CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/12/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03007364
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: December 22, 1959

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22 December 1959
3.3(h)(2)
Copy No. C ,3.5(c)
.610
CENTRAL
TYTELLIGENCE
BULLETI\
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22 DECEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet spokesmen seek to blame US for
impasse in Geneva nuclear test talks.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru's flat rejection of latest Peiping
note leaves Sino-Indian border dispute
deadlocked.
Iranian artillery movement in Abadan
area sustains tension with Iraq over con-
trol of Shatt-al-Arab navigation.
Morocco--Tension between King and left-
ists eased for time being.
0
()Brazil suggests Latin American chiefs
of state attend April dedication of new
capital.
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INTELLIGENCE
22 necc.7.3.b..81,19uo.
DAILY BRIEF
Geneva Talks: The initial Soviet reaction to the failure
of the technical experts to reach agreement on the most im-
portant problems of detecting underground nuclear explosions
reflects Moscow's apparent concern that the 'United States
and Britain may use this impasse to press for a limited trea-
ty which would exclude underground tests from a permanent
ban. n his final statement on 10 December before the Christ-
mas recess, Soviet delegate Tsara,pkin attempted to discount
the disagreements and called on his Western colleagues to 'put
aside "artificial difficulties" and accelerate the work of the
political conference. Soviet spokesmen moved iminediately
to try to shift blame for the impasse to the United States. They
challenged the correctness and objectivity of United States
seismic data and insisted that the talks proved the accuracy
of the 1958 report on a control system which the Western pow-
ers, in the light of new information, feel is no longer adequate.
Moscow's first public reporting of 'the latest A41:,' C underground
experiments using conventional high explosives was clearly
intended to leave the impression that the United States has re-
sued nuclear testing. (Page 1)
� If. ASfA-AJ1YCA
India - COnitnunist China: Nehru's flat rejection on 21
December of the claims Made in Chou En-lai's letter of 17 De-
cember leaves the border dispute deadlocked. Nehru advanced
no new proposals, noting that Chou had found his "practical"
suggestions unacceptable and had :nerely reiterated Peiping's
claims to extensive Indian territory. He maintained that Chi-
na's claims were based on its recent intrnsions. Nehru turned
down Chou' s invitation to meet on 26 December as premature
as long as the Chinese and Indian viewpoints are ALI so far
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apart.. He stressed again, however, that his policy was t
negotiate, negotiate, negotiate to the bitter end."
fran-Iraq: Iran is reinforcing its artinery tne Aoaaan-
Khorram.shahr area as the dispute continues between Tehran and Bagh-
dad over control of navigation on the Shatt7al-Arab. In a news
conference on 2P December, the Shah emphasized that his gov-
ernment's present policy of patience in the face of Iraqi pro.,
vocations ,could not continued "at the expense of our sover-
eign and sacred rights" While both governments probably want
to reach an amicable Settlement of the dispute, the recent Iran-
y moves will increase the possibility of incidents.
. (Page 3)
Morocco: Differences between Moroccan Premier Abdallah
Ibrahim' and, the ,ing apparently have,been,patched up for the
time being. Friction had arisen over the arrest last week of
two leaders Of the leftist National Union of Popular Forces for
baving implicitly criticized the The American Ambas-
sador in Rabat believes that a,showdown now is desired neither
' by the palace nor by leftist sUpporters of Ibrahim and that ten-
sion once again' is moderating(
riCkl'E
Latin America: ff3razil has requested Argentina's support
for a meeting of Latin American chiefs of state at Brasilia
during the city's dedication on 21 April as Brazil's new capital.
The Brazilian ambassador in Buenos Aires said Brazil's objec-
tive was an "important declaration" on "Operation Pan America,'
President kubitschek's proposal for a joint attack on underde-
velopment in Latin Arnerica
C.Libitschek's interest in such a meeting is probably three-
fold.-- to raise Brazil's -diplomatic prestige, to increase pres-
sures on the United States for expanded technical and financial
assistance to Latin America, and to help his party's chances in
the QPtober presidential election_P
) (Page 21)
22. De.c 5.9
DAILY ElICEE� ii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Moves to Offset Impasse in Geneva Technical Talks
Soviet spokesmen at Geneva have moved promptly to play
down the importance of the areas of disagreement in the re-
port of the technical working group on the underground test
detection problem, At the same time, they are seeking to
place blame for the impasse on the United States. At the fi-
nal session of the political conference before the Christmas
recess, Chief Soviet Delegate Tsarapkin stressed that the
work of drafting a comprehensive test ban treaty should not
be "drowned in the doubts, speculations, and arguments"
raised by the experts. He called upon his Western colleagues
to put aside "artificial difficulties" and accelerate the work
of concluding a treaty�
Tsarapkin claimed that a treaty could be signed in two or
three days "if those forces in the United States who want a
speedy conclusion of a treaty prevail." He charged that agree-
ment was blocked by the American experts at Geneva who "al-
leged that it is not possible to devise an effective control system"
--in contradiction to evidence furnished by, the Soviet experts.
