CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03007385
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 23, 1961

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or lwr ZCI6ICIC I
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
23 March 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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23 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2. Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow scheduled for 28 March,
day after SEATO Council of Ministers meeting opens in
Bangkok. (Page t)
3. Congo: Tshombd begins trip today to Leopoldville, Brazza-
ville, Abidjan, and Monrovia; hopes to gain support for
concept of loose confederation. (Page tt)
4. Vietnam: Oorth Vietnamese
- directed guerrillas gives timetable for acts of
violence to sabotage 9 April election to South. (TOP
(Page it)
5. Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi says
� Peiping will not enter UN until US ends "occupation"
of Taiwan. (Page tit)
6. Afghanistan: Daud to visit Moscow: will probably discuss
Soviet aid. (Page iit)
7. Ethiopia: Troops in Addis Ababa protest against low pay;
Emperor promises investigation to rectify inequities.
(Page iv)
8. Morocco: King Hassan II exploiting recent capture
and release of foreign oil technicians to further his
claims to Spanish Sahara. (Page iv)
9. Watch Committee conclusions. Page v)
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Phong Sal y
PHONG SALY
N AdiTH A
Miuong SaiANI
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LUANG1 PRABANG
Luang Prabang
SAYAB OU R Y
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Sam'Neua
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Plain
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13
VIENTIANE
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NORTHERN LAOS
Forces in
40 KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
0
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GOVERNMENT
ROAD
� TRAIL
0
ROUTE NUMBER
50
illit
STATUTE MILES
100
am Bac
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Tha Thom
AND
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Kam Keut
KHAMM UANE
11-
T akhek
avannaktiii
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: sie ports indicate that the government's explo- 6
ration of possible political solutions is centering on
acceptance of Sihanouk's 14-nation conference proposal.
The cabinet apparently is also considering the idea of a
commission to follow the conference comprised of Cam- If' "t-
bodLa Burma, Malaya, India, Poland, and Canada3,.
L...there are tentative indications of a Kong Le - Pathet
Lao effort to outflank government forces blocking the ap-
proach to Luang Prabang along Route .13. Some government
troops have been deployed to counter this threat. Other
government forces are being sent to reinforce the Kam Keut
area, �where skirmishing apparently continues
:Backup, Page 1) (Map)
*Warsaw Pact: The chief purpose of the Warsaw Pact
meeting announced for 28 March in Moscow is to create a
forum from which to respond to Western moves on the Lao-
tian situation. This meeting of the Pact's Political Consult-
ative Committee is timed to follow the current meeting in
Bangkok of SEATO military advisers and the opening on 27
March of the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers.
Moscow probably feels that the Laotian situation is moving
Into a new and decisive phase which may require high-level
coordination of future bloc steps and which in any event makes
desirable a new demonstration of bloc solidarity. Yester-
day's TASS announcement refers, as did the announcement
prior to a similar session last year, to a meeting at the "top
level." This suggests that Eastern European party leaders
and premiers may again attend along with the foreign and
defense ministers, who are specifically mentioned in the
vfi
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announcement. Such a meeting could provide an occasion
for Khrushchev to break his long public silence on foreign
affairs. It is probable that next week's session will cover
the Berlin question, at least on a pro forma basis. and
possibly in a more threatening context.
(Backup, Page 2)
Congo: Tshombd is to leave Elisabethville today for a
trip which reportedly will include stops at Leopoldville,
Brazzaville, Monrovia, and Abidjan in the Ivory Coast. In
his talks with Leopoldville officials he apparently will push
his plans for a round of conferences to follow up those at
Tananarive. In his international travels he probably hopes
to obtain support for his concept of a Congo confederation.
He plans to attend the conference of Independent African
states tentatively scheduled for early April in Monrovia.
Tshombe reportedly believes that if he can gain the confi-
dence of Liberia's President Tubman, he will have the sup-
port of the African leader best able to influence United States
policy and can thereby counteract what he considers the un=
sympathetic American attitude toward Katanga.
