CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/04/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03004635
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: April 15, 1960

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15 April 1960
Copy No, C 68
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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15 APRIL 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR rebuffs Iranian sugge
Shah-Khrushchev meeting.
Forthcoming central committee meeting
likely to replace presidium members
Kirichenko and Belyayev.
Cuts in Soviet Army under Khrushchev's
demobilization program to be largely
completed by September.
Taiwan Strait--Watch Committee analy-
sis.
0
Communist China unsuccessfully attempt-
ing to convert Afro-Asian Solidarity
Conference into anti-American propa-
ganda forum.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
South Korea�Opposition Democratic
party leaders may incite disorders in
Seoul.
South Vietnam and Cambodia continue
dispute over several small islands in
Gulf of Siam.
0 Laos--Communists may withdraw some
or all of their election candidates to
protest government's strong-arm tac-
tics.
0 Libya--Minority bloc in new Chamber
of Deputies launches strong attack on
existence of Wheelus base.
III. THE WEST
0 Italy--Fanfani faces difficult task in
trying for center-left cabinet.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR -Iran: The Soviet Union has rebuffed Iranian sug-
gestions both for a meeting in Austria between Ithrushchey
and the Shah following the summit conference in May and
for a "purely ceremonial" visit to Moscow by the Iranian
foreign minister. Soviet leaders are probably confident that
the cumulative effect of the bloc's propaganda and subversive
campaigns against the Shah's regime and the impact of Khru-
shchev's talks with Western government leaders Wi1Unduce
Tehran to make new efforts to improve relations
(Page 1)
USSR: Changes in the party presidium will be made at
a forthcoming meeting of the central committee, according
to a current Soviet rumor. The committee will allegedly pro-
mote candidate members Dmitry Polyansky and Aleksey Kosy-
gin to replace Aleksey Kirichenko and Nikolay Belyayev, who
are in disfavor. A separate rumor alleges that security, chief
Aleksandr Shelepin is also in trouble. While the main purpose
of any central committee meeting convoked in the near future
would probably be a demonstration of party support for Khru-
shchev on the eve of the summit, the promotio7 nf. PnlvanR7
and Kosygin at such a meeting is not unlikely.
(Page 2)
USSR:
mosr Ririe army demobilization will be completed by 1 Septem-
ber 1960. The plan's current phase calls for the disbandment
of selected divisions, certain headquarters staffs, and inde-
pendent engineer and technical battalions. The "cleanup" phase
will begin in September, and the en-
tire roram will be completed by the early, spring of 1961.
(Page 3)
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'Taiwan Strait. Verbatim Extract from Watch Committee
Report of 13 April: The Chinese Communist military attachg
in East Berlin recently told a Western journalist that Commu-
nist China would "take certain steps" during the spring months
to "liberate" Taiwan and the offshore islands, possibly after
the end of the National People's Congress (which terminated on
10 April) or several weeks later. Although the Chinese Commu-
nists have not fully endorsed Khrushchev's tactics of detente,
there has been no propaganda build-up with respect to the strait
situation such as preceded the August 1958 hostilities. China
also has been trying to convince its Asian neighbors that its in-
tentions are peaceful, a line likely to be followed by Chou En-lai
during his present tour of Burma, India, and Nepal. Available
evidence does not indicate that an offensive in the Taiwan Strait
is imminent, although the Chinese Communists have the capability
to take military action against the offshore islands at any time
with little or no warning.
Communist China: Peiping is making a strong bid at the Afro-
Asian Solidarity Conference to inject its own bitter hostility to-
ward the United States into the Afro-Asian "national liberation
struggle." Chinese delegates are charging that "US imperialism
is the most vicious enemy of the Asian and African people," and
are attempting to convert the Conakry meeting into a forum for
this line. Moscow has avoided such vituperation, blaming colonial-
ism in general as the main opponent of independence.
