CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/09/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000961
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: September 28, 1955

rip7/0,7 s/proved for Release: 2019/09/16
P SECRET
/
"
� /�/
/ /
/ SEC.RET
'Approved for Release: 2019/09/16
co ;;11 ,7y//z/zfy/4
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c) ////
/
10009, ###A
28 September 1955
Copy No. 99
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANOE IN CLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO; TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: I
AUTH: HA 70-2
DATE:
41.�
VIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
Nov' Nome
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
I lit OJC.L11.1:4 I
CONTENTS
1. SOVIET OFFICIALS DISCUSS PRESIDENTS BLUEPRINT
PROPOSAL (page 3).
2. MOSCOW AGAIN URGES IRAN NOT TO JOIN BAGHDAD
PACT (page 4).
3. ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH KOREA IN-
TENSIFIED (page 5).
4. INTERNAL CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC DISPUTES
REPORTEDLY THREATEN SEGNI GOVERNMENT (page 6).
28 Sept 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
rrn rary n
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
-
1. SOVIET OFFICIALS DISCUSS PRESIDENT'S BLUEPRINT
PROPOSAL
An adviser to the Soviet representative
on the UN Disarmament Subcommittee
told American officials on 23 September
that the USSR did not reject President
Eisenhower's Geneva "blueprint" and
aerial flight proposals and said "our attitude is positive!'
He used passages from Molotov's speech beforp the UN
General Assembly to illustrate that the USSR was still
earnestly studying the proposals, but indicated that the
USSR would like to have more details on how the plan would
operate.
The Soviet official also indicated that
while he could understand why the United States was re-
serving its position regarding the abolition of nuclear weap-
ons, the USSR was disturbed by the American reservation
regarding conventional force levels. He insisted that the
United States intended to revise these upward.
Soviet officials present at the meeting
denied that the USSR was principally concerned with force
levels and bases and declared that establishing a "legal
basis" for the proscription of atomic weapons was still
the important thing. In arguing that adoption of the Soviet
10 May inspection plan was necessary to guard against
concentration of forces, one Soviet spokesman contended
that a surprise blow could never be decisive, either now
or in 100 years.
Comment These remarks appear to indicate a more
favorable attitude toward some form of
President Eisenhower's proposals than Bulganin's letter, which
only stated that they were still under consideration. Bulganin's
strongest criticism of the President's proposals was that they
failed to meet the main problem of ending the arms race be-
cause they did not include reduction of either conventional
forces or atomic weapons.
The Soviet leaders have consistently de-
fended their 10 May proposals regarding "control posts" by
contending that modern war, including the necessary follow-
up to any surprise blow, requires drawing into action armies
of many millions and enormous quantities of equipment.
28 Sept 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
71f) p Cr'-r"
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
NNW'
2. MOSCOW AGAIN URGES IRAN NOT TO JOIN BAGHDAD
PACT
Comment
Soviet ambassador
Lavrentiev's demarche to the Shah on 8 September and were
timed to counter the effect of the Turkish president's recent
visit to Iran. Iranian foreign minister Entezarn told Ambas-
sador Chapin on 26 September that the Shah was not particu-
larly concerned at this veiled threat.
The Soviet Union is able to bring severe
economic pressure on Iran as required in order to influence
the Shah on this question, but Moscow would probably prefer
to avoid any act which could endanger the Soviet program to
encourage "neutralism" among the other Middle Eastern
states.
28 Sept 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
Tru) errprPr
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
3. ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH KOREA
INTENSIFIED
President Rhee appears to be making
a deliberate effort to promote Korean
slspicion and dislike of the United
States, according to Ambassador Lacy
in Seoul� This is suggested by recent bitter attacks by
Korean officials who have used "lies and innuendos" in
misrepresenting American policies.
Recent charges include allegations
that the United States intends to wreck the South Korean
economy, that American businessmen are "carpetbaggers
and smugglers," that a secret American agreement exists
which would eventually return Korea to Japanese domina-
tion, and that the United States is prepared to barter
Korean independence for a momentary relaxation of world
tension.
Comment These attacks reflect an attempt by
Rhee to force the United States to sub-
stitute Rhee's objectives in Korea for its own. Rhee's ex-
ploitation of strong Korean nationalist feelings has brought
about a deterioration of American prestige. One conse-
quence is a growina threat to the position of pro-American
Korean officials.
28 Sept 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
rre-rr t rye-. re,
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961
L.P41..a�-.4 Le I
1, gir
4. INTERNAL CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC DISPUTES
REPORTEDLY THREATEN SEGNI GOVERNMENT
The intraparty maneuvers of Italian
Christian Democratic secretary
Amintore Fanfani against Premier
Segni may bring about the fall of his
government
Fanfani is allegedly using various
domestic issues, such as the establishment of a consti-
tutional court, land tenure pacts, and the reform of
state-owned industries, to create difficulties for Segni.
Segni reportedly threatened to resign over these intrigues
at the 15 September meeting of his party's national coun-
cil.
Meanwhile, President Gronchi is re-
ported to look forward to the possible fall of Segni, since
this would open the way to the premiership for Budget
Minister Vanoni.
Comment Intrigue by Gronchi contributed to the
downfall of the Scelba government last
June. Gronchi favors a single-party Christian Democratic
government with parliamentary support from the Nenni
Socialists on domestic issues and Fanfani would probably
go along. The candidacy of Vanoni seems to find favor
with both Gronchi. and Fanfani.
28 Sept 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000961