CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03007383
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 21, 1961

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3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
21 March 1961
Copy No. C 7
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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LATE ITEM
Ethiopia: A new wave of tension and uneasiness has
sprea ti-Z---ii-oughout Addis Ababa amid indications that army
troops and younger officers are planning demonstrations in
protest over failure of the government to provide satisfactory
pay raises. In the absence of leadership from higher rank-
ing officers, who remain passive, junior officers have taken
the initiative in organizing the demonstrations. Ambassador
Richards reports that while only peaceful demonstrations
are planned, possibly beginning today, serious trouble could
easily erupt; Chief of Staff Kebede Gabre is reported to have
advised the government that he is no longer able to control
either the situation or his troops. While support for the
objectives of last December's abortive coup has continued
to grow, the Palace has drifted along evidently hoping to
preserve the status quo by minimal concessions where nec-
essary to retain loyalty among security elements. Haile
Selassie, appears
unable to com rehend the forces behind last uecember's
revolt.
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21 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2. Situation in the Congo. (rage t)
3. France-Algeria: Rebel negotiating delegation includes
representatives of both "hard" and "moderate" views.
(Page tt) ,
fr
4. Poland: Comment on Cardinal Wyszynski's recent ser-
mons, (rage tt)
5. Brazil: Proposed legislation may force foreign banks
out of business. (Page tt)
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/ NAMITHA �
./%ong Sai
,
LUANG1 PRABANG
.\�4
AM NEUA
Luang Prabang
SAYABOURY XIENG KHOUANG'.t!!
Muoih Soui Ban Ban
Plain- es
idrrep. Xieng Khouan
1 Ban Ta Viang
Tha Thom
Vang Vreng
VIENTIANE I
Pak Sane
;41
NORTHERN LAOS
ism GOVERNMENT
MOM KONG LE - PATHET LAO
KONG LE - PATHET LAO CONCENTRATIONS
AREA OF ACTION
--ROAD
0
TRAIL
(...111) ROUTE NUMBER
10321
50
STATUTE MILES
100
I
Nam Bac
Vientiane
IlKam Keut
--
KHAMM UANE
Thakhek
�
vannak
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
/
*Laos 'bovernment units in southern Xieng Khouang Province
apparently have largely completed their withdrawal to Tha Thom,
where they are preparing defensive positions. Government parti-
sanS operating in this general area continue harassment of Kong
Le - Pathet Lao forces. Preliminary reports indicate that a
government battalion at Kam Kout, some 70 miles east of Paksane,
has abandoned its post in the face of a Pathet Lao attack of un-
known strength on 20 Marchij
A press report from Vientiane alleges that government In-
formation Minister Bouavan Norasing has proposed, in two
current Laotian journals, that the Pathet Lao be allowed to form
"states" out of the areas they now control and that these along
with all other Laotian provinces be represented in an elected
national parliament. This formula may have been advanced with
official sanction out of desperation over the military situation
as a trial balloon to elicit the attitude of the Pathet Lao toward
a political settlement, following the breakdown of talks with
Souvanna Phouma. As such it would be in character with the
Laotian inclination toward compromise. It may, however, have
been devised unilaterally by Bouavan; in this event, it would be
a further indication of the confusion now nrevalent in the anvern-
ment in Vientiane
-hongo: The American ambassador in Khartoum believes
that e Sudanese Government will continue to support the UN
effort in the Congo, despite its disappointment over the "slow
pace" of the operation there. He points out that Sudan has
maintained its stand against transit of supplies to Gizenga in
what it believes to be its own interest, rather than from a de-
sire to accommodate the UN or the Western powers. Sudanese
leaders fear that a UAR or Soviet-controlled government in
the Congo would attempt to exploit long-smoldering dissidence
among the negroid tribes in Sudan's southern provinces.