(Backup, Page 3)
Vietnam: North Vietnamese directed guerrillas in at
least one area of South Vietnam have been given a timetable
for acts of violence to sabotage the South viptnAmpsp nrAR-
idential elections scheduled for 9 April.
the following timetable to
guerrillas in Kien Giang Province, southwest of Saigon on
the Cambodian border:
2 April: Attacks on official buildings; assassination
of "wicked people"--presumably village of-
ficials; posting of anti-Diem slogans; meet-
ings to organize popular support.
Attacks to disrupt road travel; continuation
of attacks on official buildings; and apparently,
4 April
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VIA
VA
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14�14 ur
efforts to surround military and civil guard
posts.
8 April: Bridges to be destroyed; waterways blocked;
large-scale demonstrations to be organized
In towns. Instructions for this date also
specify: "Bring out the armed forces and have
them break the enemy's grip on the outside
areas."
9 April: (election day): A general strike to be organized
in towns and villages.
10-15 April: Instructions for this period call for launching
"a struggle opposing the fraudulent election,"
and a "fierce frontal struggle principally aimed
at the vile authorities." I
Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yl, in an inter- 0
view published in Hungary's party newspaper, has said that it
,
will not be possible for Peiping to enter the UN until the US ends,
e.41-.---t
its "occupation" of Taiwan and withdraws its armed forces from?'
the area. Heretofore, Peiping's public statements on UN repr
sentat ion have not gone beyond insistence on the ouster from thge ,it
UN of the Chinese Nationalists. While Peiping has not issued"
an official policy statement along these lines, the Chinese
Communists may believe that international pressures for their
participation in the UN have reached a point that encourages
them to press their demands for a US withdrawal from Taiwan
with new vigor. (Backup, Page 4)
Afghanistan-USSR: Afghan Prime Minister Daud, now in�
Rome for medical treatment. Plans to leave for Moscow on
4 April,
He made similar trips to Moscow while returning
home from visits to Europe in 1959 and 1960. Daud probably
intends to discuss Soviet assistance programs under Afghan-
istan's Seennd Five-Year plan, which is to begin in September. ,
paud suggested that the Afghan deputy
minister of planning come to Rome to discuss possible Italian
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aid for the' Second Five-Year Plan.
"Then he can go to Moscow with me." Daud will also probably
try to learn how the recent limited improvement in Soviet rela-
tions with Pakistan might affect Moscow's suPport for Afghan-
stan in the Pushtoonistan dispute.
;)4
Ethiopia: The Emperor on 21 March filet a deputation of
500 unarmed enlisted men representing all army units in the
Addis Ababa area, following peaceful demonstrations by these
troops who were protesting against low pay scales. The troops �
dispersed peacefully after the Emperor promised to institute
a full probe to rectify inequities in army pay scales. They, re-
portedly remained dissatisfied, however, and reconvened into
smaller groups to discuss further moves. The Emperor ap-
pears reluctant to yield to the soldiers' demands despite warn-
ings from senior army leaders that they will be unable to control z
, /
the troops unless concessions are forthcoming. The populace
In the capital is apparently becoming more sympathetic to demands fl
for reform.
(Backup, Page 6)
/ A
-4;-,
Morocco-Spanish Sahara: King Hassan Ills exploiting 0 k -
the capture and release of the 11 foreign oil technicians--in-, 7
eluding three Americans--to further Morocco's claims to /Ai
Spanish Sahara, in the opinion of the American charge d'af-1
faires and the British ambassador in Rabat. These officials fP -1--
believe that the King's communiqu�issued simultaneously ,6-0-
with his theatrical release of the captured men to their re-
spective embassies, contains a clear threat that other oil pros-4...t.v.i7
pectors in northern Spanish Sahara will get similar treatment. /7--- /
4
At thQ same time, Hassan indicated he was willing to negotiate ,-
-%
Morocco's claim to the Sahara with Spain and France.
