THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03010091
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: November 27, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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Information as of 1600
27 November 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
The South Vietnamese Government's recent mobili-
zation decree has come under fire in the Senate.
Hanoi is keenly interested in the US presidential
elections but is cautious in assessing the impact
of antiadministration sentiment.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
North Vietnamese gunners attacked six allied posi-
tions in Kontum Province with mortar fire on 26-27
November (Para. 1). US Marines reported two sharp
clashes in I Corps (Para. 2).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Senate on 25 November began discussing the
recent mobilization decree, charging that its pro-
mulgation was unconstitutional.
The lower house
has recessed temporarily, but several deputies
have been actively seeking assistance for their
constituents (Para. 3).
There is
IV.
There is
Military Developments in North Vietnam:
nothing of significance to report.
Other Communist Military Developments:
nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: A Viet-
namese spokesman has expressed interest in the
forthcoming US presidential elections. Hanoi has,
however, repeatedly indicated that it foresees no
change in US policy as a result of the election
(Paras. 1-4).
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VI. Other Major Aspects: The Laotian Govern-
ment has registered its strongest public protest to
date against the possible extension of a defensive
barrier into Laos (Paras. 1-3).
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NORTH
VIETNAM
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27 NOVEMBER
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. North Vietnamese troops hit four US outposts
area with some 250 mortar rounds on
Early on the 27th two allied positions
provincial capital, Kontum city, were
casualties in the attacks were six
wounded. US military officers specu-
enemy may have fired this large amount
of ammunition to use it up prior to completing a
withdrawal ffom the Dak To battle area./
in the Dak To
26 November.
in the nearby
also hit. US
killed and 31
late that the
but additional fighting cannot be
ruled out in this area.
2. US Marines reported two sharp clashes in
I Corps. In the heaviest action 12 Marines were
killed and 66 wounded in a day-long fight in the
coastal lowlands some 19 miles southwest of Da Nang.
Another engagement near the southern boundary of
the Demilitarized Zone cost seven US lives. Twenty-
two North Vietnamese soldiers were reported killed
in that fight.
The Situation in the DMZ
3. The Demilitarized Zone has been relatively
quiet for nearly two months. The last major action
in this area was the massive artillery shelling of
Con Thien in September. There are now indications
pointing to a resumption of fighting in this sector.
4. The most important is the movement of the
North Vietnamese 304th Division from its garrison
area at the Thanh Hoa southward toward the zone.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Senate on 25 November took up discussion of
the government's recent mobilization decree and indicated
general displeasure that it was promulgated unilaterally
by the government before the legislature was invested.
Although a number of senators criticized the substance
of the decree, particularly the lowering of the draft
age, the majority were concerned with its constitu-
tionality. It was finally agreed that Prime Minister
Loc or his representative should be invited before the
Senate to discuss the decree and answer questions.
Final language of the invitation iS to be decided on
at the Senate's next session on 28 November.
2. Defense Minister Vy reportedly is dissatisfied
with the caliber of Vietnamese Army officers and is con-
sidering revamping the selection process. Rather
than use a college degree as the sole criterion for
admission to officer candidate school, Vy would report-
edly first induct college graduates as privates and
then screen them carefully for officer qualifications
before giving Commissions to those who measure up.
Lower House Activities
3. The lower house has recessed until 1 December
while its rules committee begins work on drafting rules
Meanwhile, a number of deputies have been seeing to
the needs of their constituents. Several deputies from
central highland provinces met with Defense Minister Vy
on 21 November to request better security along roads
in the area. Other deputies have distributed relief
supplies in their constituencies or have approached the
government for such things as more refugee assistance
and better compensation for war damage.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Hanoi continues to show keen interest in the
US presidential elections, but it is cautious in
assessing the impact of antiadministration sentiment.
North Vietnamese commentary takes pains to show that
the regime is not counting on the elections for a
change in US policy, and to stress that the war
must be won by frustrating US objectives in South
Vietnam.
2. Mai Van Bo, North Vietnam's chief repre-
sentative in France, touched on some of these points
in a recent conversation with a Western journalist.
Bo said that he believes the Vietnam war will be
the principal theme of the election. He said he
accepted, with "some reservation," US opinion polls
showing a marked decline in President Johnson's
popularity. He also said that he attaches particular
importance to the New Hampshire primary as a preview
of the November election.
3. Bo also claimed that "aggressive" US military
and economic policies will eventually become stale-
mated and that the US will have to return to a "forced
isolationism," and to a policy of "peaceful coexistence."
His remarks are consistent with those of other regime
spokemen, who usually seek to avoid any implication
that North Vietnam expects an early end to the war.
4. This theme was taken up recently in the army
daily Quan Doi Nhan Dan, which commented approvingly
on the antiwaf sentiment in the US. The paper asserted
that North Vietnam does not overestimate "internal
contradiction" in the US. The deciding factor for
victory, said the daily, is to "change the balance
of strength in our favor on the battlefield by beat-
ing the Americans and their allies, militarily and
politically." Whatever the results of the US pres-
idential elections, it went on, the Vietnam policy
of the US Government "will not change fundamentally
by itself."
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. The Laotian Government, in its strongest
statement to date, has reiterated its opposition
to the extension in Laos of the defensive barrier
being constructed south of the Demilitarized Zone.
A recent article in the official government news-
paper argued that a manned barrier in Laos "would
be without doubt an act in violation of the Geneva
Accords."
2. The article, apparently written under the
direction of Souvanna Phouma, appears in part to be
an answer to a recent Newsweek article speculating
that a manned barrier may be extended into Communist-
controlled Laos, with or without the approval of
Vientiane. It could also be that Souvanna has
taken this opportunity to placate the Russians, who
expressed irritation over his pro-Western remarks
during recent trips to Washington and Canberra.
3. Although a barrier would somewhat tarnish
Vientiane's neutrality, Souvanna appears more con-
cerned that it would increase his country's direct
involvement in the Vietnam war. He has also ex-
pressed fear that an artificial barrier would re-
sult in a de facto division of Laos and would en-
courage regional separatism.
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