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� Eliremier-designate Ileo, in an 18 March briefing to the
diplomatic corps in Leopoldville, stated that the Tananarive
conference had had no power to change the fundamental law of
the Congo. He asserted that his provisional government would
continue to function until the new structure proposed in broad
outline at Tananarive is established and legalized. He claimed
that Tshombe and Kalonji, in signing the conference's final
resolution, had recognized the Leopoldville government for
the first time. Further claims and counterclaims ran he ex-
pected:1
France-Algeria: Designation by the rebel Algerian provi- 0
sional government of four "ministers" to meet with French
officials confirms the rebels intention to begin high-level
negotiations on an Algerian settlement. The rebel delegation
Is composed of capable men from both the military and polit-4-e-g-Z
ical factions of the rebel government, representing both "hard"
and "moderate" views. Ellebel leaders, who are said to feel
6
that the recent secret preliminary talks with the French made
little progress in resolving key substantive issues, will prob-
ably seek to give considerable publicity to the progress of fur-
ther negotiations in an attempt to keep pressure of world opin-
ion on FranceD (Backup, Page 1)
Poland: Available texts--incomplete--of Cardinal Wyszyn-
ski's two most recent sermons show a decided stiffening by the
church against further compromise with the regime. Although
Wyszynski did not explicitly call for direct political opposition
by Catholics to the Communists' economic and social welfare
programs, he nevertheless implied that, if necessary to pre-
serve spiritual integrity, Polish Catholics would form an
underground church. At least until the 16 April parliamentary
elections, the regime may decide it is best to temporize and
avoid exacerbating a potentially explosive popular issue.
(Backup, Page 3)
Uir
Brazil: Proposed Brazilian congressional action would
make it "virtually impossible" for foreign banks to continue to 0,C
function in Brazil, according to the head of the First National
21 Mar 61
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City Bank in Rio de Janeiro. Under the proposed law, foreign
banks would be required to maintain capital reserves amount-
ing to 20 percent of deposits, while Brazilian-owned banks
would need reserves of only 10 percent. Ambassador Cabot
believes that the measure is unlikely to be beaten in Congress.
Closing of foreign banks would give new momentum to a long-
standing proposal for expropriation of foreign electric com-
panies, owned principally by US and Canadian interests
(Backup, Page 4)
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Algerian Rebels Designate Negotiating Team
&he rebel negotiators are Vice Premier and Foreign
Minister Belkacem Krim, and Minister of Interior Lakhdar
Ben Tobbal, Minister of Finance Ahmed Francis, and Min-
ister of Information Mohammed Yazid. Krim and Ben Tobbal
are former rebel military commanders and are now members
of the Interministerial War Committee of the rebel provisional
government (PAG), the top military authority of the rebel
� movement. Both of them have great influence and popularity
among rebel fighting men in Algeria. They are generally con=
sidered to be among the "hard" faction of the PAG, but they
now have agreed that the PAG should seek a negotiated settle-
ment3
CKrim is highly regarded within Algeria and in the other Arab
states. He has a long record as a militant and has been a vice
premier of the PAG since it was founded in September 1958. He
headed a PAG group to Communist China in 1960, and has twice
led the rebel "delegation" to the UN General Assembly. There
are indications, however, that his power within the PAG may
have waned within the last year. Ben Tobbal accompanied Pre-
mier Ferhat Abbas to Moscow and Peiping in the fall of 1960,
and is reported to have been impressed with the achievements
of the Communist states-3
/Both Minister of Information Yazid and Minister of Finance
Francis have long advocated a negotiated settlement of the Al-
gerian problem. Francis has little stature as a revolutionary
and is relatively unknown among the Algerian masses. He is
respected within the PAG, however, for his technical ability. A
brother=in-law of Premier Abbas, he shares Abbas' moderate
outlook. Yazid has a solid reputation as a nationalist leader be-
fore the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954. His standing within
the PAG comes largely from his ability as a political adviser.
Yazid, who is married to an American, is well known in France,
and is considered the most pro-Western of the rebel leaders.
