina has become an important supplier
during the past year. Closer to home, Guatemala and El
Salvador are sympathetic to Somoza and might be willing
to assist him politically as well as militarily--although
there is no evidence that either government dispatched
materiel to Nicaragua during the recent crisis. On the
diplomatic side, Somoza can continue to count on the
reluctance of most Latin American governments to become
involved in any action that suggests intervention in
Nicaraguan internal affairs.
Argentina has been pushing military sales in Central
America for more than a year and has given priority to
Nicaragua. Last year, Argentina supplied Nicaragua with
nearly $1 million worth of 70-mm rockets and rocket
launchers, as well as small arms. In March of this year,
Argentina extended a $20 million credit to Nicaragua,
which Somoza opted to use for military equipment. In the
same month, Nicaragua arranged to buy a range of Argentine-
made weapons, including the Pucara counterinsurgency air-
craft, rockets, and small arms.
With these sales in the pipeline, the Argentine Gov-
ernment might be inclined to look favorably on any
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Nicaraguan requests for military shipments if it con-
cludes that Somoza will be able to maintain himself in
power. Argentine leaders probably consider Somoza a
victim of the US human rights policies that they also
find vexing.
Somoza has the money and the connections to get help
from private international arms merchants, but there is
no evidence that he now is dealing with them. There is
also a glutted Central American black market in arms.
In Central America, the Guatemalan Government has
supplied arms to Nicaragua in the past and is probably
Somoza's most likely nearby source of military and polit-
ical support in a crisis. Last year, Guatemala sold
1.2 million rounds of M-1 ammunition to Nicaragua, as
well as 5 million rounds of M-16 ammunition produced in
Taiwan.
Guatemalan President Lucas does not have a partic-
ularly close relationship with Somoza, but he is a hard-
line military officer who subscribes to the domino theory
in Central America and wants to avoid the power vacuum
he foresees if Somoza were to leave suddenly. Lucas
would prefer a peaceful transition to a new regime in
Nicaragua but doubts that a peaceful change is possible.
He might supply Somoza with covert support if he thought
that would help stabilize the situation.
The government of El Salvador is also sympathetic to
Somoza and, under some circumstances, would probably
send him aid. President Romero, like Lucas, is worried
about the ripple effect if a radical regime came to power
in Nicaragua. He heads a rightist government, and his
empathy with Somoza is strengthened by the growing threat
he faces from leftist terrorists in El Salvador.
Honduras, like Guatemala and El Salvador, wants to
see Nicaragua's Sandinistas defeated militarily, but the
cautious Hondurans are not likely to move ahead of their
neighbors in supporting the Somoza government.
All three Central American countries have vigorously
denied sending any reinforcements or supplies to Somoza
during the recent crisis. Past practice, however, and
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the ties of regional solidarity and ideological affinity
suggest that the Central Americans could be induced to
supply materiel support discreetly. Under the most ex-
treme conditions--with Somoza's National Guard on the
verge of military defeat by the Sandinistas--these coun-
tries would seriously consider committing troops, prob-
ably in a coordinated effort.
On the diplomatic front, Somoza won sympathy by de-
fault in the OAS. To almost all Latin Americans, nonin-
tervention is an all but sacred principle of the inter-
American system. Paraguay voted against even the con-
vening of a meeting of OAS foreign ministers to consider
the Nicaraguan situation, and most Latin American coun-
tries were extremely reluctant to back any strong OAS
action that smacked of intervention in Nicaragua's
internal affairs.
Although Somoza has now agreed to a mediation for-
mula by accepting the offer of the
US and others, Somoza almost certainly feels he won a
tactical and facesaving victory in staving off strong
multilateral action in the OAS meetings.
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