THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03010098
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 4, 1967

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So?
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
ir7X_e_77
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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4 December 1967
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jap-Srecrer
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
- Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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Information as of 1600
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4 December 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
US and South Vietnamese forces inflicted heavy
casualties on a Viet Cong unit they trapped in the
delta on 4 December.
I. Military Situation in South Vietnam: US
infantrymen and South Vietnamese Marines trapped a
Viet Cong force in the Mekong Delta and killed nearly
200 in a day-long battle on 4 December. To the north
allied forces in Quang Ngai Province repelled a heavy
enemy attack at the Binh Son District Headquarters
on 3 December. Viet Cong guerrillas also staged a
series of attacks in the Saigon area on 4 December
(Paras. 1-7). Recent well-coordinated Viet Cong at-
tacks in the delta indicate that the enemy in this
area has improved his command and control capability
(Paras. 8-9).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Some 20 persons are to be tried on 19 December for
their part in the 1966 Buddhist struggle movement in
Hue and Da Nang (Para. 1).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
MACV reports that over 47,000 North Vietnamese troops
infiltrated into South Vietnam through 30 November
(Para. 1). Infiltrators in 1967 made heavy use of
the Demilitarized Zone but the Laos panhandle was
still the primary route (Paras. 2-9).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: The So-
viets are again trying to persuade the US to prolong
the projected holiday bombing pause (Paras. 1-3).
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I. MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. US infantrymen and South Vietnamese Marines
trapped a Viet Cong force in the Mekong Delta and
reported killing nearly 200 in a day-long battle on
4 December. First reports put US casualties at four
killed and 38 wounded and South Vietnamese at 15 dead
and 50 wounded.
2. The fighting erupted 66 miles southwest of
Saigon as an allied task force, part of Operation
CORONADO IX, moved up a delta waterway in armored
troop carriers. When the leading troop carriers
carrying South Vietnamese Marines came under heavy
Viet Cong fire from the right bank, they proceeded
past the enemy positions, landed, and swept back
toward the enemy. The Communists are believed to
have been the 502nd Viet Cong local force battalion.
At the same time one battalion of the 2nd Brigade,
9th US Infantry Division, landed from troop carriers
below the Viet Cong and another battalion was landed
by helicopter behind the enemy. As the US forces
moved to link up with the South Vietnamese Marines,
the armored troop carriers laid down a barrage of
fire.
Viet Cong Attack in Quang Ngai
3. US, South Vietnamese, and South Korean
forces assisted beleagured South Vietnamese troops
defending the Binh Son District Headquarters in
northeastern Quang Ngai Province which came under
heavy enemy attack early on 3 December. The attackers,
probably from the 48th local force battalion, were
driven off after a six-and-a-half-hour battle which
left 52 enemy soldiers killed. Allied casualties
included 40 killed (22 civilians) and 12 wounded.
The recent increase in enemy activity in Quang Ngai
suggests that Viet Cong units there may be attempting
to launch their winter-spring campaign.
4 December 1967
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Guerrilla Activity Near Saigon
4. Viet Cong guerrillas staged a series of
attacks in the Saigon area on 4 December. Casu-
alities were light but damage was considerable.
5. The first attack shortly after midnight
was against the US supply complex at Long Binh in
Bien Hoa Province--the largest US base in South
Vietnam. Four enemy rockets struck the ammunition
storage area but did little damage. Other rockets
set fire to nearly 1.5 million gallons of liquid
asphalt and other building supplies. This was the
second attack on Long Binh in less than a week.
6. Later in the day some 13 miles east of
Saigon the enemy used recoilless rifle and small-
arms fire to attack a river convoy consisting of
four ammunition barges and a floating crane. One
barge was sunk, another partially sunk, and the
three remaining barges damaged. Some 21,000
rounds of 4.2-inch mortar and 105-mm. howitzer
ammunition were lost.
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Enemy Command and Control
7. During the night of 24-25 November in
the Mekong Delta, Viet Cong gunners shelled ten
district towns, 12 government outposts, two South
Vietnamese Army night defensive positions, and two
airfields. The Viet Cong also launched ground
attacks against seven outposts on the same night
and cratered Route 4--the main route from Saigon
southward into the delta--in nine places. Surges
of coordinated attacks like these have occured
periodically in the delta since late October.
Prior to that time coordinated enemy activity in the
delta was generally confined to a selected prov-
ince. The recent attacks show that the Viet Cong
have considerably improved their command and control
capability in this region.
8. The attacks were timed with large-scale
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army offensives in
the Loc Ninh - Song Be - Bu Dop area north of Saigon
and in the Dak To area of the central highlands, and
4 December 1967
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are probably part of the Communist country-wide
winter-spring campaign. In recent weeks examples
of closer coordination between Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese forces have been noted in a number of
other cases. Viet Cong local forces south of Da
Nang in the coastal districts of Quang Nam and Quang
Tin provinces have sustained a damaging campaign
of sabotage and harassment in an effort to relieve
pressure on the main force regiments of the North
Vietnamese 2nd Division operating in the Que Son
Valley.
9.
A s irmis on I October
near Phu Cat in which both the North Vietnamese
18th Regiment and the Viet Cong 50th Battalion were
identified confirms that North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong units are conducting joint operations in Binh
Dinh. Similar close coordination between North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong units has been noted in
Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa provinces along the central
coast and in the highlands of Kontum and Pleiku
provinces.
4 December 1967
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. The government will try leaders of the
1966 Buddhist struggle movement in Hue and Da
Nang. 4 government offical announced on 4 Decem-
ber that about 20 persons implicated in the
struggle will stand trial before Saigon's special'
military court on 19 December. The 20 include
several army officers and Nguyen Van Man, the
former mayor of Da Nang.
