CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/07/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003003
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: July 4, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN

4 July 1957
SC No, 03033/57
Copy No.
136
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
rc�KHRUSHCHEV'S PURGE OF THE PRESIDIUM (Confidential)
(page 3).
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CONEII1KNTIAL
CONTENTS
1. KHRUSHCHEV'S PURGE OF THE PRESIDIUM (Confidential)
(page 3).
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CONE. IAL
1. KHRUSHCHETS PURGE OF THE PRESIDIUM
Comment on:
An internal feud in the highest body of
the Communist Party in the USSR has
ended in the sharpest political purge
since Stalin's death and a total victory
for party chief Khrushchev and his, sup-
porters. Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich have been
branded an "anti-party group" and ousted from the presid-
ium--comparable to Stalin's politburo. D. T. Shepilov, al-
though charged with less serious offenses, has been dropped
as a candidate member of the presidium and as a party secre-
tary. The name of Maxim Saburov, who was the USSR's top
economic planner until last December, does not appear on any
of the lists of the new presidium thus far made public, while
Mikhail Pervukhin, another high= level economic specialist,
has been demoted to a candidate membership.
Only six of the presidium's 11 full members
survived a plenary session of the CPSU central committee
which met for 10 days, from 20 to 29 June, and passed a res-
olution condemning the opposition faction. Nine new members
have been added to create a new 15-member Khrushchev-packed
presidium. Among them are former candidate members Marshal
Zhukov, Mme, Yekaterina Furtseva, Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai
Shvernik, and Frol Kozlov. The remaining four have been brought
in from outside the former presidium. The number of candidate
members, of whom only one is a holdover from the pre-purge
composition, has been increased from seven to nine. The entire
presidium, counting both full and candidate members, thus now
numbers 24 against a pre-purge 18.
The explanation given in the central committee
resolution and a 3 July Pravda editorial for this dramatic change
was that the effective functioning of the presidium demands that
"the standard of discipline is the same for all members of the
party, both the leaders and the rank-and-file." Malenkov and Mol-
otov have been censured in the past, and it would seem that all
three of the ousted members have kept up a stubborn resistance
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to Khrushchev policies and have refused to submit to the
"persuasion" of their colleagues. It is less certain, how-
ever, that they can all be lumped together as "Stalinists,"
or that their opposition has had any common denominator.
Khrushchev has apparently concluded that he is strong enough
to eliminate such veteran Communists opposing him as Mol-
otov and Kaganovich and may have included Malenkov as a
rival young enough and powerful enough to challenge his lead-
ership.
Khrushchev needed considerable power
to bring off this move, and it can be assumed that, now that
he has swept aside his opposition, he will be in a position to
move ahead full speed in implementing his policies. But
these events are not without drawbacks for him.
Despite the invocation of Leninist princi-
ples and a show of respect for the forms of party democracy,
this development obviously reflects poorly on the much vaunted
"collective leadership." The reorganization constitutes a purge,
although differing from the Stalin pattern in that none of those
ousted probably need fear for their lives. The men who con-
stituted the presidium at Stalin's death have thus proven that
they cannot settle their differences easily or amicably. "Col-
lective leadership," as a stable political formula capable of
reconciling separate ambitions and policy views, has become
a mere phrase. The display of strength and authority may well
add to Khrushchev's prestige in the Communist world, but it is
much less certain that it will contribute much to solution of the
bloc's complex economic, social and ideological problems which
came to the surface with Stalin's death, and to which the 20th
Party Congress added.
Charges Against the Anti-party Group
The resolution charged that "the anti-party
group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov--and Shepilov who
joined them =which had formed within the presidium of the CPSU
central committee" had consistently opposed party policies for
the past three or four years, i.e. , since Stalin's death in March
1953.
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The general charges against those ousted
were as follows:
(a) They used anti-party, factional methods
in an attempt to change the composition of the party's leading
bodies.
(b) All three are specifically accused of
opposing criticism of Stalin's "cult of the individual." They
opposed the decisions of the 20th Party Congress, which "the
entire Soviet people" supported. "The anti-party group turned
a deaf ear to this creative movement of the masses." (This
identifies them with the worst aspects of Stalinism.)