The Spanish command in the Canary islands claims that
Spanish forces in northeastern Spanish Sahara have surrounded
an invadin Moroccan group and are attacking it from land and
air. (Backup, Page 8)
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
A. No change from last week.
B. No change from last week.
C. LAOS
Communist forces, supported by undiminished bloc material
assistance by air and road, continue pressure on discouraged
Lao Army forces which are in a generally defensive posture
on the approaches to Luang Prabang, yang Vieng, and Tha
Thom. Communist forces are probably consolidating their
recent advances in the Route 13 area between Vientiane and
Luang Prabang in preparation to exploit further opportunities.
The Communist attacks in the vicinity of Kham Keut probably
are intended to cause further dispersion of Lao Army forces
and to extend the areas under Communist control; they
probably will be followed by similar attacks in other areas
of southern Laos.
Members of the Boun Oum government, discouraged
by the continuing improvement in the Communist military
position, are tending to desire an early political settle-
ment, perhaps even involving adverse terms. The Bloc
nations charge increasing intervention by the US, Thailand,
and South Vietnam, but have not embarked on a major cam-
paign stressing threats to their own security; this, com-
bined with a lack of urgency in their diplomatic approaches,
may reflect confidence in continued enhancement of the
Communist position in Laos.
SOUTH VIETNAM
Viet Cong (Communist) guerrilla groups in South Vietnam
will probably engage in a vigorous extensive campaign of
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sabotage and political terrorism in connection with and prior
to the 9 April South Vietnamese presidential elections. The
Vietnamese security forces are already heavily committed,
which will facilitate Viet Cong efforts to undermine govern-
mental authority in the countryside to create widespread
chaos and unrest.
CONGO
Continuing efforts by the Stanleyville regime to obtain de-
livery of promised material assistance from Bloc and Radical
African sources have been unsuccessful and, in effective
quantities, will remain so as long as the Sudan refuses transit.
The continued control of the Matadi area by Congolese troops
and the indications by the Government that only non-military
cargoes will be allowed to enter suggests that any effort to
disembark UN troops at Matadi under these circumstances
may create a serious incident, particularly as the first troop
ship to arrive will be carrying Indian troops. Dayalts return
as UN representative would worsen relations between the UN
and the Leopoldville government.
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Situation in Laos
request for
maps showing the various towns between the junction and Luang
Prabang. maps for this area were
unavailable, but that an inquiry was being sent to Hanoi.
leaflets be prepared for
the purpose of inducing the rallying of former Kong Le para-
troopers, now in Luang Prabang, who had gone over to Phoumi's
side when Vientiane was recaptured last December.
these former comrades might desire to return
to the Kong Le side if they were sure they would not be shot as
deserters. Kong Le -
Pathet Lao personnel are going to Hanoi for jump training and
other specialized instructions.
all Luang
Prabang province east of that city is now under Pathet Lao con-
trol.
Llri the tense atmosphere of Vientiane, the possibility of an
anti-government coup cannot be excluded. Communist agents are
spreading rumors and anti-American propaganda among the
population. A morale problem exists among civil servants and
garrison troops; recent defections from both groups have been
reported. Additionally, there is a growing body of feeling
against the continuation and possible expansion of hostilities.
While Phoumi maintains in Vientiane several units considered
by him to be among his most reliable troops, a determined ef-
fort against the government by a relatively small armed group
could gain rapid momentu_nE
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Warsaw Pact Meeting
On intra-bRic matter, the Soviet leaders could use next
week's meeting as an opportunity to apply new pressures de
signed to bring Albania babk-litito line with thel USSR. In the
military field, discussion of A-possible reduction in Soviet
forces in Hungary might be on the agenda, as might also be
plans for Warsaw pact combined-training excercises later
this year.
Meetings of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Com-
mittee have been used since the Pact's formation in 1955 as a
forum for discussion of a wide range of pressing political matters
by Soviet bloc leaders. These meetings have been attended4337
observers from Communist China; last year's session was at-
tended also by observers from North Vietnam and North Korea.
