THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03010094
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: November 29, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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29 November 1967
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Nole' lop-Secret vtreo
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
Inp-Secrer
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SS 10 11tJ K L 1 I 610,
Information as of 1600
29 November 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
North Vietnamese units seem to be preparing
new attacks in the Dak To area. Communist forces
are active in northwestern III Corps and seem bent
on dominating this area.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Enemy forces launched two attacks in northwestern
III Corps during the night of 28-29 November (Paras.
1-4). Intercepted enemy communications in the Dak
To area indicate that the North Vietnamese may be
planning another attack (Paras. 5-8). The enemy
wishes to dominate the Binh Long - Phuoc Long
Province area (Paras. 9-11). The Weekly Review
of South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Para. 12).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Two more of North Vietnam's MIGs moved to China on
29 November, but, despite these evacuations, Hanoi's
air force continues to offer resistance to US
strikes (Paras. 1-3).
/V. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: A Libera-
tion Front spokesman has again stated that a cessation
of the bombing of North Vietnam would not necessarily
affeCt the situation in the South (Paras. 1-3).
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I. MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A battalion-size force launched a heavy mor-
tar barrage and ground assault on the Bo Duc district
headquarters located 18 miles northeast of Loc Ninh
and some 85 miles north of Saigon along the Cambodian
border. The attack, during the night of 28-29 Novem-
ber, was timed to coincide with mortar and heavy
machine-gun fire on a nearby US Special Forces Camp
at Bu Dop.
2. The ground attack, possibly by elements of
the Viet Cong 272nd Regiment, penetrated but did not
overrun the Bo Duc district compound. During the five-
hour battle, approximately 200 South Vietnamese de-
fenders and ten US advisers were forced to withdraw.
They then called in air strikes on enemy troops in
the southern half of the compound and by morning had
regained control of the entire compound.
3. Early reports list 15 South Vietnamese killed
as against 100 enemy killed.
4. In another action, South Vietnamese Army
troops claim 36 Viet Cong were killed in a battle 84
miles southwest of Saigon late on 28 November. The
troops were searching for enemy forces which had
shelled the Soc Trang Airfield on 27 November.
The Central Highlands
5. North Vietnamese forces may be planning a
new attack in the Dak To area.
6. Although the headquarters of the North Viet-
namese 1st Division and probably some of its sub-
ordinate units have pulled back across the Cambodian
border, intercepted messages disclose that enemy forces
are continuing to conduct reconnaissance patrols near
US positions west of Dak To. Increasingly detailed
enemy intelligence reports have been intercepted during
the past three days. These include information on the
number of troops, artillery, and supplies at various
US positions.
29 November 1967
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7. The North Vietnamese appear to be particularly
interested in the US artillery fire support base at
Ben Het and a nearby hilltop supply base. These po-
sitions are some 12 miles west of Dak To and about 7
miles east of the point where the Laotian, Cambodian,
and South Vietnamese borders join.
8. The North Vietnamese may hope additional
attacks west of Dak To will tie down and hold US
battalions in the highlands for a longer time. This
region, like the Demilitarized Zone area, is a
battleground favorable to the Communists, because
it is near sanctuaries across the border and has
easy access to main supply routes. By maintaining
forces active in these areas, the Communists may
hope to relieve allied pressure on other North Viet-
namese and Viet Cong units deployed near coastal
population centers.
A "Third Front" in III Cor .s
9. The North Vietnamese are trying to establish
a main force enclave in the Binh Long - Phuoc Long
Province area along the Cambodian border north of
Saigon. The heavy attacks in the Loc Ninh - Song Be
area earlier this month and the recent attack on the
Bo Duc District headquarters in northern Phuoc Long
tend to confirm previous indications in captured
documents that the Communists hope to dominate this
region.
10. Communications intelligence also suggests
that the North Vietnamese have established a major
"front" command group in this area, similar to the
DMZ Front and the B-3 Front in the central highlands.
The technical features of a new radio net, located
by communications intelligence in the northern Binh
Long - Cambodian border area in August, are similar
to those exhibited by the B-3 Front when it first ap-
peared in July 1965. Three of the radio stations on
the net have been tentatively identified as the Viet
Cong 5th and 9th divisions and the North Vietnamese
7th Division.
