CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/12/12
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03003759
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 12, 1953
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15677571].pdf | 270.24 KB |
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SECURITY INFORMATION
12 December
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. Tr
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO; TS 8
NEXT REVIEW DATE. P. O9
AUTI-I: Hi{ 70-2
DATE: 202-1.7...2.. RrVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
zo_p_s_EGRE
SECURITY INFORMATION
1953
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Armenian purge underlines Khrushchev's growing stature (page 3).
2. Soviet gold sales to Western Europe continue at a high rate (page 3).
3.
4.
5,
FAR EAST
Peiping spokesman prepared to "stay till spring" at Korean talks
(page 4).
Thimavva rpnorts extensive military construction in Korea (page 4).
3.3(h)(2)
SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. Defense minister's policies may result in showdown in Indonesia
(page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. British modify stand on control of Iranian oil consortium (page 6).
8. Comment on incidents in the Suez area (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Austria may request revision of state treaty draft (page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
1. Armenian purge underlines Khrushchev's growing stature:
The purge of Armenian party boss G. A.
Arutinov announced on 9 December appears to reflect the influence
of N. S. Khrushchev, whose power has been increasing rapidly since
he was appointed all-union party first secretary in September 1953.
Arutinov was in 1951 the first Soviet official to criticize publicly
Khrushchev's ideas on agricultural organization.
Khrushchev's public participation in the
removal in late November of Leningrad party leader V. M. Andrianov,
long considered a Malenkov associate, and his earlier failure to give
Malenkov any credit for the new agricultural program suggest the de-
velopment of rivalries within the framework of the USSR's collective
leadership.
Besides assuming public supremacy in the
important agricultural field, Khrushchev has apparently been able to
gain an increasingly important role in top personnel appointments.
Former Khrushchev associates who have been promoted recently in-
clude L. R. Korniets, new minister of procurement, and V. P. -
Mzhavana.dze, first party secretary in Georgia.
2. Soviet gold sales to Western Europe continue at a high rate:
The British Foreign Office has informed
the American embassy in London that re-
cent sales of Soviet gold in the United
Kingdom amount to the equivalent of
approximately $30,000,000.
Comment: Since mid-October, known
Soviet gold exports to the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland
have totaled at least $60,000,000. If continued at this rate,the total
annual export of gold would be over three times the estimated Soviet
and Satellite average in the past four years.
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� In recent months the Soviet Union has
expanded its imports of consumer goods from the West and has
cut back its shipment of such important export commodities as
grain and timber, probably using the export of precious metals
as an alternative source of foreign exchange.
FAR EAST
3. Peiping spokesman prepared to "stay till spring" at Korean talks:
Huang Hua, Chinese Communist spokesman 3.3(h)(2)
at the Korean talks, told a senior Indian
official in Korea on 9 December that he was
"prepared to stay until spring" at these talks.
Huang and the North Korean representative
seemea 'TunaIie to understand" Ambassador Dean's rejection of the
USSR as a neutral and "appeared incredulous" when the Indian stated
that Dean's position would not change.
The Indian official believes that Huang's
insistence on the USSR's "neutrality" is due in part to Peiping's sensi-
tivity about appearing subordinate to the Russians at the Korean confer-
ence, which the Chinese consider to be their own concern.
Comment: Communist propaganda, although
it describes the impasse in the Korean talks as "grave," suggests an in-
tention to avoid taking the initiative in breaking off the talks.
Moscow and Peiping appear to have agreed
from the start on the USSR's "neutral" status' to give Moscow maximum
maneuverability in the future.
4. Thimayya reports extensive military construction in Korea:
General Thimayya, Indian chairman of the 3.3(h)(2)
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission,
believes that the Communists in Korea are
working furiously on airfields, gun emplace-
ments, and on an intricate system of tunnel
defenses, according to Ambassador Dean.
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Thimayya, who is permitted to go north of
the demilitarized zone, reiterates that the Communists can move men
and a large amount of supplies through the tunnels without interference.
Dean points out that the general, not being allowed south of the demili-
tarized zone, "constantly questions" whether full advantage of the armi-
stice is being taken to build up South Korean defenses.
Comment: These firsthand observations
reinforce other reports that the enemy is strengthening his forward
positions, preparing underground storage space, and extending forward
his line of communications.
Thimayya's statement underlines his increas-
ingly sympathetic attitude toward the West.
5
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. Defense minister's policies may result in showdown in Indonesia:
3.3(h)(2)
The American embassy in Djakarta reports
that five of the Indonesian army's seven terri-
torial commanders are unwilling to accept
the pro-Communist defense minister's reorgan-
ization plan, which would curb their power. At the same time the govern-
ment, by supporting the defense minister's activities and by favoring the
Nationalist Party in making government appointments, has caused serious
dissatisfaction among the small non-Communist parties represented in the
cabinet. Thus for the first time there is a chance for the opposition to
break the present coalition.
Defection of the government's moderate support
would not necessarily bring about the cabinet's fall but would leave it
wholly dependent on the support of the Communists, who could then dictate
its policies. To accept this course, the embassy believes the government
must risk forceful action from the military groups opposed to the defense
minister.
Comment: The army commanders opposing
the defense minister include those of West Java, where Djakarta is located,
and Central Java. The commander in East Sava is the only one fully sup-
porting the government.
3.3(h)(2)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. British modify stand on control of Iranian oil consortium:
3.3(h)(2)
Foreign Secretary Eden indicated at Bermuda
that London is willing to push forward as
quickly as possible with negotiations for a
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settlement of the Iranian oil dispute. He gave the impression that
Britain would not insist on AIOC control of the Iranian oil industry
or on a majority British share in any consortium established to
market Iranian oil.
For domestic reasons, however, the
British feel that their own analysis of the situation must precede
any cabinet decision.
Comment: London has heretofore in-
sisted that British companies must hold at least a 51-percent interest
in any consortium.
Direct negotiations with Iran are unlikely
for some time, pending solution of many complicated financial and
legal problems involved. There are indications that AIOC representa-
tives may be reluctant to adopt a position acceptable to Iran.
8. Comment on incidents in the Suez area:
The increase in minor incidents in the
Suez Canal area and the reported British military retaliation are
not expected to result in a breakdown of law and order. The Egyptian
government, frustrated over the apparent unwillingness of Britain to
make further concessions as well as over the delay of American eco-
nomic aid, may be condoning some local expressions of anti-British
sentiment.
Egyptian military leaders are aware that
unrestrained terrorist activities endanger their regime and accordingly
can be expected to counter this threat when necessary. For the time
being they will probably continue to press for a ne otiated solution of
the Suez issue and for direct American aid.
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Austria may request revision of state treaty draft:
Foreign Minister Figl informed the American
embassy in Vienna on 10 December that he
intends to urge his government to request
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formal consent to participate in the proposed four-power conference in
Berlin. He "expects" any Austrian representative at the conference
would make a strong plea for revision of Article 35 of the draft treaty.
Comment: The three Western powers
have previously consented to Austrian participation in future treaty
negotiations provided the Soviet Union concurs. Thus far Vienna
has been unable to obtain a formal Soviet commitment to Austrian
participation, although Soviet authorities in Austria have unofficially
stated that this would be possible provided Austria "plays a good part."
An Austrian plea at the Berlin conference
for revision of Article 35 would greatly assist Western efforts to re-
vise the economic articles of the treaty. British and French support
of these efforts is currently conditioned on Austrian initiative in urging
revision.
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