WEEKLY SUMMARY APRIL 15, 1977[SANITIZED] - 1977/04/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03013534
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: April 15, 1977

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Weekly Summary
et
CG WS 77-015
April 15, 1977
Copy
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EEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Reporting Group, reports and analyzes significant
pments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
y includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
f Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Eco-
Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of
ic ce, the Office of Weapons Intelligence,
e of Geographic and Cartographic Research.
fling Notice
ence Sources and Methods Involved
NINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
ode d Disclosure Subiect to Criminal Sanctions
CONTENTS
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5
April 15, 1977
WitIMINSNUMIWIERONAMEMNOS.U.Stgam
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9 Argentina: Support for President Videla
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
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3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
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President Videla has strengthened his position with the
Argentine military and may now be in a better position to move
forward on moderate proposals for restructuring the unions and
permitting civilians a limited political role.
( Argentina: Support for President Videla
President Videla begins his second year
as Argentina's leader in a reasonably
strong position. Only a few weeks ago
there was widespread talk about Videla
giving up one of his jobs, the presidency or
his membership on the junta. Such talk
has now ceased, and the President seems
to. be enjoying�at least for the pres-
ent�the support not only of the army,
but also the navy and air force, which
from time to time expressed dissatisfac-
tion with him. This military consensus
around Videla means that for the time be-
ing officers with moderate views are in
control in Argentina.
Videla and the junta last month marked
the first anniversary of their takeover with
low key, characteristically austere
statements. The President's address to the
nation pointed to the progress made dur-
ing the past year in controlling leftist sub-
versives and in improving the economy.
As is his custom, he promised nothing, ex-
cept that the armed forces would not be
deterred from pursuing their own concept
of economic and political progress.
Videla did suggest that a new, more
constructive phase of political activity
could begin. He made it clear there will be
no early return to free-wheeling politics,
but some civilians will be allowed to ex-
press opinions on a variety of subjects
through informal channels.
On March 15, Videla assembled all
Page
army generals to review the government's
performance during the past year and to
outline its plans for the future. The Presi-
dent anticipated criticism of his perfor-
mance and skillfully neutralized it. The
session, which lasted an entire workday,
was a success for the President. He
assuaged the feelings of the air force and
navy by strongly reiterating the
supremacy of the junta and playing down
his own role.
The President announced at the
meeting that he would remain as chief ex-
ecutive and army commander in chief
through March 1979, refuting the notion,
widely discussed among Argentines in re-
cent months, that he would relinquish
either the presidency or his post in the
three-man interservice junta.
Videla himself may have had a hand in
encouraging public discussion of his au-
thority. He probably judged that such
a "debate" would do him no harm and
might help, and he was right. The dis-
cussions never turned up a serious con-
tender to replace him. Moreover,
although some individuals indulged in
personal criticisms, no really damaging
criticism of Videla emerged.
The army meeting seems to have
demonstrated that the present govern-
ment, with Videla at the top, is still the
most desirable choice and perhaps the
only practical one. The public "debate"
may also have served as an escape valve
9
WEEKLY SUMMARY
SUMMARY
for Argentina's highly politicized
citizenry, deprived for the past year of
normal outlets for political expression.
The Government and Labor
The ascendancy of Videla and his
moderate line will have an important im-
pact in the crucial area of
government-labor relations. Union ac-
tivities have been suspended since the
coup, and the military has been unable to
agree on how to treat organized labor.
Some military men believe labor, the
long-time stronghold of Peronism, must
be permanently shorn of its potential
political power. Others, including Videla,
favor an accommodation.
Developments on the labor scene over
the past year have worked to the advan-
tage of Videla and weakened the
arguments of those calling for punitive
measures. There have been numerous
violations of the junta's ban on strikes,
but the government has not used force,
nor has labor defied the junta on the
massive scale some officers anticipated in
response to government-imposed
economic austerity measures.
The way now seems clear for the
emergence of a labor policy that is not as
vindictive as the so-called "hard liners"
had demanded. The new labor code,
although it will still be restrictive, will
probably allow unions to join together in
federations. Unions will continue to be
prohibited from blatant political activity.
Apr 15, 77
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It is doubtful that larger groupings like
the Peronist General Workers'
Confederation, through which labor flex-
ed its political muscle during the Peron
regimes, will have government backing,
but such a confederation may not be
specifically banned, as some officers have
recommended. Videla presumably hopes
the workers will recognize and accept the
new law as a compromise, permitting the
unior s some, but by no means all, the im-
portance they have had in the past.
The Government and Civilians
Conditions also seem favorable for im-
plementing Videla's policy of encouraging
communication with representative
civilians. At the meeting with army
generals, the President indicated that he
intencs to continue this process, but made
it clear that he envisions no program for-
mally reincorporating civilians into the
governing process. This is in keeping with
Videl i's public statements; he has
repeatedly declared that he has no
timetable for the reemergence of an
elected legislature or free political parties.
Civilian opinion leaders will be disap-
pointed�but not surprised�that the
political "opening" many of them had
begun to predict some weeks ago is not
arounc the corner. Most of them will take
heart, however, at least privately, from
the fact that Videla and not one of the
hard-line generals is in the driver's seat.
Counterinsurgency
The strengthening of Videla's hand
does not mean any slackening of pressure
against leftist guerrillas. Here, Videla is
not, ard cannot afford to be, any less
tough than the "hard liners."
The President may attempt to make
sure that the security forces pay more
attention to legal guarantees, and he could
justify this approach to the "hard liners"
by arguing that the subversive threat had
been no obviously hurt by the
government's campaign that the harsh
measures were no longer necessary. Any
resurgence of the terrorism, however,
would force Videla to get tougher.
Hemisphere Affairs
In his first year in office Videla has
visited the capitals of Chile, Peru, and
Bolivia. He plans trips to Venezuela and
Paraguay.
He is clearly making the point that
after a period of enforced withdrawal
from hemispheric affairs because of
domestic political turmoil, Argentina is
now ready to claim its rightful place as an
important regional power. The message
Videla carries to the heads of other
authoritarian governments in the area is
one of solidarity in the face of inter-
national pressure for greater respect for
human rights.
The General is well suited to the task of
rebuilding his country's influence in the
region without antagonizing Brazil, the
historic rival that has pulled far ahead of
Argentina by almost any measure. With
his reserved style, Videla seeks to assure
the Brazilians that his country is not out
to make gains at their expense. For the
moment, at least, the Brazilians probably
take him at his word, seeing virtually no
prospect for Argentina to contest serious-
ly the regional dominance Brazil has es-
tablished.
Outlook
The military consensus that Videla has
established is fragile. The officers who
have in the past been the most
tro.ublesome to Videla, navy chief Ad-
miral Massera, for example, are quiet, at
least for now. Still, Massera has a long
history as a "spoiler," and he is not likely
to remain in the background indefinitely.
Political conditions in the country
could change, perhaps rapidly, with dis-
ruptive effects on military unity. Organiz-
ed labor could react violently if a new
labor code is not forthcoming soon or if it
is enacted and, in their view, is too restric-
tive. Terrorists may launch a spectacular
last-ditch offensive. Such events would
reinforce the hard-line officers and
weaken Videla.
Videla recognizes the frailty of the con-
sensus. He will continue to move with
great caution on all fronts in order to
preserve it. Policy making and implemen-
tation will continue to be slow and
cumbersome and could falter if the regime
were to be confronted with fast-breaking
problems)
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
3.5(c)
Apr 15, 77
President Videla
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