CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/01/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003304
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 31, 1959

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31 January 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
DAI.E
40P-SECRET-
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31 JANUARY1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Guided Missile Intelligence Com-
mittee statement abo it Soviet a-uided-
missile Submarines.
UAR instructs ambassador in Peiping
'to reject Communist China's offer of
arms "with thanks."
North Vietnamese message explains
Communist intention in Taiwan Strait
issue as promoting split between US
and Taiwan, not immediate capture of
Island.
Yugoslays respond to Khrushchev's
statements at party congress with
severe personal press attacks on So-
viet leader.
Soviet delegates at Geneva state pri-
vately that negotiations should con-
tinue until treaty is signed.
0
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
� Chinese Nationalists order intercep-
tion of Communist shipping in Taiwan
Strait area.
�Shah of Iran says he intends to wait
one week before deciding on non-
� aggression pact with USSR.
C) Libyan military mission now in Cairo
reported discussing acquisition of
arms from the USSR.
0 Cambodia - Dap Chhuon reported to
have approached Thai authorities for
support in plot against Sihanouk.
0 Japanese - South Korean relations
will worsen as a result of Japanese
decision to permit Korean residents
to depart Japan for North Korea.
III. THE WVST
0 Paraguay - Attempt to oust President
Stroessner may be imminent.
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PA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
itS
31 January 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Modified Soviet submarines: The Guided Missile Intel-
ligence Committee has made a preliminary assessment of
the evidence concerning the modification of at least three
Soviet Z-class submarines. Although there may be other
reasons for this modification, GMIC believes that it is a dis-
tinct possibility that these submarines have been equipped to
fire ballistic missiles having a range of 100 to 200 nautical
miles. (Page 1)
� Communist China - UAR: The UAR informed its em-
bassy in Peiping to "extend thanks" but that
the artillery offered to a UAR military mission
by Communist China was "not suit-
able," and that no contract was to be concluded.
(Page 2)
North Vietnam:
Chinese Communist policy in
the Taiwan Strait is "to fire at times and cease fire at times"
and "not to liberate Quemoy and Matsu immediately."
Peiping's policy is to "win over world
opinion" and create discord between the US and the Chinese
Nationalists. (Page 3)
Yugoslavia-USSR: Belgrade apparently no longer feels
that Khrushchev might act to moderate the bloc-Yugoslav dis-
pute. In response to his statements about Yugoslavia at the
party congress, the Yugoslays have launched the most severe
personal attacks against Khrushchev since the dispute was re-
newed last spring. (Page 4)
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Ntwe Niue
USSR-Geneva talks: The chief Soviet delegate at the nu-
clear test-cessation talks in Geneva told the American and
British delegates :hat he does not wish nor intend
to break off the negotiations. The number-two man on the
Soviet delegation said the USSR also had new data on under-
ground explosions but "could not discuss it until the treaty is
signed." Another Soviet delegate admitted that "military
authorities" in the USSR did not want to stop tests and would
be happy if no treaty were concluded.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
*Taiwan Strait situation: he Chinese Nationalists have
informed American officials on Taiwan that orders have been
issued for the interception of Chinese Communist shipping in
the Taiwan Strait from just north of Matsu to just south of
Chinmen. Such action was common prior to last fall but was
discontinued shortly after the beginning of the offshore island
crisis. If the Nationalists carry out their intentions, the Chi-
nese Communists would probably retaliate by shelling Chinmen
heavily and engaging any Nationalist naval craft operating in-
side the 12-mile limig (Page 5)
Iran-USSR:
treaty negotiations with the USSR,
will otter to agree not to sign a pending bilateral defense agree-
ment with the US and not to permit Iran to be used as a base
against the Soviet Union. In exchange, the Shah will ask for a
Soviet guarantee not to attack Iran and to cease hostile prop-
aganda. He says he intends to wait one week before making a
final decision on concluding the projected nonaggression pact.
