CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/08/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003006
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: August 28, 1957

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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
28 August 1957
SC No, 04443/57
Copy No.
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AUTH: 1-:f. 70-2
usvi i,1[:,:vvER: 072044
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its security must be maintained in accordance
with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be
gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
TOP SECRET f
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CONTENTS
1. EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF
SUCCESSFUL ICBM TEST (page 3).
642- 2. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MISSILE ANNOUNCE-
MENT (Secret) (page 4).
0-C 3. FURTHER ACTION AGAINST MALENKOV INDICATED (Secret)
(page 5).
4. JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PROPOSES FEDERATION
WITH IRAQ (Secret) (page 6).
Az) 5. BRITAIN SEEKING RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELA-
TIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA (page 7).
)--,0 6. PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER UNDER INCREASING POLIT-
ICAL PRESSURE (page 8).
(9-12_ 7. INDONESIAN ARMY IN JAVA REPORTEDLY VOTED FOR
COMMUNISTS (Confidential) (page 9).
(94p, 8. ARREST OF KEY OPPOSITION LEADER MAY PROVOKE
SERIOUS UNREST IN VENEZUELA (Confidential) (page 10).
9. GOMULKA REPORTEDLY TO VISIT TITO (Confidential)
(page 11).
28 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRET EIDER
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1. EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF
TEST
Aside from the TASS announcement there
is no evidence of the successful launching
in the USSR of an ICBM test vehicle to ex-
treme ranges
possiote launcning
sites for testing ICBM's or earth satellites have not reflected
the full scope of activities which would be expected to occur dur-
ing the launching of an ICBM test vehicle. However, since it
has been estimated that the USSR could, in the relatively near
future, have the capability to launch an ICBM test vehicle, the
Soviet claim cannot be completely discounted.
It is also possible that ICBM components
have been flight tested to ranges of 950 nautical miles or less.
In this context, activities at Kapustin Yar, consisting of two un-
usual multistage missile firings on 16 and 24 May 1957 and six
firings to 950 nautical miles during the period 22 June-15 August
1957, could possibly be related to a test firing of ICBM compo-
nents. The Soviet statement could be based on these tests and
could be timed to exploit its propaganda value.
The most recent Soviet nuclear test oc-
curred on 22 August at the Semipalatinsk proving grounds. An
earlier series .of five tests was concluded at the same location
in April. There is no 'evidence that the Soviet nuclear explosion
on 22 August was associated with the firing of an ICBM test ve-
hicle.
28 Aug 57
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2. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET
MISSILE ANNOUNCEMENT
Comment on:
The Soviet announcement on 26 August
of a successful test of an interconti-
nental ballistic missile and a, series of
nuclear and thermonuclear explosions
"in recent days" is probably intended to help set the stage
for a major Soviet offensive at the forthcoming session of
the UN General Assembly for a suspension of nuclear weap-
ons tests and a pledge not to use nuclear weapons or mis-
siles carrying nuclear warheads. The USSR probably an-
ticipates an early recess in the London disarmament talks
and believes that the General Assembly will provide a more
effective forum to seek support for its position from many
small non-nuclear powers.
The TASS announcement of the test included
the standard charge that the Western powers were creating ob-
stacles to a disarmament agreement, particularly a cessation
of tests. The Soviet proposals of 30 April and 7 June for a
partial disarmament agreement called for renunciation of the
use for military purposes of both nuclear weapons and missiles
of any range carrying nuclear warheads. Soviet spokesmen in
the past have played down the problem of inspection and control
of missile experiments, stressing that the danger comes from the
nuclear warheads.
In addition, Moscow probably calculates
that its announcement will add substance to the Soviet warn-
ings last spring that NATO members and other countries which
permitted American guided missile bases on their territories
would be subjected to Soviet nuclear devastation in the event
of war.