(c) They fought against rectifying distor-
tions of the Leninist nationality policy (the rehabilitation of the
minority peoples deported by Stalin during World War II).
(d) They opposed the policy of peaceful co-
existence with countries of different social systems and the
relations between the USSR and all peoples of the world (cul=
tural exchanges, high-level visits, trade, and aid to underde-
veloped countries).
(e) They opposed extension of the rights of
the USSR's republics in economic and cultural development and
fought legislation which would enhance the role of local soviets
in fulfillment of these tasks. (This implies a broad charge of
"Great Russian chauvinism" against the group.)
(f) They fought and tried to frustrate the re-
organization of industrial management even after the Supreme
Soviet approved the measure (a serious charge two days after
this major change had gone into effect).
(g) They opposed agricultural policies which
recognized the need for material incentives for the collective
farm peasantry and for collective farm initiative in planning.
They failed to see the possibility of abolishing compulsory de-
liveries from collective farmers' private plots (an obvious at-
tempt to blacken Malenkov's name in the eyes of the peasants,
who look back on his "New Course" with favor). They also
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CON 71 41,
opposed the recent Khrushchev proposal to overtake the US
in per capita production of meat and dairy products (an accu
sation implying that they opposed a higher standard of living
for the people).
(h) Molotov is specifically accused of op
posing Khrushchev's virgin lands program.
Foreign Policy
In the sphere of foreign policy, Molotov
was specifically castigated for opposition on the following
points: reconciliation with Yugoslavia; conclnsion of the Aus-
trian Treaty; normalization of relations with Japan; possibility
of preventing wars "in present conditions;" possibility of differ-
ent ways to socialism in different countries; necessity for strength-
ening contacts between the CPSU and progressive parties abroad;
and new steps in defense of peace and security of nations--in par-
ticular high-level contacts between Soviet leaders and other states-
men. He was supported "in many cases" by Kaganovich, and "in
a number of cases" by Malenkov.
The Khrushchev coup confirms the existing
lines of Soviet foreign policy. Those policies, laid down at the
20th Party Congress, will be maintained in the future because
the locus of power now lies completely in the hands of those So-
viet leaders who devised and most actively promoted those pot
icies. The elimination of the Molotov "faction" also will be dis-
tinctly valuable to the Soviet government in its energetic efforts
to restore the USSR's pre-Hungary posture of peaceful coexistence.
Khrushchev probably will try to exploit this aspect in seeking new
top-level meetings with Free World leaders as soon as he is able
to consolidate his coup.
The resolution did not mention the disarma-
ment question.
Effects in Eastern Europe and China
The central committee's condemnation of
Molotov for opposing "the possibility of different ways of transi-
tion to socialism" will tend to stimulate unrest in Eastern Europe.
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Just as the resolutions of the 20th Party
Congress, and particularly Khrushchev's de-Staliu' iization speech,
gave courage to the dissidents among the Satellite intelligentsia
and within the Satellite parties, so too will these latest develop-
ments. The Satellite leaders, other than in Poland, have been
faced in recent months with sporadic efforts by the intelligentsia
to put forth views other than those prescribed by the orthodox
hard-line leaderships. This has been particularly true in East
Germany, and to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia, Rumania
and Bulgaria. So far, these orthodox regimes have been suc-
cessful in keeping the lid on this form of dissidence. In view
of the example of Hungary, it seems likely that they will con-
tinue to bend every effort to maintain this control, while at the
same time paying lip-service to the Soviet central committee
resolution, a policy similar to that which they followed after the
20th Party Congress.
The Gomulka regime will be able to use the
very charges that have been spelled out against "the anti-party
group" in the USSR against its own most dangerous adversarY, ,
the Stalinist Natolin faction in the Polish party. Extreme liberal
elements in the Polish party, who have recently been reported as
being more favorably inclined to the Gomulka program, probably
will give him increasing support as they see his hand strengthened
by the resolution.
