CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/07/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03004220
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: July 22, 1960

3 August 1960
Copy No. C 73
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. �19
110 ORANGE IN CLASS.
DEGLASSIIIED
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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
TOP SECRET
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(b)(3),
CENAL INTELLIGENCE BULLE IN
3 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
�
*Republic of the Congo: UN Secretary General Hammar-
skJoa announced in Leopoldville late on 2 August that UN
troops will enter Katanga Province on 6 August. Dr. Bunche
reportedly will go to Elisabethville on 5 August to lay the
groundwork for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the
province.
The threat by the Lumumba government to expropriate
all :elgian firms which do not reopen for business by 10 Au-
gust may stimulate new anti-European incidents in the Congo.
The security situation remains uncertain; tribal warfare has
flared up once again in Kasai Province, The UN forces appear
hesitant about becoming involved in the tribal warfare, and of-
ficial statements have characterized it as "an internal matter"
beyond UN jurisdiction. (Page 1) (b)(3)/
Persian Gulf Oil: A sharp break in the posted prices of Per-
sian Guli crude oil appears imminent. For the past several
months the Western-owned oil companies have found it necessary
to grant substantial discounts to sell this oil. The drop is ex-
pected to be more than 10 percent- a somewhat larger cut than
the 18-cents-per-barrel reduction made in early 1959. The 1959
reduction--the first in the Persian Gulf--cost the oil-producing
states there an estimated $140,000,000 in expected 1959 revenues.
Reaction to the prospect of an additional drop is expected to be
even more severe than in 1959 and will add to frictions between
the Arabian-American Oil Company and Saudi Arabia, between
the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company and the UAR, and between
the Iraq Petroleum Company and Iraq. Arab governments are
almost certain to step up their pressures for a greater voice in
the management of Western-owned oil concerns.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
d
TOP-SECBZZ (b)(3),
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4.R
Noe
sErikET,
Aden: gritain is planning a showdown with Nasir- controlled
labor unions in Aden whose activities are disrupting the colony's
conorny and threaten eventually to challenge British control.
egislation is to be passed which will outlaw strikes, make ar-
itration compulsory, and provide for unusually severe penal-
ies for strike leaders. The proposed legislation may lead to a
general strike and violent demonstrations which could paralyze
all port activity. The British appear confident that the security
precautions they have taken can contain the situation.
Indonesia: Political maneuvering among major power ele-
ments is increasing. The army, which apparently instigated
last week's anti-Communist demonstration in South Sumatra and OK
plans others, is testing how far it can go without incurring strong
reaction from Sukarno. The Communists, who recently indulged
In open criticism of the government, are apprehensive over Su-
karno's failure to prevent the army from harassing them. Sukarno
thus far has employed his usual tactic of maintaining the uneasy
balance between the army and the Communists without compromis-
ing his own position.
3 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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(b)(3)
Situation in the Congo Continues Critical
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold announced late on 2 Au-
gust that UN troops will move into Katanga Province on 6 August.
Dr. Bunche reportedly will go to Elisabethville on 5 August to lay
the groundwork for Belgian evacuation of the province. Ctlammar-
iskjold had been under growing pressure from the Congolese cab-
inet which had threatened to appeal to the UN Security Council to
hasten the entrance of UN forces into Katangi". The Secretary Gen-
eral has apparently postponed his scheduled trip to South Africa
until next week in case Katangan Premier Tshombef,,should carry
out his threat to oppose UN military intervention. LThere has been
I no official Belgian announcement as to the status of Belgian troops
1 in Katanga although it is reported that Brussels has apparently ac-
cepted the inevitability of an early withdrawal"
The threat by the Lumumba government to expropriate all
Belgian firms which have not reopened for business by 10 August
may stimulate new anti-European disorders in the Congo. The
Belgian Government has estimated that between 30,000 and 35,000
Europeans remain in the Congo, compared with about 115,000
shortly before independence.
The security situation there remains precarious, with inter-
tribal warfare having flared arrain in Kasa Province. (b)(1)
officers of the UN force
have yet to receive any instructions concerning the rehabilitation
of the once-effective Force Publique3 Nonetheless, the UN forces
appear unwilling to take action to contain intertribal warfare; state-
ments by the UN Command have characterized the tribal clashes as (b)(3)
"an internal matter" to be handled by the "Congo Army."
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
3 Aug 60
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(b)(1
(b)(3
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British Crackdown on Adeni Nationalists May Lead to Violence
The colonial government's announcement on 1. August that
It intends to obtain legislation which will enable it to crack
down on Nasir-controlled unions in Aden may lead to a general
strike and violent demonstrations which could paralyze all port
activity. The British move is likely to close the ranks of the
feuding leaders-of the Aden Trade Union Congress and increase
the possibility of violence. Cairo is likely to make a big prop-
aganda play over the "imperialist repression."
Britain regards this as a showdown with Arab nationalists
led from Cairo who are using domination of the labor movement
--the strongest political force in the colony--to challenge con-
tinued British control. The British feel that the unions have
been given every chance to develop responsibility, but are inter-
ested only in nationalist politics, not labor benefits. Politically
motivated strikes, which the new legislation will outlaw, are
damaging Aden's economy and have convinced London that strong
action is necessary. There were over 70 strikes in 1959, and
a 70-day refinery strike this spring just recently was brought
to final settlement. The new legislation to be voted about 15
August by the colony's legislative council will provide for com-
pulsory arbitration except in certain limited circumstances.
Instigators of "political" strikes disguised as industrial dis-
putes will be tried as felons under the criminal code.
The British apparently believe the extra security precau-
tions they have taken can contain the situation. They now have
4,700 troops�including a commando unit--in Aden to ensure
maintenance of essential services in the event of a general
strike as well as provide internal security.
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SEERfikt
� Intensified Maneuvering in Indonesia
Indonesia's major power elements are once again inten-
sively maneuvering against one another.
The Communist party, which triggered the latest round
of maneuvering by severely criticizing the government in an
8 July statement, now appears apprehensive over President
Sukarno's permitting an army investigation of party leaders.
The army has interrogated five members of the politburo
since 16 July, planned to begin a more intensive "second�
phase" interrogation on 30 July, allegedly hopes ulti-
mately to bring the politburo to trial on charges of violating
the criminal code. An emergency meeting of Communist
provincial leaders was reported scheduled for 20 to 23 July.
Depending on Sukarno's reaction, the Communist leadership
is reported making plans to go underground for an indefinite
periodl
Sukarno is angry over the army's activities among non-
Communist political parties and reportedly has decided to
displace Colonel Sukendro, who has served as the army's
liaison with political parties.
Although Sukarno at first interfered with the army's in-
terrogation of Communist party leaders, he now seems in-
clined to wait and see how far the army is prepared to go and
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what resources the Communists can muster. Several times
during the past two weeks, however, he has, in effect, reas-
sured the Communists by stating publicly that his views coin-
cide in many areas with those of the party. Sukarno undoubt-
edly desires to preserve the party as a balance against army
power in order to maintain his own pre-eminent position.
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Wi'4ririti4-4-44L14�
'SW
THE PRESIDENT
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Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
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The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
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The Secretary of the Army
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T.TINFMKNITIA I.
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