CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003522
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 30, 1959

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30 October 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. _
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30 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists apparently seeking
to increase their influence in Asian Com-
munist movements at the expense of Soviet
influence.
Renewed factional struggle in Hungarian
Communist party.
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Syrian Communist leader discusses Com-
munist tactics regarding Iraq and UAR. 0
UAR reinforces army units in eastern
Sinai.
Israeli Government asks Shah of Iran to
convey its good will to Jordanian King.
Sudan--Junior army officers continue
preparations for early coup; their pros-
pects for success are doubtful.
FrPoPT
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I I I. THE WEST
Venezuela--Economic difficulties may
bring on political crisis.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
30 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - USSR: Peiping's desire to diminish
Soviet influence and increase Chinese influence in Asian Com-
munist movements was indicated to
Mao Tse-tung suggested
that the problems facing Asian Communists are better
appreciated by the Chinese' who are closer to the scene3
(Page 1)
Hungary: itctional clashes within the politburo and central
committee of the Hungarian party reportedly again erupted dur-
ing this fall's pre-congress discussions of the draft Five-Year
Plan for 1961-65. Party functionaries expect the expulsion of
anti-Kadar dissidents from the leadership at the congress, which
opens on 30 November. These Stalinist elements are said to
have attacked party First Secretary Kadar's policies on agricul-
tural collectivization and consumer goods production, in terms
reMiniscent of those used by former party leader Rakosi in his
attacks against the relatively liberal "New Course" in 19553
(Page 2)
Correction�
D For a fuller version of the
f\I item, see Part III: Page 1 of the Current Intelligence Weekly
Review and Current Intelligence Weekly Summary dated 29 Octo-
ber 1959,
VA
TO CRET
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Arab Communists: (The exiled Syrian Communist leader,
Rialid Bakdash, early this month told the secretary general of
the Lebanese Communist party that Iraq should be kept neu-
tral for the time being. He also urged the Lebanese party to
assist Iraqi Communists in avoiding a return to their "incor-
rect extremist policy." Bakdash, who met the Lebanese party
chief in Moscow, said that he felt the Soviet attitude toward
?Nasir was "hardening." He counseled Syrian-Lebanese Commu-
nists to continue their strong opposition to UAR policies and to
stress Egypt's "exploitation" of Syria, but to avoid calling for
dissolution of the union.] (Page 4)
iTAR-Israel: The UAR�
has reinforced its army units in eastern
Sinai with an infantry battalion "as part of the plan to safeguard
the Eastern Front and the advanced stockpiling operations."
another stage in the gradual re-
bIdgFUAluitarysireagth along the Israeli border.
A UAR air squadron was to be prepared in anticipation that
there might be Israeli air reconnaissance missions in reaction
to the transfer of the battalion.
two separate overflights of Egyptian territor lay
Tgraeli aircraft. Air clashes are a distinct possibility.
israel-Jordan- an: 'The o ran, w
visit Jordan beginning 2 November, has been asked to convey a
message of Israeli goodwill to King Husayn. The request was
made by Israeli Foreign Minister Meir, and reflects her govern-
ment's continued interest in the peuetuation of Husayn's regime
u and its independence from Nasir. iThe Israelis already have a
channel to Jordan through their intelligence relationships with
an and Turkey:(
(Page 5)_ ,m�M ���
Sudan: (Disgruntled junior army officers are continuing
their preparations for an early coup attempt despite their knowl-
edge that the government is aware of some aspects of their plan-
ning and the identity of many of their adherents. They havO
30 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF
TOP S
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Qostponed initiation of their move several times, but they seem
to believe that they can succeed, even without a strong element
of surprise. The Abboud government is unstable and unpopular,
and the dissident officers are reported to have strong backing in
the Eastern and Central commands, but loyal military forces ap-
pear capable of thwarting any move by these elements in the im-
mediate future)
1110 '11-IE W.E; ST
Venezuela: Economic problems confronting the coalition of
President Betancourt could touch off a political crisis. Depletion
of the country's' foreign exchange and signs of growing opposition to
foreign investments in iron and oil are causing a loss of business
confidence. Betancourt's broad military and civilian support was
recently demonstrated when the government cted against conspira-
torial activity, but considerable unrest apparently prevails beneath
the surface calm. The mid-October transfer of 30 military officers
to posts outside Caracas suggests that some dissidence exists
within the armed forces. Page 6)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Austria's Position Between East and West. SNIE 25-59,
27 Oct 59,
30 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
14.