28 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
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SECRET
3. FURTHER ACTION AGAINST MALENKOV INDICATED
Comment on:
A new attack on former Soviet Premier
Georgy Malenkov by Party Secretary
Khrushchev in heretofore unpublicized
speeches appears intended to prepare the
way for further punitive action against
Malenkov. Summaries of these speeches were reprinted in
the party journal Kommunist and partially broadcast by Radio
Moscow on 27 August. Characterizing him as Beria's "shadow'
Khrushchev accused Malenkov of "taking advantage of Stalin's
weaknesses in the last years of his life. In many instances he
incited him to take action which was deserving of stern condem-
nation."
Khrushchev seems to be preparing a case in
which Malenkov will be accused of masterminding some of the
worst excesses of the latter part of the Stalin era. Malenkov,
the leading rival of Khrushchev among those indicted at the June
plenum of the central committee, is the logical victim of the main
attack. He was also singled out as the most heinous member of
the "anti-party group" in the propaganda barrage following the
June plenum, being the one member of the opposition, for instance,
charged with complicity in the notorious "Leningrad affair."
The return to the offensive against Malenkov
after a period of relative quiet may stem from the need to silence
any continuing opposition to Khrushchev's policies and to try to
create a new wave of popular indignation against Malenkov that
apparently was not achieved during the initial effort.
As further information on the speeches car-
ried in Kommunist becomes available, the status of the remaining
members of the "anti-party group" may be clarified. Molotov and
Kaganovich have reportedly been further criticized in secret letters
from the central committee to party organizations throughout the
country, but they have not been accused of misdeeds as severe as
those of Malenkov. The diverse treatment thus far accorded Mol-
otov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov suggests that each case is being
considered separately and that the fate of these other leading oppo-
nents is not necessarily wrapped up with that of Malenkov.
28 Aug 57
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4� JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PROPOSES
FEDERATION WITH IRAQ
The Jordanian deputy prime minister
and foreign minister, Samir Rifai, has
told Ambassador Mallory he believes a
federation between Jordan and Iraq may
be the only remaining political move by which pro-Western
Arabs could resist the pressure which will be generated by the
consolidation of the leftist regime in Syria. Rifai said he ex-
pects the leftists' position in Syria to be consolidated within the
next two months.
Rifai argued that the idea of Arab unity
is so popular that prompt government action, without prior pub-
lic discussion or fanfare, could at this time put Jordan and Iraq
into federal arrangements which might include joint customs,
education, and military establishments. He admitted that King
Saud's blessing would be necessary for the move to succeed.
The American embassy in Amman notes
that early Jordanian hopes for a reversal of leftist gains in Syria
have given way to fear that the present Jordanian government may
not endure, and to some tendencies toward appeasement.
Comment Jordan's King Hussain warned, before his
departure for Turkey last week, that
Jordan might be obliged to reduce the intensity of its anti-Syrian
campaign unless more support were forthcoming from other Arab
states Rifai's federation idea is a measure of the desperation
which pro-Western Jordanians apparently feel in the face of in-
creasing indications of their government's economic and political
weaknesses.
28 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
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5. BRITAIN SEEKING RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA
Comment on:
Britain is actively seeking to re-establish
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in
the hope that eventually it will be possible
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problems.
The British have already conveyed to Saud
through King Hussain of Jordan and other Middle Eastern lead-
ers their desire to restore relations. A high Saudi official re-
cently told the Iraqis he would be willing to meet Britain's
Foreign Secretary Lloyd while passing through London in early
September.
To help prevent future trouble in the Per-
sian Gulf area, Britain may now wish to re-establish diplomatic
contact before the Sultan of Muscat comes to London for discus-
sions in October.
