CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/10/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003301
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: October 15, 1958

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15 October 1958
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
II DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. Cl ANGPD TO:
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REVIEWER:
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15 OCTOBER 1958
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait - Nationalist newspaper
says Taipei will reduce forces on
Quemoy and Matsu if US agrees to
defend islands.
Intensity of bloc-Yugoslav mutual
recriminations may be leveling off.
USSR increasing economic pressure
on Finland, probably hoping to bring
about government change and more
favorable Finnish policy toward
Moscow.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq - Separatist sentiment increas-
ing among Kurds despite Barzani's
avowal of loyalty to regime.
Indian Foreign Ministry considers
Pakistan's new military regime
"level-headed and practical."
0 Thailand - Marshal Sarit plans un-
announced return from England to
quash discord among his followers.
0 Agreement to hold conference on
Cyprus problem increases possi-
bility of compromise.
IlL THE WEST
France - De Gaulle's crackdown
on political activity by military in
Algeria and his call for broad
participation in November elections
pose challenge to European settlers.
LATE ITEM
Lebanon - Karame forms compro-
mise four-man cabinet.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 October 1958
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DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Taiwan Strait situation: A Nationalist China news-
paper, published by a ranking member of the Kuomintang,
stated on 14 October that Taipei probably will accept a
request by the United States to reduce military forces on
0 )4� Quemoy and Matsu if America agrees to defend the islands.
The report probably is a 'filar balloonto assess American
reaction. There was no significant military activity on 14
October. (Page 1 ) (Chart)
(1))-
OK--
USSR-Yugoslavia: There are suggestions that Mos-
cow's dispute with Yugoslavia may be leveling off. Khru.
shchev went to particular pains to meet with the Yugoslav
ambassador on 8 October before the latter's departure for
reassignment. The moderate tone of Tito's speech four
days later may reflect his hopes that Belgrade's relations,
at least with Moscow, will not degenerate further.
(Page 2)
USSR-Finland: Soviet economic pressures on
Finland are building up, probably aimed at replacing the
present Finnish coalition government with one more
favorably disposed toward the USSR. The Helsinki govern-
ment faces acute economic problems, and failure to cope
with growing unemployment could lead to a cabinet crisis.
(Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Separatist sentiment among Iraq's Kurds, en-
couraged by local Communists, has increased since the July
revolution, and Kurdish leaders seem likely to seek inde-
pendence or increased autonomy. Mustafa Barzani, a Kurdish
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is publicly pledging loyalty to the regime. Should he
revert to a separatist position, he would most probably have
of a majority of the 800,000 Iraqi Kurds.
(Page 4) (Map)
India-Pakistan:
that New Delhi does not exnect trouble from Karachi in the
near future. (Page 6)
Thailand: Marshal Sarit, the leader of the ruling Thai
military group, is planning to return unannounced to Bangkok
within a week. Sarit's decision to cut short his stay in
England apparently stems from reports of continuing discord
among his military followers and a specific request from
Premier Thanom. (Page 7)
Cyprus: Agreement in the North Atlantic Council on
13 October that Britain, Greece, and Turkey, subject to
final approval by the respective governments, Will hold a conference
on the Cyprus issue at arr early dateoaffers a new opportunity
for progress toward a negotiated settlement. The willingness
of all parties to the dispute to compromise on procedure in-
creases the prospects for substantive concessions. There
continues to be a wide difference of opinion, however, as to NIt'hat
constitutes a satisfactory solution. (Page 8)
II L THE WEST
France-Algeria: De Gaulle's order to the French Army
in Algeria to withdraw from political activity, and his invitation
to "all tendencies" to participate in the November legislative
elections threatens the position of the European settlei.s and
oses the first major test of his control over the military. The
lgerian rebels are unlikely to cooperate openly with the De
aulle election program, but may not repeat their attempt, un-
uccessful in the �titutional referendum, to enforce a general
oslem boycott. (Page 9)
15 Oct 58
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LATE ITEM
*Lebanon: Agreement has been reached on a stopgap
four-Man cabinet headed by the present prime minister,
Rashid Karamet and including militant Christian leader
Pierre Gemayel. This compromise has enabled Gemayel
to call off the strike which his supporters have been trying
to enforce. Attempts probably will have to be made soon to
bring additional individuals into the government, however,
and new difficulties may well arise over their selection.