The Yugoslays undoubtedly will be pleased
by the changes. The statements in the resolution which place
the blame for the breakdown of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapproche-
ment on MolotOv suggest that with him out of the way, the USSR
may make new efforts to woo Tito. The basic ideological differ-
ences between Yugoslavia and the USSR, however, remain un-
resolved, just as they have been for the past two years since the
Khrushchev pilgrimage to Belgrade.
Peiping will probably accept and publicize
Moscow's version of the purge. The Kao Ka,ng case in China in
1954-55 was also one of "anti-party factionalism," and Moscow
at that time completely accepted thefl Chinese version, despite
the many years of close relations between Kao and the Russians
in Manchuria.
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The Chinese are very probably pleased
that Molotov has been brought down. He has been identi-
fied with the inflexible policies in intra-bloc relations which
Peiping strongly criticized in 1956. Peiping has not shown
any favor for the other purged Soviet leaders. Peiping's
favorite Soviet leader has seemed to be Khrushchev.
The New Presidium
The composition of the newly elected pre-
sidium exemplifies clearly the absolute predominance of
Nikita Khrushchev. In addition to eliminating an alleged anti
party opposition group within the presidium, Khrushchev has
succeeded in reducing the voice of government officials in the
formulation of over-all Soviet policy, and has brought into the
presidium nine new members, most of whom have enjoyed his
patronage in the past. Khrushchev is thereby assured of almost
unanimous support in any vestige of collective decision making
which may remain within the party's ruling body.
All members of the party secretariat (Khru-
shchev, Aristov, Belyayev, Brezhnev, Furtseva, Kuusinen,
Suslov and Pospelov) are now members of the presidium. The
secretariat, which conducts the day-to-day business of the party,
will now participate directly in the formulation of the policies it
is charged with implementing. Previously only Furtseva and
Brezhnev were candidate members.
A sop to Soviet minority groups is evident
in the inclusion of a representative of each major national minor-
ity area. In addition to Kirichenko and Mukhitdinov, who repre-
sent the Ukraine and central Asia respectively, the Baltic area
is now represented by Latvian party boss Kalnberzin, the Belo-
russians by their republic first secretary, K. T. Mazurov, and
the Transcaucasian minorities by Georgian party chief Mzhava-
nadze. The Ukraine received an additional bonus in the election
of its chief of state Demyan Korotchenko. Otto Kuusinen, nom-
inally from the Baltic area, was probably included-as a sort of
elder statesman representing Finnish minorities.
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Principal members of the central committee
bureau for the RSFSR (Great Russian Republic). have also been
elevated to -.Presidium membership. They are Aristov, bureau'
deputy chairman Belya,yev� Ignatov, Kozlov, Pospelov and Kiri-
lenko. Furtseva and Koslov will represent the two major Soviet
cities, Moscow and Leningrad.
The name of M. Z. Saburov, former Gosplan
boss, was conspicuous by its absence from both the central corn-
mittee resolution and membership of the new presidium. The
newly appointed chief of Gosplan, I. I. Kuzmin, did not gain a
seat on the presidium. His first deputy, Kosygin, however, was
elected a candidate member.
PunisbAnOt UIP Auti-yarty group
The resolution warned that party members
who refused to submit in the face of these events would be dis-
ciplined further and eventually expelled altogether from the ranks.
But despite the repopted "unanimous demands" of central com-
mittee members for the expulsion from the party of the anti
party group, the resolution did not go this far, possibly because
the offenders admitted the charges "and committed themselves
to complying with the party position." Instead the resolution
concluded:
"1: To condemn as incompatible with the
Leninist principles of our party the factional activities of the
anti-party group a Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov, and
of Shepilov who joined them;
"2: To exclude Comrades Malenkov, Kagano-
vich, and Molotov from the membership of the presidium of the
central committee, and from the central committee; and to re-
move Comrade Shepilov from the post of secretary of the central
committee, and to exclude him from the alternate membership of
the presidium of the central committee, and from the central com-
mittee."
The resolution was passed by "unanimous vote...
with one abstention, in the person of Comrade Molotov."
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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