(Page 4)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
South Korea: Opposition Democratic party leaders will
probably attempt to capitalize on the spontaneous popular re-
sentment against the government displayed at Masan, and in-
crease their efforts to hold demonstrations elsewhere in South
Korea. Although their request to the Rhee government for
15 Apr 60 DAILY BRIEF
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permission to hold a rally in Seoul on 15 April has been refused,
It is possibl7 that they will try to incite disorders there in the
near future. (Page 5)
South Vietnam - Cambodia: The dispute between Cambodia
and South Vietnam regarding jurisdiction over several small is-
lands in the Gulf of Siam is intensifying. South Vietnamese For-
eign Minister Mau has circulated charges to "friendly govern-
ments" that new Cambodian landings in the area are "an act of
aggression," and Saigon has dispatched patrol craft to reconnoiter.
Mau has disclaimed any intention of forcibly dislodging the Cam-
bodians, but relations between the two countries are so strained
that a serious incident could occur. (Page 6) (Map)
Laos: khe fellow-traveling Santiphab party is considering
withaFiiiing some or all of its candidates from the 24 April elec-
tions in protest against the government's alleged strong-arm
tactics, The Commu-
nist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat reportedly may take similar action in
order to dramatize to the world that the elections are "a farce
rigged to please foreign friends." These reports may have been
deliberately circulated to generate pressure on the government to
hold reasonably fair elections) (Page 7)
Libya: tt.. minority bloc in the new Chamber of Deputies has
launched virulent attacks on the administration and existence of
Wheelus Air Force Base. One of the group's spokesmen has de-
manded that the chamber take matters into its own hands and
"annul this evil American treaty." Prime Minister Kubar and
other leading officials have continued to press for major revi-
sions in the American aid program, including a firm commit-
ment of funds to the Libyan budget for several years running, as
the price for continued US use of the basej
(Page 8)
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III. THE WEST
Italy: An attempt to end the six-week-old cabinet crisis is
now being made by left-wing Christian Democrat Amintore Fan-
fani, who is known to favor a center-left cabinet with outside
support of the Italian Socialist party. Fanfani will either seek
such a solution immediately or else work for a temporary care-
taker government during which he would pave the way for this
solution. (Page 9)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Outlook for Burma. ME 61-60. 12 Apr 1960.
Trends in Soviet Military Capabilities in the Period 1965-
1970. ME 11-60 12 Apr 1960.
15 Apr 60
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Union Rejects Meetings With Top Iranians
The USSR has said it will not agree to Iranian proposals
for a meeting between the Shah and Ithrushchev and for a visit
to the USSR by Foreign Minister Aram unless Iran is willing
to accept Moscow's proposal which would ban foreign military
bases in Iran, In
giving Moscow's reply to a proposal made through the Iranian
ambassador. in Moscow for a meeting in Austria between the
two countries' top political figures following the summit con-
ference in May, Foreign Minister Gromyko stated on 9 April
that such contacts "must have a purpose," and that Iran's in-
sistence on the Shah's offer, of a guarantee against only medium-
and long-range missile bases in Iran may make the situation
"even worse."
the Soviet
charge in Tehran, responding to a suggestion by Aram that he
pay a purely ceremonial visit to Moscow, stated that the visit
must have as its object the signing of the Soviet draft protocol
for a guarantee against foreign military bases of all types from
Iranian soil. The subject of a visit by Aram or by Prime Min-
ister Eqbal to the Soviet Union as a prelude to improved rela-
tions was broached in February by the Indian ambassador in
Tehran, presumably with the knowledge and approval of Soviet
officials there.
Soviet leaders, in rejecting the Iranian suggestions, appear
confident that the cumulative effects of the bloc's propaganda
and subversion campaigns against the Shah's regime and the im-
pact of Khrushchev's meetings with Western heads of government
will induce Tehran to make new efforts to improve relations with
the USSR.
rtranian officials have begun to show concern over the forth-
coming Menderes-Khrushchev exchange of visits announced on
11 April, as well as apprehension that the summit me_eting mav
lessen US interest in and support for the Middle East.1
CRET-
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cONFIDEN TIA L
Soviet Central Committee Meeting Rumored
The Soviet party central committee will meet soon to make
changes in the party presidium, according to a current Soviet
rumor which has been reported by the American Embassy in
Moscow. Such a meeting would presumably precede the Su-
preme Soviet session scheduled to open on 5 May and would
probably serve mainly as a demonstration of party support for
Khrushchev on the eve of his departure for the summit meet-
ing in Paris.
