CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/07/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03015173
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: July 3, 1956

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3 July 1956
Copy No. 105
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN CLASS.
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S c soof
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTFI: HR -2
DAT
REVIEWER
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Top SECRET
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CONTENTS
1.
2. SOVIET RESOLUTION ON ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN
(page 4).
3. POZNAN SITUATION
(page 6).
4. HUNGARIAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION CON-
DEMNS "ANTIPARTY" GROUP (page 7).
5. DUTCH AND BELGIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
ON KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH
(page 8).
6. DALAI LAMA REPORTEDLY SEEKING ASYLUM
(page 9).
7. FOREIGN MINISTER MAY HEAD JAPANESE MISSION AT
SOVIET PEACE TALKS (page 10).
8. SOVIET LEADERS EXPECT RECORD HARVES11
(page 11).
9. POSSIBLE INDIAN PURCHASE OF SOVIET IL-14 AIRCRAFT
p (page 12).
10. PAKISTANI-SOVIET TRADE AGREE MEN
(page 13).
3 July 56
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(page 14)
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2. SOVIET RESOLUTION ON ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN
The lengthy central committee resolu-
tion of 30 June explaining and justifying
the anti-Stalin campaign is an attempt by
the Soviet regime to provide an answer
to questions recently raised by foreign
Communist parties.
In tones frequently defensive, the reso-
lution attempts to demonstrate that Stalin's errors in no way
discredit the Soviet system as such nor its present leaders
and policies.
The resolution reviews Stalin's errors but
states that they were expressed in methods rather than goals
and contends that the Soviet system developed consistently and
progressively despite these errors. Stalinism, it asserts,
"could not change and has not changed the nature of our social
order," and it rebukes Italian Communist leader Togliatti for
raising the question.
As to guarantees for the future, the resolu-
tion argues that the historical conditions which gave birth to
Stalinism have passed forever and cites post-Stalin changes as
proof.
The resolution asserts that the Soviet party
launched the anti-Stalin campaign deliberately with an eye to
"a positive result from the point of view of the . . . ultimate
aims" of the Communist movement, and calls for a closing of
ranks against Western attempts to exploit "temporary difficul-
ties."
The resolution abruptly dismisses the ques-
tion of the current leaders' responsibility for Stalinism with the
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statement that it is "in no way a question of lack of personal
courage:' An attempt to check Stalin in his later years, the
resolution argues, would have been misunderstood by the
Soviet public.
The resolution offers little that is new in
its analysis of Stalin's role and the socialist system in the
USSR. Most of the points it makes have already been pre-
sented in both Soviet and Western Communist statements.
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3. POZNAN SITUATION
The situation in Poznan is quiet, but
there are signs that the riots have
aroused concern in other Soviet bloc
countries. According to embassy offi-
cials who visited Poznan on I. July, all
tanks had been withdrawn from the city
the night before, telegraph and telephone
communications had been restored, and
transportation facilities were normal.
a c ec pa n s, however, remained on the outskirts of
the 'city and at various points between Poznan and Warsaw.
Border units on the East German-Polish border have also
reportedly been strengthened.
The other bloc countries have echoed
the Polish line that the riots were due to the activities of a
reactionary underground and have called for increased vigi-
lance to prevent similar outbreaks. In East Germany, pro-
vincial party units were ordered
to report on the prevailing attitudes and
reactions regarding the riots in Poznan. The instructions
emphasized the importance of estimating the attitude of the
populace and detecting any "deviations among comrades and
workers."
while it is not yet possible to evaluate the entire
situation, most workers "correctly recognize fascist provo-
cation for what it is:' A few workers, however, had expressed
the opinion the Polish uprising was justified and that it would
sweep through Czechoslovakia and into East Germany.
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4,p HUNGARIAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION
CONDEMNS "ANTIPARTY" GROUP
The Hungarian party leadership has made
its first major effort since the Soviet 20th
Party Congress to check the "moderate"
faction and whip the party rank and file
back in line.
A Hungarian central committee resolution,
published on 30 June, sharply condemned a "malignant anti-
party movement formed around Imre Nagy" which has launched
an attack "gradually increasing in strength against the policy
and leadership of our party!' The resolution specifically cited
the "Poznan provocations" as a warning to every Hungarian
"to oppose firmly attempts at troublemaking!'
This sharp attack is in reaction to outspoken
criticism of leading Ilingarian Communists, made in a series
of meetings of journalists, economists, philosophers, youths,
World War II resistance fighters and intellectuals in the past
few weeks.
The resolution indicates that Rakosi's lead-
ership was re-endorsed in early June by Soviet presidium
member Suslov, who was then in Budapest analyzing the prob-
lem of Hungarian factionalism, and at the end of June by Soviet
leaders during Rakosi's reported visit to Moscow.
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5. DUTCH AND BELGIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
ON KHRUSHCHEIT'S SPEECH
confusion in the ranks and
leadership of the Netherlands Com-
munist Party indicates no guidance
was given them by the USSR on how to handle the revela-
tions of Khrushchev's secret speech at the Soviet 20th
Party Congress. Moreover, there is no indication that
the Netherlands party believes Italian Communist Party
leader Togliatti was given Soviet endorsement to speak for
Western European Communist parties or to lead their re-
actions. Secretary General Paul de Groot is apparently
striving to steer a middle course between the Italian party
criticism of Khrushchev and the milder treatment by Eugene
Dennis of the United States party. The whole matter of the
20th Party Congress will be aired at the next Netherlands
party congress in September.
