CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/10/04

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03000966
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
September 20, 2019
Document Release Date: 
September 26, 2019
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 4, 1955
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15722019].pdf260.97 KB
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F Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 TOP SECRET 4 October 1955 Copy No. 100 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO 2(5 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. e" Cl DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DAT LO AUTH: HR 710k DATE: 14 S. REVIEWER: 4 a Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) # Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Now, Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 TOP SECRET "row' CONTENTS I. NASR UNYIELDING ON EGYPTIAN-SOVIET BLOC ARMS DEAL (page 3). 2. FIRST SOVIET BLOC ARMS SHIPMENT ARRIVES IN EGYPT (page 4). 3. YUGOSLAVIA PROMISES GREATER CO-OPERATION IN US AID PROGRAM (page 5). 4. GREEK OPPOSITION REPORTED UNITING TO FORCE ELECTIONS (page 6). 5. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTION RETURNS (page 7). 6. LAOS PLANS COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN EVENT OF PATHET LAO ATTACKS (page 8). 7. COMMENT ON SHAKE-UP IN RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP (page 9). 4 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 �T-OP�SESCREZ 1. NASR UNYIELDING ON EGYPTIAN-SOVIET BLOC ARMS DEAL In a conversation with Assistant Secretary Allen and Ambassador Byroade on 1 October, Egyptian prime minister Nasr reiterated his determination to go through with his arms deal with the Soviet bloc. The prime minister emphasized that the agreement with Czechoslovakia was without condi- tions and that any unusual features were in 'Egypt's favor. He insisted that he was as anxious to keep communism out of Egypt as anyone and that having got rid of the British and refused to let the Americans replace them, he was not likely to let the Communists move in. Nasr again spoke at length of the threat of Israeli aggression, eventual if not immediate, as the motive for making a deal with the Soviet bloc, and said he was convinced the United States was trying to keep Egypt weak. 4 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3 �trrr)�SEreRE"-T Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 ftso' 2. FIRST SOVIET BLOC ARMS SHIPMENT ARRIVES IN EGYPT A shipload of Soviet small arms, including machine guns, arrived in Egypt on 27 September, according to information received by American offi- cials in Cairo. Another shipment in- cluding 60 "Stalin" heavy tanks is to arrive within a week. Comment � Small arms, not previously reported to be a part of Egypt's deal with the Soviet bloc, will be more immediately useful to the Egyp- tian army than the much-publicized heavy equipment and aircraft promised by Moscow. However, Egypt's acquisi- tion of heavy tanks, when made effective by training in their use, will introduce a new element into Middle East- ern military tactics, since neither the Arab states nor Israel has hitherto had equipment of this caliber, Small arms available to Egypt may filter into the hands of nationalists in French North Africa, 4 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 NNW 3. YUGOSLAVIA PROMISES GREATER CO-OPERATION IN US AID PROGRAM Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy believes that his past week's conversa- tions with Yugoslav officials have sub- stantially eliminated the difficulties which had earlier caused American officials in Belgrade to recommend the suspension of military end-item deliv- eries. The Yugoslays agreed that the American military assistance staff could contain at least 60 members�an increase of approximately 20. They also promised greater co-operation in furnishing information and allowing Ameri- can inspection of units receiving US military goods. The Yugoslays appear to need and want US economic aid even more than last year as a result of "a certain disillusionment" with their recent negotiations with the USSR. Murphy notes that aid to the Yugoslays remains a calculated risk. He believes that Yugoslav communism may become more closely associated with the Soviet bloc, but thinks Yugoslavia will not join the Comin- form or any similar organization. He comments that Tito's ambitions for playing a larger role in the Balkans make the Yugoslays a potential spearhead for some effort to disrupt the Satellites' alignment with the USSR. 4 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Ur 4. QREEK OPPOSITION REPORTED UNrriNG TO FORCE ELECTIONS The Liberal Democratic Union and the Democratic Party agreed on 28 Septem- ber to unite to oust the Greek Rally government and force new elections, This new coali- tion also decided to negotiate for the support of the Communist- dominated United Democratic Left. The combined parties' program is re- ported to include abrogation of the Greek-American base agreement, general amnesty for all Communist prisoners and suspects, "a neutralist line," and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Comment This combined group, led by former prime minister Sophocles Venizelos, represents about one third of the opposition in parliament. Most of the rest of the opposition is, however, joining in demanding new elections and is threatening to resign en masse if elections are delayed. 4 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6 =Fefl�SEeREP Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Approved for. ReleasLCt(te: 2019/09/16 C03000966 101'.wair� 5. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTION RETURNS Unofficial election returns reported through 3 October, largely from Java but including scattered counts from other areas, continued the lead of the National Party and dropped the Masjumi to fourth place. The Masjumi has been overtaken by the Nandlatul Ulama (NU), another Mos- lem party, which now holds second place, and by the Communist Party. Of the votes counted, which are be- lieved to be about three fifths of the total cast, the approx- imate percentage distribution for the four leading parties is: National Party, 33; NU, 24; Communist Party, 23; and Masjumi, 20. These percentages do not reflect the vote for minor parties, for which no tabulations are avail- able. The minor party vote, however, is unlikely to change the standing of the four major parties. If the electorate's turnout is uniformly 70 percent as estimated in areas al- ready returned, about 12 million votes have yet to be counted. The relative strength of both the National Party and the NU probably will be reduced by returns from non-Javanese areas, where both the Masjumi and the Com- munist Party are expected to pick up a greater proportion of the votes. However, there appears to be little chance that the National Party's lead will be overcome. 4 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7 TO! " SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 3LA.,n.L. NW' 6. LAOS PLANS COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN EVENT OF PATHET LAO ATTACKS The Laotian government will respond with a substantial counteroffensive if Pathet Lao attacks follow the expected breakdown of negotiations on 10 October. Both the crown prince and the prime minister are confi- dent of their army's capability of driving the Pathet Lao out of Phong Saly Province and of capturing Sam Neua town. The prince expressed his view that in the event of Viet Minh intervention in force, action by the Manila pact sig- natories would be appropriate The American embassy estimates that the royal government troops could withstand a general Pathet Lao attack if adequately supplied, but doubts they could mount a successful counteroffensive. Comment There is some indication that the Pathet Lao is planning further local action, although not yet on the scale of a general offensive. 4 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966 11)1 Jr.t�rtz Neffol Noe 7, COMMENT ON SHAKE-UP IN RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP The resumption of the post of Commu- nist Party chief by Gheorghiu-Dej, the outstanding Rumanian Communist, and his relinquishment of the premiership reflect the renewed pre-eminence of party over government which has become characteristic in the Soviet bloc since the fall of Malenkov. The shift, following shortly after Ithrushchev's visit to Bucharest, probably does not portend any significant policy changes or high-level purges in either the party or govern- ment. The simultaneous announcement that the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party Congress will be held on 23 December suggests that Gheorghiu-Dej con- siders that Soviet bloc policy and the position of the Rumanian party are now sufficiently stabilized to permit the convocation f the twice-postponed party caucus. 4 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000966