The committee might also use the occasion, the rumor
alleges, to take up some pending personnel matters, including
the promotion of candidate presidium members Dmitry Pol-
yansky and Aleksey Kosygin to full membership as replacements
for Aleksey Kirichenko and Nikolay Belyayev. The latter two,
who have tumbled from favor in recent months, are still for-
mally full members. Polyansky heads the government of the
Russian Republic (RSFSR); 1Cosgyin is chief of the State Plan-
ning Committee.
The embassy reports another rumor in Moscow to the
effect that Aleksandr Shelepin, who has been chief of state
security since December 1958, is in trouble. Despite the un-
certain tenure of Soviet police chiefs, however, there has
been nothing to substantiate this.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Soviet Army Demobilization
army demobilization plans call for the bulk of the reduc-
tion to take place before September of this year. Selected
divisions, headquarters staffs, and independent engineer
and technical battalions would be affected in this phase.
A cleanup phase involving miscellaneous elements would
be completed by the early spring of 19610 He said that a
division in the Moscow area was the first to be demobilized.
Although Marshal Bagramyan told Ambassador Thompson
on 1 April that the bulk of the reductions would take place
in the spring and summer, this is the first indication of a
plan to complete the reductions well before the two-year
time limit set by Khrushchev in his speech of 14 January.
It is also the first suggestion that division-size units are
to be disbanded. There is no information as to which geo-
graphic areas will retain the greatest percentage of their
original strength.
many of the officers
who nave been selected for demobilization, particularly
those without enough nt, were
extremely unhappy. the "extraordi-
nary" benefits the Soviet Government had decreed for the
discharged officers were overcoming this discontent. No
problem has arisen in connection with the demobilization of
enlisted me
Shortly after announcing plans for the troop cut, Premier
Khrushchev admitted in private conversation that it "had
not been easy to sell" to the military. In January and Feb-
ruary the regime engaged in a major campaign to explain
and "justify" the measure and to publicize the privileges
and financial benefits granted the disthrg1
qprxriedaman
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CONFIDENTIAL
Communist Olina Seeks to Convert Afro-Asian Conference
Into Anti-American Forum
Communist China is making a strong bid at the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference to inject its bitter hostility toward the
United States into the "national liberation struggle."
Spokesmen for the 23-man Chinese delegation--the larg-
est present at the meeting in Conakry, Guinea--have charged
that "US imperialism is the most vicious and treacherous ene-
my of the people of Africa, Asia, and the world." MOSCOW has
avoided such vituperation, centering on colonialism in gen-
eral as the main opponent of independence.
This Chinese effort to focus antagonism on the United
States is part of Reiping's campaign advocating hard, uncom-
promising political opposition on all fronts as the best and
quickest means for destroying "imperialism." The Chinese
delegation also is pledging Peiping's "firm support" for na-
tionalist movements in a continuing effort to increase Chi-
nese influence among new African states.
So far there is no evidence that the efforts of Peiping's
and other Communist representatives have had the intended
effect on the large number of African nationalists attending
the conference. In fact, the Communists' heavy-handed ap-
proach may be proving counterproductive, even in some of
the most leftist-inclined African circles. Although he has
accepted an invitation to visit Peiping, Guinean President
Sekou Tour d was apparently addressing himself primarily to
the bloc when, in his opening speech to the delegates, he re-
buked those who saw in Africa "a possibility of transforming
our nations into territories reserved to their sole influence"
and who brought to Africa "their quarrels and differences."