TO ECRET
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,e'RET
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Mao Tse-tung Indicates Desire to Increase Influence in Asian
Communist Parties
'Peiping's desire to diminish Soviet influence and iprreaRp its
own in Asian Communist movements were indicated to I
Mao
Tse-tung hinted that the Chinese want to lead the Asian
Communist parties on the grounds that the problems facing Asian
Communists are better appreciated by the Chinese-01
Whatever its claims to keener insight into Asian Communist
problems, Peiping's advice, like Moscow's,has in fact served pri-
marily to advance its own foreign policy interests and only second-
arily the interests of the Asian Communists. The Indian Commu-
nists, for example, were asked by Peiping to take a pro-Chinese
stand on the Tibet revolt. Later, they were embarrassed by ve-
hement Chinese statements�including attacks on "Indian expan-
sionists"--and had to advise the Chinese to moderate their attacks
on New Delhi.1
iPeiping in the past year has had considerable contact with
Communist leaders from Japan, Indonesia, and India. In an ef-
fort to avoid the appearance of directly challenging Moscow's in-
fluence, however, Chinese counsel has generally been offered as
complementary to rather than competitive with that of the USSR.
Peiping apparently agreed with Soviet advice to the Indian Commu-
nists to rely on "parliamentary means" to come to power; but the
Chinese went on to counsel the Indian party to adopt a "tougher"
line than it has previously followed in opposing certain policies
of the Congress party. "United front" tactics for the Japanese
Communists, apparently sanctioned by Moscow, were reaffirmed
as appropriate for the Japanese party in the communique signed
in Peiping on 20 October between Liu Sliao-chi and party chairman
Nosaka.I
SEC
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Hungarian Party Factionalism on Eve oitvongress
/Acrimonious factional debate within the politburo and central
committee of the Hungarian party has broken out over the extent
and direction of agricultural and industrial development during the
period of the next Five-Year Plan, 1961-65,
The last
time a factional struggle within the Hungarian party reached sim-
ilar heights--at the party conference in June 1957--it was glossed
over, but the basic issues were not resolved. Intraparty unity
was again threatened during the December 1958 central committee
meeting, by the decision to speed up collectivizatiorq,
fft_alinist elements led by Depaty Premier and politburo mem-
ber Antal Apro, Minister of Heavy Industry Janos Czergo, and the
director of the party's central school, Geza Kassai, favor a more
rapid completion of agricultural collectivization and greater em-
phasis on the expansion of heavy industry than is called for in party
leader Kadar's draft plan. The group reportedly advanced its views
at a central committee meeting in September, but was rebuffed
by ICadar's supporters, from whom politburo member Jena Fock
was then designated to present the draft plan to the Congress on
30 November instead of Apro� who was reportedly in line for the
assignment.
apro then is said to have formalized his objections in a memo-
randum which he asked Soviet Ambassador Shtykov to forward to
Moscow. Shtykov is known to have left for Moscow unexpectedly
on 26 October. In the meantime, Apro has twice taken issue pub-
licly with the draft plan's provisions on agriculture. On 16 Octo-
ber he called for the complete "socialist" reorganization of agri-
culture by 1965--a goal carefully avoided in the plan--and on 24
October he said that present conditions favor the "total socialist
transformation" of the villages within the next five years:4
Ca_se pite these implicit disagreements, Apro was chosen to
deliver a report on deficiencies in Hungary's present economic
planning to another central committee meeting on 22 October.
While no decision on his future has apparently yet been made!!
