CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/10/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000965
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: October 2, 1955

Approved for Release: 2019/09/16
frr 7737. "el "111TOP SECRET
c"/2;7A(3 /174
/
3.3(h)(2)
2 October 1955
Copy No. 100
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE INC
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: __aCg-Cj-------
AUTH: HR 70
DATi
REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
V /
C03000965
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
Nale 4wir,
CONTENTS
1. EGYPT ALERTS FORCES ON ISRAELI FRONTIER
(page 3).
2. FRENCH WILL LIMIT AIR SUPPORT OF LAOTIAN
ARMY IF HOSTILITIES FLARE UP (page 4).
3. COMMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FRANCE'S UN
DELEGATION (page 5).
4. FURTHER DELAY SEEN IN MOROCCAN SETTLEMENT
DESPITE SULTAN'S DEPARTURE (page 6).
5. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTION RETURNS (page 7).
2 Oct 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
'Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
w.
1. EGYPT ALERTS FORCES ON ISRAELI FRONTIER
equipment such
stricted leaves,
"number one."
Cairo is rein-
forcing its forces in the Gaza strip
and is issuing additional military
as live grenades and barbed wire.
Egypt's military command has rer
and raised its state of readiness to
Comment Egypt's actions, which are probably
defensive in intent, spring largely
from immediate concern over Tel Aviv's delay in imple-
menting the Israeli-Egyptian agreement that both sides
withdraw from the El Auja demilitarized zone. Egypt
considers General Burns' request for
a further delay to be an inOication that Israel is maneuver-
ing to gain time to prepare for further aggressive action.
Defense Minister and Prime Minister-
designate Ben-Gurion has recently issued several blunt
statements to the effect that he would break the Egyptian
blockade of the Israeli port of Elat at the head of the Gulf
of Aqaba.
Egypt is also aware that its arms deal
with the Soviet bloc has roused strong Israeli concern and
may anticipate Israeli border action on that account.
2 Oct 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
ITT
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
rl IN rv,
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
mare vque
2. FRENCH WILL LIMIT AIR SUPPORT OF LAOTIAN
ARMY IF HOSTILITIES FLARE UP
The French High Representative in
Vientiane has told Ambassador Yost
that in the event of stepped-up hos-
tilities in northern Laos, French air-
era w e va le for use behind the lines but will
not drop troops or munitions directly into combat. The
French will take no action that might subject them to
charges of violating the Geneva accords.
The American embassy notes that
the situation could become critical any time after 11
October, the break-off date for government- Pathet Lao
negotiations, and fears that last-minute qualms in Paris
on the use of French planes might lead to fatal delays.
Comment The Laotian forces in the two northern
provinces are almost wholly depend-
ent on air supply which has been provided by French
C-47's. During a Pathet attack in July, the French re-
fused to fly in reinforcements and commercial planes
were chartered at heavy cost. Not enough of these are
immediately available for full-scale support.
In August the commander of the French
air force in the Far East reportedly stated that French air
support of the Laotian army would be withdrawn in the
event of a major conflict with the Pathets.
2 Oct 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
Approved falierea-es:7579/09/16 C03000965
*Nov ,Nre
3. COMMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FRANCE'S UN
DELEGATION
The French government's decision
to withdraw its UN delegation follow-
ing the General Assembly's vote to
debate the Algerian situation probably
sprang more from immediate domestic political reasons
than from France's long-standing objection to what it re-
gards as international interference in a strictly internal
problem. There is little likelihood that France will sever
its UN ties, and the delegation may still return to this
session of the General Assembly after the Algerian de-
bate is over.
Premier Faure was probably relieved
to have an excuse for a forceful step which will be backed
by most Frenchmen. France strongly resents foreign
criticism of its conduct in North Africa, and most non-
Communist elements can be expected to rally to Faure's
support on this issue. The premier will be the target of
some attacks on the ground that his vacillation on both
Morocco and Algeria brought on the General Assembly's
action, but most of the pressure will be directed toward
hastening an Algerian political solution entirely under
French auspices.
At the UN, the General Assembly can
probably go no further than debate on the Algerian ques-
tion, since any resolutions or recommendations require
approval by two thirds of the members present and vot-
ing. France's withdrawal from the UN subcommittee on
disarmament will have little immediate effect since the
subcommittee had already tentatively decided to recess
on 8 October until after the Geneva conference.
In Algeria, the General Assembly's
action probably will strengthen nationalist opposition to
French policy. Terrorists and rebels will probably in-
crease their activities in an effort to influence UN debate.
2 Oct 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
-T-OP-SECRE
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
Nom,
4. FURTHER DELAY SEEN IN MOROCCAN SETTLEMENT
DESPITE SULTAN'S DEPARTURE
The American embassy in Paris does
not think that Sultan Mohamed ben
rafa's departure from Rabat means
mediate institution of a council of
the throne in Morocco--the next step in the reform pro-
gram for Morocco. The embassy believes that Resident
General Latour won rightist acquiescence in Ben Arafa's
removal only by concessions on the throne council.
Comment The Moroccan nationalists will prob-
ably refuse to accept any change in
the throne council agreement reached in their conference
with Premier Faure at Aix-les-Bains in September.
American officials in Morocco estimate that the national-
ists by mid-October could again be in position for large-
scale demonstrations.
The rate at which Faure implements
the remaining provisions of the Aix-les-Bains agreements
will probably be determined by the reaction of the national-
ists. He will seek National Assembly approval of his
Moroccan program, asking for patience pending its com-
pletion and relying on the assembly's reluctance to oust
him while France's Algerian policy is under attack from
abroad.
2 Oct 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965
--
Approved for Re-lease: 2019/09/16 C03000965
Nape woo
5. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTION RETURNS
The substantial lead piled up by the
Indonesian National Party on the basis
of unofficial returns from about one
third of a total of 80,000 polling stations points to the pos-
sible re-establishment of a Communist-supported govern-
ment in Indonesia. The National Party, which has ac-
tively co-operated with the Communists since mid-1952,
assumed first place in the provisional national count as
the result of its heavy vote in Central Java. The Commu-
nists also did well in Central Java, and so far hold a
strong third place in the national count. In fourth place
is the Nandlatul Ulama, a Moslem party which is sup-
porting the present government but which supported the
National Party in the previous government.
Central Java is the home of President
Sukarno, who has largely identified himself with the National
Party. It is also a stronghold of nationalist sentiment, on
which the National Party apparently capitalized.
The Masjumi, the Moslem party which
leads the present government, had been confident of win-
ning a plurality, but held only a narrow lead before the
Central Java returns were counted. It is now running sec-
ond in the national count. Available reports do not indicate
what part of the total so far counted is from East Java,
the country's most populous district and a Moslem strong-
hold. Even if the Masjumi regains its plurality, however,
it is likely to be a small one, and its political allies, on
the basis of the present count, are polling badly.
2 Oct 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000965