CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/10/01
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03003299
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2019
Document Release Date:
December 20, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 1, 1957
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15757415].pdf | 246.76 KB |
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
0
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1 October 1957
Copy No.
138
DOCUMENT NO.
CHANCiF. N CLASS.
LCLASTjED
Ci--11,0-;CD TO: TS :;..2eCis
i'ZWEVY DATE:
AUTH: 10-2
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
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'rod
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111111,
C ONTENTS
1. BOURGES-MAUNOURYIS FALL SHARPENS
ECONOMIC AND ALGERIAN ISSUES
(page 3).
2 SAUD SEEKS TO REASSURE KING HUSSAYN ON
DAMASCUS VISIT (page 5).
3. FRICTION AMONG THAI ARMY COUP GROUP
LEADERS SEEN (page 6).
p.L., 4.. DISSIDENT INDONESIAN LEADERS REPORTEDLY
COORDINATING PLANS (page 7).
5. INDONESIAN CHIEF OF STAFF MOVES TO
PLACATE REGIONAL LEADERS
(page 8).
1 Oct 57
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1. BOURGES-MAUNOURY'S FALL SHARPENS
ECONOMIC AND ALGERIAN ISSUES
Comment on:
The defeat of the Bourges-Maunoury
government by a vote of 279 to 253
over the proposed basic statute for
Algeria precipitates a political crisis
in France at a time when the area of maneuverability for
a prospective successor has been reduced to a minimum.
The willingness of numerous conservative deputies to
vote against the premier despite his plea for unity in the
face of the pending UN discussion of Algeria emphasizes
the weight of economic considerations in this vote.
Rightists apprehensions that the gov-
ernment's proposal would lead to the secession of Algeria
had intensified in the past week despite the premier's ef-
forts to meet objections. Pressure from the strong agri-
cultural interests which are firmly opposed to Bourges-
Maunoury's price controls swayed enough Independent and
Peasant deputies who might otherwise have abstained.
By disavowing the Algerian policy
strongly backed by the Socialists, the Independents and
Peasants have widened the breach dividing the moderate
forces in the Assembly, Without Communist support, no
government is likely to be formed over the objections of
the Independent and Peasant bloc, and President Coty's
nomination of a candidate will be governed by this circum-
stance. Continuing pressure from labor and farmers for
relief from Finance Minister Gaillard's anti-inflation drive
may hasten a compromise, and a new government may be
able to obtain support for the Algerian statute provided it
eases unpopular anti-inflation measures.
President Coty has formally refused to
accept Bourges-Maunoury's resignation and will probably
1 Oct 57
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%iof *Avoll
wait until he can name a premier-designate. He had re-
portedly begun consultations on a possible new government
before the Algerian debate but announcement of his decision
will be delayed by the formalities incident to the opening of
the new session of the Assembly on 1 October.
Ex-premier and Socialist leader Guy
Mollet has been regarded as a possible replacement for
Bourges-Maunoury since the time the latter took office
less than four months ago. Another prospective candidate
is ex-Gaullist and former governor of Algeria Jacques
Soustelle who played a major role in rallying rightist op-
position to the Algerian statute. Ex-premier Rene Pleven
and Education Minister Rene Billeres, both representa-
tives of center parties which might become the nucleus
nf enmn rel m ^Palition, have also been mentioned.
1 Oct 57
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41110 `400
2. SAUD SEEKS TO REASSURE KING HUSSAYN ON
DAMASCUS VISIT
King Saud,
sought to reassure Jor-
dan's King Hussayn regarding the pur-
poses of Saud's visit to Damascus. Saud
explained he had asked Syrian officials
to treat his stay as "personal," not official, and said he hoped
it might be "of some good in persuading the extremists to mod-
ify what they are doing, limiting their excesses and bringing
about good behavior, if we can do that." The King also said
he hoped to show the Syrians "the right way so that communism
will not penetrate into the Arab countries."
Comment The communiqu�ssued by Saud when he
left Damascus on 26 September, stating
that "Syria can never in any case constitute a danger to any of
its neighbors," is being acclaimed by the Syrian and Egyptian
press as a major defeat for American policy. Whatever the
real intentions of Saud and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Ayyubi,
the immediate effect of their visits in Damascus has been to
lend prestige to the Syrian regime and to make the Jordanian
government appear more isolated.
1 Oct 57
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TOP SECRET
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3. FRICTION AMONG THAI ARMY COUP GROUP
LEADERS SEEN
The American attach�n Bangkok, in
assessing the recent Thai army coup,
foresees that friction may develop among
the top levels of the new ruling clique.
He indicates that in any new struggle for
power, General Prapat, Bangkok garrison commander and
newly appointed minister of interior, is in a good position
to emerge as a strong contender in his own right. The at-
tach�otes that several of Prapat's friends and relatives
also hold key posts.
Comment Although Marshal Sarit is presently in
firm control of the Thai government,
stability in Thailand over the long run will probably depend
on his ability to keep his ambitious subordinates in line.
Prapat, who has long been associated
with Sarit, is considered one of the most able and ambitious
officers in the Thai army. His rise, under Sarit's protec-
tion, has been rapid, and prior to the coup he was reputed
to be the man who actually ran the army.
1 Oct 57
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4. DISSIDENT INDONESIAN LEADERS REPORTEDLY
COORDINATING PLANS
Dissident regional commanders in Indo-
nesia have drawn up a joint plan for
further opposition to the central govern-
ment,
They plan to call on Djakarta to pro-
claim a national anti-Communist policy and dismiss army
chief Nasution. The dissident groups have agreed on mutual
military assistance in the event of an attack by Djakarta
against any one of them.
Lt. Col. Hussein of Central Sumatra will use his current
visit to East Indonesia to coordinate these plans with Lt
Col. Sumual, the dissident leader in that area.
Comment There have been increasing indications
that the recent national round-table con-
ference called by Sukarno to compose the differences be
tween Djakarta and the provinces may, in fact, have hardened
the dissidents' attitude toward the central government. Hus-
sein has been particularly outspoken in this regard, saying
that the conference was only "for show."
Coordination among the scattered opposi-
tion commanders heretofore has been spotty, but recent re-
ports indicate that they are unified in their determination to
extract significant concessions from Djakarta.
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Niks0
5. INDONESIAN CHIEF OF STAFF MOVES TO
PLACATE REGIONAL LEADERS
Comment on:
Two recent events suggest that Indo-
nesian army chief Nasution may now
be attempting to placate dissident
provincial leaders in hope of modify-
ing their demands that he resign. On
28 September, Lt. Col. Gintings, the
pro-Djakarta commander in northern
Sumatra, arrested Lt. Col. Macmour,
a pro-Communist regimental commander,
and two subordinates for their activities against anti-Djakarta
elements in the area. Macmour's supporters, both in his com-
mand and in the Communist-led civilian defense corps he has
armed, have the capability of reacting forcefully. These ar-
rests have been ordered by Nasution
without President Sukarno's knowledge. On the same day,
Nasution installed Maj. Somba, a close collaborator of Lt.
Col. Sumual in East Indonesia, as commandant of a new mili-
tary command there.
Nasution's actions would appear to be a
blow to Sukarno. Until now, Nasution's behavior has been that
of a loyal supporter of the President.
1 Oct 57
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CONFIDENTIAL
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