SEC
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party functionaries reportedly anticipate that Apro and his ex-
tremist colleagues will be demoted at the congress. Press crit-
icism of "dogmatists" and "sectarians"--ostensibly within the
party's lower ranks--has become increasingly bitter during the
past four weeks, suggesting that Kadar may be planning decisive
action to overcome the influence of Stalinist elements in both the
higher and lower levels of the party apparatus-d
CR
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7.L ASIA-AFRICA
Bakdash States' Views. on (�ompunibrn
S rian Communist leader Khalid Bakdash, now in exile
in the Communist bloc, said early this m'onth that he believed
Iraq should be kept neutral for the present. Speaking in Moscow
to the secretary general of the :Lebanese Communist party,
Nicolas Shawi, Bakdash voiced the hope tat the Lebanese Com-
munists would give "sensible advice" to their Iraqi counterparts
who, he said, had realized their previous extremist policy had
been wrorig),
Lon Soviet-UAR relations, Bakdash said Moscow's attitude
toward Nasir was "hardening" and implied that, although the
USSR had not attacked Nasir politically as yet, such action is
likely to occur if his accommodation with the West reaches the
point where his personal popularity and influence in the Arab
world become vtnerable. Meanwhile, Bakdash advised Arab
Communists to keep up their attacks on Nasir's policies, empha-
sizing Egyptian "exploitation" of Syria but not calling for dis-
solution of the union. Bakdash further advised the Lebanese
Communist party to continue supporting Prime Minister Karami,
whom he considered a lesser evil than other candidates for the
Lebanese premiershii5.4
(Shawl. told Bakdash that since Nasir's crackdown there were
probably between 200 and 300 Communists underground in Syria,
with their activities limited to keeping the party alive. He gave
the impression that the Nasir regime was keeping the lid on
tiffht In this connection,
UAR security forces have
picked up two Bulgarianol who were allegedly engaged in "sub-
versive Communist activity" in Syria.
they were to be deported with the utmost spj
30 Oct 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Shah Asked to Give Friendly Israeli Message to Jordan's
King Husayn
Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir,
has requested that, when the
Shah of Iran visits Jordan on 2 November, he convey a message of
Israeli good will to King Husayn. Mrs. Meir reportedly said that
Israel has always had friendly feelings toward the King personally,
citing the fact that at the time the British were sending emergency
aid to Jordan following the Iraqi revolution, "He did not prevent
the flight of their planes over Israel."
Her remarks reflect Israel's continued interest in the per-
petuation of Husayn's relatively weak regime as an alternative to
a Nasir-dominated Jordan. Israel and Jordan have a 330-mile com-
mon border, passing about 12 miles from Tel Aviv, which would b
difficult for Israel to defend. fin the past Israel has stressed that
if a pro-Nasir regime should come to power in Jordan, Israel
would probably feel compelled--as a "defensive" measure--to oc-
cupy West Jordan--the Palestinian sector of the country west of
the Jordan River:'
Mrs. Meir made similar cordial references to Husayn last
April, calling him a courageous young man with hitherto unsus-
pected potentialities for leadership. At that time, in a conversa-
tion with the American charge, she said Israel had no complaint
about the Jordanian Government's attitude, and that she was con-
vinced the occasional border incidents were unrelated to any Jor-
danian policy.
(Husayn probably will welcome the message, since he has been
concerned over what Israel's reaction might be if Jordan found it
"necessary" to preserve the integrity of its borders or even to
take some sort of action in Iraq. He remains in contact with a
group of royalist Iraqi exiles who want him to aid their plans to
re-establish the Iraqi monarchy-.1
[Iran, like Turkey an indirect channel to Jordan for Israel, has
cordial though informal relations with the Israelis. Israel has pro-
moted a close intelligence relations:lip with Iran and imports
Iranian oil through its Gulf of Aaaba nort of Mini-
30 Oct 59
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III. THE WEST
Situation in Venezuela
Venezuelan President Betancourt% coalition is confronted by
economic problems�especially a decline of foreign exchange and
a loss of business confidence--which could touch off a serious
political crisis. At the end of August,Venezuelan exchange re-
serves, although the highest in Latin America, had dropped to
about $9301000,000, and less than a third of this amount was in
liquid dollar reserves, which have been dwindling rapidly. The
president of Venezuela's largest oil company has expressed con-
cern that the need for foreign exchange may cause the sale of
gold that makes up the remainder of the exchange reserves, and
that this would cause a complete loss of confidence abroad and a
panic in Venezuela. He said the government had already asked
the oil industry to buy $300,000,000 worth of short-term treasury
notes.
The uncertainty has been compounded by rumors of plotting
and financial deterioration; by recent policy statements by the
minister of mines unfavorable to the economically important for-
eign-owned oil and mininginterest�;andby the threat of a paralyz-
ing strike accompanied by violence if negotiations for a new oil-
worker g contract fail.
The basic stability of Betancourt% regime was demonstrated
by the broad civilian and military support which rallied to him af-
ter the government arrested about 40 persons in Caracas for con-
spiratorial activity on 12-13 October. The recent transfer of 30
military officers to posts outside the capital suggests, however,
that dissidence is present in some degree in the armed forces.
0
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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