The final communique � of these various meetings have annount4d
a unified bloc position on the questions at issue.
Thus the meeting in February 1960, although marredlyy
sharp Sino-Soviet differences, issued a statement which
fully restated the Soviet position on the Berlin and German
Issues and outlined those topics the USSR intended to discuss
at the then-forthcoming Big Four "summit" meeting. 'The coin-
muniqud following the April 1959 meeting was directed toward
the issues to be considered at the Big Four foreign ministers'
conference that spring. The May 1958 meeting was used to
attack the theses issued a month earlier by a congress of the
Yugoslav party and to widen the break in party relations between
the bloc and Belgrade. The meetings in 1958 and 1960, though
riot the one in 1959, were attended by Soviet bloc party leaders
and chiefs of state, in addition to the foreign and defense min-
isters.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Situation in the Congo
During his Leopoldville visit Tshombd reportedly hopes
to be briefed on the status of negotiations with Gizenga and
Lundula.
Leopoldville officials were authorized at the Tananarive
co erence to make secret contacts with the Stanleyville re-
gime. There have been persistent reports of such contacts
and
Leopoldville is at least attempting to maintain com-
mumcations contact with Stanleyville; however, there is no
firm evidence of any negotiations.
Tshombd apparently will attempt to convene a meeting
in April which would be attended by the Tananarive conferees.
He hopes to follow this with a large-scale round-table confer-
ence in Elisabethville. ale seems to believe that the Tananarive
resolution provided for the complete abolition of the central gov-
ernment machinery- a position at variance with that of most
Leopoldville officials, who hope to retain elements of a federal
structure; Ileo and other leaders in Leopoldville expect to per-
suade Tshombe to modify his proposals at the forthcoming con-
ferences, but their conciliatory posture may be compromised
by Mobutu, who has stated that he considers the Tal-
nanarive conference idiotic.
The security situation in outlying areas of the Congo con-
tinues to deteriorate
intimidation by Congolese armed bands is increasing. As a re-
sult, the senior WHO official in Leopoldville has told his head-
quarters in Geneva that work may soon become impossible in
many areas.
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Peiping Expands Conditions for UN Seat
aieiping's reported new demand is a logical expansion of
its thesis that "imperialism--especially US imperialism--" is
the greatest danger in the world and that the Communist
bloc's efforts must be devoted to a no-holds-barred struggle
against it. This attitude is reflected in Peiping's current in-
sistence on the withdrawal of US forces and the recognition
of its claim to Taiwan as a necessary preliminary to the set-
tlement of all Sino-US prob.bems3.
Li'ollowing the 103rd Sino-US ambassadorial meeting in
Warsaw on 7 March, Peiping said it would be difficult to
reach agreement with the US on any matter until the US ends
its "occupation" of Taiwan. Peiping now may be seeking to
take the issue outside the field of bilateral Sib-US relations
and force its consideration in the UN. The Chinese Commu-
nists may also intend through this maneuver to make it more
difficult for any consideration in the UNof a "two Chinas"
solutionj
/he new condition may not reflect a firm policy position.
Peiping may be employing the familiar tactic of setting a
high price in preparation for bargaining later. Chou En-lai
may have been hinting at the nature of a compromise accept-
able to Peiping when he told Edgar Snow last November that
the US must agree to withdraw its forces but added that as
to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, "they are
matters for subsequent thscussion.7
Many UN members which now support Peiping's entry
into the UN would probably be unwilling to attempt to accom-
modate the Chinese Communists beyond voting to seat Pei-
ping's representative. These members believe that UN mem-
bership is a privilege as well as a right and therefore would
consider Peiping's demands demeaning to the organization.
