CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03007386
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 25, 1961

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IF
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
25 March 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
�
II
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LATE ITEM
USSR: An earth satellite vehicle--Sputnik X--was
successfully launched from the Tyura Tam Missile Test
Range at about 0054 EST 25 March. Preliminary evidence
suggests that the payload was landed intact, alter about
one complete orbit of the earth, in an area approximately
200 nautical miles west of Sverdlovsk.
Sputnik X. amnnif nthpr frequences
which have been identified with
moiogical payloads in earlier satellites. Identification of
the payload will have to await detailed analysis of the inter-
cepted telemetry. Preliminary field analysis
indicates an ob-
ject which in general appearance resembles a helmet and
the size and proportions appear to match those which would
be expected if 2 man wprp ahnarri
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25 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page i)
2. Congo: UN postpones plan to re-enter Matadi. (Page ti)
3. Ethiopia: Emperor's prestige damaged by conces-
sion on army pay. (Page it)
4. South Korea: Demonstration against proposed anti-
Communist law. (Page it)
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A!uong Sal S Nam Bac
4 '1 or / Sam Neua ,
LUANG' PRABANG
Luang Prabang
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Vientiasie
THAI L AND
NORTHERN LAOS
4ar GOVERNMENT Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
4110
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
X SITE OF C-47 SHOOTDOWN
ROAD
� -TRAIL P
ROUTE NUMBER
50
STATUTE MILES
Thu'khek
Vtivannakhet
25 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
� Laos: Moscow has not yet broadcast, as it has done
In the past, either a summary account or an interpretative
commentary on President Kennedy's remarks on Laos at his
recent press conference. A Home Service broadcast an-
nounced that a statement on Laos was made at the press con-
ference, and Izvestia reported the event without further elab-
oration. Moscow's silence probably reflects an unwillingness
to make a public statement on the issue before a reply has
been made to the British note on Laos. Premier Khrushchev
only arrived in Moscow on 24 March following his tour through
the New Lands area. Peiping has broadcast a news item on
the press conference charging that the President "blatantly
clamored for further actions to save the rebellious clique."
Hanoi has not commented on the press conference but on 24
March, for the second time in three days, broadcast a state-
ment by Souvanna Phouma suggesting that the ICC might be
reactivatereceded by an international confer-
ence.
an American C-47 aircraft was shot down
on 23 March in the Plaine des Jarres area.
seven Americans were killed and one was
captured after parachuting to the ground. According to another
report, the aircraft was flying at an altitude of about 6,500 feet
when hit. a missing USAF
iC-47 which was engaged in reconnaissance in the course of a
flight from Vientiane to Saigon. The aircraft renortedlv carried
el ht American air force and army personne
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
ii
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3
7,
Congo: Erhe UN plan to re-enter Matadi has been post-
poned. According to high officials in the UN Secretariat, the
decision to move more slowly was made partly because Ham- 0-
marskjold's plan was opposed by his military officers in the 1.-1
.1rInp*n on grounds they did not have sufficient military strengtiii ()pi
(Backup,
Page 3)
Ethiopia: The Emperor's decision of 22 March to yield
to the demands of army elements for an increase in enlisted
�pay scales has lessened--at least temporarily�the threat to
his regime. The Emperor, however, has suffered a loss in
prestige by surrendering to a threat of force. This incident,
moreover, may serve as a precedent for future threats to the
regime by other dissatisfied groups. One such group, con-
sisting of army officers, is rumored to have met to formulate
demands for the retirement of inactive and a
promotion system based on merit. Backup, Page 5)
South Korea: Scattered violence and the appearance of
pro-Communist themes in the later stages of a demonstration
� in Seoul on 22 March are probably the result of organized sub-
version. This demonstration, like others in major South Korean
cities against a proposed anti-Communist law, failed to attract
wide public support. However, it did succeed in arousing con-
siderable emotion stemming from fears of a return to the re-
pressive practices of the Rhee regime and led the press to take
a common position opposing the bill. The government has re-
portedly decided to drop the proposed legislation. The police
showed some improvement in their ability to control limited
crowds but they still appear incapable of handling large-scale
disturbances. (Backup, Page 6)
25 Mar 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Situation in Laos
Souvanna Phouma, now in Paris, has told reporters that
he was "slightly disquieted" by President Kennedy's press
statement on Laos. Souvanna said he hoped that the contacts
he would be having with French and British officials would
help to limit the conflict in Laos--a country already "trans-
formed into a battlefield by foreign intervention." Souvanna
reiterated his claim to have the support of 90 to 95 percent
of the Laotian people.