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INFILTRATION TOTALS SINCE 1 October 1965
Based on MACV Holdings as of 30 November 1967
ACCEPT ED
CONFIRMED PROBABLE TOTAL
POSSIBLE
MONTHLY
TOTALS
1965
October.
7,000
7,000
400
7,400
November
. 3,300
3,300
1,000
4;300
.' December
200
400
600
� 800
1,400
Sub-Total
10,500
400
10,900
2,200
13,100
1966
January
4,200
2,000
6,200 .
3,000
9,200
February
6,800
2,300
9,100
2,100
11,200
March -
11,800
1,300
13,100
3,600
16,700
April
100
500
600
- 600
1,200
May
1,300
500
1,800
3,600
5,400.
June
12,300
700
13,000
1,700
14,700
July
4,000
700
4,700
4,200
8,900
Amgust.
1,800
400
2,200
3,700
5,900
September
1400
700
2,100
700
2,800
October
100
600
700
5,200
5,900
November
500
100
600
600
1,200
December
1,000
600
1,600
2,500
4,100
Sub-Total
45,300
10,400
55,700
31,500
87,200
1967 January
1,000
800
1,800
3,700
5,500
February
1,700
2,000
3,700
1,500
5,200
March
4,300
400
4,700
4,500
9,200
April
4,000
600
4,600
300
4,900
May
4,000
1,300
5,300
1,500
6,800
June
4,200
_
4,200
1,700
' 5,900
July'
800
100
900
900
1,800
August
3,500
300
3,800
1,400
5,200
September
400
100
500
900
1,400
October
500
-
500
700
1,200
November
-
-
-
Sub-Total
24,400
5,600
30,000
17,100
47,100
TOTALS
80,200
16,400
96,600
50,800
147,400
MONTHLY AVERAGE (1 OCT 1965 - 31 MAY 19611
ACCEPTED: CONFIRMED AND PROBABLE 4,350
. TOTAL ACCEPTED AND POSSIBLE 6,600
ACCEPTED INFILTRATION: Those NVA personnel, groups, and units which have entered South Vietnam and are carried
in the confirmed or probable categories.
CONFIRMED: A confirnied infiltration unit/group is
one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis
of information provided by a minimum of two POWs
or returnees (Hui Chanh) from the unit/group, or two
captured documents from the unit, or a combination of
personnel and documents.
PROBABLE: A probable infiltration unit/group is one which
is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis of information
provided by one POW or returnee (Hol Chanh) from the
unit/group, as a captured document, supported by information
from other sources which can be evaluated as probably nue.
POSSIBLE INFILTRATION: A possible infiltration unit/group is one which may be in South Vietnam on the basis of
information which can be evaluated as possibly true even though no POW, returnee (Hol Chanh), or document is
available to verify the report,
NOTE: In addition to the infiltrators which fall into the above infiltration categories, other units or groups have been
mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, interrogation reports and sightings by friendly forces, but the information
is insufficient to warrant inclusion of these units or groups in any of the above categories.
MONTH OF INFILTRATION: The month established as the date an infiltration unit/group crosses the international border
into South Vietnam for the first time.
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III MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
_
1. MACV reports that the evidence so far shows over
47,000 North Vietnamese troops have infiltrated into
South Vietnam during the first 11 months of 1967. Of
these, 24,400 are listed by MACV as confirmed, 5,600 as
probable, and 17,100 as possible.
2. An analysis of infiltration units and groups
which arrived in South Vietnam through 31 October indi-
cates that at least 60 percent of the infiltrators were
replacements or fillers for North Vietnamese, Viet Cong,
and local force units. The percentage probably is even
higher because the disposition or assignment of a number
of infiltration groups is not. yet known.
Routes of Infiltration
4. Infiltration in 1967 has been marked by the use
of the Demilitarized Zone./
Use of the Demilitarized Zone complicates infiltration
analysis because units suffering casualties in the area
often return to North Vietnam for replacements, and it
frequently is impossible to fix the number of new infil-
trators when these units return to South Vietnam. There
are also some North Vietnamese units which have taken
part in actions in the area but have not yet been in-
cluded in MACV's infiltration statistics.
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5. The infiltration trails which extend through
the Laos panhandle continue to be the primary means
of travel.
6. Sea infiltration appears to have been al-
most totally thwarted. Only six infiltrators were
detected entering South Vietnam by sea in the first
ten months of 1967, and all of these were captured.
7. An additional 6,800 infiltrators--some 17
percent--came by unknown routes. It is believed
most of these probably came through Laos.
Indications of Additional Infiltration
8. There are indications of other large-
scale infiltrations which are not yet reflected
in MACV's statistics. Prisoners and defectors in
recent weeks, particularly in the central high-
lands, have identified a large number of new
infiltration units and groups. In addition, there
are reports of additional regimental-size for-
mations--such as the 40th Artillery Regiment,
which have not yet met all of MACV's criteria.
There is a time lag of six months and longer for
the detection of a new infiltration group, and
the problem is exacerbated by replacement
personnel who are even harder to detect.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
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1. There is nothing of significance to report.
4 December 1967
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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1. This year's Soviet effort to persuade the
US to prolong the projected holiday bombing pause
has begun. Last week a Soviet diplomat in London,
speaking "personally," told that
he felt the Soviet Union could persuade Hanoi to
enter negotiations if the US announced no terminal
date for the bombing pause.
3. More such approaches can be expected, but
there is no indication that Moscow is acting at
Hanoi's behest.
4 December 1967
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