Britain's recent announcement that Communist China should
be seated in the United Nations has subsequently been am-
plified by a Foreign Office private view that no conditiolas7
CONFIDENTIAL
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[jould be attached by Taipei's supporters to the seating of
Peiping. On the other hand, the Foreign Office would oppose
the Chinese Communists if Peiping advanced such conditions
as UN recognition that Taiwan belonged to China or that
charges of aggression against Communist China be expunged
from UN recordsi
CONFIDENTIAL
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Army Dissidence Threatens Ethiopia
Ambassador Richards indicated on 22 March that while
an uneasy calm has returned to Addis Ababa, trouble could
break out again unless the Emperor acts quickly to accom-
modate the army dissidents' demands.
The Emperor's attempts to date to reduce the growing
criticism of his regime appear to have failed. He sought to
alleviate army discontent on 14 March by announcing a mod-
est increase in its pay scales and to quell dissension among
junior and middle-level officers the next day by promoting 73
army officers. The pay increase, however, which is to come
from the present army budget, falls considerably short of that
promised by the rebel leadership last December. Moreover,
air force, police, and navy personnel will be aroused over be-
ing denied a pay raise equal to that given the army, while army
officers are likely to regard their promotions simply as a
counterbalance to those given air force officers last month. Po-
lice officials are also displeased because the Emperor recently
appointed an army officer instead of a career police official as
commissioner of police.
Government officials are sufficiently alarmed to have or-
dered precautionary measures, including the construction of
breastworks around at least one army installation and the po-
sitions of heavy weapons and additional guards at other key
placesT7
Handbills, which may have originated in the Ministry of
Defense, were circulated in the capital on 20 March setting
forth the demands of the dissidents. These included�in addi-
tion to the pay raise--the dismissal of Chief. of Staff Kebede
and other, high government officials, threatening direct action
if they are not complied with.
The American army attache notes that the dissidents ap-
parently have succeeded in establishing organizational ties
through several if not all local army units. A leader capable
of directing action against the regime is not yet known to have
emerged, however. Although army officers reportedly have
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secured all arms in unit armories, the troops could recover
these weapons through mass action if the situation were to get
out of hand.
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Moroccan Claims to Saharan Territories
Soon after Spain published regulations on 15 June 1959
for the exploitation of petroleum resources in the Spanish
Sahara, the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid made known Mo-
rocco's claims of sovereignty over the region. The Moroccan
economic counselor in Madrid indicated at that time that he
thought American oil companies should be advised this was a
contested area and that they might subsequently have to rene-
gotiate their status with another government. The following
year, nine American firms obtained concessions from the
Spanish Government, and by January 1961,38 American teams
were engaged in exploratory work. Emphasis was placed on
�the northwestern part of the Spanish Sahara because of the
availability of supply lines and water. The United Oil Company,
whose 11 employees were captured�apparently by Moroccan
irregulars at the direction of the Moroccan Army--on 11 March,
had recently ceased operations in Latin America to concentrate
on exploratory work in Spanish Sahara and Australia.
ibanish Army Minister Barroso continues to view Moroccan
troop movements near the Spanish Saharan border as menacing,
and claimed on 21 March that Spanish troops had the previous
day captured "300 Moroccan camels" in the Spanish Sahar.2,..7
Spanish officials in Paris are reported to have proposed that
France join forces with Spain for a systematic cleanup of Mo-
roccan irregulars operating in Spanish Sahara and Mauritania.
Such a joint operation early in 1.958 suppressed Moroccan irregu-
lar activities in the region. Paris purportedly has not responded
to this request and is not anxious to become involved in such an
expedition.
The Moroccan press, meanwhile, continues to play up
charges of Spain's aggressive intentions, reporting on 21 March
the arrival of Spanish reinforcements not only in Spanish Sahara
but also in the Spanish-held presidios of Ceuta and Melilla on
Morocco's Mediterranean coast. It also claims that Spanish mil-
itary aircraft created havoc among the population by flying low
over the southern Moroccan town of Tarfaya on 20 March, and
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continues to charge Spanish authorities with kidnaping a team
of four Italian oil prospectors operating in the Tarfaya area.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
-Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Deprtment of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investi-gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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