28 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
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6. PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER UNDER INCREASING
POLITICAL PRESSURE
Comment on:
neictuunb petween raxistam Frime min-
ister Suhrawardy and President Mirza
apparently have reached a critical stage
as a result of political wrangling among
members of the government coalition
Mirza, along with his Republican followers who form the ma-
jor component of the coalition, are exerting strong pressure
on Suhrawardy to oust M. A. Gurmani, governor of West
Pakistan, "or resign yourself:' Gurmani is a leading Repub-
lican party politician who has incurred the enmity of other
Republicans by intriguing against them in provincial politics
and by offering Suhrawardy the support of his parliamentary
followers in a realigned coalition excluding the Republican
party. Mirza reportedly also fears Gurmani as a prospective
rival candidate for president in the elections tentatively sched-
uled for next year.
Suhrawardy apparently was inclined to re-
fuse the Republican demands and risk his position until 26
August when Gen. Ayub Khan, commander in chief of the Pald-
stani army and a mainstay of the present government, urged
Suhrawardy to oust Gurmani so that nothing will "drive you
and Mirza apart:' Despite his reluctance to desert Gurmani and
lay himself open to further demands by Mirza and his Republican
colleagues, Suhrawardy may feel he can no longer resist such
powerful pressures and still remain in office. His chances of
lining up majority parliamentary support outside the Republican
party, and without the cooperation of Mirza, appear limited.
28 Aug 57
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7. INDONESIAN ARMY IN JAVA REPORTEDLY VOTED
FOR COMMUNISTS
Over 60 percent of the votes cast by the
Indonesian army and police in Java dur-
ing recent local elections were for the
Communist party,
The armed forces and police vote can be
ascertained because they voted separately from the general
public. Reportedly very few police voted. (NOFORN)
Comment
Even if exaggerated, this report is indica-
tive of gains made by the Communists in pene-
trating army units in Java. Enlisted men and noncommissioned
officers, like the general population, undoubtedly were influ-
enced by the Communist party's campaign tactic of identifying
itself with President Sukarno and his concept of "guided democ-
racy."
The officer corps in Java, however, is still
believed to be largely anti-Communist.
28 Aug 57
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-CONFIDENTIAL-
8. ARREST OF KEY OPPOSITION LEADER MAY PROVOKE
SERIOUS UNREST IN VENEZUELA
Comment on:
The arrest of Rafael Caldera, chief
Venezuelan opposition leader and head
of the Catholic-oriented COPEI party,
has provoked widespread concern in
Venezuela and may seriously compound
President Perez' problems in seeking another five-year
term in the December elections. The church, which has
been at odds with the government since last May and in
August openly protested against the regime's authoritarian
political policies, is apparently determined to insist on
Caldera's release. The church and the principal opposition
factions would probably support Caldera% presidential candi-
dacy in the event he is allowed to run.
The American embassy in Caracas com-
ments that Caldera% arrest is a serious official blunder since
his "martyrdom" might lead to a surge of popular support or
even demonstrations in his behalf. The arrest further indi-
cates the government's lack of confidence in Perez' popular
support for re-election.
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9. GOMULKA REPORTEDLY TO VISIT TITO
Polish Party First Secretary Gomulka
plans to visit Marshal Tito in Yugo-
slavia in September or early October,
according to information obtained by
Western journalists
Comment
The possibility of a Tito-Gomulka meet-
ing was suggested by reports that Tito's
chief of protocol visited Warsaw last month. Shortly after Go-
mulka's rise to power in October 1956, the Yugoslays expressed
their willingness to consult with the Poles at any time at the high-
est level, but indicated their understanding that the Polish polit-
ical situation might well make such a move impossible at that time.
Gomulka may feel that the Tito-Khrushchev
talks earlier this month, as well as Moscow's favorable comment
on Ho Chi Minh's visit to Yugoslavia, preclude any Soviet objec-
tion to a meeting with Tito, An atmosphere more favorable to
Polish-Yugoslav talks has resulted from the rebuff administered
to Soviet "dogmatists" at the Soviet party plenum in June and the
subsequent lessening of domestic opposition from Stalinist ele-
ments in the Polish party. The Poles are studying some eco-
nomic aspects of the Yugoslav system to determine their applica-
bility in Poland.
28 Aug 57
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