Ein the discussions held with Ambassador Harriman in India
recently, Souvanna was emphatic on the need for including the
Pathet Lao in the government. Souvanna said that the original
error was in attempting to suppress the rebellion by force of
arms and that the Pathet Lao were so interspersed among the
people that the government had no way to take direct action. He
mentioned that only when he had taken the Pathet Lao into the
government in 1957 did the Vientiane government regain control
over Phong Saly and Sam Neua province.3
6ouvanna outlined to Harriman his solution for the Laotian
problem: reconvene the ICC to establish a cease-fire and stop
outside military assistance; convene a 14-nation conference; and,
simultaneously, form a coalition government in Laos--by agree-
ment among the Laotians themselves--to prepare general elec-
tions. Souvanna insisted he is still prime minister and justified
his absence from the Laotian scene by the need to inform world
leaders of the true situation in Laos. He said he planned after
visiting London to go to Prague, Warsaw, Moscow, and Peiping:A
[French officials have indicated that although the French
Government has no objections to the recent British demarche
to the Soviet Union, Paris feels that a meeting between the
"principals" involved in Laos--the US, USSR, France, and
"possibly" the UK--must be the first step in any solution there.
De Gaulle's diplomacy has consistently favored calm delibera-
tions and big-power decisions on a global basis. Therefore,
hile Paris is not opposed to holding a 14-nation conference, re-
alling the ICC, or seeking a cease-fire in Laos, it believes that_)---?
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Lany or all of these efforts would be meaningless in the absence
(
of a prior agreement win, the USSR nn thP hit' nntline nf a
Laotian settlement.
Bloc airlift operations into Laos continu
the Soviet transport reportedly shot down by
Meo tribesmen on 17 February was an IL-14. On that day Hanoi
requested that "all elements make a thorough search for aircraft
042." The number apparently refers to Soviet IL-14 registra-
tion number 52042, which arrived in North Vietnam with the
first group of five Soviet IL-14s on 2 December last year.
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Situation in the Congo
One UN official in New York implied that if tensions less-
en as a result of Kasavubu's current visit to the Lower Congo
area, a military operation might not be necessary. However,
civilians in the UN Command in Leopoldville continue to press
local officials to permit a return to Matadi. The UN adminis-
trative officer said on 23 March that the command had had not
information concerning the arrival of goods in the port since
its officers were forced out early in March. As a result, it
has issued no instructions for shipping goods inland. Officials
of OTRACO, the company which operates the port facilities
and the railroad to Leopoldville, apparently believe that the
UN has deliberately refused to issue forwarding instructions,
since to do so would weaken its claim that a UN presence in
Matadi is necessary.
The heads of state of the twelve "Brazzaville powers"--the
former French territories in tropical Africa with the exception
of Guinea, Mali, and Togo--are to meet at Yaounde in Cameroun
from 26 to 31 March. At this time they hope to develop a com-
mon policy on the Congo. dhe Ivory Coast's Felix Houphouet-
1 Boigny, the prime mover of the Brazzaville grouping, stated
recently that he plans to make a determined effort to persuade
his associates to contribute contingents to the UN Commancti
Cleophas Kamitatu, a former ally of Gizenga who has been
cooperating with the Leopoldville government, reportedly is to
leave the capital for Stanleyville on Saturday for negotiations
with the Gizenga regime. Optimism is high in Leopoldville that
a reconciliation can be reached; however, Gizenga's opposition
to the central government and its supporters apparently has
hardened. He has expelled the five Western consuls from Stan-
leyville and reportedly told a visiting journalist that there was
"not the slightest possibility of reaching a compromise" between
his regime and Leopoldville.
