CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/12/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003764
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: December 18, 1953

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C03003
18 December 1953
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCLIMENIT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20.02
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE; egitairN..REVIEWEd
Officeiof Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Chinese Communists want Korean talks continued (page 3).
2. Soviet position on Korean political conference reaffirmed (page 3).
3. Menon seeking UN discussion on Korean prisoners (page 4).
4. Soviet officials suggest postponement of Berlin conference (page 4).
SOVIET UNION
5. Yugoslavia and USSR negotiate air transport agreement (page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. Chinese Nationalists in Burma and Karens increase cooperation
(page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Comment on Iranian government's drive against non-Communist
opposition (page 6).
8. Cairo tightens Red Sea blockade of Israel (page 7).
9. Egypt advances date for visit of economic mission to Moscow (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Pella may announce within week intention to act on EDC (page 8).
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GENERAL
1.
Chinese Communists want Korean talks continued:
3.3(h)(2)
The Swedish ambassador in Peiping was
told by a Chinese Communist vice foreign
minister on 14 December that the Commu-
nists wish to resume the Korean talks but
will not retract the remarks
to which American envoy Dean had ob-
jected. The ambassador's
impression, 3.3(h)(2)
was that
the Chinese desire both a continuation
of the preliminary talks and a convening of the Korean political con-
ference itself.
Comment: The vice foreign minister's
line follows precisely Peiping 's propaganda of the past several days.
Even if the talks are resumed, there is no evidence that the Commu-
nists will compromise on the main issues.
2. Soviet position on Korean political conference reaffirmed:
Comment: This is the most recent indica-
tion from an official Soviet spokesman that Moscow's attitude toward
the political conference remains unchanged. The Soviet leaders will
probably reject any UN recommendation designed to bind the USSR to
agreements reached by the political conference.
In the proposed four-power Berlin confer-
ence, the Soviet Union may attempt to use the stalemate in the Korean
talks as a basis for demanding a five-power conference including Com-
munist China.
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3.3(
h)(2)
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3. Menon seeking UN discussion on Korean prisoners:
.ccording to Ambassador Lodge, Indian
elegate Menon told a group of Latin
�merican delegates on 16 December that
he General Assembly should be convened
efore 22 January to consider disposition
f the nonrepatriated Korean prisoners.
Le said that the lack of a political confer-
nce confronted Indian custodial troops with
a potentially dangerous situation. Menon made it clear that the Latin
Americans should use their influence to bring the United States around
to the Indian viewpoint.
Menon left a memorandum to the same effect
with the British delegate.
Comment: Menon's maneuvers and India's
reported denial of Thimayya's statement favoring release of the pris-
oners on 22 January represent a reversal of previously stated views.
Since the talks have been broken off, India may wish to avoid Commu-
nist charges that releasing the prisoners would violate the armistice
agreement.
4. Soviet officials suggest postponement of Berlin conference:
Officials of the Soviet embassy in London,
in two separate approaches to the British
Foreign Office on 14 and 15 December,
suggested that 4 January is too early for
erence. ne official emphasized the inconvenience
to the French, and the other pointed out that both the Soviet and
Western powers need several more weeks to prepare for it.
The second Soviet official also said that
the USSR at the outset of the conference would propose a subsequent
five-power meeting, but would not break it up on this issue. He ex-
pected Moscow to insist on the formation of a government by repre-
sentatives of East and West Germany, and the Allies to demand free
elections as a first step. A compromise might be found, however,
if the West would propose a mutual withdrawal of troops.
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3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
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Comment: There have been other indica-
tions that the Kremlin will seek postponement of the Berlin meeting.
The remarks on substantive issues seem designed to counter Western
skepticism of Soviet willingness to accept any compromises at the
conference.
Although the Kremlin might indicate a
favorable attitude on troop withdrawal for propaganda purposes, it
would probably demand conditions unacceptable to the West in order
to prevent such a development, which the 17 June riots have shown
would jeopardize its control of East Germany.
SOVIET UNION
5. Yugoslavia and USSR negotiate air transport agreement:
The USSR will authorize the Yugoslav
airline JAT to make a weekly flight from
Belgrade to Vienna in return for Yugoslav
authorization for the Soviet airline Aeroflot
to make weekly flights between Moscow,
Belgrade and Tirana.
Comment: This agreement appears to be
another step in the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and
the Orbit.
Flights by Aeroflot between Budapest,
Belgrade and Tirana were discontinued in mid-April 1953, probably
because of excessive Yugoslav demands for information on cargo,
passengers, and documents aboard the aircraft at the required inspec-
tion stop at Belgrade. The Yugoslays probably have moderated their
demands in this regard in order to obtain permission to fly to Vienna.
In July, Soviet authorities in Austria
authorized three Western lines to fly regular schedules into Vienna.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. Chinese Nationalists in Burma and Karens increase cooperation: ,
Ambassador Sebald says the recently con-
firmed construction of a new airstrip in
southeastern Burma near the Thai border
strongly supports the belief that the hard
core of the Chinese Nationalist forces plan to establish themselves
there in collaboration with the Karen insurgents. Such a development
indicates that the Nationalist problem in Burma will continue and that
the Rangoon government will be under intensified internal political
pressure to seek an accommodation with Peiping.
Even if further evacuation efforts now
promised by Taipei are successful, cooperation between remnant
Nationalists and the Karens in southeastern Burma will keep Rangoon
aroused over this problem.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Comment on Iranian government's drive against non-Communist
opposition:
The Iranian government's decision to
arrest Hossein Makki and Mozaffar Baghai, two of the chief non-
Communist opposition leaders, who have gone into hiding, indicates
that Prime Minister Zahedi plans to hasten the implementation of
his domestic program, and is preparing to open talks with Britain
on the oil issue. Zahedi tried but failed to gain Baghai's cooperation.
The decision to act against its opposition
suggests that the government now feels strong enough to risk popular
reaction. The decision probably also springs from recognition that
vocal and popular leaders of ultranationalism must be silenced before
Zahedi's program can be implemented or serious talks on the oil dis-
pute begun.
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8. Cairo tightens Red Sea blockade of Israel:
Comment: This is the first evidence
that Egypt is implementing its decision of 23 November to tighten
the blockade against Israel. This action is being taken in the face
of an American protest against the Egyptian attack on 3 December
against a US ship carrying grain to Jordan.
Egypt's hardening attitude on this issue
probably stems from increased frustration over the developments
in the Suez dispute.
9. Egypt advances date for visit of economic mission to Moscow:
3
.3(h)(2)
3.3(
h)(2)
Comment: The decision to send the
economic mission to Moscow now, instead of next May as previously
announced, suggests that Egypt is serious in its threats to pursue its
policy of neutralism.
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WESTERN EUROPE
10. Pella may announce within week intention to act on EDC:
Ambassador Luce in Rome reports that
there is reason to believe Premier Pella
is considering a pre-Christmas announce-
ment of his government's intention to intro-
duce EDC when Parliament reconvenes on
15 Ianuary,
The possibility of this move was pointed
out to the ambassador by ex-premier De Gasperi, who expressed
the belief that EDC could be ratified without a Trieste settlement
if there were an amendment to the EDC treaty which would permit
a delay in Italy's full adherence until a reasonable solution of the
Trieste issue had been found.
Comment: An Italian Foreign Ministry
official recently told the A.me rican embassy that in his opinion the
effect of the Trieste question on EDC ratification is exaggerated.
Nevertheless, Italian ratification of EDC appears to depend on the
government's ability to defend its position in Parliament regarding
Trieste.
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