Moreover, Tour's Marxist-oriented half-brother, who is
serving as conference president, is reported to have blocked
an attempt by the Communist-dominated Japanese delegation
to make Okinawa and the US-Japanese security treaty formal
agenda items.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Opposition Continues Attacks on Rhee Regime
Opposition Democratic leaders, encouraged by the
growing opposition to the Rhee administration displayed
at Masan, probably will increase their efforts to hold
demonstrations elsewhere in South Korea. They have de-
cided to go ahead with plans for a mass rally in Seoul
on 15 April commemorating the victims of the Masan
election-day riots, despite the government's refusal to
permit the use of Seoul Stadium. Regardless of their
success in this instance, they are likely to continue ef-
forts to promote protest rallies in Seoul.
Militant opposition leaders might welcome disorders
as the most effective means of stimulating support. For
its part, the government is afraid even to permit an opposi-
tion rally in the stadium under close police supervision,
but it realizes that the use of force to prevent demonstra-
tions might incite mass rioting.
The Democrats have launched the most bitter parlia-
mentary attack on the administration since Rhee's Liberal
party resorted to repressive tactics in late 1958 to break
a Democratic sit-down strike in the National Assembly.
Opposition leaders also have filed suit in the Supreme Court
to have the recent presidential elections nullified. Such
legalistic maneuvers, however, seem likely to be over-
shadowed by the resort to mass action.
� North Korea is mounting a propaganda campaign to
exploit the troubles in South Korea. Pyongyang has staged
a mass rally, and the press and radio are giving develop-
ments in Masan extensive coverage. All Koreans are being
exhorted to rise against the "Syngman Rhee clique" and
to accelerate peaceful unification. Such a North Korean
response very probably will be used by Rhee to substan-
tiate his allegations that the dissidence is entirely Commu-
nist inspired.
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South Vietnamese - Cambodian Dispute Over Uninhabited
Islands Intensifying
The dispute between South Vietnam and Cambodia over own-
ership of several small islands in the Gulf of Siam is becoming
increasingly, bitter. South Vietnam has reacted sharply to re-
ported landings on 9 April by Cambodian troops on two uninhab-
ited islets in the Iles des Pirates archipelago, which was among
several offshore islands claimed by South Vietnam in a note to
Cambodia last month.
The Diem government has circulated an aide-memoire to
"friendly governments" denouncing Cambodia's new "premed-
itated act of aggression" and recalling Cambodian occupation in
1956 and 1958 of Ile du Milieu, Ile a PEau, Ile du Pic, and Ile
Pirate du Nord--all claimed by Saigon. The Vietnamese note
states that Cambodia's provocative act creates an "extremely
dangerous situation for peace in this part of the world:'
The Diem government is dispatching two patrol craft to recon-
noiter, and a company of Vietnamese marines reportedly was
placed on 48-hour alert on 13 April. Foreign Minister Mau has
told American Ambassador Durbrow that Vietnam has no inten-
tion of dislodging the Cambodians by force, but he admitted
this was considered at a special cabinet session., Mau com-
plained that the West did not understand Cambodian leader Si-
hanouk's "real game, which is one of continual aggressive jabs!'
Saigon's note last month on the islands touched off a violent
reaction in Phnom Penh. Sihanouk warned that Cambodia would
fight to retain its territory and would not hesitate to seek Chinese
Communist support if needed. While the islands in question have
little real value, the supercharged emotions generated in both
capitals reflect the traditional enmity between the two countries
as well as friction over, contemporary, differences.
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_Possible Withdrawal of Pro-Communist Candidates From
Laotian Elections
g4uinim Pholsena, lead'er of the fellow-ti-aveling Santi-
phab -party, is considering withdrawing some or all of the
party's candidates from the National Assembly elections on
24 April in protest against the Laotian Government's alleged
strong-arm tactics,
the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak
Sat (NLHS) may take similar action in order to dramatize
to the world that the elections are na farce rigged to please
foreign friends."]
