CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/11/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003736
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 10, 1953

Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO3003736,
SE TY INFORMATION
TOP R.ET rr
10 November 1953
Copy No. NI
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. �51
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE c"�00 9
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ac://2/ r9 REVIEWER: .
Office of Current Intelligence
3.5(c)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP ET
TY INFORMATION
f
3.5(c)
3
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
isse r
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
1.
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
SOUTHEAST ASIA
o American official comments on first Nationalist evacuees from
Burma (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Comment on Mossadeq's trial (page 4).
Comment on the death of King Ibn Saud (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. New Hungarian economic policy creates dissension among
party leaders (page 6).
T 0 1>S E C
10 Nov 53
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
Now I Ur N.t
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
FAR EAST
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3
TOP T
10 Nov 53
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
Nage tl.,Kt, 1
SECURITY INFORMATION
3. American official comments on first Nationalist evacuees from Burma:
The American army attache in Thailand,
presently supervising the evacuation of
Chinese Nationalist troops from Burma,
reports that the first 155 evacuees have
shown excellent discipline but that they are mostly headquarters and
supply personnel, many of them suffering from malaria. Moreover,
the failure of the Nationalists to bring their weapons with them has
increased the suspicions of Burmese observers and correspondents.
The attache adds that the Nationalist
representative on the evacuation committee has confidentially
asserted that the guerrilla commanders in Burma are disregarding
Taipei's evacuation orders.
Comment: These developments are likely
to strengthen the Burmese belief that any Nationalist withdrawal would
be merely a token maneuver. Meanwhile, the evacuation proceedings
have been disrupted, at least temporarily, by a Burmese order to the
evacuation committee to return to the Thai side of the border. This
action grew out of a Burmese claim that 38 members of the second
contingent of evacuees are Burmese nationals�
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Comment on Mossadeq's trial:
The opening of former prime minister
Mossadeq's trial indicates that he will attempt to use the court as
a sounding board to embarrass the Iranian government through a
review of his program. He is also setting the stage for his own
martyrdom.
- 4 -
TOP RET
10 Nov 53
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
�. Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
NftieI L�.,2�1�.' ..ZYM..itt�
SECURITY INFORM,i JUN
3.5(c)
Mossadeq's references to his two-year
struggle with the British indicate that allegations of foreign influ-
ence in Iran may become a major part of hi defense, although
his full argument on this point will not appear until the competency
of the court has been established. The charge of foreign influence
will arouse popular sentiment and make it more difficult for Prime
Minister Zahedi to reopen diplomatic relations with Britain or to
settle the oil dispute.
Mossadeq's apparent desire to make sure
that he is remembered as a national hero and his allegations that the
court had prejudged him highlight the government's dilemma in the
case. Mossadeq probably will be found guilty of treason, but there
is as yet no indication as to whether a death penalty would be carried
out.
3.5(c)
5. Comment on the death of King Ibn Saud:
The death of King Ibn Saud and the succession
to the throne of Crown Prince Saud offer no immediate prospect of
change either in the central government's authority or in the present
position of American oil and military interests in Saudi Arabia. Saud,
who long acted for his father, was appointed commander in chief of the
armed forces last August and became the country's first prime minis-
ter in mid- October. there is no evidence3.3(h)(2)
that Ibn Saud's death will occasion an immediate struggle for power.
Since the new king previously was supported
by the authority of his father, however, he has yet to prove his ability
in handling his brother Faisal, now designated crown prince, and also
such influential officials as Finance Minister Sulaiman and Deputy For-
eign Minister Yassin. His adroitness in holding the kingdom together
will also be tested in his dealings with powerful tribal sheikhs. He
faces additional problems from the new labor unrest in the oil industry.
Saud has been reservedly friendly toward
Americans, but there is no indication that he will be easier to deal
with than his father on either oil matters or arrangements for the air
base at Dhahran. There is no indication that he will be more willing
to compromise with Britain on the Buraimi dispute.
- 5 -
SECET
10 Nov 53
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736
Noe' j CRE I
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
EASTERN EUROPE
6. New Hungarian economic policy creates dissension among party
leaders:
The American legation in Budapest
believes that the 31 October resolution
of the Hungarian Workers' Party central
committee indicates that the government's
new economic program is meeting resistance from important party
and government officials and has failed to win the support of middle
and low-level party workers. The resolution also reveals that re-
cent government measures to reduce economic difficulties have done
little to mitigate popular antagonism toward the regime.
The legation points out that the resolution,
which is an amazingly frank admission of the party's failure to imple-
ment the economic policy launched in July, does not appear to change
the policy's original goals.
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: The week's delay in publishing
this resolution, as well as a similar delay in publicizing Premier Nagy's
recent criticism of the government's past agricultural policy, suggests
that dissension exists within the party hierarchy. This is the first pub-
lic endorsement of Hungary's new economic program by the party.
6
TO,M
10 Nov 53
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003736