CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/12/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003760
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: December 13, 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION
13 December 1953
Copy No. b
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. LTS3
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
iee7
Cl DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. PO 0 9
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:20,:e/r.9_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-or SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. British officials believe failure of Berlin conference likely (page 3).
2. Greece proposes expanding Balkan treaty to include formal defense
pact (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Sapanese reparations proposal unacceptable to Philippines (page 4).
4. Good rice harvest estimated in Communist China (page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Chiang Kai-shek makes "last appeal" to Nationalist troops in
Burma (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Sudan administration concerned over possible visit of Nagib (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
33(h)(2)
8. Italy considers reduction of armed forces (Rage 7).
9. CSC High Authority split may defer action against steel cartel
(page 7).
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GENERAL
1. British officials believe failure of Berlin conference likely:
The American embassy in London reports
that Foreign Office officials are increase-
ingly pessimistic about the probable results
of the four-power meeting in Berlin.
They argue that one factor leading to the
stalemate in the Panmunjom talks may be a Soviet desire to make
the Berlin talks focus on the necessity for five-power talks about the
Far East. The Soviet representatives, they fear, will propose dis-
missing the German question with a recommendation that East and West
Germany begin detailed discussions.
Comment: Although there has been no of-
ficial Soviet reply to the Western proposal for a four-power conference,
there have been some hints that the USSR will attend. There is no 'indi-
cation that the Kremlin is prepared to discuss the German problem
substantively at the projected conference.
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2. Greece proposes expanding Balkan treaty to include formal defense pact:
Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos told A mbas3.3(h)(2)
sador Cannon on 8 December that the Greek
general staff wants the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav
treaty of friendships and collaboration expanded
to include a formal military agreement. The general staff desires pro-
visions for automatic joint military action in the event of an attack by
Bulgaria on any one of the signatories.
Stephanopoulos assured Cannon that he did
not underrate the complications involved and that the recommendations
represented the desiderata of the general staff rather than what might
be practicable now.
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Cannon believes, however, that current
developments in the Balkan relationship are leading to a situation
that the major NATO powers have been anxious to avoid.
Comment: The proposed amendment to
the Ankara treaty would go far beyond the present limits of contin-
gent military planning urged by the major Western powers. It is
indicative of the Greek general staffs concern over the country's
relatively unprotected borders and its impatience at the slowness of
tripartite military planning.
There is no indication that the Turks are
as impatient as the Greeks over lagging military coordination in
southeastern Europe.
FAR EAST
3. Japanese reparations proposal unacceptable to Philippines:
The Philippine Foreign Ministry stated on
10 December that Japan's proposal to pay
reparations of $250,000,000 in services,
plus a small supply of capital goods, was
unacceptable. The Philippine foreign
secretary said that this was less than what
Japanese foreign minister Okazaki had
offered during his October visit to Manila.
Comment: The Japanese Foreign Ministry
had indicated to American officials in Tokyo that the $250,000,000 was
an initial negotiating figure which might be increased to $400,000,000.
The Japanese probably are reserving their "best and final" offer for
the incoming Magsaysay administration, which will assume office in
January.
Any Philippines reparations settlement
will set the pattern for subsequent Japanese agreements with Burma,
Indonesia, and the Associated States and will improve Japan's pros-
pects for developing economic relations with Southeast Asia.
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4. Good rice harvest estimated in Communist China:
This year's production of rice, soybeans,
and peanuts in Communist China has been
tentatively estimated by the American
consulate general in Hong Kong to be greater
than that in 1952, which was a good year.
Comment: This estimate indicates that the
Peiping regime is in a stronger food position
t expected. Rice and oilseeds are the crops on which it
depends for export and for feeding the urban population and armies.
Decreases in the production of wheat and
other grains as a result of poor weather have necessitated rationing
in some cities and will have an even greater effect on the food supply
of some rural areas. The grain shortages expected this winter in
northern China and Manchuria will not seriously interfere with Peiping's
major programs.
SOUTHEAST ASIA.
5, Chiang Kai-shek makes "last appeal" to Nationalist troops in Burma:
The Chipese Nationalist Foreign Ministry
has given the American ambassador at
Taipei a translation of a "last appeal"
sent by Chiang Kai-shek on 5 December to
Nationalist forces in Burma. Chiang reportedly informed the forces
that after thorough consideration he felt that there was no alternative
to evacuation and no other hope for their survival.
Comment: Taipei on 11 December claimed
to have received information from Mong Hsat, the Nationalist head-
quarters in Burma, indicating that up to 3,000 more of the estimated
10,000 troops still in Burma may be evacuated.
The Nationalists have possibly decided to
abandon the Mong Hsat area, but to maintain their tie with Karen
insurgents to the south. This would enable them to keep their hold
on the opium traffic.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Sudan administration concerned over possible visit of Nagib:
7.
The possibility that General Nagib will soon
visit the Sudan for the opening of the newly
elected Sudanese parliament has concerned
British administrators in Khartoum. They
fear that his visit would become a "triumphal
tour."
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To counter this, Britain is considering sending
Admiral Mountbatten to visit the Sudan. London believes Mountbatten
would be its best choice because of his reputation as the "man who gave
India to the Indians."
Comment: Nagib informed the press on
30 November that he hoped to visit Khartoum at the earliest opportu-
nity, probably at the time of the inauguration of the new parliament.
A visit by Nagib could mean an intensification of Cairo's campaign to
extend its influence in the Sudan.
WESTERN EUROPE
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8. Italy considers reduction of armed forces:
Italian defense minister Taviani has informed
the American embassy in Rome that a short-
age of funds may force a reduction in the
number of Italian divisions. He added that
the government has no intention of increasing defense appropriations.
Taviani also commented that war with the
Orbit is not imminent, and that in view of the unsettled Italian political
situation, parliamentary support for an increased defense program
would be uncertain.
Comment: Taviani's statement on the eve
of the NATO ministerial meeting is the first indication that the Pella
government has ended its months-long period of uncertainty regarding
force goals. The budget passed in October had reduced appropriations
but there was no indication at that time that a reduction in force goals
was contemplated.
Premier Pella, who as treasury minister
was the leading opponent of increased defense appropriations in the
De Gasperi cabinet, had indicated last year that after the June 1953
elections expenditures would be increased to enable Italy to meet
NATO force goals.
9. CSC High Authority split may defer action against steel cartel:
Jean Monnet, president of the Coal-Steel
Community High Authority, will not be
able to find the necessary support for a
motion for immediate action against the
steel export cartel, in the opinion of Dirk Spierenburg, prominent
Dutch member of the High Authority. He believes that even if such
a motion were passed, it would be overruled by the CSC Court of
Justice, and that in any case, action against cartel agreements
affecting trade within the community should come first.
Spierenburg anticipates High Authority
action against the south German coal cartel within six weeks, and
against the Ruhr coal cartel and the French steel association by
1 April.
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Comment: There have been previous indica-
tions of a division within the CSC executive over priorities on anticartel
measures. The cartel issue, particularly at a time when sales diffi-
culties are promoting cartelization, can be expected to provide the
most severe test to date of the 17-month-old community's authority.
The governments of several member coun-
tries are apparently leaning toward support of the producers' argument
that export cartels lie beyond CSC jurisdiction.
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