CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/11/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03002999
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: November 29, 1956

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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
SC No. 05760/56
Copy No. 1.12
DOCUMEgt NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: -----
AUTH: 1411 70-2
DAT _REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any rammer
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
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THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
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It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its security must be maintained in accordance
with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be
gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central
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29 November 1956
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CONTENTS
1. HAMMARSKJOLD'S VIEWS ON SUEZ PROBLEMS aezt-ertr"
(page 3).
2. SUEZ CANAL SITUATION.liSee (page 4).
3. THE SYRIAN SITUATION
(page 6).
4. FURTHER ISRAELI DEMOBILIZATION REPORTED
page 8).
5. AGREEMENT REACHED ON SOVIET ARMS AID TO SYRIA
(page 9).
6. PROVINCIAL RADIOS CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE HUN-
GARIAN REGIME Secfel) (page 10).
7. SOVIET TROOPS REPORTEDLY RESUME EAST GERMAN
BORDER CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY (S,...e.rtra (page 11).
8. CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY LAUDS STALINIST
HERO (C.o.uf-i-eletrtrair (page 12).
9. INDONESIAN VICE PRESIDENT CHALLENGES SUICARNO
(Coftficlentral). (page 13).
29 Nov 56
* * * *
THE TAIWAN STRAIT
(acu2fide1rtitIMage 1,4)
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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1. HAMMARSKJOLD'S VIEWS ON SUEZ PROBLEMS
UN secretary general Hammarskjold has
told American representatives that he
plans to establish the UN emergency force
in two stages--the first being the station-
ing of 1,800 men, mostly Scandinavian, at
Port Said. The second stage involves moving a force of about
44200 men to the armistice lines, "ultimately" ending up on
Israel's borders. Hammarskjold believes that a 6,000-man UN
force is needed, of which 4,2130 are now available.
On clearing the canal, Hammarskjold said
the UN would take the responsibility and underwrite any loans,
but that final payment should probably come from canal tolls.
He is optimistic about the withdrawal of British and French
troops and Egypt's consent to clearance operations beginning
the following day. He recognizes that "many people" believe
the Egyptian position on clearing the canal is unreasonable,
but feels that, as an executive of the General Assembly, he
must act in accordance with assembly directives, which gave
clear priority to troop withdrawal.
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2. SUEZ CANAL SITUATION
Statements from London and Cairo point to
the continuing possibility of incidents in
the Suez Canal zone that might lead to a
resumption of hostilities.
Stating that his demarche was made with
Nasesknowledge, an Egyptian spokesman
has emphasized to the American embassy
in Cairo the growing tension and frustra-
tion in Egypt since the cease-fire, and ex-
pressed fear of possible "rash action" by
Egyptian officials and people. He said
Nasr does not "seriously" believe the
British are planning new aggression, but
stated that Cairo had recently received
reports of new British military prepara-
tions in Libya.
The spokesman informed the embassy that
�Egypt wants a deadline established for the complete withdrawal
of Anglo-French forces. He stated that Egypt would "prefer"
the UN to set such a deadline, since an Egyptian attempt to do
so would amount to an ultimatum.
The British and French continue to with-
hold their agreement to definite arrangements for withdrawal
from Egypt. According to Secretary General Hammarskjold,
Foreign Secretary Lloyd said on 25 November that he would
announce a date for the beginning of evacuation when he is
satisfied that arrangements for the canal clearing operation
are in order.
The British, meanwhile, appear to be con-
templating moving beyond the cease-fire line either salvage
equipnwere marooned in the
canal. Britain intends to
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move salvage operations down the canal, halting only if
fired upon by the Egyptians.
British and French forces in the canal
zone remain sufficient to conduct full-scale hostilities.