In preliminary talks with Hammarskjold's personal repre-
sentative in Brussels, Belgian Foreign Ministry officials took
the position that the only way to settle the question of withdrawing
CONFIDENTIAL
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rnwp, CONFIDENTIAL Now
Belgian officers from areas controlled by Kasavubu is to have
the three parties involved "thrash out the question of individual
officers." Even if such a conference could be organized, it is
doubtful that it would prove productive.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Haile Selassie Capitulates to Army Demands
The announced pay increases, which equal the amount
promised by the short-lived rebel regime last December,
are also to apply to the 28,500-member police force; they
apparently do not extend, however, to the air force and the
navy. The latter services, which to date have not been in-
volved in significant antiregime activity, apparently are not
to receive higher pay because of budgetary considerations.
In the future, however, they may join forces with civil serv-
ants, whose salaries are to be cut to defray the cost of the
army and police pay raises, to create further difficulties
for the regime.
� The US Embassy believes that the events of the past
few days were well organized. [Government officials in Addis
Ababa reportedly believe that a group of civilians--as yet
unidentified--planned the palace demonstrations on 21 March
Involving about 500 enlisted army personnel.
Other observers believe a group of army officers insti-
gated the recent disordere-d Earlier information indicated
that a group of army officers was joining the increasing num-
bers of malcontents who favor the reformist objectives of
the December coup and who sympathize with GeneralMen-
ghistu--former commander of the disbanded Imperial Body
Guard. Menghistu, whose trial has been in progress since
27 February, is gaining acceptance as the symbol of reform
in Ethiopia. Should he be executed, as expected, a new
crisis will confront Haile Selassie,
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Demonstrations in South Korea
The demonstrations on 22 March were conducted by about
a thousand reformist political agitators and students, but a
small, hard-core subversive group is believed to have been
responsible for the appearance of pro-Communist slogans fa-
voring Korean unification and for several clashes with the
police which occurred during the last stages of the demon-
strations.
The demonstrations were staged to protest efforts by the
Chang Myon government to tighten the law passed in June 1960
which prohibited membership in or conscious support of Com-
munist groups. One draft law would have punished persons
who praised or encouraged antistate organizations�not clearly
defined--and their members, or who were in any way involved
in defections to North Korea. This law would have increased
�the maximum penalty for illegal entry from North Korea from
five years' imprisonment to death and would have authorized
military intelligence agencies to investigate civilians suspected
of violating security laws.
A second draft bill would have limited public demonstra-
tions to one-half hour's duration and prohibited demonstrators
from blocking public buildings, using loudspeakers, or con-
ducting demonstrations in front of foreign official buildings and
private residences.
As a result of its failure to pass the draft legislation, the
government presumably will depend on stricter enforcement of
existing regulations and more effective police work to control
demonstrations, disorders, and subversive activities.
American Ambassador McConnaughy comments, however,
that such countermeasures provide no fundamental cure. Under-
lying public apprehension about security legislation is gradually
increasing dissatisfaction with the Chang government for its
failure to move quickly in the field of economic reform. A dem-
onstration in Seoul on 23 March by 2,000 members of the Korean
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100
Unemployed Association criticized the government for its
preoccupation with antisubversive measures and called for
speedy implementation of the National Construction Service
program, which is designed to utilize large pools of unem-
ployed persons in nationwide public works projects. Further
demonstrations are expected in April to celebrate the first
anniversary of the ouster of the Rhee government.
CONFIDENTIAL
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4riei1FIUCdIIstLi
"ye
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIM-
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