CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/09/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000962
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: September 29, 1955

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29 September 1955
Copy No. 99
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
CI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE P010
AUTH: HR 7.9a2.0
DATE. Al REVIEWER:.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
for Release: 2019/09/16
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Nee' Nine
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CONTENTS
1. MOLOTOV SAYS DISARMAMENT PROGRESS DEPENDS ON
US AGREEMENT TO BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS (page 3),
2.
3. BRITISH AMBASSADOR CONVINCED DIEM WON'T YIELD
ON ELECTIONS ISSUE (page 5).
4. NASR APPEARS UNYIELDING ON EGYPTIAN-SOVIET BLOC
ARMS DEAL (page 6).
5. TANKS ARRIVING IN EGYPT REPORTED OBSOLETE
BRITISH MODELS (page 7).
6. FAURE REPORTED UNWILLING TO FORCE ISSUE ON
REMOVAL OF SULTAN (page 8).
7. PARAGUAYAN ARMY LEADERS REPORTEDLY WANT PURGE
OF GOVERNMENTS PRO-PERON ELEMENTS (page 9).
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I. MOLOTOV SAYS DISARMAMENT PROGRESS DEPENDS
ON US AGREEMENT TO BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In a conversation with the chairman of
the Canadian UN delegation on 22 Sep-
tember, Molotov reiterated that progress
on disarmament cannot be made if the
Americans refuse to agree to the aban-
donment of nuclear weapons. When the Canadian represent-
ative referred to the difficulties of control over nuclear
weapons, Molotov said indirect control is possible through
control of the "instruments of delivery." He agreed that
100-percent control would not be possible but argued that
"controls are never 100 percent. We must trust one another."
Molotov avoided a direct reply to a ques-
tion whether the USSR would accept President Eisenhower's
blueprint and aerial inspection proposals, saying that "we
are studying many proposals and they all have good features."
Soviet deputy foreign minister Kuznetsov
professed surprise at the Canadian attitude on controls, say-
ing, "You want all the details. We would prefer to set up
a general plan and then work out the details." The Canadian
representative believes the Soviet delegates have no inten-
tion of answering detailed questions on control.
Comment Molotov's remarks parallel Bulganin's
letter to the President in seeking to
focus the disarmament debate on the absence of an Ameri-
can commitment regarding the ultimate prohibition of nu-
clear weapons and the reduction of armaments. Soviet
spokesmen are insisting that it is essential to establish a
"legal basis" for the proscription of atomic weapons.
The Soviet representative on the UN
Disarmament Subcommittee has so far refused to elaborate
on the functions of the international control agency proposed
in the 10 May plan. Molotov's reference to control of the
instruments of delivery suggests that in any detailed dis-
cussion of the control question, the USSR will maintain that
"control posts" in ports, railroad junctions, highways and
airfields would provide adequate safeguards against a sur-
prise attack. This would obviate any need for aerial photog-
raphy and for according international inspectors access to
industries and installations engaged in nuclear activities.
(SECRET)
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3. BRITISH AMBASSADOR CONVINCED DIEM WON'T YIELD
ON ELECTIONS ISSUE
British ambassador Stephenson in Saigon
is convinced that Premier Diem can
never agree to nationwide elections or
to genuine consultations with the Viet
e eves the best way for Diem to gain time is
to insist that elections must first be held in South Vietnam,
Stephenson has cabled these views to
Foreign Secretary Macmillan in New York.
Comment As a cochairman of the 1954 Geneva
conference, Britain is in the difficult
position of having to go through the motions of urging Diem
to abide by the stipulations of the accord despite their in-
feasibility. The British have hoped that Diem would adopt
a more positive stand on the consultations issue, thereby
Implying his acceptance of the Geneva responsibilities and
obviating any excuse for reconvening the Geneva powers.
Diem apparently intends to announce,
sometime before the foreign ministers' meeting in October,
a plan for the election of a national assembly for South
Vietnam, possibly in December. The election would be
preceded by a referendum on Bao Dal and the formation of
a constituent assembly.
