CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/12/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003756
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: December 9, 1953

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9 December 1953
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
bocumENt No. 74-
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T$ S C
NEXT REVIEVV DATE. 0,03
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ,e02/7_9 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
India plans to release Itorean prisoners after 22 January (page 3).
2.
FAR EAST
3. Japan seen unable to accept bs defense goals (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Navarre discounts possibility of negotiations with Viet Minh
(page 4).
5,
6. true in maoriestan armea Iorceb reporteaLy buarpenuig kpage
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GENERAL
I. India plans to release Korean prisoners after 22 januarT
2.
After consultation with Prime Minister
Nehru, Foreign Secretary Pillai has
confirmed to Ambassador Allen that
India is planning to return the remaining
prisoners in Korea to the original retain-
ing sides if no other disposition is agreed
on prior to 22 January.
General Thimayya, head of the custodial
forces, told an American military officer on 6 December that he
would withdraw the guards from the enclosures after 22 January
unless both sides agree that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-
mission should continue to maintain custody of the prisoners.
Comment India has shifted from its
earlier view that the release of the prisoners would be contingent
on the holding of a political conference. It may, however, attempt
to have the UN General Assembly reconvened to consider the prob-
lem, in which case support for the prisoners' release seems assured.
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FAR EAST
3. Japan seen unable to accept US defense goals:
Ambassador Allison believes that the
Japanese public's apprehension of a
rapid military build-up and the govern-
ment's vulnerability to leftist attack on
rearmament make it impractical for Tokyo to accept the minimum
defense goal for 1957 of a 325,000-man ground force as proposed by
the United States. He doubts that the government can be persuaded
to revise substantially the defense program it has informally pre-
sented to the United States, which provides for a 180,000-man ground
force.
In view of the recent progress toward
conservative unity, Allison thinks that encouragement of a prompt
build-up from the present 110,000-man force might lead the Japanese
government to adopt a more realistic defense policy.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Navarre discounts possibility of negotiations with Viet Minh:
General Navarre told Ambassador Heath
in Saigon on 6 December that he is not
worried over Ho Chi Minh's peace offer
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which appeared in the Swedish press, as there are "no practical
possibilities of negotiating peace" now. Heath concurs in this view.
Navarre believes the peace feeler may
have a salutary effect in causing the Vietnamese to think more
seriously about their danger and the necessity of agreeing to some
form of association with France which would justify the latter in con-
tinuing its efforts in Indochina.
Comment: It would be virtually impossible
for the French to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh without the full participa-
tion of the Vietnamese government, which is strongly opposed to such
a course.
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6. Strife in Indonesian armed forces reportedly sharpening:
There are increasing signs of an approach-
ing political and military "eruption" in Indo-
nesia,
This deteriorating situation has
been aggravated y the activities of the Moscow-trained minister of
defense, who was hand-picked by President Sukarno for his job.
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This official is reorganizing the Ministry of Defense in order to
obtain control over the armed forces and has appointed three sus-
pected Communists as deputy chiefs of staff.
Sharpening disagreement in the armed
forces between those who favor a nonpolitical military establishment
and those who support Sukarno in his desire for a "people's " army
loyal primarily to himself, is leading steadily toward civil war.
It is uncertain whether opposition political groups can bring about a
change in government peacefully before the military resorts to force.
Comment: The American ambassador in
Djakarta reported on 4 December that there was ample evidence of
dissatisfaction among some army circles with the defense minister's
appointments, policies and programs. He also stated that the recent
movement of artillery and heavy equipment out of Djakarta could
have been in preparation for an army coup. Anti-Communist politi-
cal leaders, however, have reportedly been trying to dissuade their
military contacts from taking overt action for at least six months.
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