CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/12/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003755
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: December 8, 1953

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8 December 1953
Copy No. 81
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
SOVIET UNION
2. Bohlen sees genuine Soviet interest in reducing tension (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. North Korea receiving railway equipment from USSR (page 4).
4. Stalemate in negotiations with Korea threatens moderate Japanese
stand (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Chinese Nationalists announce end of evacuation from Burma
(page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Iran objects to accepting British diplomats who previously served
there (page 6).
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1.
GENERAL
SOVIET UNION
. Bohlen sees genuine Soviet interest in reducing tension:
Ambassador Bohlen believes that the Western
note of 16 November proved to the Kremlin
that it had failed to divide the West on the
question of Chinese Communist participation
in a conference and that as long as the Soviet Union continued to insist
on this condition it could have no important contact with the leading
Western powers. He states that most foreign observers in Moscow
consider that the present regime genuinely desires to avoid complica-
tions and adventures in its foreign relations while it is carrying out
new programs in agriculture, consumers' goods and trade, both in the
USSR and the Satellites.
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The ambassador points out that the
26 November note suggests, for the first time since the war, that
the Eastern European nations and their relationship to European
security are suitable subjects for discussion. He thinks the ref-
erences to European security in the note and in subsequent propa-
ganda foreshadow Soviet proposals at the four-power conference
for a European regional security plan designed to limit German
rearmament with the ultimate aim of squeezing the United States
out of Europe.
FAR EAST
3. North Korea receiving railway equipment from USSR:
According to a broadcast in Korean from
Pyongyang, 546 carloads of rails, concrete
and other railway and construction equipment
had been received from the Soviet Union by
20 November under the billion-ruble aid program. Much of this material
is being used to reconstruct trunk rail lines in North Korea.
Comment: This is the first indication from
Pyongyang that substantial amounts of railway equipment are arriving
from the USSR under the Soviet-North Korean agreement signed in Sep-
tember. Along with the reconstruction of metallurgical and hydroelectric
plants, railroads are probably being given a priority because they are
vital to the rehabilitation and further development of North Korea.
4. Stalemate in negotiations with Korea threatens moderate Japanese stand:
The continued delay in resumption of negotia-
tions with South Korea in the dispute over
fisheries and property claims threatens to
discredit the Japanese Foreign Ministry's
policy of conciliation toward the Rhee government, according to Ambas-
sador Allison. He notes that if the prospects for an early settlement
continue to recede, the advocates of forceful retaliation against Korea
will assume control of Japanese policy.
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Allison comments that the Japanese
public and the fishing interests believe that the good offices of the
United States will provide for an early resumption of negotiations.
He notes, however, that Foreign Ministry officials are becoming
increasingly alarmed by the lack of progress.
Comment: Prime Minister Yoshida on
2 November postponed taking cabinet-approved retaliatory measures
against South Korea for its seizures of Japanese fishing vessels in
view of America's willingness to lend its good offices and provide
observers at future talks. Rhee has indicated, however, that he
feels no compulsion to modify his attitude.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Chinese Nationalists announce end of evacuation from Burma:
A Chinese Nationalist spokesman has
informed the three-power committee
in charge of the evacuation of Chinese
troops from Burma that the withdrawal
will end on 8 December. The American
embassy in Bangkok points out that by
then 1,800 troops and 225 dependents
will have been evacuated instead of the
2,000 troops with arms and "several
hundred" dependents originally promised by Taipei.
The Burmese cease-fire agreement
terminates on 15 December.
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Comment Scarcely any arms have been
brought out by the evacuees. An estimated 10,000 Chinese troops remain
in Burma. The remaining forces apparently now call themselves the "Anti-
Communist United Forces of Free Peoples in Southeast Asia," welcoming
recruits from all nationalities in the area.
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6. Iran objects to accepting British diplomats who previously served there:
Foreign Minister Entezam told Ambassador
Henderson on 5 December that it was his and
Prime Minister Zahedi's earnest hope that the
British embassy in Tehran will be staffed by
personnel "entirely new to Iran." �
Entezam emphasized that this should apply
to the entire British mission, including the ambassador. He remarked
that such extremists as Kashani, Makki and Baghai could create even
greater difficulties for the government if the British returned personnel
who had formerly served in Iran.
Comment: Prime Minister Zahedi has con-
sistently voiced fear of public reaction to early resumption of diplomatic
relations with Britain. Should opposition become strong, particularly
on the point of "tainted" personnel, the Zahedi government might be in-
clined to reconsider its conciliatory attitude toward Britain.
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