British forces in Egypt as of 28 November numbered 13,300
with approximately 31,000 on Cyprus. French ground strength
currently in the canal area is believed to be approximately
6,500 with an additional 6,500 on Cyprus. JAC/FORM'
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THE SYRIAN SITUATION
Syrian, Egyptian, and other. Middle
East sources continue to be appre-
hensive over the possjhuitv nf fnrpiPTI
intervention in Syria.
there is a stronger possibility
today that fighting will be resumed
and extended to the north than there
was the day it bega'n in the Suez area!'
during the recent visit of
Turkish prime minister Menderes, to Baghdad, the govern-
ments of Iraq and Turkey made a secret agreement to work
together to bring about a change in the Syrian government
as soon as possible.
air reconnais-
sance was carried out over Syria on 24 November by �Mysteres,
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Canberras, and Sabres," looking
for Soviet aircraft,as they reconnoitered and photographed
most of the airfields in Syria.
Soviet foreign minister Shepilov said
on 28 November that he had "incontestable information" that
Britain, France and Israel intend to attack Syria, Lebanon
and other mideastern countries.
29 Nov 56
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4� FURTHER ISRAELI DEMOBILIZATION REPORTED
Israel has continued demobilization of
its forces, including both combat and
service units
Israeli strength
as seen re.0 -' . . . 'ut 100,000, in-
cluding 25,000 paramilitary personnel
who man the border settlements. This
is about half of peak strength during
hostilities in Egyp . Ten brigades remain at full strength
and 11 have been reduced to cadre strength. The latter
units can be rapidly activated, however, since a large num-
ber of requisitioned civilian vehicles and military police
units remain on duty, and Israel could remobilize fully with-
in 24 hours.
With the military threat from Egypt re-
moved for the present, Israel appears concerned primarily
with the threat to its security posed by the ultranationalist
trend in Syria and Jordan. Arab forces in Jordan, on Israel's
most vulnerable flank, have been increased to over 50,000 as
a result of deployment there of two Syrian brigades, a rein-
fnreed Trani hrirradP and a Saudi Arabian infantry reeiment.
29 Nov 56
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5. AGREEMENT REACHED ON SOVIET ARMS AID TO SYRIA
agreement
has been reached on an arms deal with
9,ussia.
the deal was reported to include "jet
aircraft, antiaircraft guns, and some administrative equip-
ment"--nrobablv communications equipment and motor vehicles.
the date of delivery in Syria has not
yet been fixed."
Comment
This is Syria's first arms deal arranged
directly with the Soviet Union. Previous
transactions were negotiated with Czechoslovakia and Poland.
the USSR
may try to send the first shipments by the end of November.
Syria originally requested "two squadrons of MIG-17 'et
fighters"--about 30 to 40 aircraft--from the USSR,.
at least
one squadron of MIG-17's may be supplied. Syria is nego-
tiating to send 15 pilots to the Soviet bloc this winter for
training in MIG-17's.
29 Nov 56
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6. PROVINCIAL RADIOS CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE
REGIME
Regional Hungarian broadcasts have re-
cently expressed views opposed to the
Kadar regime in Budapest. Radio Gyoer
has criticized the Kadar government and
specifically expressed its opposition to the regime's conduct
in the Nagy abduction. The Miskolc station has announced
the continuation of the strike and rejected the appeal by the
Budapest Central Wofkers' Council to return to work.
Comment The adoption of a hard line by Kadar on
25-26 November may foreshadow an at-
tempt to impose censorship over these provincial broadcasts.
The regime apparently has already done so in Budapest, where
similarly independent views were broadcast last week by
Radio Budapest.
Kadar's stiffer policy may have followed
talks with Soviet deputy premier Malenkov, who reportedly
has been in Budapest for the past few days. Following his
threat to hunt down "counterrevolutionaries," Kadar has ap-
parently arrested a number of Hungarians, including several
"insurgent" writers who at one time were Communists.
29 Nov 56
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7. SOVIET TROOPS REPORTEDLY RESUME EAST GERMAN
BORDNTROLRESRQNSIBILITY
The United States military mission in
Potsdam believes that Soviet personnel
have reassumed control of the East Ger-
man borders. West German officials at
East German border-crossing areas re-
ported on 26 November that Soviet troop units had reappeared
at several check points and are apparently backstopping East
German troops assigned to those areas. Except for the Soviet
control points on the autobahn between West Germany and
Berlin, the borders had been under East German control since
October 1955.