There are reports that Krim and others are distrustful of his
moderate attitude
CMinister for Algeria Louis Joxe is expected to head the
French negotiating team. De Gaulle reportedly has full confidence)
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(that Joxe, a top-level career diplomat before joining the cab-
inet in July 1959, will deal patiently with the rebel delegation
in strict accordance with De Gaulle's instructions.)
LThe rebel negotiators will operate under handicaps aris-
ing from the fact that the PAG is a somewhat loose organiza-
tion designed to carry on a rebellion and has no elaborate
ministerial staff and few technical advisers. The director of
De Gaulle's staff indicated to an officer of the US Embassy in
Paris on 17 March that the French realized the PAG represent-
atives may have difficulty in making decisions on the complex
problems which will arise during negotiations. Also, as nego-
tiations proceed, the rebel leaders may become increasingly
concerned with internal power struggles in order to ensure their
positions in a future Algerian government.i
(French Premier Debra has admitted "disillusion-
ment" with De Gaulle's Algerian policy but said he intends to
continue in office even though De Gaulle does not listen to him
or his staff. Debre may try to obstruct the negotiations by fur-
ther public statements on issues under negotiation:-.3
�SteRET--
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CONFIDENTIAL 'As
Poland
The Cardinal chose to dramatize the situation by present-
ing his defense of the church on 19 March, following party
boss Gomulka's speech on 18 March opening the parliamentary
election campaign. In his speech the Communist leader as-
serted that in fact no persecution existed, and that the Vatican,
by its "hostile attitude" toward the state, was attempting to
create Polish martyrs. Wyszynski rebutted Gomulka's charges
in detail, and named 20 state-supported organizations openly
devoted to anti-Catholic activities. He flatly denied Gomulka's
charge against the Vatican and, in effect; defied the regime to
retaliate; Wyszynski declared that he has sole responsibility
for church policies in Poland.
As early as 12 January the Primate indicated that he felt
the situation had deteriorated to a critical stage, and in an
episcopal letter he exhorted his clergy to defend the church's
rights at all "reasonable costs, even... punishment, expulsion,
loss of personal liberty." "There can be no husbanding of
strength and sacrifices," he added. He apparently intends to
sum up his position for the general public in a pastoral letter
--reportedly drafted last week--which will be read from all
pulpits on Easter Sunday.
In contrast to the elections in 1957, when Gomulka needed
support against strong party factionalism, the church has not
been asked to support the regime's slate or programs in the
election campaign. Gomulka's sensational charges against the
church and the Cardinal's reply may have an adverse effect on
the forthcoming balloting, and lead many otherwise apathetic
voters to oppose regime-favored candidates. If the regime
continues to press its anti-church line during the mass meet-
ings organized in the course of the campaign, a violent reac-
tion could result. In the past year there have been a number
of local riots and demonstrations over regime treatment of
less important church matters.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Brazilian Congress May Act Against Foreign Banks
Ambassador Cabot believes that from the viewpoint of
foreign banks, a new banking bill preparedfor congression-
al action by a committee of moderates may be worse when
passed by Congress.
Extreme nationalist and leftist forces have substantial
strength in Congress and have in the past succeeded in
arousing effective national opposition to private foreign
investment in Brazil, notably in the 1947-53 period prior to
passage of legislation providing for a national petroleum mo-
nopoly. Extremist agitation has more recently been effec-
tive against certain existing US investments, such as the
American meat packers, a large can manufacturing com-
pany, and an electric company's subsidiary in southern
Brazil.
A bill proposing a government-controlled agency for the
production and distribution of electric power was first sug-
gested by President Vargas, shortly before his suicide in
1954. It was approved by Congress in 1960, but President
Kubitschek left office without taking action onithe bill. The
bill does not expropriate existing plants and installations,
but provides authority for the government company to do so.
Quadros undoubtedly reflected considerable support for
expropriation when he said during his campaign, "There are
fields where foreign investments are not necessary and may
constitute some danger, as is the case with petroleum and
electric energy.... Electric power has become so important
that it must be supplied at cost; thus private capital, even
national, has to be excluded."
CONFIDENTIAL
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Now# CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Derixtment of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investi"gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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