The Shah indicated that Iran will remain in the Baghdad Pact
and has refused Soviet economic aid. Court Minister Ala says
the Shah will be glad to see the American ambassador at any
timf3 (Page 6)
31 Jan 59
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Libya: Libyan military mission led by the defense min-
ister is reported to have been meeting with the Soviet military
attache in Cairo and the Egyptian army chief of staff to discus
the acquisition of arms from the USSR. According to earlier
reports, the purpose of the Libyan mission's visit to the UAR
was to request from Cairo heavy equipment, including tanks
and armored cars, which the Libyan Government had unsuccess-
fully sought from the Brit1sh-7
Cambodia: Txternal and internal plotting against the
Sihanouk regime may soon be coordinated. General Dap Chhuon,
commander in northwestern Cambodia, is reported to have ap-
proached Thai authorities for the first time and to have uraentl
requested their support for his efforts.
Daily anti-Sihanouk broadcasts from a mobile station on the
Thai-Cambodian border are scheduled to begin next week
(Page 7)
Japan-Korea t Foreign Minister Fujiyama's announce-
ment on 30 January that the Japanese Government will permit
Korean residents in Japan to depart for North Korea, if they
desire, probably will be used by Syngman Rhee as an excuse
to break off negotiations for normalization of relations. The
Japanese move probably stemmed from impatience at lack of
progress in the negotiations. (Page 8)
III. THE WEST
*Paraguay: Opposition elements, including some within
Paraguay's ruling Colorado party, have stepped up their plot-
ting arid, plan an at-
tempt to remove 131�icient Stroessner within the next few days.
Stroessner is known to be aware of at least some of the plots
against his administration and has taken special security
ures, particularly since the Castro victory in Cuba.
31 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Possible Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines
At least three Soviet Z-class submarines in the Northern
Fleet and perhaps one or more in the Far East have been mod-
ified and are markedly different from others in this class. This
modification, which may date back to 1956, involves an exten-
sive alteration of the conning tower fairwater. The fairwater
has been enlarged and two circular covers or domes are on top
of the after portion of this structure.
the three Northern Fleet units identified as modified Z-class
boats operate in a somewhat different, manner from other sub-
marines of that fleet. One of these units is now on patrol in the
northeast Atlantic.
The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee has made a
preliminary assessment of the evidence concerning these sub-
marines. Although there may be other reasons for this mod-
ification, GMIC believes that it is a distinct possibility these
units have been equipped to fire ballistic missiles. If equipped
for this purpose, it is estimated that each submarine can carry
two missiles having a 100- to 200-nautical-mile range with cir-
cular error probability of 2 to 4 nautical miles and a payload of
1,000 pounds. The two domes on top of the conning tower could
be the covers of vertical tubes for launching these missiles.
These modifications to the Z class could serve the dual role
of providing the USSR a limited operational capability and serv-
ing as a research and development system for a later, more
advanced missile and submarine system.
It is estimated that the USSR has 18 Z-class submarines.
Four and possibly five of this class are in the Pacific Fleet,
11 or 12 are in the Northern Fleet, and the remainder are in
the Baltic Fleet.
31 Jan 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Chinese Communist Arms Offer Refused by UAR
the artillery offered to the UAR by the Chinese
People's Republic is "not suitable," and that no contract
is to be concluded.
A UAR military mission, described as a coastal defense
committee, in early December witnessed a demonstration in
China of 122-mm. and 152-mm, artillery pieces. The mis-
sion planned to begin discussing a draft agreement with Pei-
ping for the purchase of these arms in mid-December.
31 Jan 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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Nrame
Hanoi Discusses Peiping's Taiwan Strait Strategy
a "conflict" between
the United States and Nationalist China might be sharpened
by current Chinese Communist tactics--"to fire at times
and cease fire at times" and "not to liberate Quemoy and
Matsu immediately." The "conflict" stems from the alleged
US desire for a withdrawal of Nationalist forces from the two
island groups in order "to build up Taiwan into a separate
China" and the opposition to this by Chiang Kai-shek, who is
attempting to "maintain the status quo."
