THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM - 1967/12/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03012456
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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Sirweir 04/ `""
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
The Situation in South Vietnam
(Weekly)
Sec't 149
11 December 1967
No. 0380/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the
OS Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or
receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNORADINO AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(4 December - 10 December 1967)
CONTENTS
POLITICAL SITUATION
Section
Generals jealous of waning powers;
Proposed trial for "struggle" leaders;
Lower House activities; Buddhist developments.
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT II
Continued decline in security adversely
effects Revolutionary Develbpment; Dak Son;
Pacification funding and planning; Chieu Hoi
affairs; Revolutionary Development cadre.
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Prices; Currency and gold; Estimate
of rice production for 1967-1968; Shopping
in Saigon.
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
Saigon Cost of Living Index (graph)
South Vietnam Money Supply (graph)
South Vietnam Foreign Exchange Reserves (graph)
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
(graph)
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I. POLITICAL SITUATION
Although the most recent crisis among
the senior generals will probably blow over,
/the generals' con-
tinuing discontent at being cut out of the
political picture may lead to other crises
in the future. Some of the generals, partic-
ularly the corps commanders, are also unhappy
over the prospect that current plans for a
reorganization of the armed forces will
effectively cut their individual powers and
command authority. Some 20 leaders of last
year's "struggle" movement are to be brought
to trial on 19 December--a move that may pro-
voke a loud outcry from opposition elements.
The Lower House has joined with the Upper
House in calling for a review of the mobili-
zation decree, and has set 14 as the minimum
membership for formation of an official bloc.
Two blocs in the Lower House are attempting
to organize themselves formally as political
groups, with varying success, while a third
has apparently let its efforts at organiza-
tion and recruitment lag.
Generals Jealous of Waning Powers
1.
although the most recent crisis among
the senior generals will probably soon blow over,
a "feeling of political uneasiness" lingers and may
lead to new crises.
/the basic reason behind the
threatened resignations of generals Loan, Khang, Cao
Van Vien, and Thang is their unwillingness to see
power shift from the military to a civilian govern-
ment that they believe is incompetent. They have
no confidence that Prime Minister Loc can set the
country on its feet and apparently believe sincerely
that they could do a better job.
2. It is possible that the moderating influence
of Vice President Ky, who has already averted a more
serious crisis by persuading Loan to withdraw his
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resignation and the other generals to give the govern-
ment a chance, will have a stabilizing effect. Ky's
own approach to the situation has been more adult,
and his conduct may serve as an example to the gen-
erals who support him.
3. Some of the generals are also apparently
worried that their personal influence will be cut
in the military sphere.
are reportedly objecting
ganize the armed forces
their individual powers,
in the plans scuttled.
the four expressed their opposition at a meet-
ing in late November at Joint General Staff headquart-
ers. They pointed particularly to plans that would
break up divisions into battalion strike forces, shift
Revolutionary Development support battalions from
corps/division command to that of province chiefs,
and reorganize the Regional and Popular Forces.
The four corps commanders
to plans that would reor-
in such a way as to reduce
and they may succeed in hay-
4.
Joint
General Staff chief Cao Van Vien,
argued in favor of the genera
reorganization but showed little enthusiasm for it.
Senior unit commanders at the meeting indicated that,
just as little has yet been done to implement the
plans, little will probably be done in the future.
�Proposed Trial For "Struggle" Leaders
5. The government will try leaders of the 1966
Buddhist "struggle" movement in Hue and Da Nang.
A government official announced on 4 December that
about 20 persons implicated in the struggle will stand
trial before Saigon's special military court on
19 December. The 20 include several army officers
and Nguyen Van Man, the former mayor of Da Nang. The
trial is likely to raise some furor among opposition
elements, particularly the militant Buddhists and
opposition deputies in the Lower House. Several
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antigovernment deputies have already formed a committee
to look into what they regard as unjust punitive measures
taken against a number of student demonstrators. The
trial, especially if severe sentences are meted out,
will probably add fuel to their fire.
Lower House Activities
6. The Lower House has echoed the Upper House's
call for a review of the mobilization decree. Claiming,
as the Upper House had previously, that the decree is
unconstitutional because it was promulgated without
legislative approval, the Lower House voted on 1 Decem-
ber to invite a government representative to appear
before a closed sesssion to defend the decree. Since
the Upper House has issued a similar "invitation," it
is possible that the problem can be handled before a
joint session of both houses. At last report, Defense
Minister Vy had been tabbed as the probable government
witness for the Upper House's interpellation on the
decree.