The Soviet delegation apparently had hoped that some com-
promise formula could be worked out to avoid an impasse at
the technical level which might sidetrack Moscow's tactics of
clearing the way for focusing the negotiations on the Soviet pro-
posal for solving the underground detection problem--an agreed
number of annual on-site inspettions. In the final stage of the
technical talks, the chief Soviet expert sought to prevent the in-
clusion of disagreement in the final report to the political con-
ference. He continued to the end his efforts to refute Amer-
ican seismic data and to contend that the talks had proved the
complete accuracy of the report on a control system by the
1958 experts conference. In a bitter tirade at the 18 Decem-
ber session, he expressed doubt about the correctness and
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objectivity of the American data and charged that the "tendentious
use of unilaterally acquired materials" was aimed at "undermin-
ing confidence in the control system."
Moscow appears concerned that the United States and Britain
may use the failure to reach agreement on the most important
aspects of the underground test detection problem to renew pres-
sure for a limited treaty confined, at least at the outset, to ban-
ning atmospheric, high-altitude, and underwater tests. rrsarap-
kin has privately indicated that in the event of disagreemenl
the technical talks, the USSR might consider a phased treaty,
but stressed that the "crux of the matter" must be an obligation
to halt all tests at the outset� regardless of the temporary na-
ture of a ban on underground tests.
Premier Khrushchev may believe the impasse at Geneva
calls for a fresh Soviet initiative designed to place the Western
powers on the defensive and focus the debate on terms favorable
to the USSR. He may take the opportunity of a recess in the talks
to address new letters to President Eisenhower and Prime Min-
ister Macmillan appealing for a compromise settlement based
on t e pt of an annual quota of on-site inspections.
22 Dec 59
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran Reinforcing Troops Along Iraqi Border
With tension continuing between Iran and Iraq over naviga-
tion rights on the Shatt al-Arab, Iranian Army officials have
confirmed that two artillery battalions are being moved to rein-
force troops in the Khorramshahr-Abadan area. Iranian naval
units in the area, normally two patrol craft and four submarine
chasers, were placed on alert last summer. The
Iranian Government has not indicated, however, whether it
knows that Iraa recently acquired three Soviet motor torpedo
boats.
New tension was caused by Premier Qasim's assertion on
2 December that Iraq intends to acquire suzerainty over a three-
mile strip of the river which was placed under Iranian control
by a treaty in 1937. Iran recalled its ambassador for consulta-
tions and does not intend to have him return to Baghdad until
relations improve. The killing of an Iranian peasant and
wounding of two others by Iraqi border guards on 16 December
has caused excited statements in the Iranian Parliament and
press. In a news conference on 20 December, the Shah em-
phasized that his government's present policy of patience in
the face of Iraqi provocations could not be continued "at the
expense of our sovereign and sacred rights."
For several years Iran has been unsuccessful in its at-
tempts to negotiate with Iraq regarding sovereignty and naviga-
tion on the river. Both governments are believed to want to
reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute, but Iranian mili-
tary moves may reduce the chances for early ne otiations and
increase the likelihood of further incidents.
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III. THE WEST
Brazil Suggests Meeting of American Presidents in April 1960
Clirazil has requested Argentina's support for a meeting
of Latin American chiefs of state in Brasilia to mark the city's
dedication on 21 April as Brazil's new capital and to issue an
"important declaration" on "Operation Pan America" (OPA).
President Kubitschek first proposed OPA in a letter to Presi-
dent Eisenhower in May 1958, calling for a reappraisal of
hemisphere relations and a joint attack on underdevelopment.
Possibly in order to promote interest in such a meeting,
the Brazilians are claiming that President Eisenhower will
attend. Furthermore, Brazil is backing Ecuador's suggestion
that the 11th Inter-American Conference scheduled for Feb-
ruary 1960 at Quito be postponed, perhaps to improve chances
for a meeting at Brasilia.
A high Argentine Foreign Ministry official has said Ar-
gentina is reluctant to join in any Brazilian gambit to put the
United States "on the spot." He pointed out that when the
Brazilian foreign minister visited Buenos Aires in November
as part of Brazil's intensifying diplomatic campaign for OPA,
President Frondizi had qualified his endorsement by em-
phasizing self-help.
Kubitschek stated on 16 December that OPA provided
the opportunity of overcoming what he called US indifference
toward Latin America. Although he emphasized that OPA
was not intended as an effort to form a Latin American bloc
hostile to the US, Kubitschek apparently hopes to enhance
Brazil's leadership in the hemisphere and its importance in
world affairs. At the same time, he probably wants to use
OPA and a meeting at Brasilia to help his party's chances
in the October presidential e1ection9
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22 Dec 59
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Acsistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secreft_ry for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department cf Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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