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4. NASR APPEARS UNYIELDING ON EGYPTIAN-SOVIET
BLOC ARMS DEAL
Prime Minister Nasr told Ambassador
Byroade on 26 September that the course
of American-Egyptian relations will de-
pend (1) on the general American reaction
'to the Egyptian-Soviet bloc arms deal, and (2) on whether the
United States now supplies Israel arms so that the Egyptians
remain in the same relatively defenseless position vis-a-vis
that country. If the United States gives the Israelis such
equipment, he said, he could only conclude that it had hos-
tile intentions toward him and Egypt. He wondered whether
the United States would now force the situation to the point
where the only co-operation open to him would be from the
Soviet bloc.
Nasr avoided furnishing specific data on �
the arms to be received, apparently because he feared this
information would reach Israel. He insisted, however, that
he had no desire for war, and that Egypt needed arms to pro-
tect itself should Israel attack.
Comment Nasr apparently intends to go ahead with
the arms deal. He and most Arab lead-
ers are convinced that Israel poses a direct threat to Arab
states. This conviction appears to be the basic motivation
in Nasr's determination to get major military equipment.
29 Sept 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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5. TANKS ARRIVING IN. EGYPT REPORTED OBSOLETE
BRITISH MODELS
The shipment of tanks which arrived
at Alexandria on 22 September for the
Egyptian army were sold by a Belgian
firm,
The shipment con-
sistect ot about iut.. "demilitarized and obsolete" Valentine
tanks, including four 32-ton tanks, sixteen 16-ton tanks,
and probably 80 12-ton tanks.
Comment The initial report on this shipment
stated that there were 120 tanks and
that they appeared to be German World War II models.
Valentine tanks were manufactured by the British during
World War II and are no longer being produced.
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6. FAURE REPORTED UNWILLING TO FORCE ISSUE ON
REMOVAL OF SULTAN
rotectorates Minister July believes
hat the possibility of Faure's program
or Morocco being implemented becomes
ore unlikely every day, according to
American embassy in Paris. The embassy added that
Faure appears to have refused to force the issue in the cabi-
net, and now seems to be throwing up a smoke screen by
emphasizing Algeria and other problems.
July told an embassy official on 27 Sep-
tember that Sultan Mohamed ben Arafa, who up to 24 Sep-
tember was "prepared to leave" the throne, is "no longer
amenable to leaving."
Comment Faure had earlier planned to remove
the sultan and face the National Assembly
with a fait accompli on this key point in his program. The
premier may now hope to avoid a cabinet split prior to an
assembly vote on his program and that once the assembly,
as is expected, votes its support, rightist ministers may
be deterred from an open break.
The apparent abandonment of Faure's
plan portends the speedy deterioration of the situation in
Morocco. The American consul in Rabat reports that
Resident General Boyer de Latour is opening displaying
contempt for the nationalist Istiqlal party with which Faure
consulted at Aix-les-Bains in August and that he is even
taking positive steps to make any French-nationalist con-
ciliation impossible. Other French officials declare the
French are prepared for a showdown with the nationalists,
and settler "commando" groups
The
Moroccans, meanwhile, have started city-wide strikes in
Marrakech and Fez, and this strike movement can be ex-
pected to spread.
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1171
7. PARAGUAYAN ARMY LEADERS REPORTEDLY WANT
PURGE OF GOVERNMENT'S PRO-PERON ELEMENTS
Paraguayan army leaders are reported
pressing President Stroessner to keep
Argentine ex-president Peron's asylum
in Paraguay brief and to purge the gov-
ernment of pro-Peron factions, expecially Central Bank
president Mendez Fleitas and Minister of IntericT Romero
Pereira. Stroessner
agrees that a purge may be necessary but states that he
prefers to wait a few months. The army is not satisfied
with waiting this long.
Comment The Paraguayan government has been
unstable since Stroessner came to
power in the May 1954 revolution. This instability has
been caused primarily by the fact that no single person
or group has had the allegiance of the army, long the key
to control of the country.
Several times in the past year army
leaders have unsuccessfully objected to Stroessner's
co-operation with Mendez, who has ties with Communists
as well as with Peron. Until a few months ago, at least,
the president believed an open break with Mendez would
precipitate civil war, since Mendez had successfully cul-
tivated many of the junior officers, and his friend Romero
Pereira controls the police.
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