7. The Lower House, in the meantime, is moving
ahead with its rules-drafting process and approved
more than 30 rules in the first four days of plenary
debate. Among the rules approved is one dealing with
the house's board of officers. These will include
a chairman, two vice chairmen, a secretary general,
and three deputy secretaries general. Unlike the
Lower House, the Upper House had earlier voted to
substitute a full committee on internal affairs and
rules for the one-man secretary general's position.
8. The house has also decided on the minimum
membership it will allow for formation of an official-
ly'recognized bloc. The minimum was set at 14 during
debate on 7 December. This would permit as many as
nine blocs in the 137-member house and is proportion-
ately similar to the 12-member requirement of the
former Provisional National Assembly. The 60-man
Upper House, by contrast, has set its minimum at 15,
allowing only four blocs.
9. Members of the Lower House have been active
recently in consolidating blocs, forming alliances,
and lining up candidates for the house officers.
the largely Catholic
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Independence Bloc formally organized itself as a politi-
cal group after receiving written pledges of adher-
ence from 28 deputies during a meeting on 2 December.
The bloc elected officers and gave the chairmanship to
Gia Dinh deputy Nguyen Quang Luyen, a Buddhist, in an
effort to defuse charges that the bloc is solely Cath-
olic. It was further agreed that the bloc would seek
the election of several of its number to Lower House
offices as well as the chairmanships of several house
committees.
10. Bloc leaders, according to the source, have
tentatively decided to seek an alliance with the pro-
government Democratic Bloc and have extended informal
feelers to test the Democratic Bloc's reaction. The
leaders reportedly believe their proposal will be ac-
cepted, since an alliance of the Independence Bloc's
28 members and the Democratic Bloc's 51 members would
give the two a working majority in the house.
11. As for the Independence Bloc's attitude to-
ward the government,
it will support government programs that it
seems worthwhile, but does not want to become a rub-
ber stamp. The bloc has reportedly decided against
an earlier plan to form a loose alliance with the
largely Buddhist, antigovernment Progressive Bloc.
Independence Bloc leaders now believe that the Pro-
gressives are too antigovernment and that such an
alliance would hurt the bloc.
12. The All Vietnam Bloc, a group originally
formed to support Vice President Ky's presidential
candidacy, is also attempting to organize itself as
a formal bloc in the Lower House, but is reportedly
having difficulty.
bloc members, including seven Lower HOuse deputies,
were unable to agree during a meeting on 4 December
whether the bloc's Lower House branch should be overt
or covert. As a result, the group made no progress.
Bloc chairman Tran Van An is reportedly confident,
however, that the bloc can initially muster the sup-
port of 18 to 20 deputies in the Lower House and claims
firm commitments from 17. These include Cao Dai,
Hoa Hao, and Nationalist Party (VNQDD) deputies.
13., The Farmer-Worker-Soldier Bloc is having
even more difficulty in organizing its Lower House
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contingent. The bloc's liaison man with the Lower
House has not been attending meetings of the group's
working committee, 3.3(h)(2)
and the bloc has apparently done little to increase
its strength. A Catholic priest reportedly told a
bloc member recently that some 20 Catholic deputies
would like to cooperate. Nothing has yet been done
to follow this up, however, and bloc leaders do not
even know the deputies' names.
Buddhist Developments
14. The moderate Buddhists have reportedly de-
cided to defer any attempts at reconciliation with
the militants until after Tet, the Lunar New Year
holiday, while Prime Minister Loc--in an apparently
unrelated move--is making efforts to win the militants
over to the government.
15. During a meeting on 4 December of moderate
Buddhist leaders including Thich Tam Chau,
T- jThich Tam Giac presented
a proposal that outlined steps for seeking a reuni-
fication of the two factions. No action was taken
on the proposal, however, and the moderates decided
to postpone any such moves toward reconciliation un-
til after Tet in late January. Tam Giac, who had
reportedly discussed his proposal previously with
militant Buddhist Thich Thien Minh, was asked to relay
the postponement decision to Minh.
16. In the meantime, Prime Minister Loct
/has asked the Viet-
namese Confederation of Labor to initiate low-keyed
contacts among the militants, including Thich Tri
Quang. Reportedly, Loc's hope is that the militants
can be won over in this way to support of the govern-
ment or at least to a more neutral position. Failing
Loc will begin a concerted
effort to isolate the hard-core militant leaders from
their followers.