15 Oct 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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OM%
TAIWAN STRAIT TALLY SHEET
(From ICS Situation Report No. 9i)
Air Situation
(Plane losses claimed through 13 Oct)
TODAY CUMULATIVE
Destroyed Probable Possible Destroyed Probable Possible
Communist
0
0
0
33
4
8
Nationalist
0
0
0
6**
0
2*
*Damaged
**Includes 2 C-46s, 2 F-84G's, and 2 F-86's
Chinmen Supply Situation -
(Tonnage through 11 Oct)
Total
Delivery - 7-11 Oct
18,459
Total (since 7 Sept)
24,366
Average Daily Rate for Sept
125
Average Daily Rate for Oct
1,906
Minimum Austere
Daily Requirements
320
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait Situation
A Nationalist Chinese newspaper, published by a ranking
member of the Kuomintang, stated on 14 October that Taipei
probably will accept a request by the United States to reduce
military forces on Quemoy and Matsu if America agrees to
defend the islands. The report probably is a trial balloon to
assess American reaction.
Peiping on 14 October issued its 31st "serious warning,"
charging two US warships entered territorial waters in the
Matsu area and two US fighter aircraft "intruded" over Pingtan
'Wand in the same area on that day.
Peiping continues its efforts to maintain the pose of an ag-
grieved party in the current situation and to keep up some degree
of tension among the mainland population. A Sidewinder exhibi-
tion which opened in Peiping on 14 October "depicts the crime of
the American aggressor for directing the Chiang Kai-shek air
force to use the Sidewinder guided missile." When parts of the
Sidewinder were originally found in Chekiang Province, Peiping
promised "punitive" action against the Chinese Nationalist Air
Force. There was no such threat in today's announcement.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict May Be Easing
The lengthy talks in Sochi on 8 October between Khru-
shchev and Yugoslav Ambassador Micunovic before the
latter's departure from the USSR for reassignment may her-
ald an easing in Moscow's anti-Yugoslav campaign. This is
suggested by Khrushchev's last-minute decision to hold this
meeting and to put a special aircraft at Micunovic's disposal.
Micunovic had stated during his farewell call on Ambassador
Thompson on 4 October that he did not expect to see Khru-
shchev before he left for Belgrade, but that differences with
Moscow appeared to have "evened out," although at a very
unsatisfactory level.
Khrushchev may feel that his efforts to achieve greater
unity within the "socialist camp" have succeeded to a point
where carrying the anti-Yugoslav campaign further would be
self-defeating. He may, consider that the forthcoming "friend-
ship" visit to Moscow by Gomulka--a persistent holdout in the
anti-Yugoslav campaign--will be more successful as a. demon-
stration of bloc unity if efforts to curtail the Moscow-Belgrade
dispute are in evidence.
While Tito's speech on 12 October sharply condemns ele-
ments within the bloc for their attacks and reaffirms that Yugo-
slavia will not change its basic policies, his moderate tone
could reflect his hope that relations with Moscow, if not with
other members of the bloc, will not degenerate further. Mos-
cow may not object to anti-Yugoslav attacks emanating from
other quarters, for the East German- Bulgarian communique
of 11 October again attacked Yugoslav "revisionism" as the
bloc's primary enemy.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Soviet Pressures on Finland
Increasing Soviet pressures on Finland appear aimed
at bringing about the fall of the present Finnish coalition
government, the most conservative in Finland since 1945,
and replacing it with one more favorably disposed toward
the USSR. Moscow desires the inclusion in the govern-
ment of the Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic
League (SKDL)--the largest single party--which has not
had cabinet representation since 1948.
Although the present cabinet is perhaps the strongest
postwar government in Finland, it faces acute economic
problems, and failure to cope with the growing unemploy-
ment could lead to a cabinet crisis and replacement by
another coalition including the SKDL. The USSR is
stalling on trade talks which had been expected to be-
gin early in October, and any consequent curtailment
of Soviet purchases would eventually increase unemploy-
ment. Finnish Communists are seeking to create an air
of crisis around Finnish-Soviet relations by charging that
the "rightist!' Fagerholm government is pursuing a policy
damaging to Finland's neutrality.
The USSR may also be concerned over Finland's
possible economic association with Western Europe through
OEEC and ultimately through a European free trade area.
CONFIDENTIAL
15 Oct 58
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi Kurds Likely to Press for Greater Independence
Kurdish approaches to American representatives in
Iraq for support and the public excitement generated by the
return to Baghdad of Kurdish dissident leader Mulla Mustafa
Barzani after a 12-year exile in the Soviet Union indicate a
reawakening of Kurdish nationalism since the July revolution.