29 November 1967
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11.
the recent
step-up in enemy activity in northwestern III Corps
area resulted from a directive from COSVN, the
over-all Communist headquarters in South Vietnam.
The directive allegedly indicated that the Commu-
nists intend to dominate northern Binh Long and
Phuoc Long provinces with a vie l4 toward eventual
negotiations.
the Communists hope
to turn this area into a secure terminus for in-
filtration and supply routes from Cambodia and
Laos.
Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
12. The week of 19-25 November compared with
the week of 12-18 November:
Killed
Wounded
Missing/
Captured
I. Casualties
US
VC/NVA
12-18 Nov
19-25 Nov
12-18 Nov 19-25 Nov
1,287
1,826
225 212
1,251 1,241
TOTALS
1,287
1,826
1,476 1,453
GVN
FREE WORLD
12-18 Nov
19-25 Nov
12-18 Nov 19-25 Nov
Killed
269
216
10 8
Wounded
632
664
20 18
Missing/
Captured
74
25
TOTALS
975
905
30 26
29 November 1967
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II. Viet Cong Incidents
Attacks
Battalion or Larger
Small Unit
12-18 Nov
19-25 Nov
53
56
2 � � � � 0
51 � � � � 56
Harassment
332
415
Terrorism
27
39
Sabotage
45
64
Propaganda
8
17
Antiaircraft
259
194
TOTALS
724
785
III. Weapons Captured
VC/NVA
GVN
12-18
Nov 19-25 Nov
12-18
Nov 19-25 Nov
Individual
449
Not
233
178
Crew-Served
61
Reported
4
7
TOTALS
510
237
185
29 November 1967
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1:Ss,S) EGRET
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Intercepted communications on 29 November
showed two North Vietnamese aircraft, possibly MIG-
17s, flying from the Hanoi area to Meng-tzu Airfield
in China. Prior to their departure, North Vietnam
was estimated to have four MIG-21s and eight MIG-
15/17s remaining in the country.
2. Despite the limited number of MIGs left,
they continue to offer determined resistance to US
aircraft. On 28 November returning US pilots reported
six encounters, three of which involved the exchange
of missile fire. No aircraft are known to have been
lost by either side.
3. The aggressive behavior of Hanoi's fighters
in recent weeks may have been prompted in part by re-
peated attacks in the capital area. There is no evi-
dence to indicate that the North Vietnamese are employ-
ing any radically new tactics or weapons. The fighter
pilots still flying combat missions are probably the
most skilled and experienced the North Vietnamese have.
Intercepted communications indicate that, despite
numerous raids on North Vietnam's airfields, Communist
ground controllers are directing MIGs in air engage-
ments with increasing assurance and sophistication.
29 November 1967
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
29 November 1967
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Viet Cong spokesmen continue to stress
that a US cessation of the bombings of North Viet-
nam would not necessarily affect the situation in
South Vietnam.
2. Dang Trinh Thi, head of the Liberation
Front delegation to the recent Soviet anniversary\
celebrations, took this line
Dang
outlined the standard Communist view that a peace-
ful settlement of the war could best be brought
about through acceptance of Hanoi's Four Points and
the Front's new political program. When asked
about the Front's reaction to a cessation of the
bombings of the North, he replied that Hanoi would
make its own decision on how to react to such a
move. The Front, however, would continue to fight
regardless of what North Vietnam might choose
to do, even if it decides to negotiate with the US.
3. North Vietnamese officials, in an effort
to show the independence of the Front, have also
indicated that any action on their part following
a bombing halt, including "talks" with the US,
would not automatically include the war in the
South. The US would have to deal directly with the
Liberation Front on such matters.
29 November 1967
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. An intercepted message of 24 November from
the North Vietnamese trade office in Moscow to Hanoi
indicates that three carloads of unidentified cargo
have been held up at the Sino-Mongolian border since
20 September waiting for through shipment. The
Moscow office asked Hanoi to intervene with the
Chinese authorities to secure the necessary transit
permission.
2. Since last spring the North Vietnamese have
been taking title to at least some categories of
Soviet shipments at the Sino-Soviet or the Sino-
Mongolian border, and the Vietnamese have been re-
sponsible for arranging the onward movement of these
items to Vietnam. The reason for the present hold-
up is not specified in the message.
29 November 1967
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