17. There have been some indications over the
last few months that followers of both the militant
and the moderate leaders may be pulling away from
their leaders' extreme positions in an effort to ef-
fect a meaningful reconciliation of their two factions.
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Loc is probably hoping to exploit this potential split,
should the labor confederation's attempt at rallying
the militants fail. Loc is using the confederation
as a go-between because of confederation president
Tran Quoc Buu's friendship with some of the militant
leaders. This relationship is not helping the situa-
tion, however; two meetings between Buu and Tri Quang
in November proved inconclusive.
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II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
Enemy forces have hit hard at the
Revolutionary Development programs in Ba
Xuyen, Binh Long, and Binh Duong provinces.
The enemy attack against the Dak Son mon-
tagnard village appears to have been a re-
action to the villagers reporting enemy
positions to allied forces. Because of
their inability to understand Vietnamese,
many montagnards may have died as a re-
sult of failing to abandon their hiding
places when told to do so by the enemy.
The special CORDS advisers' pacification
fund, the joint sign-off authority on
planning documents, and the Vietnamese
government's transfer of the land tax au-
thority to some of the local units of
government have probably strengthened the
advisers' role in influencing pacifica-
tion program planning and, in certain
cases, program execution. Thirty-eight
persons rallied in Quang Tin Province on
5 December, the largest single Viet Cong
group to date to come in under the Chieu
Hoi ("Open Arms") program. On 9 Decem-
ber, 3,229 students will graduate from the
Vung Tau RD Cadre Training Center.
Continued Decline in Security Adversely Effects Revolu-
tionary Development
1. On 28 November elements of a Viet Cong bat-
talion attacked and overran the Tan Hung outpost
and RD campaign area located about five miles north-
east of Soc Trang, the capital of Ba Xuyen Province.
Allied forces suffered 19 killed (seven Popular
Force, 12 RD cadres), and 25 wounded (six Popular
Force, 12 RD cadres, seven civilians), and lost 24
weapons. A Vietnamese reaction force sent to aid
the beleaguered defenders killed 36 enemy and cap-
tured 22 weapons.
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2. This attack in Ba Xuyen is another in a
growing list of enemy incidents which have as their
goal the undercutting of the pacification programs.
If such attacks do not reduce the size of the areas
protected by allied military forces, they may at
least reduce the government's adminstrative con-
trol and prevent the coalescence of popular attitudes
in favor of the government.
3. Although the recent large-scale enemy at-
tacks in Binh Long Province failed and resulted in
heavy enemy losses, the attacks did succeed in dis-
rupting the RD program. In October and November,
at least 4,000 persons fled from Loc Ninh District
to the provincial capital. A Truong Son team had
to be evacuated by air from its operational area be-
cause of the proximity of an enemy battalion, and
a second Truong Son team deserted after one was
killed and seven were wounded in an abortive enemy
attack. One Vietnamese RD team joined the general
exodus of civilians from its hamlet, and another
RD team was withdrawn when its supporting military
unit was pulled back to provide security for the
provincial capital.
4. Although the enemy's offensive in Binh
Long was a military failure, it was not without some
effective results. In addition to causing a new
burden of refugees and a setback to rural pacifica-
tion, the enemy has also apparently stepped up the
collection of rice in the province. Several re-
ports further indicate that the enemy continues to
tax the 8,500 workers on the two rubber plantations
still operating in Binh Long.
5. South of Binh Long in Binh Duong Province,
the enemy during October appeared to have made the
RD program his primary target. In several instances,
the Communists warned persons connected with the
programs to cease their activity or face reprisals.
6. On 23 October enemy forces launched a multi-
company attack on a Vietnamese Army battalion support-
ing an RD team in Phu Hoa District, Binh Duong Prov-
ince. In this engagement, one ARVN company was hit
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hard and the battalion outpost and a Popular Forces
outpost both came under heavy fire; however, the
enemy was repulsed. Enemy propaganda leaflets found
after the battle stated that the attack was to "pun-
ish" the battalion for supporting the RD program
and for not heeding previous Viet Cong warnings to
end this support. On the nights of 27 and 29 Octo-
ber, enemy forces made an unopposed entry into the
hamlet where the team was working. On the 27th, the
enemy delivered a three-hour propaganda lecture to
members of the hamlet RD council and, on the 29th,
took seven members of the hamlet self-defense force
as recruits for their own military forces. The South
Vietnamese Army security battalion did not react to
either of these incidents. In addition, low-level
agent reports derived from Vietnamese intelligence
sources indicate that enemy rice and tax collection
units in Binh Doung move almost at will throughout
the province.