The American Embassy believes there will be some sort of
Kurdish bid for independence or increased autonomy within
the next year.
Mulla Mustafa is reported to have by far the largest
following among the 800,000 Iraqi Kurds, and his influence
also extends into northern Iran. His present tactic is to
pledge loyalty to the revolutionary regime, emphasizing
that Kurds and Arabs stand "in one solid rank" to defend
the Iraqi republic. Should he choose other tactics, the em-
bassy estimates that 50-60 percent of Iraqi Kurds would fol-
low him in any adventure even if it were clearly Communist-
inspired. The regime may, however, attempt to buy him off
by offering him an official post.
For the moment, it is felt, Mulla Mustafa will move cau-
tiously because of unsolved family rivalries and because he
does not command the loyalty of all Iraqi Kurds. His brother,
Sheik Ahmad, was released from jail following the revolution
and is his bitter enemy.
There are also possibly 30,000 Kurds in the area near
the Iranian border who oppose Mulla Mustafa on family and
anti-Communist grounds, but who also oppose the Iraqi Gov-
ernment because they do not believe they will get a fair deal
from the new regime. There is also a very small number of
"moderate" Kurds, represented by Minister of Communica-
tions Baba Ali, who hope the revolution will improve the lot
of their people and who are cooperating with the new regime.
The influence of this group probably will disappear quickly
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unless the new government, unlike the Nun i Said regime, be-
gins significant rural development and education programs in
the Kurdish tribal areas.
With the present deterioration of economic conditions in
Iraq and the administrative confusion prevailing in Baghdad,
the chances of the government's undertaking such programs
seem slight,while the chances of trouble with the Kurds are
growing.
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Indian Reaction to Mirza's Take-over in Pakistan
The Indian Government apparently feels that the take-over
in Pakistan by Iskander Mirza and General Ayub on 7 October
presents no immediate threat to Indian security.
a belief that these two men
will be able to control proponents of anti-Indian views, such
as Deputy Martial Law Administrator Aziz Ahmed. The Indian
Ministry of External Affairs expects no "adventures" against
India at least for the next few weeks because of the "dispersal
of effort" attending the take-over. It cautions, however, that
anti-Indian moves could not be ruled out if the Mirza-Ayub re-
gime failed to maintain internal stability.
Prime Minister Nehru in a press conference on 12 October
admitted to a "twinge of anxiety" regarding developments in
Pakistan, but stressed that the take-over was an internal af-
fair and that India is prepared to deal with the new government.
Nehru stated that US military aid and Pakistan's membership in
SEATO and the Baghdad Pact had nothing to do with the take-over
and that no foreign power was involved in it. His major concern
apparently is that while a military dictatorship can maintain law
and order, it is unlikely to lead to a solution of political and
economic problems.
The Indian press has commented on the failure of democracy
in an increasing number of Asian countries, and some concern has
been expressed over India's becoming surrounded by military dic-
tatorships.
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Sarit Newly Concerned Over Thai Political Situation
Marshal Sarit, the leader of the ruling Thai military group,
plans to return unannounced from London to Bangkok prior to
20 October,
He is said to be concerned over reports of factionalism within
the military group, and his decision to go home was reportedly
inspired in part, at least, by a specific request from Premier
Thanom. Sarit, whose health is still precarious, made a sim-
ilar precipitous return from the United States last June, follow-
ing which there was a minor reshuffle of the cabinet.
The exact sources of Sarit's concern are not specifted, but
recent reports from Bangkok suggest a strong undercurrent of
restiveness among Sarit's military supporters, who are con-
stantly vying with each other for an increased share ofAhe-power
and loot available to Thailand's military rulers. Sarit may ae
particularly concerned over the loyalty of Interior Minister
Prapat, who seems increasingly disposed to take unilateral ac-
tion without first clearing it with Sarit and has steadily improved
his power position within the military group. Sarit finally may
have concluded that his constant presence in Bangkok is necessary
if Prapat is to be controlled.
In recent weeks Premier Thanom has been a much more vig=
orous premier than he was during the first eight months of his
tenure. Contrary to his earlier concern that Thanom was too
weak a premier, Sarit now may fear that the politically inexperi-
enced Thanom's new activism will inevitably lead to a major clash
with Prapat or other members of the military group. In any event,
Sarit's return may foreshadow further changes in the Thai Gov-
ernment and in the military hierarchy on which it is based.