Peiping's policy was to
"win over world opinion" and that if the United States main-
tains its position, "it will be held in contempt:' The Amer-
ican position is already increasingly unpopular among Chinese
on �Chinmen, Matsu, and Taiwan. This line of reasoning sug-
gests that the Chinese Communists are counting on a long-
term political effort together with some military pressure to
prevent a "two-Chinas" situation from developing.
by drawing certain par-
allels between the situation in SouttiVietnam and the Taiwan
indicates close coordination between Peiping and Hanoi.
the United States has aroused the suspicion of
s smaller a ies since, "If it wants to remain, it remains; if
it wants to withdraw, it withdraws."
31 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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Yugoslays Lash Back at Khrushchev
In retaliation for Khrushchev's anti-Yugoslav remarks at
the Soviet 210t party congress, the Yugoslav party's daily,
Borba, on 30 January published the strongest attack Belgrade
has made on him since the Yugoslav-bloc dispute was renewed
last spring. The Yugoslays appear finally to have given up
any hope they may have had that Khrushchev might be inclined
to moderate the bloc's attitude toward Yugoslavia.
Borba emphasized that Khrushchev had interfered in Yugo-
slavia's internal affairs, an accusation which the Kremlin has
tried to avoid since the renewal of the dispute. Yugoslav execu-
tive committee member Djuro Pucar, in a speech to a meeting
of the Yugoslav Federation of Student Organizations, accused
Khrushchev personally of reviving Stalin's tactics. Yugoslav
Foreign Ministry spokesman Drago Kunc, in his 30 January
press conference, joined the chorus, stating that Khrushchey's
simultaneous attack on both the foreign and domestic policies
of Yugoslavia leaves little room for the cooperation he says he
desires.
The Yugoslays say they are being attacked because Yugo-
slav workers are better off than any others in the Communist
world and because the Russians don't want to admit that they
are in many ways copying Yugoslav experience.
CONFIDENTIAL
31 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Taiwan Strait Situation
Eidmiral Liang Hsu-chao, commander in chief of the
Chinese Nationalist Navy, informed American officials on
30 January that he has received orders from the Nationalist
Ministry of Defense to intercept Chinese Communist shipping
in the Taiwan Strait from just north of Matsu to just south of
Chinmen, There is no indication that British shipping is in-
cluded in the ordeA
af the Nationalists carry out this plan, it is likely that
the northern and southern patrol forces in the vicinity of the
Matsus and the Chinmens will be utilized. Similar harass-
ment in the past has been employed particularly against Com-
munist small craft moving in and out of the Min River estuary
near the Matsu. Shortly after the offshore island crisis be-
gan last August, however, this type of activity was discon-
tinued. Most sweeps in the past have been conducted by light
patrol craft. If the Nationalists use their destroyers, Com-
munist reaction could be more sever!)
a the past the Nationalists have sought to present a
"victory" to the public at the time of the Chinese New Year,
in early February. They may also want to keep US and
world attention focused on the Taiwan Strait problerlq
31 Jan 59
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�SEeRET--- Nine
.E' Shah States His Terms-ior iranicui-oorret iNunagg ession Pact
/he Shah of Iran informed the Pakistani ambassador to Iran
and a British Foreign Office official in separate audiences on
29 January that he has offered to sign a treaty with the Soviet
Union which would include as its minimum terms a Soviet assur-
ance that the USSR would not attack Iran and that it would dis-
continue hostile propaganda against Iran. In return Tehran
would agree not to sign the pending bilateral defense agreement
with the US and would not permit use of Iran as a base for ag-
gression against the Soviet Union. The Shah stated that Iran
would remain in the Baghdad Pact and that he has refused So-
viet economic aid. The Soviet delegation which arrived by
special plane in Tehran on 29 January presumably brought a
response to the Shah's terms or at least authority to negotiate
furtherj
the Shah is definitely pre-
pared to sign the nonaggression treaty if the Soviet Union meets
Iran's terms, but that if Soviet counterproposals are rigid he "may
have second thoughts." The Pakistani ambassador had reported to
his government that the Shah intended to sign a 30-year nonaggres-
sion pact with the USSR on 1February.