7. Other provinces in which security and pac-
ification are believed to have declined in recent
months have been reported on in previous issues of
the Situation in South Vietnam (Weekl ).
Dak Son
8. The montagnard village of Dak Son, located
a mile and a half from the town of Song Be in Phuoc
Long Province, was attacked and overrun on the
morning of 5 December. An unknown-size enemy force,
apparently divided into a number of smaller groups,
overran a series of allied positions and rampaged
through the village for about seven hours. Although
the village received air and artillery support, no
ground reinforcement was attempted until daylight.
9. The village is inhabited by members of the
Steng tribe, a montagnard group which numbers about
20,000 and constitutes nearly half the population
of Phuoc Long Province. Over the past several months
ill treatment of the montagnards by the government
has. led more of them to move into the hinterland,
where they reportedly were providing a willing labor
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force for the enemy. The approximately 2,000 Steng
tribesmen who lived in Dak Son were some of the last
residing under government control in New Life settle-
ments.
10. In addition, a large number of the people
in Phuoc Long Province had evacuated their villages
during the past few months because of the proximity
of enemy forces. In the absence of secure land
transportation out of the province, most of these
moved into the areas surrounding Song Be-Phuoc Binh.
The very limited RD program in Phuoc Long has, for
the above reasons, come to a virtual standstill.
The major portion of the military action has been
occurring in Phuoc Binh District--where Dak Son is
located and where the RD program and the bulk of the
population have been concentrated.
11. A number of reasons have been put forward
to explain the particular attack on Dak Son. A
Vietnamese newspaper has reported that the enemy was
seeking revenge because the villagers betrayed North
Vietnamese Army positions to the government. A US
correspondent on the scene has reported that the
attack was apparently in reprisal for the villagers'
refusal to supply recruits for the enemy labor
forces. Another press report has suggested that the
invading enemy forces yelled to the people hidden
in bunkers to "come with us or die." Since the
majority of the montagnards did not speak Vietnamese,
they were possibly unable to respond. The enemy
thereafter turned flamethrowers into their huts and
hideouts.
12. At least 74 persons have been killed in
Dak Son, including 68 civilians, four RD cadres, and
two Popular Force soldiers. At least 53 persons
have been wounded thus far, but both killed and
wounded figures will probably rise as the area con-
tinues to be searched for survivors.
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Pacification Funding and Planning
13. In the past few months the US Mission has
attempted to strengthen its advisory position in the
pacification programs by exerting a greater degree
of influence in program planning and, in certain
cases, program execution.
14. In October, a special US fund for the
support of pacification was established in each
corps, province, and district, under the respective
control of the corps deputy chief of staff for CORDS
and province and district senior advisers. The
fund is to be used locally to supplement--not re-
place--government funding which is available to
support the pacification program. This special fund
will, however, provide an immediately available
source of financial support in the event that normal
sources are inadequate or are not available because
of other commitments. The lead time for government
funding has usually been about a year and, as a re-
sult, timely support for unprogrammed activities or
projects has not always been available through Viet-
namese channels.
15. On a monthly basis, each corps CORDS re-
presentative will receive 450,000 Vietnamese piasters,
each provincial senior adviser will receive 100,000,
and each district senior adviser will receive
50,000 piasters for RD program support. In addition,
the senior advisers of the autonomous cities of Cam
Ranh, Da Nang, and Vung Tau will be authorized
100,000 piasters per month. Provisions have been
incorporated for the transfer of funds within prov-
inces and corps after approval of the next higher
headquarters. Any requirement for an expenditure of
more than 80,000 piasters on a single project re-
quires the approval of CORDS headquarters in Saigon.
16. Those programs which the MACV/CORDS senior
advisers are authorized to support include refugees,
health, education, public works, anti-infrastructure
and civilian screening operations, village/hamlet
administration, and psychological operations. Cer-
tain costs incurred in support of these programs for
supplies and equipment, maintenance, rents, daily
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labor, or transportation may be met through expendi-
tures from these US funds.
17. The US Mission has been attempting to
obtain Vietnamese Government agreement for a joint
sign-off arrangement on planning, programming, and
budgeting documents but not on the authorization of
expenditures. The major advisory effort concerns
the pacification plan. US officials have submitted
a draft memorandum of understanding to the Vietnamese
Government which provides for a joint sign-off on
the provincial RD plan and any important revisions
to the plan which may be made during the year. US
advisers have already succeeded in obtaining Viet-
namese cooperation for a joint sign-off provision
on the combined campaign plan.