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Cyprus Situation
The North Atlantic Council on 13 October obtained the
agreement of British, Turkish, and Greek representatives
to hold a conference on the Cyprus question with representa-
tives of the Turkish and Greek population on Cyprus and an
observer from NATO present. This provides a new oppor-
tunity for progress toward a negotiated settlement, although
wide differences continue over what would constitute an ac-
ceptable solution. Approval or rejection of this agreement
by the governments concerned is expected when the council
meets on 15 October.
NATO Secretary General Spaak's talk with Turkish Foreign
Minister Zorlu reassured the Turks of Spaak's objectivity and
has improved prospects for a more conciliatory Turkish atti-
tude. Turkey had earlier insisted that a conference not include
discussion of a final solution for the island and had objected to
the participation of representatives of the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots,, Ankara now is expected to agree to a conference al-
though the Greek Cypriots are likely to be represented by
Archbishop Makarios,
The Karamanlis government also is under substantial pres-
sure to resolve the Cyprus issue and is expected to ratify the
proposed conference arrangements since they provide a means
of backing down from its insistence that any conference should
have a firm agenda specifically excluding partition.
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I I I. THE WEST
De Gaulle's Crackdown Will Test His Control Over
Military th. Algeria
Premier de Gaulle's order to the French armed forces
in Algeria to withdraw from political activity and his invita-
tion to Algerians of "all tendencies" to participate in the
November legislative elections threaten the position of the
European settlers and reopen the question of his control of
the military there.
Rightist settler groups, particularly those in Algiers who
command a considerable paramilitary organization, may feel
they have nothing to lose by demonstrations aimed at re-
awakening sympathy and support among the military and metro-
politan French rightists as they did on 13 May. General Massu
and the other military members have withdrawn from the
Algeria-Sahara Committee of Public Safety, but some highly
placed officers reportedly are again expressing open bitter-
ness over De Gaulle's "treatment" of the army. While even
extremist army elements are unlikely to challenge the pre-
mier openly, the possibility that they would refuse to suppress
any major settler demonstrations cannot be ruled out. Most of
the non-Communist press in France endorses the premier's
move.
Leaders of the rebel National Liberation Front (FLN), who
established a provisional Algerian government last month, are
unlikely to cooperate openly with the De Gaulle program and
may continue their public denunciation of French policy. Their
conspicuous failure to enforce a Moslem boycott of the consti-
tutional referendum, however, may lead them to permit some
form of narticinatinn hu wLN adherents in the forthcoming elec-
tions.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Noe
LATE ITEM
New Lebanese Cabinet
The announcement of agreement on a four-man stopgap
cabinet in Beirut has enabledthe militant Christian elements
to call off their violent pressure tactics against the Karame
government Karame is to remain at the head of the new com-
bination as representative of the Moslem rebels. Pierre Gemayel,
leader of the Christian Phalange paramilitary formation, repre-
sents the former pro-Chamoun "loyalists," The other members
are veteran Lebanese politicians, Husayn Uwayni and Raymond
Edde. Uwayni is a Moslem moderate adherent of the rebel fac-
tion
Edde, a
Maronite, is the son of a former Lebanese president and has
admitted presidential ambitions himself. He was a leader of the
so-called "third force" during the past several months.
According to preliminary press reports, the two Moslem min-
isters are to hold most of the important portfolios. In addition to
being prime minister, Karame is to hold finance, economics,
defense, and information, while Uwayni holds foreign affairs,
justice, and planning. On the Christian side Edde holds interior
and social affairs, with Gemayel taking public works, education,
agriculture, and health.
The major obstacle during the past few days of cabinet nego-
tiations was the objection of one faction or the other to some par-
ticular individual; the reduction of the cabinet to four men evades
rather than solves this problem. As constituted, the new govern-
ment represents only two--albeit the two most important--of
Lebanon's religious divisions, the Sunni Moslems and the Maronite
Christians. The important Druze, Shia Moslem, Greek Orthodox,
and other communities will not be satisfied for long without their
traditional voice in the government, and the previous difficulties
may well arise again when an attempt is made to exciand the cab-
inet to include representatives of these elements.
CONFIDENTIAL
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.11�M %or I A LLL.dL L I4IJ.J
Nee *se
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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