Comment Resumption of Soviet control over East
German borders at this time probably re-
flects concern in Moscow over the increased restiveness of
the East German populace and possible Western efforts to ex-
ploit it.
Reports of Soviet troop movements within
Germany during November indicate that detachments were be-
ing deployed to bolster the East German borders on the east
and possibly the west.
29 Nov 56
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CONFIVE14411171�-
8. CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY LAUDS
STALINIST HERO
Czechoslovak Communist leaders used
the 23 November anniversary of the birth
of their former chief, Klement Gottwald,
who died in 1953, to "do homage to him
and to look homeward to Stalinism;' ac-
cording to the American embassy in Prague. Although never
completely disavowed by the party leadership, Gottwald--the
party's Stalin-type strong man for over 20 years--was mildly
and reluctantly censured by the regime last spring, in line
with the over-all bloc campaign against the "cult of person-
ality�" Since then, he has been mentioned only occasionally
by regime leaders.
Gottwald was praised ostentatiously, the
embassy reports, with the reopening of the Gottwald mauso-
leum, celebrations in key cities, the unveiling of a Gottwald
monument at his birthplace in Dedice, and heavy press cov-
erage of the day's events.
Party leaders in their speeches stressed
Gottwald's insistence on Czechoslovakia's friendship with the
USSR. Politburo member Kopecky asserted that this treat-
ment of Gottwald had nothing to do with the "cult of personality;,
since the country was commemorating the anniversary of a
real revolutionary leader.
The restoration of Gottwald's reputation has
probably been desired by party leaders for some time, and it
should serve as a clear warning to any party elements in fa-
vor of increased liberalization and independence from Moscow.
The regitne fears that events in Hungary will stimulate the dis-
content evident last spring among intellectuals, students and
local party officials.WSINSIDE-NT-firLi-
29 Nov 56
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C�ONFIEDEilhf'f2tlfr
9. INDONESIAN VICE PRESIDENT CHALLENGES SUKARNO
Indonesian vice president Hatta, who will
resign on 1 December, has directly chal-
lenged President Sukarno by publicly
stating that the "assertion that our national
revolution has not yet been consummated
is wrong." The principal theme of Sukarno's political pro-
nouncements has been the necessity for "unity" in order to
"complete the national revolution!' More recently he has
added the refinements of a need for a "guided democracy"
and the abolition or at least the de-emphasis of political par-
ties.
Hatta, who is widely respected in Indonesia,
is known to have grave reservations about Sukarno's inclination
toward dictatorship and willingness to accept Communist sup-
port. His statement, which was largely devoted to a critical
analysis of the Indonesian situation, was made in the presence
of Sukarno and Prime Minister All. It points strongly to Hatta's
intention to take up an active political career following his res-
ignation. Such a step would increase the cleavage in Indonesian
politics, with Moslem parties rallying to Hatta and the National
and Communist parties supporting Sukarno.
In the recently convened Constituent Assem-
bly, voting already has been sharply drawn between the Moslem
parties and nationalist-Marxist parties. The extension of this
development to political relationships outside the assemlbly will
almost certainly have repercussions in the coalition cabinet,
possibly leading to a political crisis. (CONFIDENTIAL)
29 Nov 56
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BIWEEKLY SUMMARY
(14 November-28 November 1956)
THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Taiwan Strait Problem
There were no significant develo nts in the area
during the period. (CONF )
29 Nov 56
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v4.1101
TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION
28 NOVEMBER 1
CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND:
DESIGNATIONS
PRIMARY AIRFIELD
CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN
AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY
GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.
SECONDARY AIRFIELD
AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES
OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE.
RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN
5000 FEET..
ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIR-
CRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES
MAY BE USABLE BY JETS
INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT
OPERATIONAL
SERVICEABLE
CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED
UNKF OWN
USABILITY
MIG-15
MIG-17
TU-4
11-213
TU-2,
IL-10
LA-9/11
LI-2
ETC.
UNKNOWN
* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE
OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPER-
ATIONS AT PRESENT.
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