18. American officials believe that it may be
more important to establish detailed, mutually
agreed upon province plans than to control each in-
crement of Vietnamese piaster expenditure. By using
this approach advisersbelieve that they can obtain
better coordination, establish a basis for measuring
progress, and obtain a means for monitoring deviations
from agreed plans and goals. If deviations from RD
plans become excessive, advisory pressure can be
brought to bear at province, corps, or national
level, as appropriate, in accordance with plans for
the use of advisory leverage which are now being
developed by the US Mission.
19. The government of Vietnam has taken some
steps to provide some of the local units of govern-
ment with a source of fiscal support so they may be
able to fund their pacification efforts. In mid-
October the Vietnamese Government enacted a decree
which transferred almost all land tax authority to
some of the local units of government. According
to the decree, the land taxes on the real estate
located in the Saigon area, or in the provincial and
district towns is to be collected for the Saigon,
provincial, or municipal budgets. The decree did
not, however, resolve the question of provincial
authority and responsibility and the differences be-
tween autonomous and nonautonomous municipalities
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for both revenue collection and bugeting purposes.
A meeting of tax officials was scheduled for mid-
November to review implementation of this decree.
US advisers--through Public Administration and the
Internal Revenue Service teams--hope to help the
government resolve the many areas of organizational
responsibility and implementation provisions that
need clarification.
20. According to the October land and property
tax decree, the minister of finance has the authority
to set broad minimum and maximum tax rates for the
different categories of land and property, but within
these guidelines local governing bodies, probably
down to the village level, will have the authority
to levy and collect their own taxes. None of the
revenue collected by these local governing bodies
will, according to the decree, go to the national
government. It is also probable that the national
government will subsidize the local governments with
additional funds.
21. The national government apparently hopes
to raise the majority of its funds by revising its
tax collection laws and methods. US officials have
been working closely with Saigon government officials
in this regard.
22. Total national tax collections for the first
nine months of 1967 were 47 percent higher than last
year; income tax collections--over 17 percent of all
taxes collected--doubled over those for the same period
of 1966. In addition, the government has approved a
1968 budget for 95 billion piasters; however, advisers
feel this to be unrealistic and feel it will probably
have to be revised upward.
Chieu Hpi Affairs
23. On 5 December, 38 enemy personnel rallied
to the government in Quang Tin Province. All 38 are
fram the village of Loc An located 17 miles west of the
provindial capital of Tam Ky. The Hoi Chanhs (ralliers)
range in age from 15 to 46 and reportedly include 18
members of the village guerrilla platoon and 20 village-
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level'members of the National Liberation Front infra-
structure. Included in this latter group are four
female nurses. Members of this group later led US
troops to a small munitions cache. The Hoi Chanh claimed
they rallied because of a lack of food, fear of death,
and a loss of belief in the Viet Gong cause.
24. On 9 December, course number seven will
graduate from the Vung Tau National Training Center
for RD Cadres. Of the 3,229 students who are expected
to graduate, 2,050 are in the basic course and the re-
mainder are in leadership and other specialist courses.
Another class, the tenth, is scheduled to begin on 18 De-
cember with 3,552 basic students. Of this group, 180
are to be trained as psychological warfare specialists.
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III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
Despite rising rice prices the retail
price index for Saigon remained stable dur-
ing the week ending 27 November. Free mar-
ket currency prices returned to the levels
prevailing prior to the devaluation of
the British pound, but the price of gold
continued to rise. Early estimates indi-
cate that rice production in the crop year
1967-68 will be roughly the same as in
1966-67. A privately owned department
store and a government-owned supermarket,
recently opened in -Paigon, have been criti-
cized for concentrating too heavily on
luxury goods.
Prices
1. During the week ending 27 November the USAID
retail price index for Saigon remained at the level
that has prevailed since 6 November despite rising
rice prices. The price of US medium-grain rice rose
sharply, reportedly because the government suspended
releases from its stock of imported rice. This in-
crease, in turn, influenced domestic rice prices,
which rose to a lesser extent. Cabbage prices also
were higher because supply was diminished, but the
over-all index for food prices was unchanged as fish
and shrimp prices fell. The price of shrimp reached
its lowest level since May. The index for nonfood
prices declined slightly as the price of laundry
soap fell for the first time since starting its rise
early in October and all other prices were unchanged.
