WEEKLY SUMMARY OCTOBER 8, 1976[SANITIZED] - 1976/10/08

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03004448
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U
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24
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April 3, 2019
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April 12, 2019
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October 8, 1976
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Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 EO 13526 3.5(c) NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Weekly Summary Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 CI WS 76-041 No. 0041/76 October 8, 1976 Copy N9 88 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued _ id ornirg by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports crid cayzec signifi- cant developments of the week through n Thursday, it frequently includes mate coordinated wt or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strateg ic Research ie Office of Geographic and Cartographic Rch. and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Sensiye Wiirrung No ice nte gence ScurcEs and Meth d (WNINTEL) nvolved NA *NAL SECURITY INFOR ATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subj ct to Crumnal Sancti CONTENTS .1;k4Ef October 8, 1976 momsintIVeliVrat9MONWM.:.. 17 South America: Cooperation Among Military Regimes Comments arid queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 SET South America: 3r5(c) Cooperation Among Military Regimes Circumstance and mutual interest are drawing leaders of the southern cone countries�Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay�into closer political and economic cooperation. The army-con- trolled governments of these countries share a ubiquitous fear of communist sub- version, a growing feeling of isolation from the rest of the world, and a concern that they are being abandoned by the US. Brazil and Bolivia are beginning to par- ticipate in the relationship but have reser- vations for one reason or another. A close-knit alliance of these countries could have important implications for the US. The southern cone regimes purport to be "democratic," but are clearly authoritarian. The men in power do not get their support from political groups, but from the military. Most of the military leaders are con- vinced they can exert a modernizing in- fluence on government through increased efficiency and rationality. Most believe they are better qualified to govern than civilian politicians. The views of these military leaders seem to be coalescing into a still-unform- ulated philosophy of military admin- istration in which an abhorrence of disorder, distrust of the old politics, and dedication to social and economic progress are the driving forces. Fear of Subversion The military leaders believe the primary national concern should be security. The principal enemies are leftist terrorism and international communism. Preserving the nation, in their view, must take precedence over personal well-being and individual freedom. The preoccupation with security may seem excessive, but for the countries that have participated in a struggle against terrorists, the fight is real. It is true, for instance, that political violence in Argen- tina took more lives last year than the total killed in Northern Ireland during the past five years. All of the southern cone countries, to one extent or another, feel threatened by terrorist violence. Isolation Most of the countries suffer from a poor image in the world press and in inter- national forums. The military governments are variously described as "totalitarian" and "fascist." One Brazilian government official lamented to US embassy officers that the Israelis are praised for staging a raid into Africa against terrorists, but similar counterterrorist activities in Brazil are called excessive and cruel in the world press. Leaders in the southern cone also believe that investigations by unofficial and official bodies such as Amnesty Inter- national and the UN Commission on Human Rights are overzealous and mis- guided. The leaders think they should have the right to eliminate terrorists without foreign interference. Chilean leaders in particular are weary of "international interference," and profess to see the recent murder in Washington of former ambassador Page 17 NA/PPVI V CI IKAKA A DV Clr-+ St 7k Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 UZIET Letelier as part of a plot to discredit the nation. All of these countries believe they are the victims of an international cam- paign led by the communists. Close Cooperation The original impetus for cooperation among the southern cone countries probably came from Chile. Following the coup in 1973, the Chilean regime was anx- ious to acquire friends and military equip- ment for protection against a perceived threat from Peru. The Chileans first approached Brazil and came away with the belief that Brazil at least would lend a hand indirectly if Chile were invaded. Chile then ap- proached Bolivia and proposed a renewal of discussions on an outlet to the sea. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were re-established in February 1975. The military coup in Argentina last March brought Buenos Aires into step with its neighbors. The Argentines in- creasingly began talking of "new realities" in hemisphere affairs and cooperation among all of the southern cone countries including Brazil. After a period of concentration on the internal security situation and the economy, the Argentine government finally felt secure enough early last summer to implement some new foreign policy initiatives. In June, the Foreign Ministry sent carefully selected am- bassadors to Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay. High Argentine officials also began visiting around the continent to dis- cuss topics of mutual interest. The security organizations of the southern cone countries were already cooperating in actions against political refugees and terrorists. This program ap- parently began in 1974 when security of- ficials from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia agreed to establish liaison channels and to facilitate the movement of security officers to and from each country. The campaign against subversion was intensified in June when the group met to plan further cooperation. Brazil par- ticipated in these discussions and reportedly agreed to become a member. The extent of security cooperation was evident this summer during several in- cidents in which joint countersubversive operations were mounted against refugees and terrorists. Security cooperation reportedly now has been augmented by an agreement among the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay to coordinate positions on international political matters, particularly the threat posed by terrorism and communism. The coordination will be conducted secretly so that each country will appear to be operating in an independent manner. The group hopes to bring Brazil into the arrangement. Current Status of Cooperation Diplomatic activity in the southern cone has continued. Argentina and Brazil reportedly have had discussions on creating a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization." This naval alliance is en- visaged as a defense of the South Atlantic against the Soviet-Cuban presence in southern Africa. The Brazilians, so far, have dismissed talk of an alliance as non- sense, but rumors persist. Argentina and Paraguay agreed this month to increase trade by eliminating customs barriers. They also said they would stimulate complementary joint in- dustrial projects. Argentine President Videla met with Uruguayan President Mendez and agreed to increase coopera- tion between the two governments. Videla is scheduled to visit Chile and Bolivia at the end of this month. Chilean diplomacy continues to be directed against Peru, but improved relations between the two countries have diminished the urgency of the Chilean ef- fort. Chile is continuing to talk with Bolivia about an outlet to the sea. Chilean willingness to discuss the problem and Peruvian intransigence have improved relations between Chile and Bolivia. Chile is working to increase trade relations with Paraguay and Uruguay. It is already involved in a "joint integration commission" with Argentina and also hopes to increase trade with that country. Chile has concluded that the Andean Pact restricts development and that there is a better market for Chilean products in the southern cone. Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay also have been discussing trade and coopera- tion. Brazil and Paraguay already are in- volved in the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric project on the Parana River. Paraguay and Uruguay have just launch- ed a joint commission; its first task is to eliminate customs restrictions between the two countries. Many intangibles will affect the extent of southern cone cooperation. There are many reasons why these countries would be drawn together in some sort of an alliance, but there are also old an- tagonisms. The great imponderable is Brazil�the only country in the area with true global aspirations. Until now, Brazil has been lukewarm toward an extensive alliance with neighboring countries. Whether or not Brazil can be enticed into joining the group may be one key factor in the extent and direction of southern cone coopera- tion. A lasting improvement in relations between Argentina and Brazil would be a difficult achievement under any con- ditions, but the leaders of both nations may now be prepared to try to accomplish just that. Continued perception of mutual in- terest among all of these countries is the most important element in the future of their relationship. A prolongation of terrorist activities in the southern cone will drive these countries into further cooperation. Continued US criticism for human rights violations will heighten the sense of abandonment already prevailing in the area and intensify the feeling of isolation and frustration. This could foster closer cooperation and increasing protests against US interference in internal affairs. Chilean and Uruguayan leaders have already suggested publicly that their con- tinued swallowing of criticism from the US on human rights issues is not worth the limited assistance they now get from Washington. PagApproved for Release: 2018/09/20 C030044485 NR Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 Approved for Release: 2018/09/20 C03004448 NR