the Shah had indicated
he would wait one week before making his final decision regard-
ing an Iranian-Soviet treatL3
rTurkish officials,
fear he may take precipitate action which will have serious re-
percussions both on domestic politics in Turkey and throughout
the Middle East. Turkish Prime Minister Menderes was par-
ticularly depressed following these talks. The Shah emphasized
to the Turks Iran's dissatisfaction with the "small repayment"
for joining the Baghdad Pact, and reiterated Iran's need for
$107,000,000 in budgetary assistance. He criticized the US for
offering only $20,000,000 and complained that the US would not
supply Iran with antiaircraft missiles and training necessary for
their usej
Court Minister Ala has informed US Ambassador Wailes that
the Shah will be glad to see him at any time, presumably to keep
the way open for US offers of increased aid designed to forestall
the Iranian-Soviet rapprochemenE
31 Jan 59 CENTRAL laggikE BULLETIN
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Plotting Against Cambodian Government tAcceleratea
areparations by Cambodian General Dap Chhuon for an
internal coup against Prince Sihanouk may shortly be coor-
dinated with the heretofore separate Thai-Vietnamese in-
trigues against the Sihanouk government. Chhuon, whose
military command region in northwestern Cambodia fronts
on Thailand,
urgently requesting support for his planned
move against the Sihanouk government around 8-10 February.
Chhuon presumably is seeking logistical support in the form of
gasoline and ammunition:]
rdhhuon's request will probably elicit sympathetic response
from Thai officials, although they have become much more cir-
cumspect in their plotting against Sihanouk as a result of the
presence of a UN special mediator, Baron Beck-Friis. Even
if diplomatic relations between Cambodia and Thailand are re-
stored through his efforts, this would not change the basic Thai
premise that Sihanouk must be eliminated before his soft attitude
toward international Communism imperils all of Southeast AsEj
'Voice
of Cambodian Resistance" broadcasts will soon be started from
a mobile station on the Thai-Cambodian frontier. In these
broadcasts and in Cambodian-language pamphlets prepared for
wide distribution throughout Cambodia, Sihanouk is to be por-
trayed as endangering the nation's welfare by his despotic
leadership and pro-Communist policies. Sam Sary, former
Cambodian royal councilor who is now in Bangkok working with
the Thais and Vietnamese against Sihanouk, is in charge of this
propaganda campaign9
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31 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CONFIDENTIAL
Noe'
Japan Precipitates New Crisis With South Korea
A Japanese cabinet decision, announced by Foreign Min-
ister Fujiyama on 30 January, to allow Korean residents in
Japan to leave for North Korea almost certainly will cause
South Korean President Syngman Rhee to terminate present
negotiations with Japan. South Korea's minister in Tokyo
already has stated that the decision is "tantamount to break-
ing off current normalization talks."
South Korea may also step up its seizures of Japanese
fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of the "Rhee line"
and may instigate demonstrations in South Korea which
could serve to divert foreign and domestic attention from
the controversy over the recently passed National Security
Law.
The repatriation issue has been a major obstacle in the
Tokyo-Seoul talks. Despite South Korean objections, Japanese
officials long have asserted that "voluntary repatriation" is a
"humanitarian" principle which they cannot oppose. The Kishi
government may have felt that it could be attacked domestically
for yielding to the South Korean viewpoint, while the public is
not likely to react strongly to the suspension of negotiations
which were considered to have little promise in any event.
Korean leftists in Japan claim that 100,000 of the 600,000
Korean residents would accept repatriation to North Korea,
but this estimate seems grossly exaggerated. The North
Korean Government has issued a standing offer to provide
transportation and guarantee 4 livelihood for all such returnees.
CONFIDENTIAL
31 Jan 59
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CONFIDEN TI A L
v."
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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