(A table of weekly retail prices in Saigon is in-
cluded in the Annex. Charts on cost of living,
money supply, and foreign exchange reserves are also
included.)
2. The index for prices of US-financed imports
remained stable during the week ending 28 November,
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Ntsol 1 Notir
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although prices of individual commodities varied
considerably. Prices of galvanized iron sheet
dropped sharply because of new arrivals from South
Korea, but prices of most other goods increased.
Currency and Gold
3. Free market currency prices returned on
27 November to the levels prevailing prior to the
devaluation of the British pound and the Hong Kong
dollar, but the price of gold continued to move up.
The embassy reports that currency rates have fluc-
tuated greatly since the devaluation as a result of
local market speculation. On 27 November the price
of green dollars was 156 piasters per dollar, or
eight piasters below the price of the previous week.
A dollar's worth of gold leaf, based on a gold
price of US $35 per troy ounce, was selling, on the
other hand, for 213 piasters, or two piasters higher
than the previous week. (A graph on monthly and
weekly currency and gold prices is included in the
Annex . )
Estimate of Rice Production for 1967-68
4. Early estimates of rice production in the
crop year 1967-68 indicate that the rice harvest
now under way will yield roughly the same quantity
produced in 1966-67. According to the South Viet-
namese Ministry of Agriculture, total output in the
crop year ending 30 May 1968 is expected to be about
4.3 million metric tons of paddy compared with
4,336,000 tons in 1966-67. Production has declined
steadily since 1964 when the crop was 5,327,000 tons
of paddy. Output in IV Corps is expected to be about
8 percent above last year's flood-damaged crop,
but this increase probably will be offset by de-
clines in I and, possibly, II Corps. The estimate
for IV Corps is based almost entirely on higher
yields because the area under cultivation is be-
lieved to be only a few hundred hectares larger.
Production in IV Corps, which accounts for about
two thirds of total output, still will be about 9
percent lower than the average of the last five years
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Nevi or, 1 %tool
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Shopping in Saigon
5. With considerable entrepreneurial insight,
Bui Trac, Saigon industrialist and merchant, has re-
cently opened South Vietnam's first American-style
department store, called Saigon Departo. Stocked like
a cross between Lord and Taylor's gift shop and Sears'
housewares department, the new Saigon Departo offers
automatic washers, typewriters, radios, cosmetics,
perfume, and rice cookers. The store opened in July
1967 and now reports daily sales of about 500,000
piasters. Advocates of Departo claim the wide range
of lower-priced goods will be counterinflationary.
Critics retort that most of Departo's stock consists
of luxury goods that the South Vietnamese peasant
can ill afford. In any event, the black market seems
to offer brisk competition to Departo in many of the
same goods.
6. Demonstrating some enterpreneurial imagina-
tion of its own, the government in October opened
a new American-style supermarket called Nguyen Du.
The store is under the direction of the government's
General Office of Supply and is financed by the Na-
tional Bank. Merchandise offered by the new store
consists mostly of fresh and canned vegetables, bev-
erages, meat, clothing, and, oddly enough, motor-
cycles. The daily sales volume of Nguyen Du varies
between 600,000 and 800,000 piasters, although it
has gone as high as one million piasters a day.
Like its corporate cousin, Departo, Nguyen Du has
been accused by critics of concentrating too heavily
on luxury goods. Nguyen Du, however, does offer
some bargains on such basic foods as frozen chicken
and pork, rice, and nuoc mam. Tran Do Cung, director
of the General Office of Supply, is optimistic about
the future of the supermarket and would like to see
20 additional stores in the Saigon area.
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TAB?
Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon 2./
13 Jun
1966 .11c/
3 Jan
1067
6 Nov
1967
13 Nov
1967
20 Nov
1967
27 Nov
1967
index fr all Items
070
301
Index for F000 Items
197)
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Rice-Soc Nau (100 kg.)
1,250
1,700
2,250
2,350
2,40
2,500
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)
90
130
. 220
220
220
220
Fish-Ca The (1 kg.)
130
150
260
260
250
240
Nuoc Men (jar)
76
90
150
150
150
150
Index for Nonfood Items
140
233
236
232
230
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Firewood (du. meter) 360 560
530
560
520
520
Cigarettes (pack) 10 14
14
14
14
14
White Calico (meter) 27 33
46
46
47
47
Kerosene (liter) 7.8 10.5
9
9
9
9
a.
b.
c.
Lata are from USAID sources. For all indexes 1 January 1965 =
Price level just prior to the 18 June devaluation.
Preliminary.
100.
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