CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/12/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003767
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: December 22, 1953

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22 December 1953
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. _r
NO CHANGE tfl CLASS,
DECLASSiFIED
CHANGLIED TO: TS S C
NEXT' REVIEW DATE:
ALITH: 70-2
DATE: _a_sE04914,VIEWER:
2 u
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1, Ambassador Bohlen reports on Moscow's answer to President
Eisenhower's speech (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Soviet official indicates agreement to four-power meeting
(page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on Communist call for increased military action
in Malaya (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Dissolution of Majlis to hasten new elections (page 5).
5. Comment on sentence of former prime minister Mossadeq
(page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. French presidential stalemate revives talk of coup (page 6).
7. Comment on Italian premier's threat to resign (page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
8. Guatemalan president plans continued collaboration with
Communists (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. Ambassador Bohlen reports on Moscow's answer to President
Eisenhower's speech:
Ambassador Bohlen reports that the state-
ment of the Soviet government on President
Eisenhower's speech constitutes acceptance
of the proposal for establishing an inter-
national atomic energy agency, but that the Kremlin expects further
clarification of the substantive proposals. During the talks, the
USSR will present its own proposal for a commitment from the
participants, to be reinforced by strict international control, that
they will not use atomic or other weapons of mass destruction. The
Soviet statement emphasizes that this commitment would be the
first important step toward the abolition of atomic weapons.
Bohlen stated that in the body of the
document the president's substantive proposal received a negative
response on the grounds that only a small amount of fissionable
material would be turned over to the proposed body and that since
there was no provision for limiting the use of atomic weapon;
the atomic race would not be halted.
Comment: The Soviet Statement gives
no hint that Moscow intends to go further than its previous pro-
posals in the UN or that the USSR is. prepared to accept an
effective plan for international control� inspection or ownership
of atomic or thermonuclear installations.
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SOVIET UNION
2. Soviet official indicates agreement to four-power meeting:
The chief of the German department in the
Soviet Foreign Ministry told the Swedish
ambassador that he thought both Berlin and
4 January would be acceptable to the Soviet
government for a four-power meeting.
Ambassador Bohlen comments that there
is no way of assessing what weight should be given to this casual
statement.
Comment: There have been other indica-
tions that the USSR would agree to a four-power foreign ministers
meeting but diplomatic hints and propaganda have suggested that the
Kremlin preferred a date later than 4 January.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on Communist call for increased military action in Malaya:
The Malayan government announced on
18 December that it had knowledge that the central committee of the
Malayan Communist Party had several months ago called for an
intensification of military activity. The Communist order was cited
as a possible explanation for a recent slight and localized increase
in terrorism.
A resumption of terroristic activity on a
larger scale may be in prospect. The Communists are believed to
have used the past year and a half for building a broader base through
political subversion, for improving their food supply, and for military
training. A document captured nearly a year ago specifically cited
this period as one of study and preparation for further terrorism.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Dissolution of Majlis to hasten new elections:
The shah's dissolution of the rump Majlis
and the Senate, apparently at the insistence of Prime Minister
Zahedi, was a move to make immediate elections possible in Iran.
The decision to bring about early elections probably arose from
Zahedi's desire to have a parliament available to approve any future
oil settlement as well as to aid in advancing his domestic reform
program.
The electoral lines are not yet sharply
drawn. Sources close to the shah and the prime minister, however,
report that these two have selected lists of candidates, on many of
whom both agree. The army can be expected to ensure the election
of government-backed candidates in many areas.
The opposition will probably be led by
Baghai and Makki, who, however, no longer enjoy parliamentary
immunity and are thus subject to arrest at any time. It is likely
that Tudeh activity will be expressed primarily in collaboration with
non-Communist groups, notably the National Resistance Movement.
A spokesman for the government has
announced that it hopes to have a quorum of 69 deputies elected within
two months.
5. Comment on sentence of former prime minister Mossadeq:
The decision of the Iranian military tribunal
to sentence former prime minister Mossadeq to three years of solitary
confinement appears to have been influenced by the shah's public
pardoning of Mossadeq for offenses against the throne.
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The three-year sentence may, in view of
Mossadecf s age, remove him permanently from political life. His
continued presence within the country, however, will be a constant
reminder to his adherents of his potential availability and invite
action to free him. His imprisonment will be a continuing threat
and a matter of constant concern to the government. Mossadeq's
death in prison would make him a martyr, just as his execution
would have done.
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Freneh presidential stalemate revives talk of coup:
As the deadlock in the French presidential
race continues, popular disgust with parliamentary bickering is
rising sharply. Responsible newspapers of various political shades
have begun to discuss seriously the possibility of a dictatorship,
whereas last June, during the prolonged cabinet crisis, talk of a
prospective military coup to establish Marshal Juin as dictator was
dismissed as rumor.
Regardless of the outcome of the presidential
race, the stability of the Fourth Republic has been further shaken.
An additional step toward the disintegration of democracy in France
is feared when the search for a new cabinet is undertaken following
the presidential election.
Even if the National Assembly were to agree
to dissolve, under the present electoral system, new elections for
the National Assembly offer no guarantee of a solution to the problem.
Any attempt to find a substitute for the present system is sure to lead
to a prolonged battle
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7. Comment on Italian premier's threat to resign:
Italian premier Pella's threat on 20 December
to resign unless assured "complete and unconditioned support" from
his Christian Dernocractic Party suggests that he wishes to use the
threat of new elections to frighten party leaders who have been critical
of him into giving him solid support. He may also hope to extract
additional American support for his government by giving the impression
that the only alternative is a cabinet in which Communist sympathizers
would participate.
Former premier De Gasperi and former
defense minister Pacciardi have told Ambassador Luce that the present
political situation is dangerous because the government has only an
unsure majority in parliament and has developed no positive program
for which to rally support. They consider that a government move to
the right, which De Gasperi says is already being made, would fail
and would lead to Communist gains. Both believe the country as a
whole is anxious not to undertake new elections at this time.
LATIN AMERICA
8. Guatemalan president plans continued collaboration with Communists:
Guatemalan president Arbenz made clear
to Ambassador Peurifoy on 16 December
that he intends to continue to collaborate
with the Communists. He displayed his
deep feeling against the United Fruit
ompany, an sal it would be better for Guatemala to be
dominated by the Communists than by the company.
Regarding his friendship with Guatamala's
top Communist leaders, Gutierrez and Fortuny, Arbenz said that they
were "honest" and served Guatemalan, not Soviet, interests. He said
that they had gone to Moscow "merely to study Marxism, not neces-
sarily to get instructions. "
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Peurifoy comments that if Arbenz is not
a Communist, he "will do until one comes along.??
Comment: The unification of Guatemalan
labor under Gutierrez and the united front policy of Fortuny's Com-
munist Guatemalan Labor Party have been widely heralded as triumphs
for international Communist strategy.
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