NLHS and the Santiphab generally voted together
in the last assembly and have probably coordinated their
tactics in the election campaign now in progress. Santiphab
strength is concentrated in the southernmost provinces of
Champassak and Attopeu. An American Embassy officer
who recently toured Cha,mpassak reports a general assump-
tion there that the government candidates will sweep all six
seats in the province because the army and the police are
effectively persuading the people, sometimes through threats,
that it would be unsafe to vote for opposition candidates_j
eports that the Santiphab and the NLHS may pull out
of the elections may have been deliberately circulated in
order to generate new pressure on the government to hold
reasonably fair elections. Communist strategists might
see some propaganda advantage in making a token withdrawal
of a few of the weaker Communist or pro-Communist candi-
dates, but they would probably prefer that most of their
candidates remain in the race if there is a reasonable pros-
pect that a number of them can win. The Communists prob-
ably anticipate a split in the anti-Communist ranks in the
next assembly which could be exploited by even a small
leftist bloc.
CONFIDENTIAL
15 Apr 60 CENTRAI INTFI I inpmrp 111 III CTIkl Pc re 7
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Libyan Pressure on American Base Rights
riLhe Libyan Government, which for nearly two years has
been pressing for modifications in the American base agree-
ment and for major revisions in the American aid program,
is under growing internal pressure to show results. A minor-
ity bloc in the newly constituted Chamber of Deputies has
launched virulent attacks on the existence of Wheelus Air Base
and several phases of operation, on the "lack of respect shown
by Americans for Libyan sovereignty and honor," and on Amer-
ican "indifference" to Libyan economic needs. One of the
group's spokesmen has demanded that the chamber take matters
into its own hands and "annul this evil American treaty.'n
1:While the Libyan Government still controls the majority
of the chamber's membership, the strength of the opposition
bloc was considerably increased in last January's elections.
Prime Minister Kubar is obviously concerned by such symp-
toms_of adverse public sentiment; moreover, he has expressed
to Western diplomats his conviction that the King will replace
him if he cannot negotiate a "satisfactory" new aid agreement
with the United States:I
During the past few years American aid to Libya has a-
mounted to about $22,000,000 annually. Up to this point, Ku-
bar has found the American ambassador's proposals for modi-
fication of the aid program unacceptable; new American pro,
posals are pending. While Kubar has been bargaining for an
increase in the total level of aid, he has been particularly in-
sistent that a sizable part be in the form of an advance commit-
ment of funds for several years and completely at the disposal
of the Libyan Governmenla
CONFIDENTIAL
15 Apr 60
IT.. �K Magni I MA01.Imk Ia..= ANN II I Im�PIK I
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III. THE WEST
Italy to Try Center-Left Government
Amintore Fanfani, former premier and the leading
figure of the Christian Democratic left, has agreed to try
to form a cabinet to bring the six-weekIold Ralian� cabinet
crisis to an end. Fanfani will probably work for the forma-
tion of a coalition with the parties immediately to the left
of the Christian Democrats--the Republicans and the Demo-
cratic Socialists�with the parliamentary support of the
Socialist party. The strength of the antirightist feeling
within the Christian Democratic party was indicated on 11
April by the revolt within the party against participation
in the Tambroni government, which would have depended
on the votes of the neo- Fascists for a parliamentary ma-
jority.
If this second attempt fails, President Gronchi�per-
sonally a strong proponent of the center-left formula--
will probably favor installing a strictly caretaker, one-
party government, rather than experiment with a center-
right formula. The Liberals�who caused the crisis by
refusing to continue their support of the Segni government
without being represented in the cabinet --presumably
would demand inclusion in a coalition government. This
is a conceivable solution but not a likely one, in the face
of opposition from the Christian Democratic left.
711e current crisis has been of record duration, and
there have been rumors of a possible coup attempt which
would probably lead to a general strike initiated by the
lefq
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Neire
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
PAIVT:114r4s.
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imjezzmiern/rnpproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO30046357/1 /71//1 Zo