Comment
The Netherlands party is the only West-
ern European party to have issued a
statement criticizing the recent remarks of Togliatti.
On 10 April the executive committee of
the Netherlands party reluctantly published a resolution ca-
pitulating to the Soviet party line on Stalin.
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6. DALAI LAMA REPORTEDLY SEEKING ASYLUM
The Dalai Lama is anxious to flee Tibet,
according to a statement made by the
Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim to American
consular officials in Calcutta on 28 June.
Although India reportedly has been re-
quested to grant asylum, the Dalai Lama's advisers do not
consider New Delhi's favorable response as firm enough and
seek American assurances of sanctuary elsewhere in the
event that asylum in India is refused.
The Maharaj Kumar said fighting is severe
in eastern Tibet, but additional arms are needed to extend
the uprising to other parts of the country.
Comment The Chinese Communists indicated doubts
of the Dalai Lama's loyalty when they re-
fused to permit him to attend Buddhist festivals in India this
year. The Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, who went to Lhasa to
extend an invitation on behalf of a Buddhist society, said the
Dalai Lama expressed a keen desire to attend the ceremonies.
Peiping's refusal may have been the final factor in bringing the
Dalai Lama to a decision to seek asylum outside Tibet.
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7. FOREIGN MINISTER MAY HEAD JAPANESE MISSION AT
SOVIET PEACE TALKS
Comment on:
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu reportedly
has consented to head the Japanese dele-
gation for the peace treaty negotiations
with the USSR which are scheduled to be
resumed late this month,
Prime
Minister Hatoyama may have offered the post to Shigemitsu in
the hope the foreign minister's opposition to a quick settlement
with Moscow would cause him to refuse the appointment and
thus provide an excuse for forcing his resignation from the cab-
inet.
Shigemitsu is reported to have accepted in
the belief that success at the peace talks would strengthen his
position in the party or that, if he could not agree to Soviet
terms, the breakoff of the negotiations could be blamed on Min-
ister of Agriculture and Forestry Kono because of the commit-
ments he made in the Moscow fishery pacts.
� If Shigemitsu has accepted, he may now be
willing to concede a quick settlement with
Moscow to save his cabinet position in a reshuffle tentatively
scheduled for some time after the 8 July upper house elections.
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8. SOVIET LEADERS EXPECT RECORD HARVEST
At a reception in Moscow on 28 June,
several Soviet officials expressed great
satisfaction with the harvest prospects
for this year. Khrushchev said that tak-
ing the country as a whole, present indi-
cations were that the Soviet harvest this
year ou record" and he was very pleased.
Comment
On the basis of these statements, and
observations by officers of the American
embassy who recently traveled through parts of the "new
lands," present prospects are that the 1956 harvest may be
substantially above that of 1955. In 1955 the harvest was
fairly good, with grain production showing an announced 29-
percent increase over the 1950 level and amounting to over
100,000,000 metric tons. A major drought seriously reduced
the size of crops in the "new lands" last year, but the harvest
in the Ukraine was excellent.
Previous statements by Soviet officials
had indicated that crop prospects this year
were only fair in the Ukraine, but were good to excellent in
the North Caucasus and Volga regions, as well as in the "new
lands:' In addition, the area under cultivation in the "new
lands" is 50 percent ok 25,000,000 acres greater this year than
last.
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9. POSSIBLE INDIAN PURCHASE OF SOVIET
IL-14 AIRCRAFT
India seems about to purchase Soviet
IL-14 aircraft for its domestic airline.
Soviet eagerness to supply both civil and
military aircraft to India has been amply demonstrated in
recent months, and there seems no doubt that negotiations
on the subject have been conducted. The USSR has offered
military jet aircraft and both jet- and piston-engine commer-
cial planes. The only transaction which seems likely to be
successfully concluded in the immediate future, however, is
that involving IL-14's.
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10. PAKISTANI-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT
The Pakistani-Soviet trade agreement
concluded on 27 June appears to por-
tend no significant change in relations
between the two countries.
The agreement provides for the exchange
of Pakistani agricultural products for Soviet machinery, in-
dustrial equipment, petroleum, and timber. A special ar-
rangement is included under which payments will be in ru-
pees, and a Soviet trade office is to be established in Karachi.
There has been no official announcement of the duration of
the agreement, although the Pakistani press reports it is for
one year, renewable on mutual agreement. No mention of
technical or economic aid is included.
The Pakistani government has apparently
been careful to minimize the opportunities for Soviet eco-
nomic penetration. Soviet requests to establish trade of-
fices at Lahore and Dacca were rejected, but permission
was given to open an office in Karachi. Conclusion of the
trade agreement avoids an open rebuff to Moscow's recent
overtures and will probably satisfy some Pakistani business-
men who have been eager to find new trading partners.
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 2 July)
Egyptian machine-gun fire was directed at
an Israeli patrol near the Gaza strip, according to an Israeli
spokesman. (Press)
The Israeli ambassador in Moscow is try-
ing to secure an invitation from the Soviet Union for Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion to visit the USSR, according to a news cor-
respondent in Tel Aviv. An unsuccessful effort to arrange such
a visit was made in late 1955, the report stated, but the recent
change of foreign minister in Israel might result in a positive
reply.
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